Dist. 2, Art. 3, Q. 2
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 2
Quaestio II. Utrum anima Christi assumta fuerit a Verbo mediante aliquo habitu gratuito.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum anima fuerit assumta a Verbo mediante aliquo habitu gratuito. Et quod sic, videtur.
Ad oppositum.
1. Augustinus in decimo tertio libro de Trinitate1: « In rebus per tempus ortis summa gratia est, quod Deus in unitatem personae, nullis praecedentibus meritis, homini copulatur »: ergo videtur, quod Dei Filius uniatur animae mediante aliqua gratia sive dono gratuito.
2. Item, Augustinus2: « Quidquid convenit Filio Dei per naturam, convenit filio hominis per gratiam »: ergo videtur, quod unio Verbi et animae fiat mediante aliquo dono gratiae.
3. Item, perfectius est Deus, cum est cum aliquo, per unionem quam per inhabitationem; sed si Deus in nullo habitat nisi mediante aliquo dono gratuito3, ergo non videtur, quod animam assumat, nisi mediante aliquo habitu vel gratia disponente.
4. Item, plus est, animam uniri Verbo quam frui Deo; sed anima Christi non fruitur Deo, nisi mediante aliquo habitu gloriae, per quam fit deiformis4: ergo videtur, quod nec uniatur ipsi Verbo, nisi mediante aliquo habitu gratiae, cuius deiformitas superexcellat deiformitatem gloriae.
5. Item, unio est relatio; sed nulla relatio introducitur in esse nisi per introductionem alicuius absoluti, quia « in ad aliquid non est motus per se5 »: si ergo Deus assumit aliquam animam, quam prius non assumsit, cum hoc non sit secundum mutationem sui, quia est immutabilis, nec secundum mutationem animae de non-esse in esse, quia haec mutatio est creatio; restat ergo, quod hoc erit mediante infusione alicuius gratiae nobilissimae.
6. Item, uniri divinae naturae in unitatem personae, hoc excedit omnem naturam creatam; sed cum creatura aliqua ordinatur ad aliquod, quod est supra naturam suam, indiget habitu adiuvante et elevante: ergo videtur, quod anima uniatur divinae naturae aliquo habitu gratiae mediante.
Fundamenta.
Sed contra: 1. Omnis gratia, quantum est de se, aequaliter respicit tres personas, cum sit totius Trinitatis effectus: ergo si habitus gratuitus faceret uniri personae Filii Dei, eadem ratione et personae Patris et Spiritus sancti; sed constat, quod persona Patris et Spiritus sancti non sunt unitae illi animae in unitatem personae6: ergo illa unio non fuit alicuius gratiae.
2. Item, omnis habitus gratuitus dicit quid creatum; sed omne creatum est in infinitum Deo inferius: ergo per nihil creatum efficitur homo Deus. Sed per unionem factum est, ut homo esset Deus7: ergo non videtur, quod illa unio fieret aliquo habitu gratuito.
3. Item, si illa unio fieret aliquo habitu gratuito, cum corpus non sit illius gratiae susceptibile, ergo corpus non esset unibile; sed corpus est unibile et unitum: ergo non videtur, quod unio fiat animae ad Deum per habitum medium.
4. Item, intelligamus, quod Deus assumeret unam animam gloriosam et ipsam deponeret; planum est, quod anima illa et ante unionem et in unione et post unionem non haberet nisi habitum gloriae: si ergo habitus ille communis est creaturae unitae et non unitae, videtur ergo, quod unio divinitatis ad animam non fiat aliquo habitu gloriae mediante. Nec alium habitum supra hunc est dare: ergo non videtur, quod anima uniatur Verbo mediante aliquo habitu gratuito.
Conclusio
Anima Christi non fuit assumta a Verbo mediante aliquo habitu gratuito, cooperante per modum causae.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur, utrum anima uniatur ipsi Verbo mediante aliquo habitu gratuito, hoc dupliciter potest intelligi: (Duplex sensus.) aut quod ille habitus in illa unione teneat rationem congruentiae, vel rationem causae. Si ita, quod teneat rationem congruentiae, sic concedi potest, quod (Conclusio 1.) anima unitur ipsi Verbo mediante habitu creato8, quia non decet ipsam Verbo uniri, nisi assimiletur habitu perfectae deiformitatis. Unde anima Christi p. 53 non tantum fuit grata in instanti unionis, sed etiam glorificata super omnes animas beatas, quia non decet animam Dei9 carere deiformitate.
