Bonaventure

ARTICULUS III. De immortalitate primi hominis quantum ad coniunctum.

Consequenter quaeritur de immortalitate primi hominis quantum ad coniunctum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum illa immortalitas inesset homini a natura, vel a gratia.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum illa immortalitas esset eadem per essentiam cum immortalitate gloriosa.

QUAESTIO I. Utrum immortalitas inesset homini a natura, vel a gratia.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry begins with La. for the original Latin and En. for the literal English rendering.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum illa immortalitas esset a natura, vel a gratia. Et quod a natura, videtur.

Ad oppositum.

1. Illud est nobis naturale, quod nobis innascitur, et cum quo nati sumus¹; sed homo cum illa immortalitate productus est, et illa immortalitas indita est homini a sua conditione: ergo fuit ei naturalis vel a natura.

2. Item, mors non poterat inesse homini, nisi praecedente culpa, sicut probatum est supra²; sed culpa non poterat homini inesse, nisi deordinaretur natura: si ergo mors inerat homini contra naturam, immortalitas inerat ei per naturam.

3. Item, per hoc homo erat immortalis, per quod erat innocens; sed innocens erat ex conditione naturae; esto enim, quod nullam haberet gratiam, nihilominus tamen haberet innocentiam: ergo immortalis erat ex conditione naturae, non ex beneficio gratiae.

4. Item, immortalitas hominis consistit in continua coniunctione animae et corporis, continua autem coniunctio animae et corporis est per continuum appetitum unius ad alterum; sed anima habet continuum appetitum ad corpus, et e converso, per naturam absque gratia: ergo immortalitas inerat homini per naturam.

5. Item, idem est principium, per quod datur rei esse, et per quod in esse continuatur; sed anima rationalis, quae est forma per naturam immortalis et incorruptibilis, corpori dabat naturaliter esse et complementum³: ergo et ipsius corporis sive hominis esse naturaliter continuabat; sed a quo in esse est continuatio, ab eodem est immortalitatis perpetuatio: ergo etc.

6. Item, naturale est homini comedere ea quae sibi apponuntur; sed homo per esum ligni vitae et aliorum lignorum paradisi vitam suam poterat perpetuare, sicut dicit Augustinus et Magister⁴: ergo videtur, quod hominis perpetuatio inerat homini per naturam.

Sed contra:

Fundamenta.

1. Augustinus super Genesim, et Magister dicit in littera⁵: «Creatus est homo immortalis, quod erat ei de ligno vitae, non de conditione naturae; mortalis erat conditione corporis animalis, immortalis beneficio Conditoris». Et idem ipse Augustinus expressius dicit, quod sicut praestitum fuit filiis Israel, quod in quadraginta annis vestimenta eorum non veterascerent, ita praestitum fuit Adae, ut non moreretur.

2. Item, super illud Lucae decimo⁶: Exspoliaverunt eum, et plagis impositis etc., Glossa exponit de primo homine, quem dicit expoliatum fuisse gratuitis et vulneratum in naturalibus: si ergo immortalitas non fuit vulnerata, sed simpliciter ablata ipsi homini per culpam, ergo non inerat ei a natura, sed a gratia.

3. Item, hoc videtur ratione. Proprietates naturales non derelinquunt subiectum propter culpam⁷: ergo si immortalitas inerat homini a natura, non videtur, quod debuerit eum relinquere propter culpam; quodsi eam amisit, patet etc.

4. Item, impossibile est, duo opposita inesse eidem secundum eadem principia, maxime secundum principia naturaliter causantia, quae non inclinant ad opposita⁸; sed homo per naturam suam poterat mori: ergo aut immortalis non erat, aut si erat, non erat per naturam, sed per gratiam solum.

5. Item, corpus Adae per naturam propriam erat nobiliter complexionatum, ergo molles et teneras carnes habebat; sed naturaliter molle cedit duro: ergo per naturam corpus Adae vulnerari poterat et secari: ergo per naturam Adam non erat immortalis.

