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Dist. 2, Art. 3, Q. 1

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 2

Textus Latinus
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Articulus III. De natura assumta quoad medii necessitatem.

Consequenter quaeritur de natura assumta quantum ad medii necessitatem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum caro assumta fuerit a Verbo mediante spiritu humano.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum1 assumta fuerit a Verbo mediante habitu gratuito.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum tota humana natura assumta fuerit mediante Spiritu sancto.

Quaestio I. Utrum corpus unitum fuerit Verbo mediante spiritu humano sive anima.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum corpus unitum fuerit Verbo mediante spiritu humano sive anima. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Primo auctoritate Damasceni, quam Magister inducit in littera2: « Unitum est carni Verbum Dei per medium intellectum ».

2. Item, Gregorius3: « Carnem deitas mediante anima suscepit ».

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3. Item, Augustinus hoc ipsum ad Volusianum4: « Animam rationalem et per ipsam corpus humanum aptavit sibi ».

4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione. Extrema multum distantia non uniuntur nisi per medium aliquod; sed corporeum creatum et corruptibile, et increatum incorporeum et incorruptibile sunt maxime distantia: ergo uniuntur per aliquod medium, quod quidem sit creatum et incorporeum. Sed talis est spiritus rationalis5: ergo etc.

5. Item, maioris dignitatis est esse unitum divinitati quam esse glorificatum; sed corpus non est habile ad glorificationem nisi mediante anima6: ergo nec ad unionem.

6. Item, circumscripta anima, corpus humanum minus est nobile, quam sit brutalis spiritus, quia substantia spiritualis dignior est corporali; sed animal brutum non habet congruentiam ad unionem7 ergo nec corpus humanum per se ipsum. Si ergo congruentiam habet, hoc est mediante spiritu vel intellectu.

Sed contra: 1. Deus est intimus omni creaturae, tam corporali quam spirituali8: ergo nihil cadit medium inter ipsum et creaturam: si ergo unit sibi corpus humanum, videtur, quod non uniat sibi mediante spiritu.

2. Item, magis unitur medium cuilibet extremorum quam extrema ad invicem: ergo si divinitas unitur carni mediante anima, ergo magis unitur divinitas animae quam carni, et caro magis unitur animae quam Deo. Sed hoc est falsum, quia anima uniebatur carni separabiliter, divinitas inseparabiliter9, et ita illa caro erat Dei, sicut anima Dei: ergo relinquitur idem quod prius.

3. Item, soluto medio solvuntur extrema: ergo si Deus unitur carni mediante anima, facta separatione a carne, fit separatio a divinitate. Sed hoc est falsum, quia in morte anima a carne recessit; Deus autem carnem, quam assumsit, nunquam dimisit10: ergo videtur, quod anima mediante carnem non assumserit.

4. Item, Deus non organizavit nec formavit carnem illam mediante anima11: ergo si eadem virtute assumsit, qua formavit, et ita immediate assumsit, sicut immediate fecit; non videtur, quod assumserit mediante spiritu rationali.

Conclusio

Verbum fuit unitum carni mediante creato spiritu, non quasi anima sit medium colligantiae, sed tantum ut est medium congruentiae.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur, utrum caro assumta fuerit a Verbo mediante spiritu humano; hoc dupliciter potest intelligi, secundum quod ad coniunctionem aliquorum potest concurrere medium secundum duplicem rationem. Est enim medium colligantiae, et est medium congruentiae. Medium colligantiae est per quod extrema ligantur ad invicem, sicut duo corpora ad invicem coniunguntur, interveniente glutino. Medium vero congruentiae dicitur ratione cuius congruum est, aliqua duo extrema perduci ad aliquam unionem, sicut mulier nobilis mediante nobilitate congruentiam habet, ut sit sponsa regis; cum tamen rex sibi unitur, magis unitur sicut coniugi quam sicut nobili.