Si autem intelligatur unio illa fieri mediante habitu gratuito, ita quod ille habitus respectu unionis teneat rationem causae, sic veritatem non habet; (Conclusio 2. Ratio 1.) quoniam illa unio, quae est per habitum infusum, sicut est unio amoris et cognitionis, communiter10 respicit tres personas; unio autem illa respicit unam solam. — (Ratio 2.) Rursus, unio illa facit, hominem esse conformem Deo et ad Deum, quia gratia est influentia a Deo exiens et ad Deum reducens11; sed haec unio facit, hominem esse Deum; et ideo nullus habitus creatus potest hoc efficere, nec per collationem alicuius boni creati fit, ut homo sit Deus, sed per hoc, quod ipsa persona Verbi se ipsam facit humanae naturae hypostasim et suppositum. (Notandum.) Hoc autem non facit secundum mutationem factam in se, sed secundum mutationem factam in natura assumta. Illa autem mutatio in natura assumta fuit in ipsius naturae formatione, ita quod careret personali distinctione12 in genere proprio et inniteretur personae divinae. — (Quare vocetur gratia.) Sed quia hoc totum Deus gratuita bonitate facit, ideo maxima gratia dicitur esse in unione divinae naturae ad humanam; non quia illa unio perficiatur vel compleatur per aliquam influentiam creatam, sed quia fit per gratuitam Dei bonitatem, (Nota.) simul coexistente influentia doni gratuiti ad congruitatem, non ad causalitatem.
Unde rationes, quae ostendunt, quod non fiat unio illa mediante aliquo habitu gratuito, sunt concedendae; quoniam ea via procedunt13, secundum quod dicitur aliquid fieri per habitum gratuitum cooperantem per modum causae; sicut homo iustificatur mediante gratia informante et meretur mediante caritate movente et regulante.
(Solutio oppositorum.) 1. 2. Ad duas igitur auctoritates Augustini adductas de gratia unionis dicendum, quod large accipitur ibi gratia, non pro habitu animam informante, sed pro eo quod gratis accipitur et superexcellit terminum14 naturae; et sic potest dici, factam magnam gratiam corpori, dum assumtum fuit a persona Verbi. Et ita ex hoc non sequitur, quod unio illa Verbi ad animam fiat mediante aliquo habitu gratuito.
3. 4. Ad illas duas rationes de inhabitatione et fruitione dicendum, quod non est simile, quoniam (Notandum.) inhabitatio Dei in anima et fruitio ipsa ponit aliquem actum, qui fit ab15 anima, respectu cuius gratia infusa est causa, et ad quem habilitatur anima mediante gratia, et in quem exit, cum a gratia est adiuta et regulata. Non sic autem est de unione; quoniam natura humana unitur divinae absque actu suo et solum se habet ibi per modum passivi, et non activi; et ideo non sic indiget per habitum adiuvantem et regulantem dispositione, quae quidem sit principium illius unionis.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod relatio non introducitur nisi per aliquam mutationem, factam in aliquo absoluto; dicendum, quod verum est; sed quemadmodum duae lineae possunt intelligi uniri in puncto et continuari, ita tamen, quod non sit mutatio in altera linearum nisi per hoc, quod amittit discretionem unitatis; sic intelligendum est, quod si Deus assumeret aliquod individuum hominis in esse constitutum et gratia informatum, solum amitteret personalem discretionem per unionem cum ipso Verbo in unitate personae. In assumtione autem illius naturae, quam Filius Dei assumsit de Virgine, simul fuit formatio et unio; et ideo nunquam fuit in illo homine quantum ad humanam naturam personalis discretio; hoc enim faciebat unio ipsius cum Verbo16. Et propterea non sequitur ex hoc, quod unio in unitate personae fieri habeat mediante aliquo habitu gratuito. Assumtio enim proprie respicit illam naturam, quamvis congrue non habeat fieri absque gratia.
6. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod uniri divinae naturae superexcellit17 gradum creaturae; dicendum, quod verum est; et ideo concedendum est, quod talis unio ex gratia fit; sed tamen non sequitur ex hoc, quod fiat per donum gratiae creatae, quia omne donum creatum est hac unione inferius.
(Gratia unionis dicitur tripliciter.) Unde si quaeratur, utrum gratia unionis dicat quid creatum, aut increatum; dicendum, quod gratia unionis tripliciter potest accipi. Potest enim gratia unionis dici illud, per quod efficitur anima gratis congrua ad unionem; et sic dicit donum gratiae creatae, per quod anima habuit excellenter deiformitatem. Alio modo dicitur gratia unionis gratia effectiva unionis; et sic dicit donum gratiae increatae. Tertio modo potest dici gratia unionis ipsa unio gratuita, sive gratis facta; et sic ex parte divinae naturae dicit quid increatum, ex parte humanae naturae dicit quid creatum, non absolutum, sed relatum; et sic patet totum.
I. Si nomine gratiae intelligitur grata Dei voluntas, manifestum est, incarnationem factam esse « per gratuitam Dei voluntatem » (hic in corp.), non tanquam per medium, sed tanquam per causam efficientem. Sed proposita quaestio solummodo procedit de « habitu gratuito », id est de gratia habituali. — Quod gratia habitualis sit dispositio necessaria ad unionem hypostaticam, et quod per consequens sit medium necessarium assumtionis, cum aliis docuit Alex. Hal. (S. p. III. q. 7. m. 2. a. 1.); unde idem hanc gratiam appellat gratiam unionis. Dicit enim: « Non est possibile creaturae humanae, quod ipsa per donum conditionis naturae elevetur et disponatur ad divinam unionem; et ideo necessaria est ei gratia, quae elevet ad hoc et disponat ipsam; quam nos appellamus gratiam unionis ». Haec sententia, secundum proprietatem verborum et ordinem exsecutionis intellecta, a posterioribus doctoribus communiter reprobatur, et ab ipso S. Bonav. (hic in corp. et ad 3. 4.) solide refutatur, scilicet si intelligitur, quod ille habitus teneat rationem causae, sive necessariae dispositionis (cfr. ultima verba in solut. ad 3. 4.). — Attamen auctor noster addit, quod si intelligitur secundum rationem congruentiae, « concedi potest, quod anima unitur ipsi Verbo mediante habitu creato ». — Scot. (hic q. 2. n. 12. seqq.) cum Durando (hic q. 3.) ne hoc quidem concedendum esse vult, quod gratia in illa unione fuerit medium congruitatis. Argumenta autem ipsius supponunt, ut etiam Lychetus ibi in Comment. (n. 1.) explicat, praedicta verba S. Bonaventurae ita intelligenda esse, ut secundum ordinem naturae prius fuerit natura humana non unita, secundo gratia ipsi infusa, tertio assumtio naturae gratia ornatae. Eodem fere modo etiam plurimi posteriores theologi hunc locum S. Doctoris intelligunt et variis argumentis improbant.
Opinamur autem cum Barth. de Barberiis (Cursus theolog. p. III. disp. 2. q. 5.), hanc interpretationem esse omnino alienam a mente et a verbis Seraphici, qui nullatenus dicit, gratiam secundum ordinem naturae praecessisse unioni tanquam dispositionem congruam. Etiamsi supponamus, eum locutum esse de ordine exsecutionis, non intentionis, tamen tacet de ordine prioritatis, quem haec dispositio congrua ad unionem habeat secundum ordinem naturae, dum tantum dicit (circa finem corp.): « Simul coexistente influentia doni gratuiti ad congruitatem, non ad causalitatem »; quibus verbis generatim praecedentem causalitatem, etiam ratione congruae dispositionis, excludit. Item, in solut. ad 3. 4. docet, quod « natura humana unitur divinae absque actu suo et solum se habet ibi per modum passivi, et non activi »; sed constat, quod gratia habitualis datur in ordine ad actum. — Hinc ipsa verba huius quaestionis insinuant, mentem Seraphici bene interpretatum esse Richardum a Med. (hic a. 2. q. 3.), qui cum Petro a Tar. (hic q. 2. a. 2.) et Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 5.) approbat propositionem: animam Christi fuisse assumtam mediante gratia tanquam medio congruitatis, sed eam explicans de ordine intentionis addit: « Non ut (gratia) actualiter existens in ea in re, sed ut existens in ea secundum propositum Dei, seu in eius praeordinatione ». Sic intellecta, verba Seraphici (hic et infra d. 4. a. 2. q. 3.) nullam habent difficultatem. In ordine autem exsecutionis gratia habitualis communiter potius concipitur ut effectus unionis hypostaticae quam ut dispositio.
