Bonaventure

Quaestio II. Utrum liberum arbitrium, omni gratia destitutum, possit alicui tentationi resistere.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium, omni gratia destitutum, possit alicui tentationi resistere. Et quod sic, videtur.

Argumenta pro parte affirmativa.

1. Gregorius in Moralibus¹: «Debilis est hostis, qui non vincit nisi volentem». Sed quod quis voluntarie facit, potest non facere: ergo si voluntarie quis consentit adversario, potest etiam gratia destitutus non consentire, ac per hoc tentationi resistere.

2. Item, liberum arbitrium, omni gratia destitutum, adhuc liberum est; si liberum est, ergo non potest cogi: ergo potest repugnare diabolicae suggestioni; et si hoc: ergo et resistere non solum uni, sed etiam omni tentationi.

3. Item, bonum potentius est quam quodlibet malum²; sed liberum arbitrium, omni gratia destitutum, adhuc habet naturale iudicatorium, quod inest ei per naturam: ergo cum illud sit bonum, potentius est et peccato et concupiscentia et tentatione diabolica inclinante ad malum; et si hoc: ergo potest non solum uni, sed etiam cuilibet tentationi resistere.

4. Item, cum sit «triplex posse, videlicet gratiae, naturae et vitii», secundum quod dicitur in Glossa, ad Romanos septimo³; posse gratiae addit supra posse naturae; sed posse vitii diminuit: ergo posse naturae est supra posse vitii: ergo circumscripta omni gratia, manente sola naturali potentia, videtur, quod liberum arbitrium resistere possit vitio impellenti.

5. Item, sicut liberum arbitrium vertibile est ad malum, ita quaelibet creatura vertibilis est in non-esse⁴; sed multae creaturae conservantur in esse sine aliqua gratia gratis data per naturalia principia et divinam praesentiam: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod per liberum arbitrium, gratia destitutum, propria virtute absque aliquo dono gratiae supra apposito possit aliquis casum in peccatum effugere.

6. Item, «daemones habent sibi data integra et splendidissima⁵», ergo multo fortius liberum arbitrium hominis lapsi; sed liberum arbitrium non lapsum per se poterat tentationi resistere: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod liberum arbitrium lapsum hoc possit, etiam si sit omni gratia destitutum. Si forte tu dicas, quod etsi sit integrum quantum ad naturam potentiae, infirmatum tamen est et diminutum quantum ad habilitatem consequentem, adeo ut non possit resistere; tunc ego quaero: aut potest, aut non potest. Si potest, habeo propositum. Si non potest; et nullus est inculpandus in eo quod vitare non potest: ergo aut liberum arbitrium non resistendo tentationi non peccaret, aut in peccando non esset vituperabile. Sed utrumque horum est impossibile: ergo restat alterum, scilicet quod possit tentationi resistere.

Contra:

1. Matthaei sexto⁶: Et ne nos inducas in tentationem, dicitur in oratione dominica; sed nullus ab altero postulat quod potest per se ipsum: si ergo homo hoc sapienter petit a Deo, videtur, quod hoc non possit homo per liberum arbitrium absque aliquo dono gratuito.

2. Item, Augustinus, definiens liberum arbitrium, sicut habitum est supra distinctione vigesima quarta⁷, dicit, quod liberum arbitrium «est facultas voluntatis et rationis, qua bonum eligitur, gratia assistente, et malum, gratia desistente». Si igitur haec ratio recta est; nisi adsit divina gratia, semper liberum arbitrium malum eliget: ergo nulli tentationi resistet.

3. Item, super illud ad Romanos septimo⁸: Velle adiacet mihi etc., Glossa: «Naturale est quodam modo velle bonum per rationem; sed tale est hoc velle, quod semper vi carnis superatur»: ergo videtur, quod absque adiutorio gratiae semper, cum tentatur, consentiat homo culpae.

4. Item, liberum arbitrium in praeeligendo semper sequitur affectum praedominantem, et hoc expresse declarat Anselmus in libro de Libero Arbitrio⁹, et per experimentum est manifestum; sed absque gratia, saltem gratis data, libero arbitrio corrupto, regnat amor proprii boni: ergo videtur, quod semper illud praeeligat, quantum est de se, nisi gratia divina assistat: ergo idem quod prius.