Si ergo intelligitur de medio colligantiae, tunc quaeritur: utrum Verbum unitur carni mediante spiritu creato? Respondendum est, quod non12, pro eo quod immediate et inseparabiliter Verbum unitur tam carni quam animae; et ideo non cadit ibi anima medium quasi glutinum vel vinculum inter corpus et Deum. — Si autem intelligatur de medio congruentiae, sic absque dubio concedendum est, quod caro unitur ipsi13 Verbo mediante spiritu creato. Non enim erat congruum, quod Dei Verbum, quod est vita, acciperet corpus nisi vivificatum; nec conveniebat, eum qui est Spiritus immortalis, uniri corpori, nisi vivificato spiritu immortali, unde illud corpus esset idoneum ad incorruptionem. Et hoc est quod dicitur in littera14, quod « incommutabilis et invisibilis Veritas per spiritum animam, et per animam corpus, totum hominem, sine sui contagione susciperet ». Et accipitur spiritus pro superiori portione animae, sicut dicit Magister, quae maiorem convenientiam habet cum Deo; anima vero pro inferiori parte animae, secundum quam vivificat corpus. Et per haec duo nihil aliud datur intelligi, quam illud corpus congruum esse ad unionem, quod quidem habet per animam vivificari et per spiritum ad perpetuitatem et incorruptionem ordinari. — Et quia rationes, quae ad primam partem inducuntur, pro

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cedunt secundum medium congruentiae, ideo sunt concedendae.

Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod Deus est intimus creaturae corporali, ergo non unitur spiritu mediante; dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de medio distantiae vel colligantiae, quod quidem non est ibi reperire; non autem obviat medio congruentiae. Quamvis enim sit intimus per modum essendi potentialiter, essentialiter, praesentialiter in omni creatura15; non tamen congruum est, ut quamlibet assumat in unitatem personae, sicut supra visum est, sed eam solam, quae est ad eius imaginem, vel quae cum sua imagine habet compositionem.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non magis unitur Deus animae quam carni, immo aeque immediate utrique unitur; dicendum, quod verum est de immediatione, secundum quam privat medium faciens distare; sed non est verum de immediatione, quae16 privat medium faciens congruere; quia plus congruit unioni substantia rationalis, quae est ad eius imaginem, quam substantia corporalis.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod soluto medio solvuntur extrema; dicendum, quod illud non habet veritatem de medio congruentiae; sicut patet, cum aliquis accipit in17 uxorem aliquam ratione pulcritudinis, non tamen ab ea separatur, pulcritudine recedente; sic et in proposito intelligendum est. — Praeterea, anima non recedebat a corpore simpliciter, sed solum ad tempus; et corpus illud ex prima coniunctione sui ad animam dispositionem ad incorruptionem habebat; et ideo propter separationem ipsius animae congruitatem ad unionem non amittebat; et ideo, quamvis anima separaretur a carne, non18 oportebat, divinitatem a carne separari.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus non formavit carnem illam mediante anima; dicendum, quod etsi teneat hoc de medio per modum causae19, non tenet tamen de medio per modum congruentiae. Quamvis enim anima non fuerit causa corporis effectiva, tamen ex communicatione corporis cum anima potuit esse aliqua congruentia ad unionem cum divina natura.

Scholion

I. Doctrina Ss. Patrum a Magistro (hic c. 2.) relata, quod Filius Dei assumsit carnem et animam, sed carnem mediante anima et animam mediante spiritu, explicatione indiget, in qua Scholastici principales satis concordant, licet non eisdem verbis et distinctionibus omnes utantur. Cum hac quaestione intime connectitur et fere coincidit quaestio de ordine assumtionis respectu totius assumti ad partes, et partium inter se. — Duo autem omnino constant, scilicet Verbo immediate unita esse et corpus et animam, nec non simul secundum ordinem temporis fuisse formationem et assumtionem tam corporis quam animae. — Disputant autem posteriores Scholastici de hac speciali quaestione, utrum totum compositum humanum sit assumtum mediantibus partibus, vel vice versa partes mediante toto, et quid secundum ordinem naturae, non temporis, sit prius. S. Thom. (S. III. q. 6. a. 5.) utitur hic distinctione inter ordinem intentionis (ex parte agentis) et operationis (exsecutionis, ex parte materiae), et simpliciter dicendum esse resolvit, « quod Verbum Dei assumsit partes humanae naturae mediante toto. Sicut enim assumsit corpus propter ordinem, quem habet ad animam rationalem; ita assumsit corpus et animam propter ordinem, quem habent ad humanam naturam ». Sed praecise quoad ordinem exsecutionis idem docet: « Ex parte vero materiae est primum illud, quod primum existit in transmutatione materiae ». Contra hanc ultimam propositionem arguitur a Scoto eiusque schola. Scotus (hic q. 2. n. 5. seqq.) etiam utitur hic alia distinctione, scilicet inter medium quod et medium quo, et concedit, quod anima est medium quo, sed non quod, assumtionis totius naturae, atque diffuse disputat de quaestione, quomodo totum ut ens aliud sit distinctum a partibus simul sumtis; in qua quaestione determinanda ipsi Scotistae non penitus consentiunt.