II. Praeter citatos auctores: S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2; S. III. q. 6. a. 6. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 3.
III. Sequens (3.) quaestio sic solvitur, ut Spiritus S. non dicatur medium unionis nisi ut causa effectiva, quae licet communis sit tribus Trinitatis personis, tamen Spiritui S. appropriatur. De eadem speciatim hic tractantes non invenimus nisi S. Thomam, hic q. 2. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2.
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Question II. Whether the soul of Christ was assumed by the Word through the medium of some gratuitous habit.
Second it is asked, whether the soul was assumed by the Word through the medium of some gratuitous habit. And that it was, it seems.
To the opposite.
1. Augustine, in the thirteenth book on the Trinity1: « Among things that arise through time, the highest grace is that God is joined to man into the unity of the person, with no preceding merits »: therefore it seems that the Son of God is united to the soul through the medium of some grace or gratuitous gift.
2. Likewise, Augustine2: « Whatever belongs to the Son of God by nature belongs to the Son of Man by grace »: therefore it seems that the union of the Word and the soul comes about through the medium of some gift of grace.
3. Likewise, God is more perfectly with something through union than through indwelling; but if God dwells in nothing except through the medium of some gratuitous gift3, then it does not seem that He assumes the soul except through the medium of some habit or disposing grace.
4. Likewise, it is more for the soul to be united to the Word than to enjoy God; but the soul of Christ does not enjoy God except through the medium of some habit of glory, by which it is made deiform4: therefore it seems that neither is it united to the Word itself except through the medium of some habit of grace, whose deiformity surpasses the deiformity of glory.
5. Likewise, union is a relation; but no relation is introduced into being except through the introduction of something absolute, because « in the in-relation-to-something there is no motion per se5 »: if therefore God assumes some soul which He did not previously assume, since this is not according to a change of Himself, because He is immutable, nor according to a change of the soul from non-being into being, because this change is creation; it remains therefore that this will be through the medium of the infusion of some most noble grace.
6. Likewise, to be united to the divine nature into the unity of the person exceeds every created nature; but when some creature is ordered to something which is above its own nature, it needs an aiding and elevating habit: therefore it seems that the soul is united to the divine nature through the medium of some habit of grace.
Foundations.
Sed contra: 1. Every grace, so far as it pertains to itself, regards the three persons equally, since it is an effect of the whole Trinity: therefore if a gratuitous habit caused union with the person of the Son of God, by the same account it would do so with the person of the Father and of the Holy Spirit as well; but it is settled that the person of the Father and of the Holy Spirit are not united to that soul into the unity of the person6: therefore that union was not of any grace.
2. Likewise, every gratuitous habit signifies something created; but everything created is infinitely inferior to God: therefore man is made God by nothing created. But by the union it came about that man was God7: therefore it does not seem that that union came about by any gratuitous habit.
3. Likewise, if that union came about by some gratuitous habit, then since the body is not receptive of that grace, the body would not be unitable; but the body is unitable and united: therefore it does not seem that the union of the soul to God comes about through an intermediary habit.
4. Likewise, let us suppose that God should assume one glorious soul and lay it aside; it is plain that that soul, both before the union and in the union and after the union, would have nothing but the habit of glory: if therefore that habit is common to the creature both united and not united, it seems then that the union of the divinity to the soul does not come about through the medium of any habit of glory. Nor is there any other habit above this to be granted: therefore it does not seem that the soul is united to the Word through the medium of any gratuitous habit.
Conclusio
The soul of Christ was not assumed by the Word through the medium of any gratuitous habit cooperating after the manner of a cause.