5. Item, mors non inest nobis nisi per peccatum¹⁰: ergo ubi est necessitas moriendi, videtur, quod nisi adsit gratia Dei, sit similiter necessitas et peccandi; sed ubi est necessitas peccandi, non est potestas resistendi tentationi: si igitur hanc habet liberum arbitrium, prout est gratia destitutum; patet etc.

6. Item, habens pedem claudum, cum ambulat, necesse habet claudicare: ergo si pes spiritualis est habens affectum deordinatum et obliquum, necessario claudicat in suo actu¹¹: ergo necessario liberum arbitrium, gratia destitutum, cum sit lapsum et obliquatum, praecipitabitur in peccatum. Quodsi hoc, impossibile est, quod absque dono gratiae tentationi resistat.

Conclusio

Hominis liberum arbitrium, omni gratia destitutum, nec omni potest tentationi resistere, nec necesse habet omni tentationi succumbere.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod aliqui senserunt, liberum arbitrium secundum statum, in quo nunc est, absque munere gratiae omni posse tentationi resistere propria virtute; quia si hoc non esset, peccatum ei imputari non deberet. — Sed haec positio plane falsa est et contra sacram Scripturam et contra Sanctorum testimonia. Si enim nemo potest resistere tentationi de luxuria nisi per continentiam, nemo tentationi de infidelitate nisi per fidem; continentiam autem et fidem non contingit habere absque dono divinae gratiae, iuxta illud quod dicitur Sapientiae octavo¹²: Non possum esse continens etc., et primae ad Corinthios duodecimo: Alii datur fides in eodem spiritu: planum est ex ipsa sacra Scriptura, quod liberum arbitrium absque munere gratiae non potest omni tentationi resistere. Hoc etiam multipliciter probat Augustinus in libro de Perfectione iustitiae hominis¹³, et de Natura et gratia; et in libro de Vera Religione dicit expresse, quod qui non vult ab alio superari, necesse habet alii invidere; et ita vir superbus necesse habet peccare aliquando peccato invidiae; similiter et in aliis generibus peccatorum intelligendum est esse. Et propterea illa positio Pelagii tanquam erronea repudianda est. — Hoc autem fuit quod decepit Pelagium, quod liberum arbitrium nunquam destituitur omni gratia gratis data; et ipse posse gratiae attribuit ipsi naturae. Superbia enim excaecatus, nescivit distinguere inter dona naturalia et gratuita.

Aliorum vero positio fuit, quod liberum arbitrium lapsum, omni gratia destitutum, nulli posset tentationi resistere, pro eo quod lapsum est et in lapsu suo adeo est infirmatum et obliquatum, quod, nisi adsit divinae misericordiae donum, incurvatur ad omne malum, quod sibi suggeritur et offertur. Et innituntur super illam Glossam, quae dicit super illud Psalmi¹⁴: Immissiones per angelos malos: «Diabolus potestatem habet in peccatore sicut in proprio pecore». Et ex hoc arguunt, quod nisi adsit divinum auxilium, faciet illud pro voluntate sua ruere de peccato in peccatum. Et iterum alia Glossa super primum Habacuc¹⁵: «Nesciebam, eum tantam potestatem accepisse, ut viribus eius nemo posset resistere». Hoc intelligendum est esse dictum per se, absque auxilio divinae gratiae. Et si tu obiicias eis, quod tunc homo non esset culpandus, respondent per illud quod dicitur in Glossa, ad Romanos septimo¹⁶: Non ego operor, sed quod habitat in me peccatum; ibi Glossa: «Nunquid, quia invitum hominem dicit peccare, immunis videri debet a crimine? Non utique; ipsius enim vitio et desiderio haec coepta sunt. Quia enim mancipavit se per assensum peccato, iure dominatur illius».

