Dist. 13, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 13
Articulus I. De gratia Christi ut singularis personae.
Quaestio I. Utrum in Christo gratia singularis personae sit creata, vel increata.
Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum in Christo gratia singularis personae sit gratia creata, vel increata. Et quod sit creata, videtur.
1. In nullo incipit habitare Spiritus sanctus nisi per aliquem effectum gratiae, qui de novo detur animaep276-2; sed in anima Christi habitavit Spiritus sanctus, et hoc non semper, sed ex tempore: ergo anima Christi habuit in se effectum gratiae, per quem sive secundum quem dicitur Spiritus sanctus inhabitare. Sed illud donum dicitur gratia singularis personae et est donum creatum: ergo etc.
2. Item, nulla anima placet Deo, nisi Deo conformetur et assimiletur per gratiam informantem ipsam et efficientem deiformem; sed gratia animam informans et Deo conformans non potest esse nisi gratia creata: ergo nulla anima Deo placet, nisi gratiam creatam in se habeat. Sed anima Christi Deo placuitp276-3 per gratiam illam, quam dicimus gratiam singularis personae: ergo etc.
3. Item, meritum dicit ordinationem ad aliquod maius per aliquod, quod reddit Deo acceptump276-4; sed quod reddit acceptum non potest esse sine gratia, quod vero ordinatur ad maius non potest esse nisi creatum: ergo meritum non est nisi per donum gratiae creatae. Sed meritum fuit in Christo: ergo habuit gratiam creatam, per quam meruit; et illa est gratia singularis personae: ergo etc.
4. Item, Christus habuit duas voluntates, sicut inferiusp276-5 patebit, creatam scilicet et increatam, et constat, quod utraque fuit perfecta; sed perfectio voluntatis creatae est per gratiam creatam, quae, inquam, dicitur gratia singularis personae: ergo in Christo non tantum gratiam increatam, sed etiam creatam necesse est ponere.
Sed contra: 1. Gratia creata non est nisi in substantia creatap276-6: ergo cum gratia singularis personae sit in persona, gratia singularis personae creata non est nec potest esse nisi in persona creata; sed persona Christi non est creata, sed increata: ergo in Christo non est gratiam creatam reperire, quae, inquam, sit gratia singularis personae.
2. Item, quia Christus est filius naturalis, non potest esse filius per gratiam adoptionis ex parte naturae assumtaep276-7: ergo cum Christus sit a Patre dilectus ut persona coaeterna, videtur, quod nulla sit ponenda in eo gratia creata, per quam fiat acceptus ut singularis persona.
3. Item, ad hoc datur nobis gratia singularis personae, ut per illam efficiamur Deo similes; sed ille non tantum est Deo similis, immo etiam Deus: ergo videtur, quod non egeat dono creatae gratiaep276-8.
4. Item, Verbum increatum, unitum animae Christi et eius potentiis, potest eas efficacissime regere et ad bona perficienda elevare; sed non oportet fieri per plura quod sufficienter et perfecte fieri potest per pauciorap277-1: videtur ergo, quod in Christo non sit ponenda gratia creata.
Conclusio. In Christo ponendum est donum gratiae, quae dicitur singularis personae, et quae est donum creatum.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod absque dubio in Christo est ponere donum gratiae, quae quidem gratia dicitur gratia singularis personae; et hoc quidem donum esse creatump277-2. — Et ratio huius est: quia tale donum gratiae animam Deo assimilat et ad bonas operationes et meritorias elevando habilitat. Quoniam igitur anima Christi fuit deiformis et ad bene operandum habilis, alioquin nec fuisset idonea ad unionem nec ad meriti perfectionemp277-3; ideo necesse fuit, in Christi anima reperiri donum talis gratiae. — Et ex eadem causa necesse fuit, ipsum esse creatum, ut animam posset informare, tanquam perfectio suum perfectibile informare habet, et ut potentias habilitare posset, sicut qualitas suum subiectum habet qualificarep277-4. — Et ideo sunt concedendae rationes hoc ostendentes.