Respondeo: It must be said that when it is asked whether the soul is united to the Word itself through the medium of some gratuitous habit, this can be understood in two ways: (Twofold sense.) either that that habit holds in that union the account of congruity, or the account of cause. If it be so that it holds the account of congruity, then it can be conceded that (Conclusion 1.) the soul is united to the Word itself through the medium of a created habit8, because it is not fitting that it be united to the Word unless it be made like Him by a habit of perfect deiformity. Hence the soul of Christ was not only graced in the instant of union, but also glorified above all blessed souls, because it is not fitting that the soul of God9 lack deiformity.
But if that union is understood to come about through the medium of a gratuitous habit, in such a way that that habit holds with respect to the union the account of cause, then it does not hold true; (Conclusion 2. Reason 1.) because that union which is through an infused habit, as is the union of love and of knowledge, regards in common10 the three persons; but that union regards one alone. — (Reason 2.) Again, that union makes man to be conformed to God and toward God, because grace is an influence going forth from God and leading back to God11; but this union makes man to be God; and therefore no created habit can effect this, nor does it come about by the conferral of some created good that man be God, but by this, that the very person of the Word makes itself the hypostasis and supposit of the human nature. (Note.) This, however, it does not do according to a change made in itself, but according to a change made in the assumed nature. But that change in the assumed nature consisted in the formation of the nature itself, in such a way that it lacked personal distinction12 in its proper genus and rested upon the divine person. — (Why it is called grace.) But because God does all this by gratuitous goodness, therefore the highest grace is said to be in the union of the divine nature to the human; not because that union is perfected or completed by any created influence, but because it comes about by the gratuitous goodness of God, (Note.) with the influence of the gratuitous gift coexisting toward congruity, not toward causality.
Hence the reasons which show that that union does not come about through the medium of any gratuitous habit are to be conceded; because they proceed13 along that way according to which something is said to come about through a gratuitous habit cooperating after the manner of a cause; just as man is justified through the medium of informing grace and merits through the medium of charity moving and ruling.
(Solution of the opposing arguments.) 1. 2. To the two authorities of Augustine adduced concerning the grace of union, it must be said that grace is there taken broadly, not for a habit informing the soul, but for that which is received gratis and surpasses the terminus14 of nature; and thus it can be said that a great grace was done to the body when it was assumed by the person of the Word. And so from this it does not follow that that union of the Word to the soul comes about through the medium of any gratuitous habit.
3. 4. To those two reasons concerning indwelling and enjoyment, it must be said that it is not similar, because (Note.) the indwelling of God in the soul and enjoyment itself posit some act which is done by15 the soul, with respect to which the infused grace is a cause, and toward which the soul is enabled through the medium of grace, and into which it goes out when it is aided and ruled by grace. But it is not so concerning union; because the human nature is united to the divine without any act of its own and holds itself there only after the manner of a passive thing, and not of an active one; and therefore it does not in this way need, through an aiding and ruling habit, a disposition which would be the principle of that union.
5. To that which is objected, that a relation is not introduced except through some change made in something absolute; it must be said that this is true; but just as two lines can be understood to be united at a point and continued, yet in such a way that there is no change in either of the lines except by this, that it loses the distinctness of unity; so it must be understood that if God should assume some individual of man already constituted in being and informed by grace, it would lose only its personal distinctness through the union with the Word itself in the unity of the person. But in the assumption of that nature which the Son of God assumed of the Virgin, the formation and the union were simultaneous; and therefore there never was in that man, as regards the human nature, a personal distinctness; for this the union itself with the Word brought about16. And therefore it does not follow from this that the union in the unity of the person must come about through the medium of any gratuitous habit. For assumption properly regards that nature, although congruously it ought not to come about without grace.
6. To that which is objected last, that to be united to the divine nature surpasses17 the rank of a creature; it must be said that this is true; and therefore it must be conceded that such a union comes about from grace; but nevertheless it does not follow from this that it comes about through a created gift of grace, because every created gift is inferior to this union.
(The grace of union is said in three ways.) Hence if it be asked whether the grace of union signifies something created or uncreated; it must be said that the grace of union can be taken in three ways. For the grace of union can be called that by which the soul is made gratuitously congruous for the union; and thus it signifies a created gift of grace, by which the soul had deiformity excellently. In another way the grace of union is called the grace effective of the union; and thus it signifies an uncreated gift of grace. In a third way the grace of union can be called the very gratuitous union, or that which is done gratis; and thus on the part of the divine nature it signifies something uncreated, on the part of the human nature it signifies something created, not absolute, but relative; and thus the whole is clear.