Sed quia illud valde durum videtur dicere, quod liberum arbitrium in statu tali nulli posset tentationi resistere, cum naturale habeat iudicatorium et quendam instinctum naturalem, remurmurantem contra malum, non sit etiam in malo confirmatum: ideo est tertia via, medium tenens inter haec duo extrema, quod liberum arbitrium, omni gratia destitutum, nec omni posset tentationi resistere, nec necesse haberet omni tentationi succumbere. Non posset, inquam, omni resistere propter suam instabilitatem et infirmitatem, iuxta illud Threnorum primo¹⁷: Peccatum peccavit Ierusalem, propterea instabilis facta est; et Glossa super illud Threnorum tertio: Misericordiae Domini etc.: «Non potest homo diu stare contra insultus diaboli, nisi misericordia Domini adiuvetur». Unde si contingeret, hominem resistere uni tentationi, tantum possent¹⁸ multiplicari, quod, nisi divinum auxilium adesset, necesse haberet homo deici, sicut ponitur exemplum in foraminibus navis, per quae ingreditur aqua. Potest etiam poni exemplum in pugile, qui, cum se cooperit ex una parte contra ictum et ex altera quasi discooperit, a magis experto pugnatore laeditur. Sic et diabolus frequenter facit pluribus, quibus praetendit tentationem de luxuria; et ex hoc quod non consentiunt, facit ipsos prosilire in superbiam; nec unquam potest evitare homo, quin in aliquam tentationem incidat, et hoc propter suam instabilitatem. — Propter suam etiam infirmitatem necesse haberet in aliquam tentationem incidere. Cum enim sit obtenebratus ignorantia et alligatus carnis concupiscentia, tentationes carnis et infidelitatis non posset evadere, quin eis aliquando consentiret, nisi adiuvaretur aliquo munere divinae gratiae.

Per iam dicta patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam, patet etiam pro parte responsio ad obiecta. Illae enim rationes, quae primo probant, quod contingat tentationi resistere, si concluderent de tentatione in particulari, concedendae essent; quia vero concludunt, quod contingat absque gratia omni tentationi resistere, ideo oportet eas dissolvere.

Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod diabolus non vincit nisi volentem; dicendum, quod verum est; aliqua tamen sunt, quae sic volumus, quod ad illa voluntas nostra necessario inclinatur propter corruptionem originalis culpae, nisi adsit aliquod munus gratiae, per quod relevetur et dirigatur; et ideo, quamvis vincat volentem, non tamen sequitur, quod homo absque gratia possit resistere.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod liberum arbitrium non potest cogi, iam patet responsio. Non enim est ibi coactio, sed tanta est ad malum inclinatio et voluntatis pronitas, quod, nisi esset aliud sustentans, necesse haberet motu voluntatis aliquando in malum incidere.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod bonum est potentius malo; dicendum, quod verum est per se loquendo; sed quando bonum subiicit se malo, malum tunc operatur per virtutem boni et subiicit sibi bonum; et per hunc modum in homine habet regnare peccatum, sicut dicit Apostolus¹⁹: Non regnet peccatum in vestro mortali corpore.

4. Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens, quod obiicitur de velle naturae et de velle vitii. Velle enim vitii praesupponit velle²⁰ naturae, et ipsam naturam deordinando efficitur ipso velle naturae potentius, sicut videmus in aliquo morbo, qui adhaeret virtuti naturali.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod vertibilitas naturae stabilitur absque munere gratiae superadditae; dicendum, quod non est simile; quia, etsi natura propter defectum sit vertibilis in non-esse, tamen totum, quod in ipsa est, naturaliter et determinate appetit esse. Et quia Deus conservat rem, secundum quod appetit:

ideo sola divina praesentia per propriam naturam conservat creaturas. Liberum autem arbitrium lapsum indifferenter appetit licita et illicita, et prohibita et concessa, et cum magno impetu tendit ad malum: ideo ad hoc, quod stabiliatur, necessarium est ei aliquod gratiae donum.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod liberum arbitrium integrum est: respondendum, sicut dicebatur in opponendo²¹, quod hoc intelligitur quantum ad essentiam potentiarum, non quantum ad perfectionem habilitatum consequentium. — Et si quaeratur ulterius, utrum possit resistere, vel non; dicendum, quod de aliqua tentatione per se non potest; si tamen consentiat, non est a culpa immune, propter hoc quod adiutorium gratiae sibi praesto est, si vellet suscipere; propter hoc etiam, quia ex propria sua culpa devenit in illam necessitatem. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus²², quod «quia homo noluit vitare peccatum, dum potuit; inflictum est ei, ut non possit, cum velit». Hoc etiam dicit Magister supra distinctione vigesima quinta²³, quod «post peccatum ante reparationem gratiae liberum arbitrium premitur a concupiscentia et vincitur; et ideo potest peccare et non potest non peccare, etiam damnabiliter». — Et sic patet, quod rationes concludentes, liberum arbitrium per se tentationi posse resistere, non cogunt de necessitate.

Ad obiecta pro parte negativa:

1. Ad rationes vero ad oppositum, quibus ostenditur, quod non possit tentationi resistere; facile est respondere. Si enim concludant, quod necesse haberet aliquando cadere; de plano sunt concedendae. Si autem quis per eas velit arguere de libero arbitrio, quod in omni tentatione succumberet; responderi potest ad primum de oratione, quod illud petitur, non quia non possit alicui tentationi resistere, sed quia non potest omni resistere per se.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod libero arbitrio eligitur malum, gratia desistente; dicendum, quod illud non intelligitur semper, sed aliquando.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod velle naturae semper superatur; dicendum, quod hoc non intelligitur, quia in omni tentatione discedat homo a naturali rectitudine voluntatis, sed quia illa rectitudo non est tantae virtutis, quod possit absque gratia Dei eripere hominem a servitute peccati.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de necessitate moriendi, dicendum, quod necessitas moriendi non inest homini propter peccatum, quod inest, sed propter peccatum, quod infuit²⁴. Unde illud non concludit, quod necessarium sit, hominem peccare, sed quod necessarium sit, hominem peccare, vel peccasse.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod liberum arbitrium sequitur affectum praedominantem; dicendum, quod affectus non praedominatur in homine respectu cuiuslibet mali, quod suggeritur, sicut patet, cum avaro suggeritur bonorum suorum dissipatio, vel prodigo bonorum suorum retentio; et ideo non sequitur, quod consentiat omni peccato. Praeterea, qui afficitur circa aliquid in habitu, potest ex aliqua consideratione magis affici circa eius oppositum in actu, sicut homo frequenter irascitur circa rem, quam multum diligit.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de claudicatione pedis, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia actus ambulationis nunquam separari potest a dispositione claudicationis in pede claudo. Non sic autem est de actu affectionis respectu deordinationis, quae est in libero arbitrio, propter multitudinem motuum et affectuum, qui consurgunt in nobis ex diversitate considerationum, sicut praetactum est, ob quam modo movetur homo ad unum, modo ad eius oppositum, et ideo aliquando motu recto, aliquando obliquo. Per haec autem, quae dicta sunt, patet responsio ad obiecta, et etiam ad consimilia, quae obiici possunt in hac materia.

Ad illas autem duas Glossas, quae in solvendo adductae sunt, quibus videtur innui, quod liberum arbitrium absque gratia omni tentationi non possit resistere; dicendum, quod intelligendae sunt, non quia diabolus plenum posse habeat super hominem quantum ad actum tentandi, et quod homo nullo modo possit ei resistere; sed hoc intelligitur quantum ad hoc, quod posse habet in eius morte ad infernalia supplicia, nullo impediente, pertrahere, ita quod homo viribus eius non potest resistere.

Question II. Whether free choice, deprived of all grace, can resist any temptation.

Secondly it is asked whether free choice, deprived of all grace, can resist any temptation. And that it can, it seems.

Arguments for the affirmative.

1. Gregory in the Morals¹: "Weak is the enemy who does not conquer save the one willing." But what someone does voluntarily, he can not-do: therefore if someone voluntarily consents to the adversary, even one deprived of grace can not-consent, and through this resist temptation.