1. Ad illud autem quod primo obiicitur, quod gratia singularis personae creata est in persona creata; dicendum, quod gratia singularis personae non dicitur, quod sit in persona secundum rationem personalitatis, in quantum persona, sed quia inest ei ratione alicuius partis; ita tamen, quod gratia sic dicta respicit illius personae merita propria. Quamvis autem in Christo sit personalitas increata, tamen illa persona habet naturam creatam, animam videlicet et carnem; et nihil impedit, quin gratia creata possit esse in Christo secundum eius animam, quae creata est, et quae est eius pars ratione humanae naturae. Ipse autem obiicit, ac si talis gratia esset in persona non ratione alicuius partis, sed ratione personalitatis.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod filiatio adoptionis non potest stare cum filiatione per naturam etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia filiatio est proprietas, quae respicit ipsam personamp277-5; et iterum adoptio importat aliquam extraneitatem et imperfectionem; et sic non est de gratia singularis personae, quae respicit ipsam animam, et non imperfectionem et extraneitatem, sed magis completionem et deiformitatem importat. Et propterea nullam omnino habet oppositionem ad illam aeternam acceptationem, sicut adoptio respectu filiationis naturalis. Et ideo non est simile.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod cum Christus sit Deus, non indiget Deo assimilari; dicendum, quod ille non esset Deus, nisi corpus eius et anima assumeretur a Verbo; nec anima esset idonea, ut assumeretur a Verbo, nisi esset deiformis et Deo assimilata perfecte per gratiam: et ideo hoc, quod ille homo est Deus, deiformitatem gratiae et gloriae non excludit, quin potius praesupponit. Et si tu obiicias de carne, ad quam non requiritur gratuita dispositio ad hoc, quod uniatur Verbo; ad hoc fuit suprap277-6 responsum, quoniam caro habet congruentiam ad unionem ex ordinatione sui ad animam. Ideo non oportet, quod dispositionis congruentia reperiatur primo in carne, sed sufficit, quod sit ex parte animae.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Verbo unito, quod potest regere; dicendum, quod verum est, quantum est ex parte ipsius Verbi uniti, sed defectus est ex parte liberi arbitrii, quod indiget debita dispositione ad hoc, quod regimini ipsius Verbi se valeat conformare; indiget etiam dispositione debita, ut possit ipsi Verbo uniri in una persona. Unde absque dubio deiformior est illa anima per abundantiam gratiae sibi datam, quam sit alia creatura, ad hoc quod ad unionem sit idonea. — Ad haec autem intelligenda valent illa quae determinata sunt in primo librop277-7 de caritate, et in secundo de gratia, ubi ostensum est, quae necessitas vel utilitas est ponere gratiam creatam.
I. Communiter distinguitur in Christo quadruplex gratia, scilicet secundum quod est singularis homo (de quo agitur in hoc articulo), secundum quod est caput Ecclesiae (de quo disputatur in 2. art.), porro gratia unionis (de qua supra d. 6. a. 2. et passim), denique gratia gratis data. — Iam notavimus (supra d. 2. a. 3. q. 2, d. 1. a. 2. q. 3.), quod ab Alexandro
Hal. (S. p. III. q. 12. m. I. a. I.) distinguitur duplex gratia unionis, scilicet gratia unionis disponens, quae est creata, et complens sive perficiens, quae est increata. Nec S. Thom. abhorret ab hoc usu nominis, in Comment. (hic q. 3. a. I.) dicens, gratiam unionis posse vocari «omne illud quod decet naturam humanam Deo unitam, sic ex parte corporis, sicut ex parte animae; et sic etiam gratia unionis est quid creatum». Eodem modo loquuntur S. Bonav. (passim, ut locc. citt. et infra a. 2. q. 2.) aliique antiqui. — De relatione, quae est inter tres priores species gratiae, cfr. infra a. 2. q. I. 2.