I. If by the name of grace is understood the gracious will of God, it is manifest that the incarnation was done « by the gratuitous will of God » (here in the body), not as if through a medium, but as through an efficient cause. But the question proposed proceeds only concerning a « gratuitous habit », that is, concerning habitual grace. — That habitual grace is a necessary disposition for the hypostatic union, and that consequently it is a necessary medium of the assumption, was taught, among others, by Alexander of Hales (S. p. III. q. 7. m. 2. a. 1.); whence he too calls this grace the grace of union. For he says: « It is not possible for human creation that it be elevated and disposed to the divine union through the gift of the condition of its nature; and therefore grace is necessary for it, which may elevate it to this and dispose it; which we call the grace of union ». This opinion, understood according to the propriety of the words and the order of execution, is commonly rejected by later doctors, and is solidly refuted by S. Bonaventure himself (here in the body and in the reply to 3 and 4), namely if it is understood that that habit holds the account of cause, or of a necessary disposition (cf. the last words in the solution to 3 and 4). — Yet our author adds that, if it is understood according to the account of congruity, « it can be conceded that the soul is united to the Word itself through the medium of a created habit ». — Scotus (here q. 2. n. 12. and following), with Durandus (here q. 3.), holds that not even this is to be conceded, that grace in that union was a medium of congruity. But his arguments suppose, as Lychetus too in his Commentary (n. 1.) explains, that the aforesaid words of S. Bonaventure are to be understood thus, that according to the order of nature the human nature was first not united, secondly grace was infused into it, thirdly the assumption of the nature adorned with grace took place. In nearly the same way also very many later theologians understand this passage of the holy Doctor and disprove it with various arguments.
But we are of the opinion, with Bartholomew de Barberiis (Cursus theolog. p. III. disp. 2. q. 5.), that this interpretation is wholly foreign to the mind and to the words of the Seraphic Doctor, who in no way says that grace, according to the order of nature, preceded the union as a congruous disposition. Even if we suppose that he spoke of the order of execution, not of intention, nevertheless he is silent about the order of priority which this congruous disposition may have toward the union according to the order of nature, since he only says (near the end of the body): « With the influence of the gratuitous gift coexisting toward congruity, not toward causality »; by which words he generally excludes preceding causality, even by reason of a congruous disposition. Likewise, in the solution to 3 and 4 he teaches that « the human nature is united to the divine without any act of its own and holds itself there only after the manner of a passive thing, and not of an active one »; but it is settled that habitual grace is given in order to an act. — Hence the very words of this question suggest that Richard of Middleton (here a. 2. q. 3.) well interpreted the mind of the Seraphic Doctor, who with Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 2. a. 2.) and Dionysius the Carthusian (here q. 5.) approves the proposition: that the soul of Christ was assumed through the medium of grace as a medium of congruity, but, explaining it of the order of intention, adds: « Not as (grace) actually existing in it in reality, but as existing in it according to the purpose of God, or in His preordination ». Understood thus, the words of the Seraphic Doctor (here and below, d. 4. a. 2. q. 3.) have no difficulty. But in the order of execution habitual grace is commonly conceived rather as an effect of the hypostatic union than as a disposition.
II. Besides the authors cited: S. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 2; S. III. q. 6. a. 6. — Giles of Rome, here q. 2. a. 3.
III. The following (3rd) question is solved in such a way that the Holy Spirit is not called a medium of the union except as an effective cause, which, although it is common to the three persons of the Trinity, is nevertheless appropriated to the Holy Spirit. Treating expressly of the same, we have not found anyone here except S. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 2. little-question 2.
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- Cap. 49. n. 24. In testimonio allato textus originalis pro in unitatem exhibet in unitate et omittit verba nullis praecedentibus meritis, quae tamen sunt in Enchirid. c. 40. n. 12, ubi simile testimonium affertur.Ch. 49, n. 24. In the testimony adduced the original text reads in unitate for in unitatem and omits the words nullis praecedentibus meritis, which nevertheless are in the Enchiridion, c. 40, n. 12, where a similar testimony is brought forward.