6. Item, ignis naturaliter consumit corpus ex elementis quatuor constitutum, et corpus animale per naturam indiget aspiratione et respiratione⁹: ergo, si homo caderet in aquam vel in ignem et non moreretur, hoc non esset per virtutem naturae, sed potius contra vel supra: non ergo esset a natura, sed potius ex gratia.

Conclusio.

Immortalitas Adae in statu innocentiae quoad aptitudinem erat a natura, sed quoad completionem a gratia.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Magister in littera¹⁰, circa hoc multiplex et varia fuit opinio. Opinio duplex. Quidam enim dicere voluerunt, quod immortalitas primi hominis esset a natura; quidam, quod esset a gratia. Utraque autem harum opinionum habuit aliquam efficacem rationem moventem, et utraque habet aliquid veritatis, licet una plus habeat quam altera. — Exemplum. Sicut enim, cum dicitur: homo est beatificabilis, duo tanguntur, et aptitudo et dispositio; ita etiam, cum dicitur: homo est immortalis. Unde, sicut homo quodam modo potest dici beatificabilis per naturam, quodam modo per gratiam; sic et in proposito. Prout enim hoc quod est beatificabile importat aptitudinem, sic inest homini per naturam; homo enim a natura sua habet aptitudinem ad beatitudinem. Secundum autem quod importat dispositionem sufficientem¹¹, per quam quis pervenit ad beatitudinem, sive sufficientem ordinem ad actum, sic inest homini non per naturam, sed per gratiam, per quam sufficienter disponitur ad gloriam, nec sine illa potest sufficere natura. — Conclusio. Sic et in proposito immortalis quantum ad statum innocentiae dici poterat homo per naturam, immortalis etiam per gratiam, quia a natura habebat aptitudinem, sed a gratia habebat completionem.

Et hoc patet sic. Triplex causa mortis. Tripliciter enim potest mors homini contingere: aut per elementorum pugnam et dissolutionem, aut per humidi¹² consumtionem, aut per extrinsecam laesionem. Immortalitas ergo dicit privationem huius triplicis modi moriendi quantum ad actum et potentiam in Beatis, qui dicuntur immortales, quia non possunt mori; quantum ad actum vero solum in hominibus institutis, qui dicuntur immortales, quia poterant non mori hoc triplici genere moriendi: habebant enim aptitudinem evadendi hoc triplex genus mortis per id quod habebant a natura.

Quoad 1. genus mortis. Nam corpus valde bene erat complexionatum, et anima de se incorruptibilis erat, quae illud corpus regebat et conservabat; et ita idoneus erat primus homo ex his constitutus, quod nunquam deficeret per elementorum pugnam. Sed tamen illud non sufficiebat; hoc enim non posset anima peccatrix facere, si poneretur in consimili corpore¹³. Accedit donum gratiae. Et ideo datum fuit illi animae donum gratiae, per quam posset corpori praesidere et illud regere et elementa quasi in quadam amicitia custodire, et hoc, quamdiu vellet, suo auctori subiacere. Hoc autem donum gratiae vocat Anselmus¹⁴ iustitiam originalem. Et sic patet, quod quantum ad immortalitatem contra primum genus moriendi aptitudinem habebat a natura, sed complementum a gratia.

Quoad 2. genus. Similiter quantum ad secundum genus moriendi, quod est per humidi consumtionem. Vis enim nutritiva potens erat ad convertendum alimentum sibi sufficiens, et alimenta efficacem habebant virtutem ad nutriendum; et ex hoc homo idoneus erat, ut conservaretur in eo sine corruptione humidum naturale. Sed quia humidum radicale paulative consumitur nec potest reparari per quodcumque alimentum: Accedit vis ligni vitae. ideo data est virtus specialis cuidam ligno, quod dictum est lignum vitae, per cuius sumtionem repararetur humidum radicale. Et hoc quidem non fuit ex conditione naturae, sed ex beneficio Conditoris, sicut dicit Augustinus.