Duo autem omnino constant, scilicet primo, quod anima Christi ornata fuit habitu gratiae creatae et accidentalis, licet hoc antiquitus a paucis obscuris theologis negatum esse dicatur; secundo, quod in Christo ratione divinae personae fuit sanctitas increata, substantialis et personalis. Facile etiam intelligitur, hanc gratiam substantialem personae vi unionis hypostaticae esse quasi radicem nec non causam efficientem gratiae creatae, quae ab ipsa oritur, dependet, dignificatur et quasi informatur. — Attamen quoad sanctificationem ipsius animae Christi ab antiquo fuit celebris controversia, et quoad subtiliores quaestiones variae inter posteriores theologos ortae sunt opiniones. De quibus haec notamus.
II. 1. Nunc communiter sanctificatio substantialis sive unctio substantialis, qua anima Christi fit absolute sancta, distinguitur a sanctificatione accidentali vi gratiae habitualis. Haec autem sanctitas substantialis non intelligitur in hoc sensu, quasi anima secundum suam substantiam vel essentiam sit sancta, sed in hoc, quod habeat sanctitatem substantialem sibi unitam in esse personali. Ipsius Scoti discipulus Frassenius (Scotus academicus, de incarn. tr. I. disp. 2. a. 2. sect. I. q. I.) defendit hanc conclusionem: «Anima Christi Domini, seclusa omni gratia, tam actuali quam habituali, revera erat sancta, Deo grata et accepta in ordine ad beatitudinem per sanctitatem personalem ac substantialem». Huic contradicit Durand. (III. Sent. d. 12. q. 2.), sanctificationem restringendo ad gratiam creatam, simulque nititur subvertere fundamentale principium: «Actiones sunt suppositorum», quasi hoc intelligendum sit tantum secundum denominationem; quod est contra S. Thom. (S. III. q. 7. a. 13.) aliosque. Etiam plurimi inter Scotistas et Nominales sanctificationem humanitatis substantialem, saltem in sensu formali, negabant, atque verba Ss. Patrum, quod humanitas Christi a divinitate fuerit sanctificata, uncta, deificata (θεωθεῖσα), explicabant in sensu causali, vel morali. Qui autem proprie sanctificationem substantialem admittunt, iterum dissident in ulteriori quaestione, utrum haec sanctificatio formaliter sit a natura divina, an a personalitate Verbi seorsim, an ab utraque coniunctim, an ab ipsa unione hypostatica, prout dicit nexum divinitatis cum humanitate (pro qua parte De Barberiis explicat S. Bonaventuram).
2. Scoti igitur discipuli cum Richardo a Med. et aliis non paucis contendebant, Christi humanitatem sanctificari formaliter per gratiam habitualem, non vi unionis hypostaticae nisi causaliter et moraliter; ex quo concludebant, gratiam habitualem fuisse necessariam, ut anima Christi sanctificetur formaliter. Iidem provocant ad ipsius S. Thomae verba (hic q. I. a. I.), qui loquens de necessitate gratiae, ut anima Christi perficiatur formaliter in esse spirituali, subiungit: «Deitas autem non est formaliter, sed effective perficiens ipsam; unde oportet aliam formam creatam in ipso ponere, qua formaliter perficiatur; et haec est gratia». Et ibidem ad 3: «Lux solis et lux candelae, utrumque est active illuminans; sed Deitas et gratia non sic se habent, sed unum illuminat active, alterum formaliter». Sed cum haec dicta sint contra eos qui gratiam habitualem Christo omnino denegant, alii videntur verba non formaliter interpretari de tali perfectione formali, quae fit per formam inhaerentem. — Nonnulli admittunt quidem, quod divinitas per se ipsam, quatenus personaliter unitur animae Christi, eam sanctificet, sed extrinsecus tantum et moraliter, non intrinsecus et physice. — Alii denique ponunt, vi unionis hypostaticae cum Verbo animam Christi sanctificari non tantum radicaliter et causaliter, vel moraliter et extrinsecus, sed etiam formaliter, intrinsecus et physice. Hoc autem explicant docentes, quod sanctitas substantialis modo eminentissimo idem praestat et amplius, quod forma creata sanctitatis, licet non sit forma inhaerens. Et pro confirmatione haec addunt: sicut anima Christi per subsistentiam Verbi est formaliter subsistens, quin ista subsistentia ei uniatur ut forma inhaerens et proprie informans; sic eadem est formaliter sancta per communicationem sanctitatis divinae, quin haec subeat imperfectionem formae inhaerentis. Hic ultimus modus dicendi videtur conformior esse verbis Ss. Patrum, praesertim Graecorum.
