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Dist. 19, Art. 3, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 19

Textus Latinus
p. 471

Quaestio II. Utrum immortalitas innocentiae eadem per essentiam fuisset cum immortalitate gloriae.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum eadem esset immortalitas innocentiae per essentiam cum immortalitate gloriae, si homo stetisset. Et quod sic, videtur.

Ad oppositum. 1. Augustinus de Vera Religione1: «Per Christum recuperamus, quod perdidimus in Adam»: ergo illam immortalitatem, quam in Adam perdidimus, per Christum recuperamus; sed illa immortalitas, quam recuperamus per Christum, est immortalitas gloriosa: ergo etc.

2. Item, potentia materiae disposita est eadem per essentiam cum se ipsa indisposita2; sed immortalitas innocentiae et immortalitas gloriae sic se habent, sicut potentia indifferens et potentia disposita dispositione, quae est necessitas, cum in statu innocentiae poterat mori et non mori, in statu gloriae necesse habeat non mori, ergo etc.

3. Item, liberum arbitrium confirmatum et non confirmatum est idem per essentiam3, similiter et caritas: ergo pari ratione et immortalitas; sed sic se habent haec immortalitas et illa: ergo etc.

4. Item, mortalitas in statu innocentiae non est alia a mortalitate in statu miseriae, quia non est post peccatum data nova potentia nec ablata: ergo pari ratione in statu innocentiae et statu gloriae non est alia et alia immortalitas.

5. Item, si homo stetisset, transferretur ad immortalitatem, ita quod nullius proprietatis nobilis in eo fieret deperditio: ergo cum immortalitas in homine diceret conditionem nobilem, si transferretur4, illa immortalitas non amitteretur; sed non sunt in eodem homine duae immortalitates simul et semel: ergo immortalitas innocentiae et immortalitas gloriae non differunt.

Sed Contra:

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Fundamenta. 1. Quod habet aliud et aliud principium proximum, differens per essentiam, est differens per essentiam5; sed immortalitas in statu innocentiae et in statu gloriae habent aliud et aliud principium differens per essentiam, quia illa est a gloria, ista est a gratia gratis data: ergo differunt per essentiam.

2. Item, non est transitus ab eodem in idem6; sed transitus esset ab immortalitate innocentiae ad immortalitatem gloriae: ergo illa immortalitas et ista non sunt eadem.

3. Item, quorum opposita sunt diversa, ipsa sunt diversa7: sed immortalitas status innocentiae non opponitur mortalitati, cum simul inessent eidem — Adam enim et mortalis erat et immortalis — sed immortalitas gloriae opponitur illi: ergo non est eadem cum illa immortalitate.

4. Item, licet vita Adae esset una et continua, si stetisset in via et patria, status tamen vitae et conditio esset alia et alia, quia conditio animalitatis et spiritualitatis non habent identitatem, sed potius oppositionem et diversitatem: ergo cum immortalitas non dicat solum vitam, sed potius conditionem vitae secundum statum animalem et spiritualem8, videtur, quod immortalitas sit alia et alia.

5. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per illud quod dicitur in littera9: «Alia est immortalitas, quam amisimus, alia, quam in resurrectione speramus». Ex hac auctoritate expresse colligitur, quod alia sit immortalitas viae, et alia patriae.

Conclusio. Immortalitas hominis in statu innocentiae et gloriae eadem est quoad potentiam, differens dispositione.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod cum idem sit significatum in principali et sumto10 sive in abstracto et concreto, idem est significatum huius quod est immortale, et eius quod est immortalitas. Immortale autem dicitur quod est aptum natum sive potens non mori; immortalitas igitur idem est quod potentia sive aptitudo ad non moriendum. Et haec potentia ad non moriendum non est aliud quam potentia animae in regendo et continuando corpus, ut numquam deficiat nec ab ea separetur. Haec autem potentia consequitur ipsum liberum arbitrium et ei conformatur. Unde sicut in statu innocentiae homo poterat peccare et non peccare, sic anima poterat corpus continere et non continere11, et homo poterat mori et non mori. Quia vero in statu gloriae impossibile est, liberum arbitrium peccare, impossibile est etiam, animam corpus deserere. Et quia in statu miseriae necesse habet peccare et aliquando in peccato esse, saltem in sua origine; ideo impossibile est, animam corpori vitam12 continuare. — Quemadmodum igitur ipsius liberi arbitrii potentia in statu innocentiae et gloriae est eadem per essentiam, differens solum secundum statum et dispositionem superadditam; sic illa potentia continuandi et regendi corpus, quae dicitur immortalitas, per essentiam est eadem, differens sola superaddita dispositione. — Et ideo, cum quaeritur, utrum immortalitas innocentiae et gloriae, sive viae et patriae, esset eadem, responderi potest, quod eadem est quantum ad potentiam13, sed alia quantum ad dispositionem superadditam; vel, ut proprius dicamus, una et eadem est, sed altera sive alterata, sicut Coriscus albus et niger idem est, sed alteratus14. — Et ideo concedendae sunt rationes ostendentes, quod haec immortalitas et illa per essentiam essent una. Ad rationes ad oppositum facile est respondere.