2. Likewise, free choice, deprived of all grace, is still free; if it is free, then it cannot be compelled: therefore it can resist the diabolical suggestion; and if so: therefore it can also resist not only one, but even every temptation.

3. Likewise, the good is more powerful than any evil whatever²; but free choice, deprived of all grace, still has the natural faculty of judgment, which is in it by nature: therefore, since that is a good, it is more powerful than sin and concupiscence and the diabolical temptation inclining to evil; and if so: therefore it can resist not only one, but any temptation whatever.

4. Likewise, since there is a "threefold power, namely of grace, of nature, and of vice," according to what is said in the Gloss on Romans 7³; the power of grace adds upon the power of nature; but the power of vice diminishes: therefore the power of nature is above the power of vice: therefore, every grace being set aside, with the natural power alone remaining, it seems that free choice can resist the impelling vice.

5. Likewise, just as free choice is changeable toward evil, so every creature is changeable into non-being⁴; but many creatures are conserved in being without any freely given grace, through natural principles and the divine presence: therefore by parity of reason it seems that through free choice, deprived of grace, by its own power without any superadded gift of grace, someone can escape a fall into sin.

6. Likewise, "the demons have given to them intact and most splendid [gifts]⁵," therefore much more the free choice of fallen man; but unfallen free choice could of itself resist temptation: therefore by parity of reason it seems that fallen free choice can do this, even if it be deprived of all grace. But if perhaps you say that, although it be intact as to the nature of the power, it is nevertheless weakened and diminished as to the consequent capacity, so that it cannot resist; then I ask: either it can, or it cannot. If it can, I have my point. If it cannot; and no one is to be blamed for what he cannot avoid: therefore either free choice would not sin by not resisting temptation, or in sinning it would not be blameworthy. But both of these are impossible: therefore the other remains, namely that it can resist temptation.

On the contrary:

1. Matthew 6⁶: And lead us not into temptation, is said in the Lord's Prayer; but no one asks of another what he can do through himself: if therefore man wisely asks this of God, it seems that man cannot do this through free choice without some gratuitous gift.

2. Likewise, Augustine, in defining free choice, as was held above in distinction 24⁷, says that free choice "is a faculty of will and reason, by which the good is chosen, grace assisting, and the evil, grace withdrawing." If therefore this account is correct; unless divine grace be present, free choice will always choose the evil: therefore it will resist no temptation.

3. Likewise, on that passage of Romans 7⁸: To will is present with me, etc., the Gloss: "It is natural in a certain way to will the good through reason; but this willing is such that it is always overcome by the force of the flesh": therefore it seems that without the help of grace man always, when he is tempted, consents to the fault.

4. Likewise, free choice in pre-choosing always follows the predominant affection, and this Anselm expressly declares in the book On Free Choice⁹, and it is manifest by experience; but without grace, at least freely given, when free choice is corrupted, the love of one's own good reigns: therefore it seems that it always pre-chooses that, so far as concerns itself, unless divine grace assist: therefore the same as before.

5. Likewise, death is not in us except through sin¹⁰: therefore where there is a necessity of dying, it seems that, unless God's grace be present, there is likewise a necessity also of sinning; but where there is a necessity of sinning, there is no power of resisting temptation: if therefore free choice has this, insofar as it is deprived of grace; it is clear, etc.

6. Likewise, one having a lame foot, when he walks, must limp: therefore if the spiritual foot is one having a disordered and crooked affection, it necessarily limps in its act¹¹: therefore necessarily free choice, deprived of grace, since it is fallen and made crooked, will be cast headlong into sin. But if this is so, it is impossible that without the gift of grace it should resist temptation.

Conclusion

Man's free choice, deprived of all grace, neither can resist every temptation, nor must it succumb to every temptation.