3. Qui putant, quod anima Christi vi unionis non sanctificetur formaliter, absolutam necessitatem gratiae habitualis statuunt, ut anima Christi sit formaliter sancta. Etiam contrariae sententiae patroni quandam eiusdem necessitatem admittunt ad hoc, ut sanctitas Christi sit completa et consummata ex parte naturae humanae, et ut anima eius tanquam principium quo operandi connaturaliter eliciat actus ordinis supernaturalis et meritorios. In hoc autem sensu loquitur S. Bonav. (et similiter S. Thom.) de necessitate huius gratiae creatae, ut patet ex eiusdem doctrina supra d. 2. a. 3. q. 2. et d. 4. a. 2. q. 3. explicata.
III. S. Bonav. hic non intendit nisi probare, sanctitatem creatam Christo inesse; de praedicta controversia, per quid anima Christi formaliter sanctificetur, explicite non loquitur, immo de ipsa sanctitate substantiali cum aliis antiquis Scholasticis distinctam quaestionem non habet. Nihilominus satis mentem suam manifestat in favorem eiusdem hic solut. ad 2. 3. et a. 2. q. 1. 2, nec non supra d. 4. dub. 4, d. 12. a. 2. q. I. Idem docet Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 8. m. 3. a. 4. in fine, q. II. m. 3. et q. 12. m. I. a. I. Nec dissentit S. Thomas, S. III. q. 7. a. I. et 13; tamen quoad ordinem, qui est inter gratiam unionis et habitualem, explicite docet, illum ratione sive natura esse priorem.
IV. De ipsa quaestione praeter locos citatos: Scot., Report. III. Sent. d. 18. q. 3. et (de formali sanctificatione) d. 2. q. I. n. 3 — B. Albert., hic a. I. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. I. a. I. — Richard. a Med., hic a. I. q. I. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 13. q. 5. — Durand., de hac et 2. seqq. qq. hic q. I. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et 2. seqq. qq. hic q. I. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.
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Article I. On the grace of Christ as a singular person.
Question I. Whether in Christ the grace of his singular person is created or uncreated.
Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and it is asked whether in Christ the grace of his singular person is a created grace or an uncreated one. And that it is created seems to be the case.
1. In no one does the Holy Spirit begin to dwell except through some effect of grace which is newly given to the soulp276-2; but in the soul of Christ the Holy Spirit dwelt, and this not always, but from a [point in] time: therefore the soul of Christ had in itself an effect of grace, through which or according to which the Holy Spirit is said to indwell. But that gift is called the grace of his singular person and is a created gift: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, no soul is pleasing to God unless it be conformed and made like to God through a grace informing it and making it deiform; but a grace informing the soul and conforming it to God can only be a created grace: therefore no soul is pleasing to God unless it have a created grace in itself. But the soul of Christ was pleasing to Godp276-3 through that grace which we call the grace of his singular person: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, merit denotes an ordering toward something greater by means of something which renders [one] acceptable to Godp276-4; but that which renders [one] acceptable cannot exist without grace, while that which is ordered toward something greater can only be created: therefore merit exists only through a gift of created grace. But there was merit in Christ: therefore he had a created grace, through which he merited; and that is the grace of his singular person: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, Christ had two wills, as will appear belowp276-5, namely a created and an uncreated one, and it is agreed that each was perfect; but the perfection of the created will is through created grace, which, I say, is called the grace of his singular person: therefore in Christ one must posit not only an uncreated grace but also a created one.