II. S. Bonav. agit tantum de duplici quaestione, utrum assumta sit caro mediante anima, et (in fine corp.), utrum anima mediante spiritu, quae ulterior quaestio a S. Thoma aliisque pluribus alia distincta quaestione resolvitur. — Distinctio illa, quam facit S. Bonav. inter medium colligantiae (quod in solut. ad 6. et quaest. seq. vocatur « per modum causae », scilicet effectivae) et medium congruentiae, a S. Thoma in Comment. (hic q. 2. a. 1.) exprimitur verbis medium necessitatis et medium congruentiae. Ab eodem hic tres aliae non inutiles distinctiones adiiciuntur. In Summa autem theol. (III. q. 6. a. 1.) distinguitur ordo naturae secundum gradum dignitatis et rationem causalitatis (scilicet congruentiae), et conceditur, utroque modo sane dici posse, carnem assumtam esse mediante anima.

III. Praeter laudatos: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 4. m. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 9. 10. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. 2. — Ægid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1, dub. lat. 1. et a. 2. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 5. — Biel, hic q. unica.

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English Translation

Article III. On the assumed nature with respect to the necessity of a medium.

Next there is inquiry concerning the assumed nature as regards the necessity of a medium. And about this three things are asked.

First it is asked, whether the flesh was assumed by the Word through the medium of a human spirit.

Secondly it is asked, whether [the soul]1 was assumed by the Word through the medium of a gratuitous habit.

Thirdly it is asked, whether the whole human nature was assumed through the medium of the Holy Spirit.

Question I. Whether the body was united to the Word through the medium of a human spirit, or soul.

Concerning the first the inquiry proceeds thus, and it is asked, whether the body was united to the Word through the medium of a human spirit, or soul. And that it was so, it seems:

1. First, by the authority of Damascene, which the Master adduces in the text2: « United to the flesh is the Word of God through the medium of the intellect ».

2. Likewise, Gregory3: « The deity took up the flesh through the medium of the soul ».

3. Likewise, Augustine [says] this same thing to Volusianus4: « He fitted to himself a rational soul, and through it a human body ».

4. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] by reason. Things greatly distant from one another are not united except through some medium; but the created and corruptible corporeal, and the uncreated, incorporeal, and incorruptible, are maximally distant: therefore they are united through some medium, which indeed is created and incorporeal. But such is the rational spirit5: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, it is of greater dignity to be united to the divinity than to be glorified; but the body is not fit for glorification except through the medium of a soul6: therefore neither for the union.

6. Likewise, with the soul set aside, the human body is less noble than the brute spirit is, since a spiritual substance is more worthy than a corporeal one; but a brute animal does not have a fittingness for the union7 — therefore neither does the human body of itself. If therefore it has a fittingness, this is through the medium of a spirit or intellect.

On the contrary: 1. God is most inward to every creature, both corporeal and spiritual8: therefore nothing falls as a medium between him and the creature: if therefore he unites a human body to himself, it seems that he does not unite it to himself through the medium of a spirit.

2. Likewise, a medium is more united to each of the extremes than the extremes are to one another: therefore if the divinity is united to the flesh through the medium of the soul, then the divinity is more united to the soul than to the flesh, and the flesh is more united to the soul than to God. But this is false, since the soul was united to the flesh separably, the divinity inseparably9, and so that flesh was God's, just as the soul was God's: therefore the same [conclusion] remains as before.

