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Dist. 37, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 37

Textus Latinus
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QUAESTIO II.

Utrum omnis rei conservatio sit a Deo.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum omnis rei conservatio sit a Deo. Et quod sic, videtur:

Fundamenta.

1. Primo per Gregorium1: « Cuncta in nihilum cederent, nisi manus Conditoris ea contineret »: ergo omnia quae conservantur, a Deo conservantur.

2. Item, esse est actus entis, et vivere viventis: sed nullus actus est, qui non sit a Deo immediate: ergo nullum esse et nullum vivere2. Si ergo creatura continue est, et continuatio in esse non est aliud quam duratio, cum esse eius non possit esse nisi a Deo, omnis rei conservatio est a Deo.

3. Item, nihil mutabile subsistit nec salvatur in esse nisi per immutabile et fixum; sed omne esse creatum mutabile est et variabile, saltem a praeterito in futurum — sicut enim dicit Hieronymus3: « Solus enim Deus est, qui non novit praeteritum vel futurum » — ergo nihil potest subsistere, nisi Deo conservante.

4. Item, quanto effectus magis percipit a causa, tanto magis pendet ab ipsa, et quanto magis pendet ab ipsa, tanto minus potest durare vel subsistere sine ipsa4; sed omne creatum totum, quod est et quod habet, a Deo habet: ergo impossibile est, aliquid nec ad momentum conservari in esse, nisi Deo conservante.

5. Item, sicut se habet essentia ad primam essentiam, et sapientia ad primam sapientiam, ita se habet duratio ad primam durationem; sed omnis essentia a prima essentia, et omnis sapientia a prima sapientia est: ergo omnis duratio a prima duratione producitur sicut a principio: ergo nihil in esse conservatur nisi per Deum5.

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Sed contra: 1. Augustinus in libro de Natura boni, tractans illud quod dicitur Ecclesiastis octavo6: Sermo eius potestate plenus est, dicit, quod « suum dicere est suum facere ». Sed statim, quando Deus fecit creaturam, simul cum hoc disposuit, quantum creatura durare debuit: ergo videtur, quod statim dederit ei virtutem continuandi se in esse: ergo non videtur, quod amplius Deus immediate eam conservet. Quodsi tu dicas, quod virtus creaturae data indiget adhuc virtute divina simul cooperante; contra: si suum dicere est suum facere, et dicere non potest esse successivum, ergo nec facere; sed conservatio creaturae est cum successione: ergo non videtur, quod illa conservatio sit a Deo sicut a conservante.

2. Item, ad nobilitatem agentis creati pertinet, quod potest facere opus per se stabile, non indigens ipso artifice continue sustentante; sed Deus est artifex multo nobilior et multo potentior: ergo videtur, quod operibus suis det tale esse, quod non indigeant7 ipso conservante continue: igitur conservatio rerum non videtur immediate esse a Deo.

3. Item, idem est principium essendi et conservandi8; sed forma sufficienter dat unicuique rei esse: ergo videtur, quod ad conservationem uniuscuiusque rei sufficit virtus propriae formae. Quodsi tu dicas, quod forma non potest conservare suam materiam; planum est, hoc esse falsum in anima, quae habet vim vegetativam et regitivam corporis.

4. Item, si omnis res conservatur a Deo immediate; cum divina virtus non possit a se deficere nec possit ab alio superari9, videtur, quod nulla operatio creaturae, nec per defectum sui ipsius nec per actionem contrarii, possit aliquando terminari; nunquam enim deficit duratio sine defectu virtutis conservantis. Et planum est istud, quod multorum10 actio terminatur: ergo videtur, quod talium conservatio non sit a Deo tanquam a principio immediato.

5. Item, esto, quod creatura sibi ipsi relinquatur; aut conservatur in esse, aut corrumpitur. Si conservatur in esse, habeo propositum, videlicet, quod non omnis conservatio est a Deo. Si corrumpitur; aut hoc est aliena actione, aut propria inclinatione. Aliena actione non, quia nulla creatura potest aliam in nihilum redigere. Propria inclinatione non, quia « natura semper desiderat quod melius est11 », et forma appetit uniri materiae et materia formae: ergo si motus sequitur inclinationem et appetitum, semper durabit et nunquam deficiet: ergo redit idem, quod prius, videlicet, quod non omnis conservatio est a Deo.