On the contrary: 1. A created grace exists only in a created substancep276-6: therefore, since the grace of a singular person is in a person, the grace of a singular person, [if] created, does not and cannot exist except in a created person; but the person of Christ is not created, but uncreated: therefore in Christ there is no created grace to be found which, I say, would be the grace of his singular person.
2. Likewise, since Christ is a natural son, he cannot be a son through the grace of adoption on the side of the assumed naturep276-7: therefore, since Christ is loved by the Father as a coeternal person, it seems that no created grace is to be posited in him, through which he would be made accepted as a singular person.
3. Likewise, the grace of a singular person is given to us for this, that through it we may be made like to God; but he is not only like to God, but rather is even God: therefore it seems that he has no need of a gift of created gracep276-8.
4. Likewise, the uncreated Word, united to the soul of Christ and to its powers, can most efficaciously govern them and elevate them to the accomplishing of good things; but that which can be done sufficiently and perfectly through fewer [things] ought not to be done through morep277-1: it seems therefore that no created grace is to be posited in Christ.
Conclusion. In Christ there is to be posited a gift of grace which is called [the grace] of his singular person, and which is a created gift.
I respond: It must be said that without doubt in Christ a gift of grace is to be posited, which grace indeed is called the grace of his singular person; and this gift indeed is createdp277-2. — And the reason of this is: because such a gift of grace makes the soul like to God and renders it apt, by elevating it, for good and meritorious operations. Since therefore the soul of Christ was deiform and apt for acting well — otherwise it would not have been fit either for the union or for the perfection of meritp277-3 — therefore it was necessary that in the soul of Christ a gift of such grace be found. — And from the same cause it was necessary that it [the gift] be created, so that it might inform the soul, just as a perfection has [the property] of informing its perfectible, and so that it might render the powers apt, just as a quality has [the property] of qualifying its subjectp277-4. — And therefore the reasons demonstrating this are to be conceded.
1. To that, then, which is objected first, that the grace of a singular person, [being] created, is in a created person; it must be said that the grace of a singular person is not said to be in the person according to the formal character of personality, insofar as [it is] a person, but because it is in it by reason of some part; yet in such a way that the grace so called regards the proper merits of that person. Now although in Christ there is an uncreated personality, nevertheless that person has a created nature, namely a soul and flesh; and nothing prevents a created grace from being able to be in Christ according to his soul, which is created, and which is his part by reason of his human nature. But he objects as if such a grace were in the person not by reason of some part, but by reason of personality.
2. To that which is objected, that the sonship of adoption cannot stand together with sonship by nature etc.; it must be said that it is not similar, because sonship is a property which regards the person itselfp277-5; and again adoption implies a certain extraneousness and imperfection; and so it is not so with the grace of a singular person, which regards the soul itself, and implies not imperfection and extraneousness, but rather completion and deiformity. And therefore it has no opposition at all to that eternal acceptation, as adoption does with respect to natural sonship. And therefore it is not similar.
3. To that which is objected, that since Christ is God, he has no need to be made like to God; it must be said that he would not be God unless his body and soul were assumed by the Word; nor would the soul be fit to be assumed by the Word unless it were deiform and made perfectly like to God through grace: and therefore the fact that this man is God does not exclude the deiformity of grace and glory, but rather presupposes it. And if you object concerning the flesh, for which no gratuitous disposition is required in order that it be united to the Word; to this it was answered abovep277-6, that the flesh has a congruity to the union from its ordering toward the soul. Therefore it is not necessary that the congruity of disposition be found first in the flesh, but it suffices that it be on the side of the soul.
4. To that which is objected concerning the united Word, that it can govern; it must be said that it is true, as far as concerns the united Word itself, but the defect is on the side of the free will, which needs a due disposition in order that it may be able to conform itself to the governance of the Word itself; it also needs a due disposition in order that it may be able to be united to the Word itself in one person. Hence without doubt that soul is more deiform through the abundance of grace given to it than is any other creature, with respect to its being fit for the union. — And for understanding these matters, those things avail which were determined in the first bookp277-7 concerning charity, and in the second concerning grace, where it was shown what is the necessity or usefulness of positing a created grace.