Solutio oppositorum. 1. Nam ad illud quod primo obiicit, quod principium proximum huius immortalitatis et illius est aliud et aliud; plana est responsio, quia principium praecipuum, scilicet potentia contentiva est

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una et eadem, licet sit aliter et aliter disposita, hinc gratia, inde vero gloria.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non est transitus ab eodem in idem; dicendum, quod transitus ab hac immortalitate ad illam est per diversificationem statuum, quia est transitus a statu in statum; et ideo, sicut quod movetur a statu imperfectionis ad statum perfectionis non dicitur aliud et aliud, sed status dicitur alius et alius; sic in proposito intelligendum.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod habent diversa opposita; dicendum, quod illa diversitas oppositionis venit ex ratione superadditae dispositionis, sicut intelligitur in libertate arbitrii, quae est libertas a coactione et a culpa et a miseria. Libertas enim a culpa superaddit aliquam dispositionem, scilicet gratiam; libertas autem a miseria superaddit aliam dispositionem, scilicet vel innocentiam, vel gloriam, ratione quarum dispositionum habet opponi diversis15. Sic et immortalitas gloriae superaddit ultra immortalitatem innocentiae, sicut dispositio, quae est necessitas, supra dispositionem, quae est congruitas.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod immortalitas dicit conditionem vitae sive statum; dicendum, quod verum est, sed non principaliter; immo principalius dicit potentiam corporis contentivam, sicut praedictum est; et ideo ratio illa non cogit.

5. Ad ultimum, scilicet ad auctoritatem Magistri, iam patet responsio. Quod enim dicitur, quod sit alia et alia, aut intelligitur hoc esse dictum, quia est altera et altera, aut intelligitur esse alia et alia, non quantum ad ipsam potentiam, quam principaliter importat ipsa immortalitas, sed quantum ad dispositionem superadditam. Et sic patet responsio ad quaesita16.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether the immortality of innocence would have been the same in essence as the immortality of glory.

Secondly it is asked whether the immortality of innocence would be the same in essence as the immortality of glory, had man stood firm. And that it would be so, seems clear.

To the opposite. 1. Augustine, On True Religion1: «Through Christ we recover what we lost in Adam»: therefore that immortality which we lost in Adam, we recover through Christ; but that immortality which we recover through Christ is the immortality of glory: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the potency of matter when disposed is the same in essence as itself when undisposed2; but the immortality of innocence and the immortality of glory are related as an undetermined potency and a potency disposed by the disposition which is necessity, since in the state of innocence one could die and not die, while in the state of glory one must necessarily not die; therefore etc.

3. Likewise, free choice confirmed and not confirmed is the same in essence3, and so likewise charity: therefore by parity of reason also immortality; but this immortality and that are so related: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, mortality in the state of innocence is no other than mortality in the state of misery, since after sin no new potency has been given or taken away: therefore by parity of reason, in the state of innocence and the state of glory there is not one and another immortality.

5. Likewise, had man stood firm, he would have been translated to immortality in such a way that no loss of any noble property would occur in him: therefore since immortality in man would express a noble condition, if he were translated4, that immortality would not be lost; but two immortalities are not in the same man together and at once: therefore the immortality of innocence and the immortality of glory do not differ.

On the contrary:

Fundamenta. 1. What has different proximate principles, differing in essence, is itself different in essence5; but immortality in the state of innocence and in the state of glory have different principles differing in essence, since the one is from glory, the other is from grace freely given: therefore they differ in essence.