3. Likewise, when the medium is dissolved the extremes are dissolved: therefore if God is united to the flesh through the medium of the soul, then, the separation from the flesh having been made, a separation from the divinity comes about. But this is false, since in death the soul withdrew from the flesh; God, however, never relinquished the flesh which he had assumed10: therefore it seems that he did not assume the flesh through the medium of the soul.

4. Likewise, God did not organize nor form that flesh through the medium of the soul11: therefore if he assumed it by the same power by which he formed it, and thus assumed it immediately, just as he made it immediately; it does not seem that he assumed it through the medium of a rational spirit.

Conclusio

The Word was united to the flesh through the medium of a created spirit, not as though the soul were a medium of binding-together, but only inasmuch as it is a medium of fittingness.

Respondeo: It must be said that, when it is asked whether the flesh was assumed by the Word through the medium of a human spirit, this can be understood in two ways, according as a medium can concur for the joining of certain things under a twofold account. For there is a medium of binding-together (colligantiae), and there is a medium of fittingness (congruentiae). A medium of binding-together is that through which the extremes are bound to one another, just as two bodies are joined to one another, with glue intervening. But a medium of fittingness is so called by reason of which it is fitting that two extremes be brought to some union, just as a noble woman through her nobility has the fittingness to be the bride of a king; yet when the king unites her to himself, he is united [to her] more as a spouse than as a noblewoman.

If, therefore, it is understood concerning the medium of binding-together, then it is asked: is the Word united to the flesh through the medium of a created spirit? It must be answered that no12, on the ground that the Word is immediately and inseparably united both to the flesh and to the soul; and therefore the soul does not there fall as a medium, like glue or a bond between the body and God. — But if it is understood concerning the medium of fittingness, then without doubt it must be conceded that the flesh is united to the Word himself13 through the medium of a created spirit. For it was not fitting that the Word of God, who is life, should take up a body unless one quickened [with life]; nor was it suitable that he who is an immortal Spirit should be united to a body, unless one quickened by an immortal spirit, whence that body would be apt for incorruption. And this is what is said in the text14, that « the immutable and invisible Truth took up, without any defilement of himself, through the spirit the soul, and through the soul the body, the whole man ». And spirit is taken for the higher portion of the soul, as the Master says, which has the greater agreement with God; but soul [is taken] for the lower part of the soul, according to which it quickens the body. And by these two things nothing else is given to be understood than that that body is fitting for the union, which indeed it has by being quickened through the soul and by being ordered to perpetuity and incorruption through the spirit. — And since the reasons which are adduced for the first part proceed

according to the medium of fittingness, therefore they are to be conceded.

Ad 1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that God is most inward to the corporeal creature, therefore he is not united through the medium of a spirit; it must be said that that reason proceeds concerning a medium of distance or of binding-together, which indeed is not to be found here; but it is not opposed to the medium of fittingness. For although he is most inward by the mode of being potentially, essentially, and presentially in every creature15; nevertheless it is not fitting that he should assume any one whatever into the unity of person, as was seen above, but only that one which is to his image, or which has a composition with his image.

Ad 2. To that which is objected, that God is not more united to the soul than to the flesh, but rather is equally immediately united to each; it must be said that this is true of the immediacy according to which it excludes a medium causing distance; but it is not true of the immediacy which16 excludes a medium causing fittingness; since a rational substance, which is to his image, is more fitting for the union than a corporeal substance.

Ad 3. To that which is objected, that when the medium is dissolved the extremes are dissolved; it must be said that this does not hold true of a medium of fittingness; as is clear, when someone takes a woman in17 marriage by reason of her beauty, he is nevertheless not separated from her when the beauty fades; and so it is to be understood in the present matter. — Moreover, the soul did not withdraw from the body absolutely, but only for a time; and that body, from its first conjunction to the soul, had a disposition toward incorruption; and therefore on account of the separation of the soul it did not lose its fittingness for the union; and therefore, although the soul was separated from the flesh, it was not18 necessary that the divinity be separated from the flesh.

Ad 4. To that which is objected, that God did not form that flesh through the medium of the soul; it must be said that, even if this holds of a medium by the mode of a cause19, it nevertheless does not hold of a medium by the mode of fittingness. For although the soul was not the effective cause of the body, nevertheless from the communication of the body with the soul there could be some fittingness for the union with the divine nature.