Quoad 3. genus. Similiter et quantum ad tertium genus, quod quidem fit per extrinsecam laesionem. Adam enim fortis et potens erat ad repellendum nociva, sapiens et diligens ad praecavenda, nec habebat nociva extrinseca; et ideo idoneitatem habebat, ut per nullius laesionem incurreret mortem. Verumtamen quod bestiae, et si qua alia¹⁵ sunt, quae nocere possent, ipsum omnino non laederent, nec in somno nec in vigilia; Accedit specialis providentia. hoc non erat a natura, sed a Dei speciali providentia, quae ita eum custodiebat, ut sub pedibus eius omnia subiacerent¹⁶, ut nihil cuperet ipsum offendere, et si cuperet, non valeret.

Et sic patet, quod immortalitas, quae fuit in statu innocentiae, quantum ad aptitudinem fuit a natura, quantum ad complementum fuit a gratia. — Et per hoc pro magna parte patet responsio ad obiecta. Rationes enim, quae probant, quod non fuit simpliciter a natura, concedendae sunt, quia verum concludunt.

Solutio oppositorum.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod fuit a natura, quia fuit ei innata; dicendum, quod non omne quod inest homini a principio suae nativitatis, naturale est, nisi extendatur hoc nomen naturale; multa enim bona gratis data concreantur et dantur cum natura, sicut planum est. Et ideo illud non valet.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod mors non poterat intervenire, nisi praevia culpa; dicendum, quod hoc non erat solum propter naturam, sed propter beneficium gratiae, quod erat naturae superadditum. Quia enim originalis iustitia faciebat, naturam immortalem esse, et hanc non poterat perdere nisi per culpam; ideo mors non poterat intervenire nisi per culpam.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod innocentia erat a natura, ergo similiter et immortalitas; dicendum, quod innocentia dupliciter potest dici: uno modo privative, quia privat culpam; alio modo positive, quia ponit iustitiam contrariam. Distinctio notanda. Innocentia autem non erat causa immortalitatis, secundum quod dicit puram privationem, sed secundum quod importat originalem iustitiam, merito cuius erat in anima vis totius corporis contentiva.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod continuatio vitae est ex coniunctione animae et corporis; dicendum, quod ad continuationem vitae non sufficit appetitus, sicut ad beatificationem non sufficit appetere beatitudinem; sed necessaria est ulterius virtus ad satisfaciendum appetitui. Omnis enim natura appetit esse et durare, non solum hominum, sed etiam brutorum¹⁷; non tamen in omnibus est immortalitas. Et ideo non sequitur, quodsi a natura sit continuatio appetitus, quod a natura sit continuatio immortalitatis.

5. Et per hoc patet responsio ad aliud quod obiicitur, quod ab eodem est datio esse, et conservatio. Dicendum enim, quod etsi illud sit verum de conservatione, quae est ad tempus, non tamen est verum de perpetuatione; multa enim sunt, quae possunt dare esse, et tamen non possunt perpetuare¹⁸.

6. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod per esum ligni vitae et aliorum lignorum poterat in p. 471esse conservari; dicendum, quod ista non erat tota causa; immo necessaria erat divina virtus protegens et prohibens nociva, et interior virtus conservans et concilians contraria. Praeterea, quod lignum vitae talem effectum haberet, hoc speciale donum erat Dei; sicut etiam, quod tanto tempore vestimenta et calceamenta populi Israel potuerunt sibi praebere obsequia. Et sic patet illud¹⁹.

ARTICLE III. On the immortality of the first man as regards the composite [of soul and body].

Next there is inquired about the immortality of the first man as regards the composite. And concerning this two questions are asked.

First it is asked whether that immortality was in man from nature, or from grace.

Second it is asked whether that immortality was the same in essence as glorious immortality.

QUESTION I. Whether immortality was in man from nature, or from grace.

Concerning the first, the procedure is thus, and it is asked whether that immortality was from nature or from grace. And that it was from nature, it seems.

On the opposing side.

1. That is natural to us which is innate in us and with which we are born¹; but man was produced with that immortality, and that immortality was instilled in him from his constitution: therefore it was natural to him, or from nature.

2. Likewise, death could not be in man unless culpability preceded, as has been proved above²; but culpability could not be in man unless nature were disordered: therefore if death was in man contrary to nature, immortality was in him through nature.