Conclusio.

Omnis rei conservatio est a Deo sicut ab immediato principio, non tamen ut a tota causa.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod non solum omnem actionem, verum etiam omnem conservationem necesse est a Deo esse. (Conclusio 1.)

Et ratio huius est necessitas et indigentia ex parte creaturae. (Ratio.) Creatura enim omnis ex nihilo est, et aliunde habet esse. Quia ex nihilo est, ideo quodam modo vana est et vanitati subiecta est12; quia vero aliunde habet esse, ideo esse est sibi quodam modo accidentale. Contrario modo est in Deo; unde Hilarius in septimo de Trinitate13: « Esse non est accidens Deo, sed subsistens veritas et manens causa et naturalis generis proprietas ». Sicut igitur vanum non potest fulciri nisi per verum et stabile, et accidens non potest fulciri nisi per subiectum; sic esse creaturae non potest conservari absque munificentia creatricis essentiae. Unde sicut creatura habet essentiam et actionem, ita etiam habet et durationem; et propter hoc, quamvis creatura non possit esse actu infinita, nihilominus tamen ponitur duratione infinita. Infinitas enim durationis non ponit in creatura aliquam actualem infinitatem. (Notandum.) — Et ratio huius est, quia potentia, per quam durat creatura, non tantum est ipsius creaturae, immo etiam creatricis essentiae. Verum est enim14, quod in creatura est aliqua potentia ad durandum; sed illa non est omnino in actu, immo est in potentia quodam modo respectu illius virtutis, quae est in actu infinita. (Conclusio 2.) Et hoc est quod vult dicere Philosophus in libro de Causis15, quod « omnes virtutes infinitae pendentes sunt per unum infinitum primum, quod est virtus virtutum ». — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod omnis rei conservatio est a Deo tanquam ab immediato principio; non tamen est ab ipso sicut a tota causa. Sicut enim in creatura est aliqua virtus operativa creata, sic etiam aliqua virtus conservativa.

Solutio oppositorum.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod suum dicere est suum facere; dicendum, quod hoc non dicitur immediate, propter hoc quod ad dicere sequatur facere; quoniam Deus dixit ab aeterno

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et fecit in tempore; sed hoc dictum est, quia non est nova operatio ex parte Dei, ipsum facere superadditum ad dicere, sicut contingit in operatione creaturae. — Nec valet quod obiicitur, quod dicere non est successivum. Dicendum enim, quod nec dicere Dei nec facere est successivum secundum id quod est, quia dicere et facere Dei Deus est et aeternum quid est. (Notandum.) Verumtamen, sicut ab aeterno potest procedere temporale, sic a divino dicere, in quo nulla est successio, potest procedere successiva duratio, quae quidem successiva est, non ratione exigentiae ex parte Dei conservantis, sed ex parte rei conservatae16.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod artifex creatus potest facere opus per se stabile; dicendum, quod non est simile, pro eo quod artifex creatus sic facit rem, quod non facit eius principia intrinseca; non enim potest in totam rei substantiam. Et propterea res facta conservari potest in propriis17 principiis, quae non dependent a potestate artificis. Non sic autem est in opere Dei. Omne enim opus, quod Deus facit, secundum totum sui facit; et ideo totaliter ab ipso dependet et sine eius adiutorio conservari non potest.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod idem est principium essendi et conservandi; dicendum, quod verum est in genere causae formalis; et similiter verum est in genere causae efficientis. (Notandum.) Quamvis igitur esse in creatura sit a forma creata tanquam ab informante, nihilominus tamen a Deo est tanquam ab efficiente. Ideo, sicut ad conservationem rei necessaria est virtus formae complentis, sic etiam necessarium est adiutorium primi et immediati efficientis18.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si Deus conservaret res, nihil corrumperetur; dicendum, quod illud argumentum deficit dupliciter. Primum quidem, quia Deus conservat voluntarie; et ideo tantum conservat, quantum placet sibi, et secundum dispositionem sapientiae suae. — Praeterea, conservatio rei non est a Deo tanquam a tota causa, sed requiritur ex parte creaturae idoneitas ad conservationem, et virtus quodam modo conservativa, ad cuius defectum velociorem vel tardiorem sequitur diuturnior vel minus diuturna duratio creaturae; et cum est idoneitas creaturae ad durandum in perpetuum, utpote simplicitas, Deus esse eius aeternaliter continuat. (Notandum.)

5. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum si creatura sibi relinqueretur, corrumperetur; dico, quod sic. — Et si quaerat, utrum aliquo agente, vel non; dico, quod nullo agente, sed propter defectum in se ipsa. Talis enim corruptio, quae est annihilatio, dicit purum defectum; et ideo non requirit causam efficientem, sed deficientem; haec autem in creatura est ex hoc, quod ex nihilo est. — Et si obiiciat, quod naturalis inclinatio cuiuslibet rei est ad durandum in esse, et quod motus sequitur inclinationem; dicendum, quod verum est de inclinatione motus dicente positionem. (Notandum.) Verum est etiam de principiis rei salvatis in esse, super quae fundatur illa inclinatio. Si autem creatura sibi relinqueretur, principia rei in esse non servarentur, immo in se ipsis deficerent; et ideo inclinatio ad esse periret19. — Posset etiam aliter dici, quod cum ponitur, quod creatura sibi relinquatur, ponitur, quod divina virtus se subtrahat; et cum ponitur, quod divina virtus se subtrahat, per consequens ponitur creaturae annihilatio. (Aliter.) Sicut enim per operationem20 virtutis infinitae potest fieri eductio de nihilo in esse, ita etiam per subtractionem potest fieri annihilatio; et pro tanto dicit Hugo21, quod soli divinae virtuti possibilis est annihilatio creaturae. Verumtamen illud verbum intelligendum est sane, quia multum est calumniabile.

Scholion

I. Quod creaturae per immediatum Dei influxum conservantur, ita tamen, ut non omnino a conservatione excludantur causae secundae, certa est doctrina. Insuper docet S. Thom. (S. 1. q. 104. a. 1. ad 4.), « quod conservatio rerum a Deo non est per aliquam novam actionem, sed per continuationem actionis, qua dat esse, quae quidem actio est sine motu et tempore; sicut etiam conservatio luminis in aere est per continuum influxum a sole ». Consentit in hoc omnino Scot. et etiam S. Bonav., cuius doctrina hic tradita illustratur iis quae supra d. 2. p. I. a. 1. q. 3. dicit de duratione rerum aeviternarum, ubi etiam ait, quod esse per creationem « datum per continuam Dei influentiam continuatur » (cfr. etiam I. Sent. d. 9. q. 4.); in hac autem quaestione addit, quod conservatio non est immediate a Deo ut a tota causa. — Henr. Gand. (Quodl. 10. q. 7, Quodl. 1. q. 9.) omnino negat, quod Deus eadem actione res creet atque conservet, quemadmodum eadem actione lumen in medio causetur et conservetur; atque simul multis argumentis probare nititur, esse rei creatae non differre realiter ab essentia eiusdem; quae sententia etiam multis posterioribus placuit. Etiam Richard. a Med. et Durand. in hac quaestione aliquatenus a S. Thoma discedunt.

II. Alii Commentatores hanc quaestionem hoc loco non tractant, sed vel in II. Sent. d. 1, aut 2, vel eam penitus omittunt. — De ea praeter citatos agunt: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 13. m. 3. 4. — Scot., II. Sent. d. 2. q. 1. n. 3. seqq. — S. Thom., loc. cit. a. 1. 2; S. c. Gent. III. c. 65. — Richard. a Med., II. Sent. d. 1. a. 2. q. 1-4. — Durand., II. Sent. d. 1. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., II. Sent. d. 1. q. 7. — Biel, II. Sent. d. 2. q. 2.

III. De sequente (3.) quaest. neminem invenimus specialiter tractantem nisi Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 12. m. 2, et B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 1. q. 3. m. 3. a. 2.

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English Translation

QUESTION II.

Whether the conservation of every thing is from God.