Scholion

I. The teaching of the Holy Fathers reported by the Master (here c. 2), namely that the Son of God assumed flesh and soul, but the flesh through the medium of the soul and the soul through the medium of the spirit, needs explanation, in which the principal Scholastics sufficiently agree, although they do not all use the same words and distinctions. Intimately connected with this question, and nearly coinciding with it, is the question concerning the order of the assumption with respect to the whole assumed in relation to the parts, and of the parts among themselves. — But two things are altogether settled, namely that both the body and the soul were immediately united to the Word, and that the formation and the assumption of both the body and the soul took place at the same time according to the order of time. — But the later Scholastics dispute about this special question, whether the whole human composite was assumed through the mediation of the parts, or vice versa the parts through the mediation of the whole, and what, according to the order of nature, not of time, is prior. St. Thomas (Summa III, q. 6, a. 5) uses here the distinction between the order of intention (on the part of the agent) and of operation (of execution, on the part of the matter), and resolves that it must simply be said « that the Word of God assumed the parts of human nature through the medium of the whole. For just as he assumed the body on account of the order which it has to the rational soul, so he assumed the body and the soul on account of the order which they have to human nature ». But precisely as to the order of execution he teaches the same: « On the part of the matter, however, that is first which first exists in the transmutation of the matter ». Against this last proposition Scotus and his school argue. Scotus (here q. 2, n. 5 ff.) also uses here another distinction, namely between the medium which (quod) and the medium by which (quo), and concedes that the soul is the medium by which, but not the medium which, of the assumption of the whole nature, and discusses at length the question how the whole as another being is distinct from the parts taken together; in determining which question the Scotists themselves do not entirely agree.

II. St. Bonaventure treats only of the twofold question, whether the flesh was assumed through the medium of the soul, and (at the end of the body) whether the soul [was assumed] through the medium of the spirit, which latter question is resolved by St. Thomas and many others under another distinct question. — That distinction which St. Bonaventure makes between a medium of binding-together (which in the reply to objection 6 and in the following question is called « by the mode of a cause », namely an effective one) and a medium of fittingness, is expressed by St. Thomas in his Commentary (here q. 2, a. 1) by the words medium of necessity and medium of fittingness. By the same author three other not useless distinctions are here added. But in the Summa theol. (III, q. 6, a. 1) the order of nature is distinguished according to the degree of dignity and the account of causality (namely of fittingness), and it is conceded that in either way it can soundly be said that the flesh was assumed through the medium of the soul.