3. Likewise, man was immortal through that by which he was innocent; but he was innocent from the constitution of nature; for grant that he had no grace, he would nonetheless still have innocence: therefore he was immortal from the constitution of nature, not from the benefit of grace.

4. Likewise, the immortality of man consists in the continuous union of soul and body, but the continuous union of soul and body is through the continuous appetite of one for the other; but the soul has a continuous appetite for the body, and conversely, through nature without grace: therefore immortality was in man through nature.

5. Likewise, the same is the principle by which being is given to a thing, and by which it is continued in being; but the rational soul, which is by nature an immortal and incorruptible form, naturally gave to the body being and completion³: therefore it also naturally continued the being of the body itself, or of man; but from that from which the continuation in being comes, from the same is the perpetuation of immortality: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, it is natural for man to eat the things set before him; but man through the eating of the tree of life and of the other trees of paradise was able to perpetuate his life, as Augustine and the Master say⁴: therefore it seems that man's perpetuation was in man through nature.

On the contrary:

Foundations.

1. Augustine on Genesis, and the Master says in the text⁵: «Man was created immortal, which belonged to him from the tree of life, not from the constitution of nature; he was mortal by the condition of the animal body, immortal by the benefit of the Creator». And the same Augustine says more expressly that just as it was granted to the sons of Israel that during forty years their garments did not wear out, so it was granted to Adam that he should not die.

2. Likewise, on that passage of Luke ch. 10⁶: They stripped him, and inflicted wounds upon him, etc., the Gloss interprets it of the first man, whom it says was stripped of the gratuitous gifts and wounded in the natural ones: if therefore immortality was not wounded but simply taken away from man himself through culpability, therefore it was not in him from nature, but from grace.

3. Likewise, this seems [to follow] by reason. Natural properties do not abandon their subject on account of culpability⁷: therefore if immortality was in man from nature, it does not seem that it ought to have left him on account of culpability; but if he lost it, it is clear, etc.

4. Likewise, it is impossible for two opposites to be in the same subject according to the same principles, especially according to principles naturally causing, which do not incline toward opposites⁸; but man through his own nature could die: therefore either he was not immortal, or if he was, he was not [so] through nature, but through grace alone.

5. Likewise, Adam's body, through its own nature, was nobly composed, therefore he had soft and tender flesh; but naturally what is soft yields to what is hard: therefore through nature Adam's body could be wounded and cut: therefore through nature Adam was not immortal.

6. Likewise, fire naturally consumes a body constituted of the four elements, and the animal body by nature requires inhalation and respiration⁹: therefore if man fell into water or into fire and did not die, this would not be through the power of nature, but rather against or above it: therefore it would not be from nature, but rather from grace.

Conclusion.

Adam's immortality in the state of innocence as regards aptitude was from nature, but as regards completion from grace.

I respond: It must be said that, as the Master says in the text¹⁰, on this matter there was a manifold and varied opinion. A twofold opinion. For some have wished to say that the immortality of the first man was from nature; others, that it was from grace. Both of these opinions had some efficacious moving reason, and each has some truth, although one has more than the other. — An example. For just as when it is said: man is beatifiable, two things are touched on, both aptitude and disposition; so likewise when it is said: man is immortal. Hence, just as man in one way can be called beatifiable through nature, and in another way through grace; so also in the matter at hand. For insofar as that which is beatifiable implies aptitude, it belongs to man through nature; for man from his nature has aptitude for beatitude. But according as it implies sufficient disposition¹¹, by which one arrives at beatitude, or sufficient order to the act, thus it belongs to man not through nature, but through grace, by which he is sufficiently disposed for glory, nor without it can nature suffice. — Conclusion. So also in the matter at hand, as regards the state of innocence, man could be called immortal through nature, and also immortal through grace, because from nature he had the aptitude, but from grace he had the completion.

And this is clear as follows. Threefold cause of death. For death can happen to man in three ways: either through the conflict and dissolution of the elements, or through the consumption of the moisture¹², or through extrinsic injury. Immortality therefore signifies the privation of this threefold mode of dying as regards act and potency in the Blessed, who are called immortal because they cannot die; but as regards only the act in the men in their original state, who are called immortal because they were able not to die by this threefold kind of dying: for they had the aptitude to escape this threefold kind of death through that which they had from nature.