Secondly it is asked, whether the conservation of every thing is from God. And that it is, it seems:

Fundamenta.

1. First, through Gregory1: « All things would fall back into nothing, did not the hand of the Creator hold them together »: therefore all things that are conserved are conserved by God.

2. Likewise, to-be is the act of a being, and to-live of a living being: but there is no act which is not immediately from God: therefore no to-be and no to-live2. If therefore a creature continuously is, and continuation in being is nothing other than duration, since its being cannot be except from God, the conservation of every thing is from God.

3. Likewise, nothing mutable subsists or is preserved in being except through what is immutable and fixed; but every created being is mutable and variable, at least from past to future — for as Jerome says3: « For God alone is he who knows not past or future » — therefore nothing can subsist except with God conserving it.

4. Likewise, the more an effect receives from a cause, the more it depends on it, and the more it depends on it, the less it can endure or subsist without it4; but every created thing, both what it is and what it has, has from God: therefore it is impossible that anything be conserved in being even for a moment, except with God conserving it.

5. Likewise, as essence stands to the first essence, and wisdom to the first wisdom, so duration stands to the first duration; but every essence is from the first essence, and every wisdom from the first wisdom: therefore every duration is produced from the first duration as from a principle: therefore nothing is conserved in being except through God5.

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On the contrary: 1. Augustine, in the book On the Nature of the Good, treating that which is said in Ecclesiastes, eighth [chapter]6: His word is full of power, says that « his saying is his making ». But at once, when God made the creature, together with this he disposed how long the creature ought to endure: therefore it seems that he at once gave it the power of continuing itself in being: therefore it does not seem that God further conserves it immediately. And if you say that the power given to the creature still needs the divine power cooperating at the same time; on the contrary: if his saying is his making, and saying cannot be successive, then neither [can] making; but the conservation of a creature is with succession: therefore it does not seem that that conservation is from God as from a conserver.

2. Likewise, it belongs to the nobility of a created agent that it can make a work stable of itself, not needing the artificer himself continually to sustain it; but God is an artificer much nobler and much more powerful: therefore it seems that he gives to his works such a being that they do not need7 him conserving them continually: therefore the conservation of things does not seem to be immediately from God.

3. Likewise, the same is the principle of being and of conserving8; but form sufficiently gives to each thing its being: therefore it seems that for the conservation of each thing the power of its own form suffices. And if you say that the form cannot conserve its own matter; it is plain that this is false in the soul, which has a power vegetative and governing of the body.

4. Likewise, if every thing is conserved by God immediately; since the divine power cannot fail of itself nor can be overcome by another9, it seems that no operation of a creature, neither through its own defect nor through the action of a contrary, could ever be terminated; for duration never fails without a defect of the conserving power. And it is plain that the action of many things10 is terminated: therefore it seems that the conservation of such things is not from God as from an immediate principle.

5. Likewise, suppose that a creature be left to itself; either it is conserved in being, or it is corrupted. If it is conserved in being, I have my point, namely, that not every conservation is from God. If it is corrupted; this is either by an alien action, or by its own inclination. Not by an alien action, since no creature can reduce another to nothing. Not by its own inclination, since « nature always desires what is better11 », and form seeks to be united to matter and matter to form: therefore if motion follows inclination and appetite, [the creature] will always endure and never fail: therefore the same returns as before, namely, that not every conservation is from God.

Conclusion.

The conservation of every thing is from God as from an immediate principle, yet not as from a total cause.

I respond: It must be said that not only every action, but also every conservation, must be from God. (Conclusion 1.)