III. Besides those praised: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III, q. 4, m. 5. — Bl. Albert, here a. 9, 10. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 1, 2. — Giles of Rome, here q. 2, a. 1, lat. dub. 1, and a. 2. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 5. — Biel, here the sole question.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Supple cum codd. P Q anima.
    Supply, with codices P Q, the word soul [so that the second question reads « whether the soul was assumed »].
  2. Hic c. 2.
    Here [in the Master's text], c. 2.
  3. Libr. XXXI. Moral. c. 23. n. 42.
    [Gregory,] Moralia, Book XXXI, c. 23, n. 42.
  4. Epist. 137. (alias 3.) c. 2. n. 8: Ipsa [magnitudo virtutis divinae] sibi animam rationalem et per eandem etiam corpus humanum totumque omnino hominem in melius mutandum, nullo modo in deterius mutata, coaptavit. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2, ubi alia Augustini verba afferuntur. — Post animam rationalem cod. Z inserit Deitas.
    [Augustine,] Letter 137 (otherwise 3), c. 2, n. 8: « That [greatness of the divine power], itself in no way changed for the worse, fitted to itself a rational soul, and through the same also a human body and the whole man altogether, to be changed for the better ». Cf. here the Master's text, c. 2, where other words of Augustine are adduced. — After rational soul codex Z inserts the Deity.
  5. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. in fine, nec non liber de Unione corporis et animae (inter opera Hug. a S. Vict.).
    Cf. here the Master's text, c. 2 at the end, as well as the book On the Union of Body and Soul (among the works of Hugh of St. Victor).
  6. Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 49. p. II. a. 1. princip. a. 1. q. 2.
    Cf. Book IV of the Sentences, d. 49, p. II, a. 1, principal a. 1, q. 2.
  7. Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1. — De ratione addita maiori cfr. tom. II. pag. 214, nota 3. — Pro animal brutum codd. G H Z bb animal brutale.
    Cf. above, a. 1, q. 1. — On the reason added to the major [premise] cf. vol. II, p. 214, note 3. — For brute animal (animal brutum) codices G H Z bb [read] animal brutale.
  8. Deus est intimus omni creaturae… Ut probatum est I. Sent. d. 37. p. I. a. 1. q. 1, et II. Sent. d. 37. a. 1. q. 2. — In fine arg. pro spiritu cod. aa anima.
    [That] God is most inward to every creature… As was proved in Book I of the Sentences, d. 37, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, and Book II, d. 37, a. 1, q. 2. — At the end of the argument, for spirit codex aa [reads] soul.
  9. Vide infra d. 6. a. 2. q. 3.
    See below, d. 6, a. 2, q. 3.
  10. Ut ostendetur infra d. 21. a. 1. q. 2.
    As will be shown below, d. 21, a. 1, q. 2.
  11. Cfr. infra d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 2. — Subinde post ergo si cod. K subiicit Deus.
    Cf. below, d. 3, p. II, a. 3, q. 2. — Thereafter, after therefore if codex K subjoins God.
  12. In edd. deest non. Paulo ante pro unitur carni codd. K P Q uniatur carni.
    In the editions no is lacking. A little before, for is united to the flesh codices K P Q [read] let it be united to the flesh.
  13. Pro ipsi Vat. Christi. Paulo inferius pro quod est vita (Ioan. 1, 4.) plurimi codd. et edd. 1, 2 qui est vita. Post pauca pro esset idoneum cod. P erat idoneum, codd. M O est idoneum.
    For to him (ipsi) the Vatican [edition reads] of Christ. A little below, for which is life (John 1:4) very many codices and editions 1, 2 [read] who is life. Shortly after, for would be apt (esset idoneum) codex P [reads] was apt (erat idoneum), codices M O is apt (est idoneum).
  14. Hic c. 2. In fine testimonii pro susciperet cod. H assumsit, quod verbum et in textu originali habetur; cod. N suscepit, cod. K susceperit, edd. susceperat.
    Here [in the Master's text], c. 2. At the end of the testimony, for should take up (susciperet) codex H [reads] assumed (assumsit), which word is also found in the original text; codex N took up (suscepit), codex K would have taken up (susceperit), the editions had taken up (susceperat).
  15. Art. 1. q. 1. — De praedicto triplici modo existendi in creatura cfr. I. Sent. d. 37. p. I. a. 3. q. 2. — Paulo superius pro obviat medio codd. M O obviat ratione medii, Vat. obviat de medio; et mox pro per modum essendi codd. G L Z aa et edd. 1, 2 per medium essendi, perperam.
    Article 1, q. 1. — On the aforesaid threefold mode of existing in a creature cf. Book I of the Sentences, d. 37, p. I, a. 3, q. 2. — A little above, for is opposed to the medium codices M O [read] is opposed by reason of the medium, the Vatican [edition] is opposed concerning the medium; and shortly after, for by the mode of being codices G L Z aa and editions 1, 2 [read] through the medium of being, wrongly.
  16. Cod. aa secundum quam.
    Codex aa [reads] according to which (secundum quam).
  17. In codd. H K Z bb deest in.
    In codices H K Z bb in is lacking.
  18. Edd. non tamen.
    The editions [read] not, however (non tamen).
  19. Edd. 1, 2 quodsi dicat hoc de medio per modum causae, non tenet; tenet tamen etc., cui lectioni favet cod. H, in quo legitur quod non tenet... per modum causae, tenet tamen etc. Cfr. infra d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 2. Pro quod etsi plurimi codd. quod si.
    Editions 1, 2 [read] but if it says this of a medium by the mode of a cause, it does not hold; it holds, however, etc., which reading codex H favors, in which is read that it does not hold... by the mode of a cause, it holds, however, etc. Cf. below, d. 3, p. II, a. 3, q. 2. For that even if (quod etsi) very many codices [read] that if (quod si).
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