Dist. 19, Dubia
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 19
## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.
Dub. I.
In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: In primo statu fuit corpus hominis animale. Animale enim denominatur ab anima, ergo omne corpus habens animam potest et debet dici animale; sed corpus gloriosum est huiusmodi: ergo animale dici potest. Qualiter ergo dividitur animale contra spirituale? Si tu dicas, quod anima nominat ibi vitam carnalem, sicut dicitur Ioannis duodecimo1: Qui amat animam suam perdet eam; sed tali modo vivere est reprehensibile: ergo videtur, quod tale corpus non competeret statui innocentiae.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod nomen generis aliquando appropriatur ei quod pro sui incompletione vel imperfectione non addit nomen speciale2; unde, sicut animal appropriatur bestiis, et dicuntur bestiae esse animalia, sic animale, dictum ab anima, appropriatur quodam modo his quae habent animam cibativam. Et ideo voluit Augustinus appellare corpus animale, id est corpus alimoniis egens; et iste modus dicendi attenditur, secundum quod animale venit ab anima. Et patet responsio ad obiecta. — Alia solutio. Alio modo posset dici, licet minus proprie, quod animale veniret ab hoc, quod est animal; et cum animal approprietur bestiis, diceretur corpus animale3, id est bestiis simile. Erat autem Adam in sua conditione, quantum ad corpus, consimilis bestiis in hoc, quod indigebat refici cibis; quantum ad mentem vero erat in honore et bestiis dissimilis. Sed quia, cum in honore esset, non intellexit, immo peccavit; ideo comparatus est iumentis insipientibus et similis factus est illis4, ut non solum ipse et eius posteri bestiis essent similes indigentia cibi, sed etiam in bestialitate et appetitu mentis. Et sic patet, pro quanto dicitur Adam habuisse corpus animale, et quomodo dividitur contra spirituale.
Dub. II.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Quod habebat corpus mortale et immortale. Cum enim mortale et immortale sint opposita, videtur, quod duo opposita simul et semel inessent eidem5. — Item, animal essentiali divisione dividitur per mortale et immortale, sicut per rationale et irrationale. Si ergo impossibile est, animal simul et semel esse rationale et irrationale, impossibile est, esse mortale et immortale.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod immortale dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo, prout privat actum et aptitudinem moriendi; et sic dicitur immortale
Notandum, quod non est potens mori; et hoc modo directe opponitur ei quod est mortale, et impossibile est esse circa idem. Alio modo, prout privat actum solum; et tunc dicitur immortale, id est potens non mori; et hoc modo mortale et immortale non habent oppositionem, quoniam « potentiae rationales et illae quae rationalibus subiiciuntur, sunt ad opposita6 »; et ideo, licet actus sint oppositi, potentiae tamen non sunt oppositae. — Et sic patet responsio ad illa obiecta; procedunt enim, secundum quod immortale privat potentiam. Et si tu obiicias, quod « potentiae distinguuntur per actus7 », et ita, si actus sunt oppositi, et potentiae similiter; dicendum, quod Notandum. illud habet locum in potentiis naturalibus puris; vel si in aliis potentiis locum habet, intelligitur de actu, qui circumplectitur totam potentiam. Cum autem potentia est ad opposita, unus illorum actuum potentiam totam non circumplectitur8.
Dub. III.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod post peccatum corpus factum est mortuum. Mortuum enim et vivum opponuntur privative: ergo si corpus Adae post peccatum vivebat, falsum est dicere, quod mortuum erat. Si tu dicas, hoc esse dictum, quia necessitati moriendi erat adstrictum; pari ratione, cum haberet necessitatem ad putrefactionem, deberet dici, corpus Adae esse putrefactum.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Augustinus in decimo tertio libro de Civitate Dei9, mortuum potest esse nomen vel participium. Secundum quod est participium, sic significat, mortem infuisse, quia est participium praeteriti temporis; et tunc dicitur esse aliquis mortuus, in quo mors prius fuit. Secundum autem quod est nomen, sic denominat aliquem non solum a morte, quae infuit, sed etiam a morte, quae inest, sicut dicitur aliquis albus ab albedine, quae inest. Et quoniam mors nihil aliud dicit quam tendentiam ad non-esse, et homo continue ad non-esse tendit post lapsum; hinc est, quod continue est in morte, et ideo continue potest dici mortuus. Et ideo dicit Apostolus10, quod corpus mortuum est propter peccatum.
