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Dist. 4, Art. 2, Q. 3

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 4

Textus Latinus
p. 108

Quaestio III. Utrum gratia in conceptione teneat rationem proprietatis naturalis, vel gratuitae.

Tertio quaeritur de gratia illa, quae fuit in conceptione, in comparatione ad dignitatem naturae assumtae, et est quaestio, utrum gratia illa teneat rationem proprietatis naturalis, vel gratuitae. Et quod tenet rationem proprietatis naturalis, videtur:

1. (Argg. pro 1. parte.) Primo per auctoritatem Augustini, quae ponitur in littera1: «In naturae humanae susceptione fiebat quodam modo illi homini gratia naturalis, ut nullum posset admittere peccatum».

2. Item, hoc ratione videtur. Quod inest rei a sua prima origine inest ei naturaliter2; sed anima Christi ab instanti conceptionis habuit gratiam, nec potest nec potuit ab ea separari gratia illa: ergo videtur, quod illa gratia naturaliter fuerit innata.

3. Item, quod inest rei a principio intrinseco inest ei naturaliter3; sed gratia Christi ortum habebat a persona Verbi, quae non est alia a persona Christi: ergo inerat ei a suo principio intrinseco; et si hoc, tunc inerat per modum proprietatis naturalis magis quam gratuitae.

4. Item, proprietas, per quam res ordinatur ad actum naturalem, est naturalis; sed per gratiam ille homo erat Filius Dei naturalis et est: ergo videtur, quod gratia sibi collata fuerit ei ad modum proprietatis naturalis.

Sed contra: 1. (Argg. pro 2. parte.) Gratia et natura dividuntur ex opposito; sed quandocumque duo aliqua opponuntur, unum non denominat reliquum4: ergo si naturale dicitur a natura, videtur, quod nulla gratia sit naturalis, aut si est naturalis, non est gratia.

2. Item, plus distat naturale a gratuito, in quantum huiusmodi, quam meritorium; sed perfecta gratia Christi non potuit esse ex meritis5: ergo multo fortius videtur, quod non fuerit naturalis.

3. Item, «naturalibus nec laudamur nec vituperamur6»; sed Christus laudabilis erat per gratiam, quam habebat: ergo non videtur, quod gratia illa fuerit ei naturalis.

4. Item, excellentior est unio humanae naturae ad divinam in unitate personae quam per conformitatem gloriae7; sed natura non elevatur ad gloriam, quantumcumque excellat, nisi mediante gratia, quae excedit terminum naturae, et quanto magis excedit, tanto magis tenet rationem gratiae: si ergo quod collatum est Christo multo magis excedebat terminos naturae, quam quod collatum est aliis hominibus; videtur, quod gratia eius plus habuit de ratione gratuiti et minus de ratione naturalis, quam gratia collata eius membris.

### Conclusio. Gratia unionis quodam modo fuit homini Christo naturalis, quodam modo non.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod gratia unionis (Gratia unionis dicitur tripliciter.), sicut in praecedentibus8 fuit tactum, tripliciter potest dici. Uno modo dicitur gratia unionis gratia disponens de congruo ad unionem; alio modo dicitur gratia unionis ipsa unio gratis facta; tertio modo dicitur gratia unionis ipsa gratia faciens unionem. — Et quocumque horum modorum dicatur gratia unionis, verum est, quod tenet rationem gratuiti (Conclusio 1.); verum est etiam, quod aliquo modo habet proprietatem rei naturalis. Et hoc insinuat ipsa littera Augustini, cum dicit, quod «quodam modo fieret illi homini gratia naturalis»: non dicit, simpliciter fieret, sed quodam modo.