I. Commonly a fourfold grace is distinguished in Christ, namely according as he is a singular man (which is treated in this article), according as he is the head of the Church (which is disputed in the 2nd article), further the grace of union (concerning which, above, d. 6. a. 2. and passim), and finally freely-given grace (gratia gratis data). — We have already noted (above, d. 2. a. 3. q. 2, d. 1. a. 2. q. 3.) that by Alexander of Hales (Summa, p. III. q. 12. m. I. a. I.) a twofold grace of union is distinguished, namely a disposing grace of union, which is created, and a completing or perfecting [grace], which is uncreated. Nor does St. Thomas shrink from this use of the term, in his Commentary (here, q. 3. a. I.), saying that the grace of union can be called «everything that befits a human nature united to God, both on the side of the body and on the side of the soul; and thus the grace of union too is something created». In the same way speak St. Bonaventure (passim, as in the places cited, and below a. 2. q. 2.) and the other ancients. — Concerning the relation which obtains among the three prior species of grace, cf. below a. 2. q. I. 2.
But two things are altogether established, namely first, that the soul of Christ was adorned with a habit of created and accidental grace, although this is said anciently to have been denied by a few obscure theologians; second, that in Christ, by reason of the divine person, there was an uncreated, substantial, and personal sanctity. It is also easily understood that this substantial sanctity of the person, by the power of the hypostatic union, is as it were the root and also the efficient cause of the created grace, which arises from it, depends [on it], is dignified [by it], and is as it were informed [by it]. — Nevertheless, concerning the sanctification of the soul of Christ itself there was from of old a celebrated controversy, and concerning the more subtle questions various opinions arose among later theologians. Of these we note the following.
II. 1. Now commonly substantial sanctification or substantial unction, by which the soul of Christ is made absolutely holy, is distinguished from accidental sanctification by the power of habitual grace. But this substantial sanctity is not understood in this sense, as though the soul were holy according to its substance or essence, but in this, that it has a substantial sanctity united to it in personal being. Scotus's own disciple Frassen (Scotus academicus, on the incarnation, tr. I. disp. 2. a. 2. sect. I. q. I.) defends this conclusion: «The soul of Christ the Lord, every grace, both actual and habitual, being set aside, was truly holy, pleasing and acceptable to God in the order to beatitude through a personal and substantial sanctity». Durandus (III. Sent. d. 12. q. 2.) contradicts this, restricting sanctification to created grace, and at the same time he tries to subvert the fundamental principle: «Actions belong to supposits», as if this were to be understood only according to denomination; which is against St. Thomas (Summa III. q. 7. a. 13.) and others. Also very many among the Scotists and Nominalists denied the substantial sanctification of the humanity, at least in the formal sense, and explained the words of the holy Fathers — that the humanity of Christ was sanctified, anointed, deified (θεωθεῖσα) by the divinity — in a causal or moral sense. But those who properly admit substantial sanctification are again divided in a further question, whether this sanctification is formally from the divine nature, or from the personality of the Word taken separately, or from both conjointly, or from the hypostatic union itself, insofar as it denotes the bond of the divinity with the humanity (on which side De Barberiis explains St. Bonaventure).