Quod ergo obiicitur, quod mortuum et vivum opponuntur; dicendum, quod verum est, secundum quod mortuum simpliciter privat vivum, hoc est, secundum quod dicit actualem separationem sive terminum corruptionis. Quando autem dicit ordinem ad illum terminum, non opponitur de se, sed ratione eius, ad quod ordinat, quia ordinat ad oppositum vitae; et sic simul possunt stare, immo necesse est, simul esse cum vita praesenti. Et ideo signanter participium huius verbi morior est anomalum11 nec tenet formationem aliorum participiorum praeteriti temporis, sicut dicit Augustinus.
Dub. IV.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Sumeret de ligno vitae, quo perfecte immortalis factus, cibi alimenta ulterius non requireret. Contra hoc est: quod est corruptibile non potest dare incorruptionem; sed fructus illius ligni vitae erat corruptibilis; aliter non posset manducari et digeri: ergo non poterat homini praebere perfectam immortalitatem. — Item, aut ille fructus convertebatur in corpus humanum, aut non. Si non: ergo non reficiebat nec sustentabat; si sic: ergo erat eiusdem naturae cum carne reliqua: ergo videtur, quod immortalitatem praestare non poterat.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod illud lignum vitae dicitur ab Augustino12 potuisse praestare perfectam immortalitatem, non quia propria virtute posset Notandum. corpus hominis facere incorruptibile, cum hoc sit solius potentiae divinae; sed quia virtute sibi data habebat ad hoc disponere, et divina virtus illi ligno tanquam sacramento assisteret, quae immortalitatem perficeret. — Et quod lignum vitae hanc posset habere virtutem, ut ad immortalitatem disponeret, satis patet in multis similibus. Multa enim sunt aromata, ut myrrha et balsamus, quae corpus hominis diu a putrefactione conservant. Quod vero ratione divinae virtutis assistentis diceretur corporibus illis immortalitatem praebere, simile habetur in Sacramentis, quae dicuntur conferre gratiam, quamvis non ipsam gratiam creent, sed divina virtus ipsis assistens, sicut melius in quarto libro13 explicari habet. Sic et in proposito intelligendum est, cum lignum vitae esset primis hominibus in Sacramentum, sicut dicit Augustinus14.
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## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE LETTER OF THE MASTER.
Doubt I.
In this part there are doubts concerning the letter, and first there is inquiry concerning what he says: In the first state the body of man was animal. For animal takes its name from soul (anima); therefore every body having a soul can and ought to be called animal; but the glorious body is of this kind: therefore it can be called animal. How then is animal divided against spiritual? If you say that soul there names carnal life, as it is said in John chapter twelve1: He who loves his soul will lose it; but to live in such a manner is reprehensible: therefore it seems that such a body would not befit the state of innocence.
I respond: It must be said that a generic name is sometimes appropriated to that which, on account of its incompleteness or imperfection, does not add a special name2; whence, just as animal is appropriated to beasts, and beasts are called animals, so animale, named from soul, is appropriated in a certain manner to those which have a nutritive soul. And therefore Augustine wished to call the body animale, that is, a body needing nourishment; and this mode of speaking is taken according as animale comes from soul. And the response to the objections is plain. — Another solution. In another way it could be said, though less properly, that animale would come from this, that it is an animal; and since animal is appropriated to beasts, the body would be called animale3, that is, like the beasts. Now Adam in his condition was, as to body, like the beasts in this, that he needed to be refreshed with foods; but as to mind he was in honour and unlike the beasts. But because, being in honour, he did not understand, but rather sinned; therefore he is compared to the senseless beasts and is become like to them4, so that not only he and his posterity should be like the beasts in their need of food, but also in bestiality and in the appetite of mind. And thus it is plain in what sense Adam is said to have had an animal body, and how it is divided against spiritual.
Doubt II.
Likewise there is inquiry concerning what he says: That he had a body mortal and immortal. For since mortal and immortal are opposites, it seems that two opposites would be in the same thing simultaneously and at once5. — Likewise, animal is divided by essential division into mortal and immortal, just as into rational and irrational. If therefore it is impossible that an animal be at one and the same time rational and irrational, it is impossible that it be mortal and immortal.