As regards the 1st kind of death. For the body was very well composed, and the soul was of itself incorruptible, which ruled and preserved that body; and so the first man was, constituted of these, suited never to fail through the conflict of the elements. But yet that was not sufficient; for a sinful soul could not do this, if it were placed in a similar body¹³. Grace's gift is added. And therefore there was given to that soul the gift of grace, by which it might preside over the body and rule it and guard the elements as in a kind of friendship, and this, as long as it willed, by being subject to its Author. Now this gift of grace Anselm¹⁴ calls original justice. And thus it is clear that, as regards immortality against the first kind of dying, he had the aptitude from nature, but the completion from grace.

As regards the 2nd kind. Likewise as regards the second kind of dying, which is through the consumption of the moisture. For the nutritive power was capable of converting sufficient food for itself, and the foods had efficacious power to nourish; and from this man was suited to have the natural moisture preserved in him without corruption. But because the radical moisture is gradually consumed and cannot be repaired by any food whatsoever: The power of the tree of life is added. therefore a special power was given to a certain tree, which is called the tree of life, through whose eating the radical moisture would be repaired. And this indeed was not from the condition of nature, but from the benefit of the Creator, as Augustine says.

As regards the 3rd kind. Likewise also as regards the third kind, which indeed comes about through extrinsic injury. For Adam was strong and powerful to repel harmful things, wise and diligent to take precautions, nor did he have extrinsic harms; and therefore he had the suitability that he might not incur death through the injury of anything. Yet that beasts, and if there were any other things¹⁵ that could harm, did not harm him at all, neither in sleep nor in waking; Special providence is added. this was not from nature, but from God's special providence, which thus guarded him, that all things should be under his feet¹⁶, so that nothing should desire to offend him, and if it did desire, it would not be able.

And so it is clear that the immortality which was in the state of innocence, as regards aptitude was from nature, and as regards completion was from grace. — And through this for the most part the response to the objections is clear. For the reasons that prove that it was not simply from nature are to be conceded, because they conclude truly.

Solution of the objections.

1. To what is objected, that it was from nature because it was innate to him; it must be said that not everything that is in man from the beginning of his nativity is natural, unless this name natural be extended; for many goods given freely are co-created and given with nature, as is plain. And therefore that does not hold.

2. To what is objected, that death could not intervene without preceding culpability; it must be said that this was not solely on account of nature, but on account of the benefit of grace, which was superadded to nature. For because original justice made nature to be immortal, and he could not lose this except through culpability; therefore death could not intervene except through culpability.

3. To what is objected, that innocence was from nature, therefore likewise also immortality; it must be said that innocence can be spoken of in two ways: in one way privatively, because it excludes culpability; in another way positively, because it posits the contrary justice. Distinction to be noted. Now innocence was not the cause of immortality according as it expresses mere privation, but according as it implies original justice, by the merit of which there was in the soul a power containing the whole body.

4. To what is objected, that the continuation of life is from the union of soul and body; it must be said that for the continuation of life appetite does not suffice, just as for beatification it does not suffice to desire beatitude; but a power further is necessary to satisfy the appetite. For every nature desires to be and to endure, not only of men, but also of brutes¹⁷; yet not in all is there immortality. And therefore it does not follow that, if continuation of appetite is from nature, then continuation of immortality is from nature.

5. And through this the response is clear to the other objection, that from the same source is the giving of being and the conservation. For it must be said that, though that be true of conservation, which is for a time, yet it is not true of perpetuation; for there are many things that can give being, and yet cannot perpetuate¹⁸ it.

6. To what is objected lastly, that through the eating of the tree of life and of other trees he was able to be preserved in being; it must be said that that was not the whole cause; rather divine power was necessary, protecting and prohibiting harmful things, and interior power conserving and reconciling contraries. Moreover, that the tree of life had such effect, this was a special gift of God; just as also, that for so long a time the garments and shoes of the people of Israel were able to render service to them. And thus that is clear¹⁹.