Si enim dicatur gratia unionis, id est gratia disponens ad unionem, quodam modo est natu-p. 109ralis, quodam modo non (Ratio.). — Nam proprietas naturalis comparatur ad aliquid sicut ad subiectum, et sicut ad causam. Secundum comparationem, quam habet ad subiectum, naturaliter dicitur inesse quod inest a primordio ipsius rei et inseparabiliter et ab ea non recedit. Secundum comparationem, quam habet ad causam, dicitur naturaliter inesse proprietas9, quae causatur a principiis subiecti, et per quam ipsum subiectum efficit operationem naturalem. Primo modo dicitur gratia Christi fuisse naturalis, per quam ad unionem disponebatur, quia gratiam habuit a primordio suae nativitatis et gratiam perdere non potuit. Secundo vero modo non fuit naturalis, quia10 potius ordinabatur ad operationem supra naturam; non habebat etiam ortum a principiis naturae, sed potius a divina voluntate. Et propterea secundum istum modum accipiendi verum dicitur, quod gratia quodam modo fuit Christo naturalis, quodam modo non. Et ista possunt accipi ex his quae dicuntur in textu11.

Similiter, si gratia unionis dicatur ipsa unio gratis facta (Conclusio 3.), quodam modo fuit naturalis, quodam modo non: Naturalis, inquam, fuit propter inseparabilitatem, quia natura humana sic fuit unita divinae a sua prima formatione, quod ab ipsa separari non potuit. Quodam modo non fuit naturalis, sed gratuita, in hoc scilicet quod terminos naturae excedit et ex mera Dei voluntate processit.

Similiter, si tertio modo dicatur gratia12 ipsa virtus gratis faciens unionem, sicut ipse Spiritus sanctus (Conclusio 4.), sic quodam modo fuit illi homini naturalis, quodam modo non. Naturalis fuit per communicationem idiomatum ratione personae Verbi, cui Spiritus sanctus connaturalis est. Non enim habuit Filius Spiritum sanctum per influentiam, sed potius, quia habet in se a Patre vim spirativam. Et propterea dicitur in Ioanne13, quod non est ei datus Spiritus ad mensuram. Per comparationem autem ad naturam assumtam gratia illa non erat illi homini connaturalis, quia Spiritus sanctus non erat in eo per principia naturae creatae, sed per gratiam inhabitantem. — Et sic patet, quod omni modo intelligendi14 gratia illa quodam modo fuit illi homini connaturalis, alio modo non.

Et secundum hoc currunt rationes ad utramque partem (Ad argumenta.), quae secundum diversas vias verum concludunt. Verum est enim, quod «gratia illa, sicut dicit Augustinus, quodam modo naturalis fuit illi homini»: non tamen simpliciter, sicut rationes ostendunt.

Ad 4. (Ad arg. pro 1. parte.) Illa tamen ratio, qua ostenditur, quod gratia illa est naturalis, quia ordinat ad actum naturalem, non valet, quia assumtio15 est falsa; quoniam, etsi per gratiam illam disponatur, ut sit filius naturalis, non tamen propter hoc ordinatur ad operationem naturalem. Hoc enim non dicitur propter hoc, quod illi naturae assumtae conveniat a Patre per gratiam illam aeternaliter et naturaliter generari; sed hoc est, quia per gratiam illam disponitur ad unionem, quae facit idiomatum communicationem, et unio illa supra naturam est. Et ideo non est mirum, si gratia, quae ad illam unionem reddit naturam congruam, est supra naturam.

Ad 3. Similiter alia ratio, quae dicit16, quod gratia illa a principio intrinseco est, non cogit; quoniam aliter accipitur intrinsecum in proposito, et aliter, cum dicitur, quod naturale est quod est a principio intrinseco. Nam intrinsecum, prout cadit in notificationem proprietatis naturalis, dicitur esse illud quod est de constitutione naturae; non sic autem persona Verbi est illi intrinseca.

Ad 1, 2. Aliae vero duae rationes sunt concedendae, quia non probant, quod gratia illa simpliciter fuerit naturalis, sed quod quodam modo conformitatem habuit ad proprietatem naturalem. Et hoc quidem veritatem habet, sicut iam ostensum est.

Scholion

I. In solvenda hac quaestione omnes antiqui Scholastici consentiunt et etiam iisdem fere distinctionibus utuntur. Attamen posteriores doctores gratiam habitualem in Christo non vocant gratiam unionis, quem modum loquendi S. Bonav. accepit ab Alexandro Hal., ut iam supra d. 2. a. 3. q. 2. in scholio innuimus, ubi etiam explicatum est, quo sensu gratia habitualis vocari possit «disponens de congruo ad unionem».