And the reason of this is the necessity and neediness on the part of the creature. (Reason.) For every creature is from nothing, and has its being from elsewhere. Because it is from nothing, it is therefore in a certain manner vain and subject to vanity12; but because it has its being from elsewhere, therefore being is to it in a certain manner accidental. The contrary manner is in God; whence Hilary, in the seventh [book] On the Trinity13: « Being is not an accident to God, but a subsisting truth and an abiding cause and a natural property of his kind ». As therefore the vain cannot be propped up except by the true and stable, and the accident cannot be propped up except by a subject; so the being of a creature cannot be conserved without the munificence of the creative essence. Whence, just as a creature has essence and action, so also it has duration; and on account of this, although a creature cannot be actually infinite, nonetheless it is posited as infinite in duration. For infinity of duration does not posit in a creature any actual infinity. (To be noted.) — And the reason of this is that the power by which a creature endures is not only of the creature itself, but indeed also of the creative essence. For it is true14 that in a creature there is some power to endure; but that is not wholly in act, but rather is in potency in a certain manner with respect to that power which is infinite in act. (Conclusion 2.) And this is what the Philosopher means to say in the book On Causes15, that « all infinite powers that are dependent are [so] through one first infinite, which is the power of powers ». — Therefore the reasons are to be granted which show that the conservation of every thing is from God as from an immediate principle; yet it is not from him as from a total cause. For just as in a creature there is some created operative power, so also there is some conservative power.

Solution of the opposing [arguments].

1. To that therefore which is first objected, that his saying is his making; it must be said that this is not said immediately, on the ground that the making follows upon the saying; for God said from eternity

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and made in time; but this is said because there is no new operation on the part of God, the making itself being superadded to the saying, as happens in the operation of a creature. — Nor is it valid what is objected, that saying is not successive. For it must be said that neither the saying of God nor [his] making is successive according to that which it is, since the saying and the making of God is God and an eternal what-it-is. (To be noted.) Nevertheless, just as from the eternal the temporal can proceed, so from the divine saying, in which there is no succession, a successive duration can proceed, which indeed is successive not by reason of an exigency on the part of God conserving, but on the part of the thing conserved16.

2. To that which is objected, that a created artificer can make a work stable of itself; it must be said that it is not similar, on the ground that a created artificer so makes a thing that he does not make its intrinsic principles; for he has no power over the whole substance of the thing. And therefore the thing made can be conserved in its own17 principles, which do not depend on the power of the artificer. But it is not so in the work of God. For every work which God makes, he makes according to the whole of it; and therefore it depends totally on him and cannot be conserved without his aid.

3. To that which is objected, that the same is the principle of being and of conserving; it must be said that it is true in the genus of formal cause; and likewise it is true in the genus of efficient cause. (To be noted.) Although therefore being in a creature is from the created form as from that which informs it, nonetheless it is from God as from the efficient [cause]. Therefore, just as for the conservation of a thing the power of the completing form is necessary, so also the aid of the first and immediate efficient is necessary18.

4. To that which is objected, that if God conserved things, nothing would be corrupted; it must be said that that argument fails in two ways. First indeed, because God conserves voluntarily; and therefore he conserves only as much as pleases him, and according to the disposition of his wisdom. — Furthermore, the conservation of a thing is not from God as from a total cause, but there is required on the part of the creature an aptitude for conservation, and a power in a certain manner conservative, upon whose swifter or slower defect follows a longer or less long duration of the creature; and when there is an aptitude in the creature for enduring in perpetuity, such as simplicity, God continues its being eternally. (To be noted.)

5. To that which is asked, whether, if a creature were left to itself, it would be corrupted; I say that it would. — And if he should ask whether [it would be corrupted] by some agent, or not; I say that by no agent, but on account of a defect in itself. For such a corruption, which is annihilation, denotes a pure defect; and therefore it requires not an efficient cause, but a deficient one; and this is in a creature from this, that it is from nothing. — And if he should object that the natural inclination of every thing is to endure in being, and that motion follows inclination; it must be said that this is true of the inclination of motion stating a position. (To be noted.) It is also true of the principles of a thing preserved in being, upon which that inclination is founded. But if a creature were left to itself, the principles of the thing would not be preserved in being, but rather would fail in themselves; and therefore the inclination to being would perish19. — It could also be said otherwise, that when it is posited that a creature is left to itself, it is posited that the divine power withdraws itself; and when it is posited that the divine power withdraws itself, consequently the annihilation of the creature is posited. (Otherwise.) For just as through the operation20 of the infinite power there can be an eduction from nothing into being, so also through withdrawal there can be an annihilation; and to this extent Hugh says21 that annihilation of a creature is possible to the divine power alone. Nevertheless that statement must be understood soundly, since it is very open to cavil.