2. Scotus's disciples therefore, with Richard of Mediavilla and not a few others, contended that the humanity of Christ is sanctified formally through habitual grace, and by the power of the hypostatic union only causally and morally; from which they concluded that habitual grace was necessary in order that the soul of Christ be sanctified formally. These same appeal to the very words of St. Thomas (here, q. I. a. I.), who, speaking of the necessity of grace, that the soul of Christ be perfected formally in spiritual being, adds: «But the Deity perfects it not formally, but effectively; hence one must posit another created form in it, by which it is formally perfected; and this is grace». And in the same place, to the 3rd: «The light of the sun and the light of a candle, each is actively illuminating; but the Deity and grace are not so disposed, but the one illuminates actively, the other formally». But since these things are said against those who altogether deny habitual grace to Christ, others seem to interpret the words not [as said] formally concerning such a formal perfection as comes about through an inhering form. — Some indeed admit that the divinity by itself, inasmuch as it is personally united to the soul of Christ, sanctifies it, but only extrinsically and morally, not intrinsically and physically. — Others finally hold that, by the power of the hypostatic union with the Word, the soul of Christ is sanctified not only radically and causally, or morally and extrinsically, but also formally, intrinsically, and physically. And this they explain by teaching that the substantial sanctity in a most eminent manner provides the same and more than the created form of sanctity provides, although it is not an inhering form. And for confirmation they add this: just as the soul of Christ through the subsistence of the Word is formally subsisting, without that subsistence being united to it as an inhering and properly informing form; so the same [soul] is formally holy through the communication of the divine sanctity, without this undergoing the imperfection of an inhering form. This last manner of speaking seems to be more conformed to the words of the holy Fathers, especially the Greeks.
3. Those who hold that the soul of Christ is not sanctified formally by the power of the union, posit an absolute necessity of habitual grace, in order that the soul of Christ be formally holy. Even the patrons of the contrary opinion admit a certain necessity of the same, in order that the sanctity of Christ be complete and consummated on the side of the human nature, and that his soul, as a principle by which of operating, may connaturally elicit acts of the supernatural and meritorious order. And in this sense St. Bonaventure (and similarly St. Thomas) speaks of the necessity of this created grace, as is clear from the same [author's] doctrine explained above, d. 2. a. 3. q. 2. and d. 4. a. 2. q. 3.
III. St. Bonaventure here intends only to prove that a created sanctity is in Christ; concerning the aforesaid controversy — by what the soul of Christ is formally sanctified — he does not speak explicitly, indeed concerning substantial sanctity itself he does not, with the other ancient Scholastics, hold a distinct question. Nevertheless he manifests his mind sufficiently in favor of the same here in the solutions to the 2nd, 3rd, and a. 2. q. 1. 2, as well as above d. 4. dub. 4, d. 12. a. 2. q. I. The same is taught by Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III. q. 8. m. 3. a. 4. at the end, q. II. m. 3. and q. 12. m. I. a. I. Nor does St. Thomas dissent, Summa III. q. 7. a. I. and 13; yet as to the order which obtains between the grace of union and the habitual [grace], he explicitly teaches that the former is prior in reason or nature.
IV. Concerning the question itself, besides the places cited: Scotus, Report. III. Sent. d. 18. q. 3. and (on formal sanctification) d. 2. q. I. n. 3 — Bl. Albert, here a. I. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. I. a. I. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. I. q. I. — Henry of Ghent, Quodl. 13. q. 5. — Durandus, on this and the 2 following questions, here q. I. — Denis the Carthusian, on this and the 2 following questions, here q. I. — Biel, on this and the following questions, here q. unica.
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- Cfr. 1. Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. I, et II. d. 26. q. 2, ubi pluribus verbis ostenditur, gratiam in anima esse quid creatum; quo dogmate nititur solutio quaestionis, de qua hic agitur. — Pro detur edd. datur.Cf. I Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. I, and II [Sent.] d. 26. q. 2, where it is shown at greater length that grace in the soul is something created; on which dogma the solution of the question here treated rests. — For detur the editions read datur.
- Codd. Z aa placet.Codices Z, aa read placet ["is pleasing," present tense].
- Cfr. II. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. I. seqq. et d. 29. a. I. q. I. seq. — Pro ordinationem cod. K. ordinem.Cf. II Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. I. and following, and d. 29. a. I. q. I. and following. — For ordinationem codex K reads ordinem.
- Dist. 17. a. 1. q. 1. seqq.Distinction 17, a. 1, q. 1, and following.