I respond: It must be said that immortal is said in two ways. In one way, as it deprives [a thing] of the act and aptitude of dying; and so it is called immortal
Note, which is not capable of dying; and in this way it is directly opposed to that which is mortal, and it is impossible [for both] to be about the same thing. In another way, as it deprives [a thing] only of the act; and then it is called immortal, that is, capable of not dying; and in this way mortal and immortal do not have opposition, since "rational potencies, and those which are subjected to rational ones, are towards opposites6"; and therefore, although the acts are opposed, the potencies nevertheless are not opposed. — And thus the response to those objections is plain; for they proceed according as immortal deprives of potency. And if you object that "potencies are distinguished through acts7", and so, if the acts are opposed, the potencies likewise are; it must be said that Note. this holds in pure natural potencies; or if it holds in other potencies, it is understood of an act which encompasses the whole potency. But when a potency is towards opposites, one of those acts does not encompass the whole potency8.
Doubt III.
Likewise there is inquiry concerning what he says, that after sin the body became dead. For dead and living are opposed privatively: therefore if Adam's body was living after sin, it is false to say that it was dead. If you say this was said because it was bound by the necessity of dying; by parity of reason, since it had the necessity of putrefaction, it ought to be said that Adam's body was putrefied.
I respond: It must be said that, as Augustine says in the thirteenth book On the City of God9, mortuum (dead) can be either a noun or a participle. According as it is a participle, it signifies that death has been in [the subject], because it is the participle of past time; and then one is said to be dead in whom death previously was. But according as it is a noun, it so designates someone not only from death which was in him, but also from death which is in him, just as someone is said to be white from whiteness which is in him. And since death says nothing other than a tendency toward non-being, and man continually tends toward non-being after the lapse; hence it is that he is continually in death, and therefore can continually be called dead. And therefore the Apostle says10, that the body is dead on account of sin.
What is objected, then, that dead and living are opposed, must be answered: it is true according as dead simply deprives [a thing] of living, that is, according as it bespeaks an actual separation or the terminus of corruption. But when it speaks of an order to that terminus, it is not opposed of itself, but by reason of that to which it orders, since it orders to the opposite of life; and thus they can stand together, indeed it is necessary, that they be together with present life. And therefore the participle of this verb morior is significantly anomalous11 and does not keep the formation of the other participles of past time, as Augustine says.
Doubt IV.
Likewise there is inquiry concerning what he says: He would take of the tree of life, by which, made perfectly immortal, he would no longer require food for nourishment. Against this is: that which is corruptible cannot give incorruption; but the fruit of that tree of life was corruptible; otherwise it could not be eaten and digested: therefore it could not afford perfect immortality to man. — Likewise, either that fruit was converted into the human body, or not. If not: therefore it did not refresh nor sustain; if so: therefore it was of the same nature with the rest of the flesh: therefore it seems that it could not bestow immortality.
I respond: It must be said that that tree of life is said by Augustine12 to have been able to bestow perfect immortality, not because by its own power it could Note. make the body of man incorruptible, since this belongs to divine power alone; but because by the power given to it, it had the capacity to dispose to this, and divine power would assist that tree as a sacrament, [a power] which would perfect immortality. — And that the tree of life could have this power, namely to dispose to immortality, is sufficiently plain in many similar cases. For there are many aromatic substances, like myrrh and balsam, which preserve the body of man long from putrefaction. But that they would be said to bestow immortality on those bodies by reason of the assisting divine power, the like is found in the Sacraments, which are said to confer grace, although they do not themselves create grace, but the divine power assisting them does, as is better explained in the fourth book13. So too in the present matter it is to be understood, since the tree of life was for the first men a Sacrament, as Augustine says14.
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- Vers. 25.Verse 25.
- Sive cui propter sui incompletionem vel imperfectionem non datur nomen speciale. — Pro incompletione vel imperfectione cod. T a secunda manu completione vel perfectione; cod. aa quod per sui completionem vel perfectionem. Proxime post in Vat. et edd. 3, 4 desiderantur verba: appropriatur bestiis... dictum ab anima.Or [to that] to which, on account of its incompleteness or imperfection, no special name is given. — For incompletione vel imperfectione codex T by a second hand reads completione vel perfectione; codex aa which through its completeness or perfection. Immediately after in the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 the words are missing: appropriatur bestiis... dictum ab anima.
- Cod. cc et ed. 1 corpus eius animale. Mox cod. O ante conditione adiicit prima.Codex cc and edition 1 read corpus eius animale. Shortly after, codex O before conditione adds prima.