Scholion

I. That creatures are conserved through God's immediate influx, yet in such a way that secondary causes are not wholly excluded from the conservation, is certain doctrine. Moreover St. Thomas teaches (S. 1. q. 104. a. 1. ad 4) « that the conservation of things by God is not through some new action, but through the continuation of the action by which he gives being, which action indeed is without motion and time; just as also the conservation of light in the air is through the continuous influx from the sun ». Scotus agrees wholly in this, and also S. Bonaventure, whose doctrine here handed down is illustrated by what he says above at d. 2. p. I. a. 1. q. 3 concerning the duration of aeviternal things, where he also says that being, given through creation, « is continued through the continuous influence of God » (cfr. also I. Sent. d. 9. q. 4); but in this question he adds that conservation is not immediately from God as from a total cause. — Henry of Ghent (Quodl. 10. q. 7, Quodl. 1. q. 9) wholly denies that God by the same action creates and conserves things, just as by the same action light is caused and conserved in the medium; and at the same time he strives to prove by many arguments that the being of a created thing does not really differ from its essence; which opinion has pleased many later [authors] also. Richard of Middleton and Durandus too, in this question, depart somewhat from St. Thomas.

II. Other Commentators do not treat this question in this place, but either in II. Sent. d. 1, or 2, or omit it entirely. — Besides those cited, the following treat of it: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II. q. 13. m. 3. 4. — Scotus, II. Sent. d. 2. q. 1. n. 3. seqq. — St. Thomas, in the place cited a. 1. 2; Summa contra Gentiles III. c. 65. — Richard of Middleton, II. Sent. d. 1. a. 2. q. 1-4. — Durandus, II. Sent. d. 1. q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, II. Sent. d. 1. q. 7. — Biel, II. Sent. d. 2. q. 2.