- Nam, ut II. Sent. d. 26. q. 3. expositum est, gratia creata est aliquod accidens, quod in Deo inveniri nequit. — Edd. primam conclus. sic truncarunt: ergo cum gratia singularis personae sit creata, non est vel potest esse etc. In cod. C sic scriptum est: ergo cum gratia singularis personae sit creata, gratia singularis personae creata non est etc., in pluribus aliis codd. sic: ergo singularis personae creata non est etc.For, as was expounded in II Sent. d. 26. q. 3, created grace is a certain accident, which cannot be found in God. — The editions thus truncated the first conclusion: therefore since the grace of a singular person is created, it is not nor can it be etc. In codex C it is written thus: therefore since the grace of a singular person is created, the created grace of a singular person is not etc.; in several other codices thus: therefore the created [grace] of a singular person is not etc.
- Cfr. supra d. 10. a. 2. q. 1.Cf. above, d. 10. a. 2. q. 1.
- De hoc arg. vide supra d. 2. a. 3. q. 2.On this argument see above, d. 2. a. 3. q. 2.
- Aristot., VIII. Topic. c. 4. (c. 9.): Est autem... peccatum, quando ostenditur per longiora quod contingit per breviora. Cfr. I. Physic. text. 41. (c. 6.), et tom. II. pag. 741. nota 4. nec non pag. 778. nota 2. — Paulo superius pro bona perficienda codd. W bb bonum perficiendum.Aristotle, Topics VIII. c. 4. (c. 9.): It is a fault when it is shown by longer [means] what is attainable by shorter [means]. Cf. Physics I. text 41. (c. 6.), and vol. II. p. 741. note 4, as well as p. 778. note 2. — A little above, for bona perficienda codices W, bb read bonum perficiendum.
- Edd. et haec quidem donum est creatum, et post pauca pro elevando cum paucis codd. exercendas. Mox pro bene operandum codd. A N bonum operandum.The editions [read] et haec quidem donum est creatum ["and this indeed is a created gift"], and a little after, for elevando with a few codices [read] exercendas. Presently, for bene operandum codices A, N [read] bonum operandum.
- Cfr. supra d. 2. a. 3. q. 2. — Mox pro donum talis gratiae cod. W tale donum gratiae. Paulo inferius pro perfectio, quae lectio confirmatur codd. P Q U bb (N a secunda manu), codd. B C D M O perfectivum, alii codd. atque edd. 1, 2 perfectum, Vat. perfectissimum. Subinde post suum perfectibile Vat. subdit quod, et edd. 1, 2 cum cod. K omittunt informare habet.Cf. above, d. 2. a. 3. q. 2. — Presently, for donum talis gratiae codex W reads tale donum gratiae. A little below, for perfectio, which reading is confirmed by codices P, Q, U, bb (N by a second hand), codices B, C, D, M, O [read] perfectivum, other codices and the editions 1, 2 [read] perfectum, the Vatican [edition reads] perfectissimum. Then after suum perfectibile the Vatican [edition] adds quod, and the editions 1, 2 with codex K omit informare habet.
- Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Quali: Qualitatem vero dico, secundum quam quales quidam esse dicuntur.Aristotle, Categories, the chapter «On Quality»: I call quality that according to which certain things are said to be of such a sort.
- Vide supra d. 8. a. 2. q. 2. De enuntiato seq. cfr. supra d. 10. a. 2. q. I. — Post personam codd. K O addunt et non imperfectionem, et sic non est de gratia. Mox pro et sic non est codd. A bb sed non sic est.See above, d. 8. a. 2. q. 2. On the following statement cf. above, d. 10. a. 2. q. I. — After personam codices K, O add et non imperfectionem, et sic non est de gratia. Presently, for et sic non est codices A, bb read sed non sic est.
- Dist. 2. a. 3. q. I. — Paulo inferius pro habet edd. habuit, et deinde cum aliquot codd. ex origine pro ex ordinatione. Cod. K ad ipsam animam pro ad animam.Distinction 2, a. 3, q. I. — A little below, for habet the editions [read] habuit, and then, with several codices, ex origine for ex ordinatione. Codex K [reads] ad ipsam animam for ad animam.
- Dist. 17. p. I. q. I, et II. Sent. d. 26. q. 2.Distinction 17, p. I, q. I, and II Sent. d. 26. q. 2. ---