- Psalm. 48, 13. — De hoc dubio cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 82. m. 2. seq.; B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 13. q. 78; S. Thom., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. 2. et 3. lit.Psalm 48:13. — On this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II q. 82 m. 2 ff.; B. Albert, Summa p. II tr. 13 q. 78; S. Thomas, here on the letter; Aegidius Romanus, here doubt 2 and 3 on the letter.
- Quod est impossibile; de quo cfr. supra pag. 100, nota 1. — De ratione seq. cfr. Aristot., IV. Topic. c. 2, ubi haec: Differentia est animalis immortale, eo quod animalium alia mortalia, alia immortalia. Cfr. et Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Differentia.Which is impossible; on which cf. above p. 100, note 1. — On the following reasoning cf. Aristotle, Topics IV c. 2, where these words: A differentia of animal is "immortal," because of animals some are mortal, others immortal. Cf. also Porphyry, On the Predicables, chapter on Differentia.
- Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 3. et 10. (VIII. c. 2. et 5.).Aristotle, Metaphysics IX text 3 and 10 (VIII c. 2 and 5).
- Secundum Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 33. (c. 4.). — Cod. S. addit et actus per obiecta.According to Aristotle, On the Soul II text 33 (c. 4). — Codex S adds and acts through their objects.
- Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 88. m. 4; Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. 2. lit.Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II q. 88 m. 4; Petrus a Tarantasia, Richard of Mediavilla, here on the letter; Aegidius Romanus, here doubt 2 on the letter.
- Cap. 11. n. 2.Chapter 11 n. 2.
- Rom. 8, 10.Romans 8:10.
- Graece ἀνώμαλον i. e. inaequale sive irregulare. De anomalia grammatici agunt et quidem illa verba vocant anomala, quae inaequaliter sive irregulariter declinantur vel coniugantur, quorum contraria analoga nominantur. — Verba August., quae hic respiciuntur, exstant XIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 11. n. 2, et sic sonant: Ab eo quod est oritur, fit verbum praeteriti temporis: ortus est; et si qua similia sunt, per temporis praeteriti participia declinantur. Ab eo vero quod est moritur, si quaeramus praeteriti temporis verbum, responderi adsolet: mortuus est, U littera geminata. Sic enim dicitur mortuus, quomodo fatuus, arduus, conspicuus, et si qua similia, quae non sunt praeteriti temporis, sed quoniam nomina sunt, sine tempore declinantur. Illud autem quasi ut declinetur, quod declinari non potest, pro participio praeteriti temporis ponitur nomen. — De hoc dubio cfr. S. Thom., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., hic circa lit., Aegid. R., hic dub. 1. et 6. lit.In Greek ἀνώμαλον, i.e. unequal or irregular. Grammarians treat of anomaly, and they call those verbs anomalous which are declined or conjugated unequally or irregularly, whose contraries are named analogous. — The words of Augustine which are looked to here are found in XIII de Civ. Dei, c. 11 n. 2, and run thus: From est (is) arises the past-tense verb: ortus est; and if there are any similar, they are declined through participles of past time. But from moritur, if we seek a past-tense verb, the customary answer is: mortuus est, with the letter U doubled. For mortuus is said in the way that fatuus, arduus, conspicuus, and such similar words are said, which are not of past time, but since they are nouns, are declined without time. But that, as it were, this be declined which cannot be declined, in place of the past-tense participle a noun is put. — On this doubt cf. S. Thomas, Petrus a Tarantasia, Richard of Mediavilla, here on the letter, Aegidius Romanus, here doubts 1 and 6 on the letter.
- Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 5. et 6.See here the letter of the Master, c. 5 and 6.
- Dist. I. p. I. a. 1. q. 4. — Pro divina virtus ipsis assistens cod. O divina virtus existens in ipsis.Distinction I p. I a. 1 q. 4. — For the divine power assisting them codex O reads the divine power existing in them.
- Libr. VIII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 4. n. 8: Erat ei ergo in lignis ceteris alimentum, in illo autem Sacramentum. — Cfr. supra a. 2. q. 2. et a. 3. q. 1; Aegid. R., hic dub. 7. lit.Book VIII de Genesi ad litteram c. 4 n. 8: In the other trees, therefore, there was for him food; but in that one, a Sacrament. — Cf. above a. 2 q. 2 and a. 3 q. 1; Aegidius Romanus, here doubt 7 on the letter. ---