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 7. m. 2. a. 2. — Scotus quaestionem tangit in utroque Scripto, III. Sent. d. 10. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 2; S. III. q. 2. a. 12. — B. Albert., hic a. 9. — Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit. Magistri. — Ricard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 3. a. 2. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4.

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English Translation

Question III. Whether the grace in the conception holds the character of a natural property, or of a gratuitous one.

Thirdly it is asked about that grace which was in the conception, in comparison to the dignity of the assumed nature, and the question is whether that grace holds the character of a natural property, or of a gratuitous one. And that it holds the character of a natural property is seen:

1. (Arguments for the first side.) First, by the authority of Augustine, which is set down in the text1: "In the assumption of human nature there came to be in that man, in a certain manner, a natural grace, such that he could admit no sin."

2. Likewise, this is seen by reason. What is in a thing from its first origin is in it naturally2; but the soul of Christ from the instant of conception had grace, and that grace neither can nor could be separated from it: therefore it seems that that grace was naturally inborn.

3. Likewise, what is in a thing from an intrinsic principle is in it naturally3; but the grace of Christ took its rise from the person of the Word, which is not other than the person of Christ: therefore it was in him from his intrinsic principle; and if this, then it was in him by the mode of a natural property rather than of a gratuitous one.

4. Likewise, a property by which a thing is ordered to a natural act is natural; but by grace that man was and is the natural Son of God: therefore it seems that the grace conferred on him was in him after the manner of a natural property.

On the contrary: 1. (Arguments for the second side.) Grace and nature are divided as opposites; but whenever two things are opposed, one does not denominate the other4: therefore if "natural" is said from nature, it seems that no grace is natural, or if it is natural, it is not grace.

2. Likewise, the natural is more distant from the gratuitous, as such, than from the meritorious; but the perfect grace of Christ could not be from merits5: therefore much more strongly it seems that it was not natural.

3. Likewise, "by natural things we are neither praised nor blamed6"; but Christ was praiseworthy through the grace which he had: therefore it does not seem that that grace was natural to him.

4. Likewise, the union of human nature to the divine in the unity of person is more excellent than [conformity] through the conformity of glory7; but nature is not elevated to glory, however much it may excel, except by the mediation of grace, which exceeds the limit of nature, and the more it exceeds, the more it holds the character of grace: if therefore what was conferred on Christ much more exceeded the limits of nature than what was conferred on other men; it seems that his grace had more of the character of the gratuitous and less of the character of the natural than the grace conferred on his members.

### Conclusion. The grace of union was in a certain manner natural to the man Christ, in a certain manner not.

I respond: It must be said that the grace of union (The grace of union is spoken of in three ways.), as was touched upon in the foregoing8, can be spoken of in three ways. In one way the grace of union is called the grace disposing congruously to the union; in another way the grace of union is called the union itself freely effected; in a third way the grace of union is called the grace itself effecting the union. — And in whichever of these ways the grace of union is spoken of, it is true that it holds the character of the gratuitous (Conclusion 1.); it is also true that in some manner it has the property of a natural thing. And this the very text of Augustine intimates, when he says that "in a certain manner there came to be in that man a natural grace": he does not say that it came to be simply, but in a certain manner.

For if the grace of union is called, that is, the grace disposing to the union, in a certain manner it is natu-ral, in a certain manner not (Reason.). — For a natural property is compared to something as to a subject, and as to a cause. According to the comparison which it has to the subject, that is said to be in it naturally which is in it from the very beginning of the thing and inseparably, and does not depart from it. According to the comparison which it has to the cause, a property is said to be in it naturally9 which is caused by the principles of the subject, and through which the subject itself effects a natural operation. In the first way the grace of Christ is said to have been natural, by which he was disposed to the union, because he had grace from the beginning of his nativity and could not lose grace. But in the second way it was not natural, because10 it was rather ordered to an operation above nature; nor did it have its rise from the principles of nature, but rather from the divine will. And therefore according to this mode of taking it it is truly said that grace was in a certain manner natural to Christ, in a certain manner not. And these things can be gathered from what is said in the text11.