I respond: For understanding the foregoing it must be noted that some held that free choice, according to the state in which it now is, without the gift of grace can by its own power resist every temptation; for if this were not so, sin ought not to be imputed to it. — But this position is plainly false and against sacred Scripture and against the testimonies of the Saints. For if no one can resist the temptation of lust except through continence, no one the temptation of unbelief except through faith; but it does not befall one to have continence and faith without the gift of divine grace, according to what is said in Wisdom 8¹²: I cannot be continent, etc., and in 1 Corinthians 12: To another is given faith in the same spirit: it is plain from sacred Scripture itself that free choice without the gift of grace cannot resist every temptation. This too Augustine proves in many ways in the book On the Perfection of Man's Righteousness¹³, and On Nature and Grace; and in the book On True Religion he says expressly that he who does not wish to be surpassed by another must envy the other; and so the proud man must sometimes sin by the sin of envy; and likewise it is to be understood to be so in the other kinds of sins. And therefore that position of Pelagius is to be repudiated as erroneous. — Now this is what deceived Pelagius, that free choice is never deprived of all freely given grace; and he attributed the power of grace to nature itself. For, blinded by pride, he did not know how to distinguish between natural and gratuitous gifts.

But the position of others was that fallen free choice, deprived of all grace, could resist no temptation, for the reason that it is fallen and in its fall is so weakened and made crooked that, unless the gift of divine mercy be present, it is bent down to every evil that is suggested and offered to it. And they rely upon that Gloss which says on that passage of the Psalm¹⁴: Sending [evils] by evil angels: "The devil has power over the sinner as over his own beast." And from this they argue that, unless divine help be present, he will make it rush of its own will from sin into sin. And again another Gloss on Habakkuk 1¹⁵: "I did not know that he had received such great power that no one could resist his strength." This is to be understood as said of itself, without the help of divine grace. And if you object to them that then man would not be blameworthy, they answer by what is said in the Gloss on Romans 7¹⁶: It is not I who work, but the sin that dwells in me; there the Gloss: "Is it the case that, because he says man sins unwillingly, he ought to seem free from crime? By no means; for through his own vice and desire these things were begun. For because he handed himself over by assent to sin, it rightly has dominion over him."

But because it seems very harsh to say that free choice in such a state could resist no temptation, since it has a natural faculty of judgment and a certain natural instinct murmuring against evil, and is not confirmed in evil: therefore there is a third way, holding the mean between these two extremes, namely that free choice, deprived of all grace, neither could resist every temptation, nor would it have to succumb to every temptation. It could not, I say, resist every one because of its instability and weakness, according to that of Lamentations 1¹⁷: Jerusalem has grievously sinned, therefore it has become unstable; and the Gloss on that passage of Lamentations 3: The mercies of the Lord, etc.: "Man cannot long stand against the assaults of the devil, unless he be helped by the mercy of the Lord." Hence if it should happen that a man resists one temptation, they could¹⁸ be multiplied so much that, unless divine help were present, the man would have to be cast down, as the example is given of the holes in a ship, through which water enters. An example can also be given in a boxer who, when he covers himself on one side against a blow and as it were uncovers himself on the other, is wounded by a more expert fighter. So too the devil frequently does to many, to whom he holds out the temptation of lust; and from the fact that they do not consent, he makes them leap forth into pride; nor can man ever avoid falling into some temptation, and this because of his instability. — Because of his weakness too he would have to fall into some temptation. For since he is darkened by ignorance and bound by the concupiscence of the flesh, he could not escape the temptations of the flesh and of unbelief without sometimes consenting to them, unless he were helped by some gift of divine grace.

By what has now been said the answer to the question proposed is clear, and the answer to the objections is in part clear too. For those reasons which first prove that one can resist temptation, if they concluded about temptation in particular, would have to be granted; but because they conclude that one can resist every temptation without grace, therefore they must be dissolved.

To the arguments for the affirmative:

1. To that, then, which is first objected, that the devil conquers only the one willing; it must be said that it is true; yet there are some things which we will in such a way that our will is necessarily inclined toward them because of the corruption of original fault, unless there be present some gift of grace by which it may be relieved and directed; and therefore, although he conquers the one willing, it does not nevertheless follow that man can resist without grace.

2. To that which is objected, that free choice cannot be compelled, the answer is already clear. For there is no coercion there, but so great is the inclination to evil and the proneness of the will that, unless there were something else sustaining it, it would have to fall sometimes into evil by the motion of the will.