- Enchirid. c. 35-41. n. 10-13, sententialiter. Hugo a S. Vict. hoc dictum tribuit Ambrosio, sed nec ibi verbotenus invenitur. — Post verba Augustini codd. M O minorem supplent sic: sed esse Deum vel Dei Filium convenit Verbo per naturam.Enchiridion, c. 35-41, n. 10-13, in substance. Hugh of St. Victor attributes this saying to Ambrose, but it is not found there verbatim either. — After the words of Augustine, codices M O supply the minor premise thus: but to be God or the Son of God belongs to the Word by nature.
- Cfr. I. Sent. d. 17. p. 1. q. 1, et II. Sent. d. 26. q. 2.Cf. I Sent. d. 17, p. 1, q. 1, and II Sent. d. 26, q. 2.
- De quo vide infra d. 14. a. 1. q. 1. — Pro per quam codd. A G H K T bb per quem.Concerning which see below, d. 14, a. 1, q. 1. — For per quam codices A G H K T bb read per quem.
- Aristot., V. Phys. text. 10. (c. 2.). Cuius verbi explicationem vide tom. II. pag. 831, nota 7. — Post introductionem edd. 1, 2 addunt vel mediationem, Vat. vel mutationem. Paulo inferius pro secundum mutationem sui, quia [cod. U Deus] est immutabilis codd. T V W X et edd. 1, 2 secundum unionem sui, quia est inunibilis.Aristotle, Physics V, text 10 (c. 2). For the explanation of this phrase see tom. II, p. 831, note 7. — After introductionem editions 1, 2 add vel mediationem, the Vatican vel mutationem. A little below, for secundum mutationem sui, quia [cod. U Deus] est immutabilis, codices T V W X and editions 1, 2 read secundum unionem sui, quia est inunibilis.
- Cfr. supra d. 1. a. 1. q. 2. et a. 2. q. 3. — Paulo superius post faceret cod. U (T a secunda manu) subiicit animam, cod. K humanam naturam.Cf. above, d. 1, a. 1, q. 2, and a. 2, q. 3. — A little higher up, after faceret, cod. U (T by a second hand) subjoins animam, cod. K humanam naturam.
- Cfr. infra d. 7. a. 1. q. 1.Cf. below, d. 7, a. 1, q. 1.
- Pro creato Vat. gratuito.For creato the Vatican reads gratuito.
- Cod. K quia non decebat animam Christi.Cod. K reads because it was not fitting for the soul of Christ.
- Pro communiter, quod ex codd. F K P Q Z bb in textum recepimus, alii codd. nec non edd. convenienter.For communiter, which we have received into the text from codices F K P Q Z bb, the other codices as well as the editions read convenienter.
- Cfr. supra pag. 20, nota 1. — Paulo inferius pro collationem cod. A collectionem.Cf. above, p. 20, note 1. — A little below, for collationem cod. A reads collectionem.
- Codd. G H K L (Z a prima manu) aa bb discretione. Paulo inferius pro ad humanam codd. V X ad humanitatem.Codices G H K L (Z by a first hand) aa bb read discretione. A little below, for ad humanam codices V X read ad humanitatem.
- Id est, iure negant, assumtionem fuisse mediante habitu gratuito.That is, they rightly deny that the assumption came about through the medium of a gratuitous habit.
- Cod. V donum.Cod. V reads donum.
- Vat. in. Paulo inferius pro quoniam codd. A M O qua. In fine solut. pro quae quidem edd. 1, 2 cum codd. K Q L' V X bb qui quidem, et immediate ante pro dispositione cod. Q (U a secunda manu) disponi.The Vatican reads in. A little below, for quoniam codices A M O read qua. At the end of the solution, for quae quidem editions 1, 2 with codices K Q L' V X bb read qui quidem, and immediately before, for dispositione cod. Q (U by a second hand) reads disponi.
- Cfr. infra d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 2. et d. 5. a. 2. q. 2. seq. — Circa finem solut. pro illam naturam Vat. ipsam naturam.Cf. below, d. 3, p. II, a. 3, q. 2, and d. 5, a. 2, q. 2 and following. — Near the end of the solution, for illam naturam the Vatican reads ipsam naturam.
- Codd. G K Z superexcedit.Codices G K Z read superexcedit.