2. Likewise, there is no passage from the same to the same6; but there would be a passage from the immortality of innocence to the immortality of glory: therefore that immortality and this are not the same.

3. Likewise, things whose opposites are diverse are themselves diverse7: but the immortality of the state of innocence is not opposed to mortality, since they were both present in the same person — for Adam was both mortal and immortal — whereas the immortality of glory is opposed to it: therefore it is not the same as that immortality.

4. Likewise, although Adam's life would have been one and continuous had he stood firm both in the way and in the fatherland, yet the state of life and its condition would have been one and another, since the condition of animality and of spirituality do not have identity but rather opposition and diversity: therefore since immortality does not signify only life but rather the condition of life according to the animal and spiritual state8, it seems that immortality is one and another.

5. Likewise, this same thing seems to be shown by what is said in the letter9: «One immortality is that which we lost, another that which we hope for in the resurrection». From this authority it is expressly gathered that the immortality of the way is one, and that of the fatherland another.

Conclusion. The immortality of man in the state of innocence and in glory is the same with respect to potency, differing by disposition.

I respond: For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that, since the same thing is signified in the principal and the assumed10, that is, in the abstract and the concrete, the same thing is signified by «immortal» and by «immortality». For «immortal» means that which is by nature apt or able not to die; therefore «immortality» is the same as the potency or aptitude of not dying. And this potency of not dying is nothing other than the potency of the soul in ruling and sustaining the body, so that it never fails nor is separated from it. Now this potency follows upon free choice itself and is conformed to it. Hence just as in the state of innocence man could sin and not sin, so the soul could contain the body and not contain it11, and man could die and not die. But since in the state of glory it is impossible for free choice to sin, it is also impossible for the soul to desert the body. And since in the state of misery it must of necessity sin and at some point be in sin, at least in its origin; therefore it is impossible for the soul to continue life12 to the body. — Therefore, just as the potency itself of free choice in the state of innocence and glory is the same in essence, differing only according to state and superadded disposition; so that potency of sustaining and ruling the body, which is called immortality, is the same in essence, differing only by a superadded disposition. — And therefore, when it is asked whether the immortality of innocence and of glory, or of the way and of the fatherland, would be the same, it can be answered that it is the same with respect to potency13, but other with respect to the superadded disposition; or, that we may speak more properly, it is one and the same, but altered or made altered, just as Coriscus white and Coriscus black are the same, but altered14. — And therefore the arguments showing that this immortality and that would be one in essence are to be granted. To the arguments to the opposite it is easy to respond.

Solution of the opposites. 1. For to the first objection, that the proximate principle of this immortality and of that is one and another; the response is plain, because the chief principle, namely the containing potency, is one and the same, although disposed in different ways, here by grace, there by glory.

2. To the objection that there is no passage from the same to the same; it must be said that the passage from this immortality to that is by a diversification of states, since it is a passage from state to state; and therefore, just as what is moved from a state of imperfection to a state of perfection is not called one and another, but the state is called one and another; so it must be understood in the matter at hand.

3. To the objection that they have diverse opposites; it must be said that this diversity of opposition comes from the account of a superadded disposition, just as is understood in the freedom of choice, which is freedom from coercion and from fault and from misery. For freedom from fault adds some disposition, namely grace; while freedom from misery adds another disposition, namely either innocence or glory, by reason of which dispositions it is opposed to diverse things15. So too the immortality of glory adds something beyond the immortality of innocence, as the disposition which is necessity over the disposition which is congruity.

4. To the objection that immortality signifies a condition of life or a state; it must be said that this is true, but not principally; rather, it more principally signifies the containing potency of the body, as has been said; and therefore that argument does not compel.