3. To that which is objected, that the good is more powerful than the evil; it must be said that it is true, speaking absolutely; but when the good subjects itself to the evil, the evil then works through the power of the good and subjects the good to itself; and in this manner sin comes to reign in man, as the Apostle says¹⁹: Let not sin reign in your mortal body.

4. And by this the answer to what follows is clear, which is objected about the willing of nature and the willing of vice. For the willing of vice presupposes the willing²⁰ of nature, and by disordering nature itself it is made more powerful than the willing of nature itself, as we see in some disease which clings to a natural power.

5. To that which is objected, that the changeableness of nature is stabilized without the gift of superadded grace; it must be said that it is not similar; because, although nature on account of defect is changeable into non-being, nevertheless the whole of what is in it naturally and determinately desires to be. And because God conserves a thing according as it desires: therefore the divine presence alone, through their proper nature, conserves creatures. But fallen free choice indifferently desires things lawful and unlawful, and forbidden and permitted, and with great impetus tends to evil: therefore, in order that it be stabilized, some gift of grace is necessary for it.

6. To that which is objected, that free choice is intact: it must be answered, as was being said in the objecting²¹, that this is understood as to the essence of the powers, not as to the perfection of the consequent capacities. — And if it be further asked whether it can resist, or not; it must be said that of some temptation it cannot of itself; if nevertheless it should consent, it is not immune from fault, because the help of grace is at hand for it, if it should will to receive it; and also because by its own fault it came into that necessity. And this is what Augustine says²², that "because man was unwilling to avoid sin while he could, it was inflicted on him that he cannot, even when he wills." This too the Master says above in distinction 25²³, that "after sin, before the repair of grace, free choice is pressed by concupiscence and overcome; and therefore it can sin and cannot not-sin, even damnably." — And so it is clear that the reasons concluding that free choice can of itself resist temptation do not compel of necessity.

To the objections for the negative:

1. To the reasons for the opposite, by which it is shown that it cannot resist temptation; it is easy to answer. For if they conclude that it would have to fall sometimes; they are plainly to be granted. But if anyone should wish through them to argue concerning free choice that it would succumb in every temptation; it can be answered to the first, concerning the prayer, that it is asked, not because it cannot resist some temptation, but because it cannot resist every one of itself.

2. To that which is objected, that by free choice evil is chosen, grace withdrawing; it must be said that that is not understood always, but sometimes.

3. To that which is objected, that the willing of nature is always overcome; it must be said that this is not understood as if in every temptation man departs from the natural rectitude of the will, but because that rectitude is not of such power that it can without God's grace rescue man from the servitude of sin.

4. To that which is objected about the necessity of dying, it must be said that the necessity of dying is not in man on account of the sin that is present, but on account of the sin that was present²⁴. Hence that does not conclude that it is necessary for man to sin, but that it is necessary for man to sin, or to have sinned.

5. To that which is objected, that free choice follows the predominant affection; it must be said that the affection does not predominate in man with respect to every evil that is suggested, as is clear, when to the miser the squandering of his goods is suggested, or to the prodigal the retention of his goods; and therefore it does not follow that he consents to every sin. Moreover, he who is affected toward something in habit can from some consideration be more affected toward its opposite in act, as a man frequently is angry over a thing which he greatly loves.

6. To that which is objected about the limping of the foot, it must be said that it is not similar, because the act of walking can never be separated from the disposition of limping in a lame foot. But it is not so concerning the act of affection with respect to the disorder which is in free choice, because of the multitude of motions and affections which arise in us from the diversity of considerations, as was touched on, by which a man is moved now to one thing, now to its opposite, and therefore sometimes by a straight motion, sometimes by a crooked one. By these things, however, which have been said, the answer to the objections is clear, and also to similar ones which can be objected in this matter.

But to those two Glosses, which were adduced in the solving, by which it seems to be intimated that free choice without grace cannot resist every temptation; it must be said that they are to be understood, not as if the devil had full power over man as to the act of tempting, and that man could in no way resist him; but this is understood as to this, that he has the power, in man's death, to drag [him] to infernal punishments, with nothing hindering, so that man cannot resist his strength.