III. Concerning the following (3rd) question we have found no one treating specifically except Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II. q. 12. m. 2, and B. Albert, Summa p. II. tr. 1. q. 3. m. 3. a. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Libr. XVI. Moral. c. 37. n. 43: Cuncta quippe ex nihilo facta sunt eorumque essentia rursum ad nihilum tenderet, nisi eam Auctor omnium regiminis manu retineret.
    Book XVI. Moralia c. 37. n. 43: For all things were made from nothing, and their essence would again tend toward nothing, did not the Author of all hold it back with the hand of his governance.
  2. Cfr. Liber de Causis, propos. 1. et 18. Cfr. etiam August., XIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 25, nec non IV. de Gen. ad lit. c. 12. n. 22. seq. et IX. c. 15. n. 27.
    Cfr. the Book on Causes, propositions 1 and 18. Cfr. also Augustine, XIII. On the City of God c. 25, and also IV. On Genesis to the Letter c. 12. n. 22. seq. and IX. c. 15. n. 27.
  3. De hoc dicto, quod etiam a Magistro, I. Sent. d. VIII. c. 1, Hieronymo tribuitur, sed Isidori est, vide tom. I. pag. 146, nota 4. — In hoc testimonio pro novit Vat. substituit notat. In edd. 2, 3 desunt verba sicut enim dicit Hieronymus usque ad ergo nihil.
    Concerning this saying, which is also attributed to Jerome by the Master, I. Sent. d. VIII. c. 1, but is Isidore's, see tom. I. p. 146, note 4. — In this testimony, for novit the Vatican [edition] substitutes notat. In edd. 2, 3 the words sicut enim dicit Hieronymus down to ergo nihil are wanting.
  4. August., VIII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 12. n. 26: Aer praesente lumine non factus est lucidus, sed fit; quia si factus esset, non autem fieret, etiam absente lumine lucidus maneret. Cfr. Liber de Causis, propos. 1.
    Augustine, VIII. On Genesis to the Letter c. 12. n. 26: The air, when light is present, has not been made bright, but is being made [bright]; because if it had been made, but were not being made, it would remain bright even with the light absent. Cfr. the Book on Causes, proposition 1.
  5. Cfr. Anselm., Monolog. c. 13.
    Cfr. Anselm, Monologion c. 13.
  6. Vers. 4. — Verba, quae hic ut ex Augustini libro de Natura boni desumta signantur, ibi non habentur. In libro autem cit. (c. 24-27.) Augustinus exponens illud Ioan. 1, 1: In principio erat Verbum etc., dicit, quod Deus omnia quae fecit, « non de se genuerit, sed in verbo atque imperio fecerit ». Lyranus verba Augustino tributa ut Glossam interlinearem exhibet. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 27. p. II. q. 2.
    Verse 4. — The words which here are marked as taken from Augustine's book On the Nature of the Good are not found there. But in the cited book (c. 24-27) Augustine, expounding that of John 1, 1: In the beginning was the Word etc., says that God all the things which he made « did not generate from himself, but made by word and command ». Lyranus presents the words attributed to Augustine as an interlinear Gloss. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 27. p. II. q. 2.
  7. Ed. 1 et Vat. indigeat.
    Ed. 1 and the Vatican [edition] [read] indigeat.
  8. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 47. (c. 4.): Generat autem nihil ipsum se ipsum, sed conservat.
    Aristotle, II. On the Soul, text 47 (c. 4): But nothing generates itself, but conserves [itself].
  9. Ita cod. T correctus a prima manu. Codd., Vat., edd. 2, 3, 4 separari, ed. 1 ab alia separari, cod. bb ab illo separari.
    Thus cod. T corrected by the first hand. The codices, the Vatican [edition], edd. 2, 3, 4 [read] separari, ed. 1 ab alia separari, cod. bb ab illo separari.
  10. Edd. praeter 1 multarum.
    The editions except 1 [read] multarum.
  11. Ut ait Aristoteles. Cfr. supra pag. 341, nota 1. — Idem dicit I. Phys. text. 81. (c. 9.), materiam appetere formam.
    As Aristotle says. Cfr. above p. 341, note 1. — He says the same, I. Physics text 81 (c. 9), that matter desires form.
  12. Rom. 8, 20.
    Romans 8, 20.
  13. Num. 11. Textus originalis loco Deo habet nomen. — Cfr. de his rationibus I. Sent. d. 37. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. in corp.
    Number 11. The original text, in place of Deo, has nomen. — Cfr. concerning these reasons I. Sent. d. 37. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. in the body.
  14. Edd., excepta 1, cum paucis codd., ut bb ee, etiam.
    The editions, except 1, with a few codices, such as bb ee, [read] etiam.
  15. Propos. 16. — Cfr. supra d. 2. p. I. a. 1. q. 3. in corp.
    Proposition 16. — Cfr. above d. 2. p. I. a. 1. q. 3. in the body.
  16. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 27. p. II. q. 1. seqq. nec non d. 36. a. 1. q. 2, a. 2. q. 1. et a. 3. q. 1. — Aliquanto superius Vat. et edd. 3, 4 omittunt verba: Dicendum enim usque ad successivum inclusive.
    Cfr. I. Sent. d. 27. p. II. q. 1. seqq. and also d. 36. a. 1. q. 2, a. 2. q. 1. and a. 3. q. 1. — Somewhat above, the Vatican [edition] and edd. 3, 4 omit the words: Dicendum enim down to successivum inclusive.
  17. Edd. 2, 3 primis, Vat. primis et propriis.
    Edd. 2, 3 [read] primis, the Vatican [edition] primis et propriis.
  18. Vide supra d. 19. a. 3. q. 1. ad 3.
    See above d. 19. a. 3. q. 1. ad 3.
  19. Cfr. supra d. 19. a. 3. q. 1. ad 4, et I. Sent. d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. — Edd. 3, 4 et Vat. conservarentur pro servarentur.
    Cfr. above d. 19. a. 3. q. 1. ad 4, and I. Sent. d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. — Edd. 3, 4 and the Vatican [edition] [read] conservarentur for servarentur.
  20. Codd. plurimi et ed. 1, 2, 3 comparationem.
    Very many codices and edd. 1, 2, 3 [read] comparationem.
  21. Libr. I. de Sacram. p. VI. c. 37. Vide supra pag. 729, nota 6 et pag. 854, nota 4.
    Book I. On the Sacraments p. VI. c. 37. See above p. 729, note 6 and p. 854, note 4.
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