5. To the last, namely to the authority of the Master, the response is now plain. For what is said, that it is one and another, is either understood to be said because it is altered and altered, or understood to be one and another, not with respect to the potency itself, which immortality principally imports, but with respect to the superadded disposition. And so the response to the questions asked is plain16.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cap. 7. n. 13; c. 12. n. 2-3; c. 16. n. 30 seqq; c. 23. n. 44; c. 46. n. 88, quibus locis s. auctor dicit, in dispensatione divinae providentiae per Christum omnia quae per peccatum amissa fuerant, esse reparata, praecipue immortalitatem.
    Cap. 7, n. 13; c. 12, nn. 2–3; c. 16, n. 30 ff; c. 23, n. 44; c. 46, n. 88, in which places the holy author says that in the dispensation of divine providence all things which had been lost through sin have been repaired through Christ, and especially immortality.
  2. Sive proxima materiae dispositio ad actum non differt essentialiter ab ipsa aptitudine et potentia ad actum, sed est eadem ac ista, differens tantum ab ea secundum statum perfectionis et imperfectionis; v. g. proxima dispositio ligni ad combustionem [in qua dispositione lignum necessitatur ad recipiendam formam ignis] est essentialiter eadem ac illa potentia ligni, quae per ignem ad talem dispositionem perducitur. Qualiter habeatur haec necessitas dispositionis, indicatur supra pag. 301, nota 3. Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 88. m. 4. — Paulo inferius post cum nonnulli codd. cum edd. 2, 3 subiiciunt igitur, ed. 1 ergo.
    That is, the proximate disposition of matter to act does not differ essentially from the aptitude and potency to act itself, but is the same as it, differing only according to a state of perfection and imperfection; for example, the proximate disposition of wood to combustion [in which disposition the wood is necessitated to receive the form of fire] is essentially the same as that potency of the wood which is led through fire to such a disposition. How this necessity of disposition is to be understood is indicated above on page 301, note 3. Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 88, m. 4. — A little below, after cum some codices with editions 2 and 3 add igitur; ed. 1 has ergo.
  3. Cfr. supra d. 7. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. — Quoad caritatem cfr. III. Sent. d. 31. a. 3. q. 1, ubi ostenditur, habitum caritatis in patria non evacuari, sed consummari per gloriam. — Paulo inferius pro haec immortalitas plures codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 haec mortalitas.
    Cf. above, d. 7, p. I, a. 2, q. 1. — As to charity, cf. III Sent. d. 31, a. 3, q. 1, where it is shown that the habit of charity is not abolished in the fatherland but is consummated through glory. — A little below, for haec immortalitas several codices with editions 1, 2, 3 read haec mortalitas.
  4. Non pauci codd. cum ed. 1 perperam transformaretur. In fine arg. plures codd. et omnes edd. perperam differrent [different?] pro differunt.
    Not a few codices with ed. 1 wrongly read transformaretur. At the end of the argument, several codices and all editions wrongly read differrent [different?] for differunt.
  5. Aristot., VII. Topic. c. 1: Nam quaecumque simpliciter eadem, etiam generationes eorum et corruptiones eaedem et effectiva et corruptiva. Et II. de Caelo et mundo, text. 86. (c. 13.): Easdem enim eorundem necessarium est esse causas eisdem.
    Aristotle, Topics VII, c. 1: For whatever things are simply the same, their generations and corruptions and their efficient and corruptive causes are also the same. And On the Heavens and the World II, text 86 (c. 13): For it is necessary that the same things have the same causes.
  6. Sub quo respectu Aristot., VI. Phys. text. 7. (c. 1.) ait: Si Thebas quis it, impossibile est, simul ire Thebas et ivisse Thebas. Et Averroes in II. de Anima, text. 67: Omne recipiens aliquid non recipit ipsum nisi in modo, secundum quem caret illo. — Minorem cod. B sic exhibet: sed transitus esset ab eodem in idem, si fieret transitus ab immortalitate innocentiae ad immortalitatem gloriae, si esset idem.
    Under which respect Aristotle, Physics VI, text 7 (c. 1), says: If someone is going to Thebes, it is impossible to be simultaneously going to Thebes and to have gone to Thebes. And Averroes on On the Soul II, text 67: Every recipient of anything receives it only in the mode according to which it lacks it. — Codex B presents the minor thus: but a passage would be from the same to the same, if there were a passage from the immortality of innocence to the immortality of glory, if it were the same.
  7. Colligitur ex Aristot., I. Topic. c. 13. et VII. c. 1.