Likewise, if the grace of union is called the union itself freely effected (Conclusion 3.), in a certain manner it was natural, in a certain manner not: Natural, I say, it was on account of inseparability, because human nature was so united to the divine from its first formation that it could not be separated from it. In a certain manner it was not natural, but gratuitous, namely in this, that it exceeds the limits of nature and proceeded from the mere will of God.

Likewise, if in the third way the grace12 is called the very power freely effecting the union, as the Holy Spirit himself (Conclusion 4.), thus in a certain manner it was natural to that man, in a certain manner not. It was natural through the communication of idioms by reason of the person of the Word, to whom the Holy Spirit is connatural. For the Son did not have the Holy Spirit through influence, but rather because he has in himself from the Father the power of spirating. And therefore it is said in John13 that the Spirit is not given to him by measure. But through the comparison to the assumed nature that grace was not connatural to that man, because the Holy Spirit was not in him through the principles of created nature, but through indwelling grace. — And thus it is clear that in every mode of understanding14 that grace was in a certain manner connatural to that man, in another way not.

And according to this the reasons run to both sides (To the arguments.), which according to diverse ways conclude truly. For it is true that "that grace, as Augustine says, was in a certain manner natural to that man": yet not simply, as the reasons show.

To the 4th. (To the argument for the first side.) That reason, however, by which it is shown that that grace is natural because it orders to a natural act, does not hold, because the assumption15 is false; for although by that grace he is disposed to be a natural son, yet not on this account is he ordered to a natural operation. For this is not said on account of this, that it belongs to that assumed nature to be eternally and naturally generated by the Father through that grace; but it is because by that grace he is disposed to the union, which effects the communication of idioms, and that union is above nature. And therefore it is no wonder if the grace which renders the nature congruous to that union is above nature.

To the 3rd. Likewise the other reason, which says16 that that grace is from an intrinsic principle, does not compel; for "intrinsic" is taken otherwise in the matter proposed, and otherwise when it is said that the natural is what is from an intrinsic principle. For "intrinsic," insofar as it falls under the notification of a natural property, is said to be that which is of the constitution of nature; but the person of the Word is not thus intrinsic to it.

To the 1st and 2nd. But the other two reasons are to be conceded, because they do not prove that that grace was simply natural, but that in a certain manner it had a conformity to a natural property. And this indeed holds the truth, as has already been shown.

Scholion

I. In solving this question all the ancient Scholastics agree and even use nearly the same distinctions. Nevertheless the later doctors do not call the habitual grace in Christ the grace of union, a manner of speaking which St. Bonaventure took from Alexander of Hales, as we already intimated above at d. 2, a. 3, q. 2 in the scholion, where it was also explained in what sense habitual grace can be called "disposing congruously to the union."

II. Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. III, q. 7, m. 2, a. 2. — Scotus touches the question in both Scripta, III Sent. d. 10. — St. Thomas, here q. 3, a. 2; Summa III, q. 2, a. 12. — Bl. Albert, here a. 9. — Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text of the Master. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here q. 3, a. 2. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 4.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Hic c. 2. — In testimon. allegato pro illi homini Vat. in homine.
    Here, c. 2. — In the testimony alleged, in place of to that man the Vatican edition reads in man.
  2. Aristot., II. Moral. Eudem. c. 9. (c. 8.) ait: Atque his fere duobus a natura quippiam inesse determinamus, eo scilicet quod a nativitate statim omnibus inest, et quod generatione existente facile consequimur, ut senectus, canities etc.
    Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics II, c. 9 (c. 8), says: And by these two marks especially we determine that something is in [a thing] by nature, namely by the fact that it is at once in all from birth, and that, generation having taken place, we easily acquire it, as old age, grey hair, etc.
  3. Cfr. Aristot., II. Phys. text. 3. seqq., ubi definitio naturae datur (principium aliquod et causa movendi et quiescendi, in quo est primum et non secundum accidens) nec non plura alia definiuntur, quae ad naturam spectant.
    Cf. Aristotle, Physics II, text 3 ff., where the definition of nature is given (some principle and cause of moving and resting, in which it is primarily and not according to accident), and likewise several other things are defined which pertain to nature.
  4. Deficiunt enim in oppositis conditiones principales ad denominationem requisitae. «Tria sunt autem necessaria, inquit Boeth., I. in Praedicam. Aristot. c. de Denominativis, ut denominativa vocabula constituantur: prius ut re participent, post ut nomine, postremo ut sit quaedam nominis transfiguratio, ut cum aliquis dicitur a fortitudine fortis... Si quid vero sit quod re non participet, neque nomine participare potest. Quare quaecumque re non participant, denominativa esse non possunt».
    For in opposites the principal conditions required for denomination are lacking. "Three things, however, are necessary," says Boethius, On Aristotle's Categories I, c. on Denominatives, "for denominative words to be constituted: first that they participate in the thing, then in the name, lastly that there be a certain transfiguration of the name, as when someone is called brave from bravery... But if there be anything that does not participate in the thing, it cannot participate in the name either. Wherefore whatever things do not participate in the thing cannot be denominatives."
  5. Cfr. infra d. 18. a. 2. q. 1.
    Cf. below, d. 18, a. 2, q. 1.
  6. De hac Aristot. propos. vide tom. II. pag. 113, nota 8. — Vat. et aliquot codd. verbo naturalibus praemittunt in.
    On this Aristotelian proposition see vol. II, p. 113, note 8. — The Vatican edition and several codices prefix in to the word naturalibus.
  7. Vide supra d. 2. a. 3. q. 2. et infra d. 6. a. 2. q. 2. seq. — Pro in unitate edd. cum codd. A T V bb in unitatem. Paulo inferius pro magis excedit codd. G H L T V aa et edd. 1, 2 magis accedit [scil. ad gloriam].
    See above, d. 2, a. 3, q. 2, and below, d. 6, a. 2, q. 2 f. — In place of in unitate the editions, with codices A T V bb, read in unitatem. A little below, in place of magis excedit, codices G H L T V aa and editions 1, 2 read magis accedit [namely, to glory].
  8. Dist. 2. a. 3. q. 2. ad 6.
    D. 2, a. 3, q. 2, ad 6.
  9. Codd. M O naturalis esse proprietas. Paulo superius pro ipsius rei in cod. K a posteriore manu substitutum est ipsi rei. — Cfr. II. Sent. d. 26. q. 3, ubi de hac re fusius agitur.
    Codices M O read naturalis esse proprietas. A little above, in place of ipsius rei, in codex K a later hand has substituted ipsi rei. — Cf. II Sent. d. 26, q. 3, where this matter is treated more fully.
  10. Edd. et nonnulli codd. sed.
    The editions and several codices read sed.
  11. Cod. X in littera, et quidem c. 2.
    Codex X reads in littera, and indeed c. 2.
  12. Codd. F N bene supplent unionis. Cod. Z omittit gratia.
    Codices F N rightly supply unionis. Codex Z omits gratia.
  13. Cap. 3, 34: Non enim ad mensuram dat Deus spiritum. — In propos. praeced. codd. K Z habuit commutarunt in habet, et pro in se exhibent in se ipso; cod. U voci Filius praefigit ipse. De ista propos. cfr. I. Sent. d. 11. 12. et 29. a. 2.
    Chapter 3:34: For God does not give the Spirit by measure. — In the preceding proposition codices K Z have changed habuit into habet, and in place of in se present in se ipso; codex U prefixes ipse to the word Filius. On this proposition cf. I Sent. d. 11, 12, and 29, a. 2.
  14. Non pauci codd. intelligendo; minus bene. Paulo superius pro principia cod. Z principium.
    Not a few codices read intelligendo; less well. A little above, in place of principia, codex Z reads principium.
  15. Sive minor. — Paulo ante pro qua ostenditur cod. bb quae ostendit.
    That is, the minor [premise]. — A little before, in place of qua ostenditur, codex bb reads quae ostendit.
  16. Pro quae dicit cod. U qua dicitur, codd. A G L N T V aa bb qua dicit. Paulo superius pro reddit cod. Z reddidit.
    In place of quae dicit codex U reads qua dicitur, codices A G L N T V aa bb qua dicit. A little above, in place of reddit, codex Z reads reddidit.
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