    Drawn from Aristotle, Topics I, c. 13 and VII, c. 1.
  8. Aristot., IV. Topic. c. 5: Quandoque autem peccant, et passionem [sive affectionem] in genere eius quod passum est ponentes, ut immortalitatem vitam sempiternam dicentes esse. Passio enim vitae et accidens immortalitas videtur esse. Quod autem verum sit quod dicitur, manifestum fit, si quis admittat, aliquem ex mortali fieri immortalem; nullus enim dicit, aliam vitam eum sumere, sed accidens aliquod vel passionem huic eidem advenire, quare vita non genus immortalitatis.
    Aristotle, Topics IV, c. 5: And sometimes they err in placing a passion [or affection] in the genus of that which has undergone it, as when they say immortality to be eternal life. For a passion of life and an accident immortality seems to be. That what is said is true is made manifest, if one admits that someone becomes immortal from a mortal; for no one says that he takes on another life, but that some accident or passion supervenes upon this same one, wherefore life is not a genus of immortality.
  9. Hic c. 6: Alia est immortalitas carnis, quam in Adam accepimus, alia etc. — Pro amisimus cod. aa accipimus.
    Here, c. 6: One is the immortality of the flesh, which we received in Adam, another etc. — For amisimus codex aa reads accipimus.
  10. Codd. IQ aa assumto, Vat. derivativo. Lectio nostra, quae est etiam plurimorum codd. et edd. 1, 2, confirmatur et explicatur illis verbis, quibus B. Albertus, II. Topic. tr. 2. c. 5, utitur ad explanandum, quid sint coniugata. Dicit enim auctor cit.: Sunt autem coniugata principale et sumtum a principali per concretivam denominationem, quamvis secundum grammaticum, qui modos in formatione vocum attendit, principale descendit a sumto, ut iustus sti [i. e. iusti] addita tia fit iustitia; considerando tamen ad rem et naturam, compositum descendit a simplici; principale simplex est abstractum, et sumtum ab ipso dicitur, et dicuntur coniugata quasi sub uno iugo principalis significationis coniuncta secundum modum significandi diversum.
    Codices IQ aa read assumto; Vat. derivativo. Our reading, which is also that of most codices and editions 1, 2, is confirmed and explained by those words which B. Albert, Topics II, tr. 2, c. 5, uses to explain what conjugates are. For the cited author says: Conjugates are the principal and that which is taken (sumtum) from the principal through a concretive denomination, although according to the grammarian, who attends to the modes in the formation of words, the principal descends from the taken — as iustus sti [i.e. iusti], with «tia» added, becomes iustitia; yet considering the thing and its nature, the composite descends from the simple; the principal simple is the abstract, and from it the taken is named, and they are called conjugates as being joined under one yoke of the principal signification according to a diverse mode of signifying.
  11. Ed. 1: corpus continuare et non continuare.
    Ed. 1 reads: to continue the body and not to continue (it).
  12. Edd. 3, 4 cum Vat. unitam. Paulo inferius pro potentia continuandi nonnulli codd. potentia continendi.
    Editions 3 and 4 with Vat. read unitam. A little below, for potentia continuandi some codices read potentia continendi.
  13. Sola Vat. essentiam, quae etiam paulo ante pro esset eadem exhibet sit eadem.
    The Vat. alone reads essentiam, which also a little earlier exhibits sit eadem for esset eadem.
  14. Ut ex Aristot., I. Elench. c. 4. (c. 5.) et c. 13. (c. 14.); II. c. 2. (c. 17.), c. 1. (c. 24.) et c. 5. (c. 26.) apparet, Sophistae utebantur Corisco ad exponendas fallacias. De Corisco cfr. etiam Aristot., II. Moral. Eudem. c. 3. (c. 1.) et supra pag. 100, nota 8. Quoad vocem alter sive alteratus cfr. supra pag. 184, nota 6.
    As appears from Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations I, c. 4 (c. 5) and c. 13 (c. 14); II, c. 2 (c. 17), c. 1 (c. 24) and c. 5 (c. 26), the Sophists used Coriscus to expound fallacies. On Coriscus see also Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics II, c. 3 (c. 1) and above, page 100, note 8. As to the word alter or alteratus see above, page 184, note 6.
  15. De hac liberi arbitrii divisione, quae sumta est ex Bernardo, vide infra d. 25, p. II. dub. 2. De dispositione necessitatis et congruitatis cfr. supra d. 9. q. 3. in corp. — Mox pro ultra cod. T supra.
    On this division of free choice, which is taken from Bernard, see below, d. 25, p. II, dub. 2. On the disposition of necessity and congruity, cf. above, d. 9, q. 3, in the body. — Shortly after, for ultra codex T reads supra.
  16. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion to the preceding question. ---
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