← Back to Distinction 18

Dist. 18, Art. 2, Q. 1

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 18

Textus Latinus
p. 387

Articulus II. De merito Christi quoad fructum vel praemium.

Consequenter quaeritur de merito Christi quantum ad fructum sive quantum ad praemium. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum Christus meruerit sibi Dei fruitionem.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum meruerit corporisp387-1 glorificationem.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum meruerit nobis ianuae apertionem.

Quaestio I. Utrum Christus sibi meruerit Dei fruitionem sive praemium substantiale.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum Christus sibi meruerit Dei fruitionem sive praemium substantiale. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia, sicut se habet gratia ad gloriam, sic se habet meritum ad praemiump387-2; sed Christus habuit gratiam ordinatam ad gloriam: ergo habuit meritum ordinatum ad praemium. Sed gloria consistit in Dei fruitione, quae est praemium substantiale: ergo etc.

2. Item, qui meretur ex caritate tanto maius quid meretur, quanto maiorem habet caritatemp387-3; sed caritas Christi fuit maxima: ergo ei debebatur maximum praemium. Sed maximum praemium non est nisi praemium substantiale, quod Deus est: ergo etc.

3. Item, gloriosius est habere praemium per merita quam sine meritisp387-4; sed Christus in gloria excellit omnes Sanctos: ergo si alii Sancti habuerunt praemium substantiale per merita, multo fortius videtur de Christo.

4. Item, Angeli sancti per merita habuerunt praemium substantiale, secundum communem opinionem omnium; sed Angeli simul habuerunt gratiam et gloriam, sicut in secundo librop387-5 ostensum fuit: ergo si non fuit minoris efficaciae gratia in Christo quam in Angelis, videtur, quod Christus substantiale praemium meruerit, quamvis meritum secundum tempus praemium non praecesserit.

5. Item, cum Deus inducit aliquam formam subito, quam creatura acquirit per successionem, nihil omittit Deus de illis dispositionibus, quas natura introduceret successive; sicut patet, si Deus subito de aqua faceret ignem, introduceret in naturam aquae raritatem et siccitatem et caliditatemp387-6: ergo si creatura nata est pervenire ad praemium gloriae per merita gratiae, videtur, quod merita non defuerunt Christo, quamvis gloria collata sibi fuerit a suae conceptionis primordio.

Sed contra: 1. Augustinus, decimo tertio libro de Trinitatep387-7: « In rebus per tempus ortis illa summa gratia est, qua homo in unitate personae coniunctus est Deo »; et in Enchiridio dicit, quod « nullis praecedentibus meritis, homo ille copulatus est Deo »; sed illa copulatio non potuit esse sine Dei fruitione,

p. 388

quae est praemium substantiale: ergo non videtur, quod praemium substantiale habuit Christus per aliquod meritum.

2. Item, Augustinus in Enchiridiop388-1: « Facta est quodam modo ipsa gratia illi homini naturalis, qua nullum posset admittere peccatum »; sed gratia talis est gratia consummata, quae non est aliud quam gloria sive praemium substantiale: ergo praemium substantiale fuit Christo quodam modo naturale. Sed nihil tale acquiritur per merita: ergo etc.

3. Item, meritum naturaliter antecedit praemium; sed usus vel actus virtutis naturaliter sequitur habitump388-2: cum ergo habitus gratiae et gloriae simul fuerit in Christo, videtur, quod merita subsecuta sunt substantiale praemium: ergo non ordinantur in Christo ad substantiale praemium promerendum.

4. Item, dispositio naturalis antecedit illud, ad quod disponit; sed deiformitas gloriae disponebat animam Christi ad unionem Divinitatis, dispositione, inquam, congruitatisp388-3: ergo deiformitas gloriae in Christo naturaliter praecedebat unionem personalem, quamvis simul esset tempore. Sed unio personalis naturaliter in Christo antecedebat meritum et liberi arbitrii usum: ergo in Christo merita sequebantur substantiale praemium secundum ordinem naturae: redit ergo idem quod prius.

5. Item, meritum praemii substantialis potissime consistit in actu et affectu caritatis, secundum quemp388-4 anima habet in Deum moveri; sed secundum illum affectum Christus non erat in statu viatoris; sed in statu comprehensoris: si ergo non merebatur in quantum comprehensor, sed in quantum viator, non merebatur secundum illum affectum caritatis, in quo consistit meritum praemii substantialis: ergo videtur, quod substantiale praemium non meruerit.

Conclusio.

Christus, proprie loquendo, non meruit sibi praemium substantiale.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod communiter non conceditur, quod Christus sibi meruerit substantiale praemium; et hoc Magister innuit in litterap388-5 satis expresse.

Ratio autem huius est: nam meritum dicit ordinationem ad praemium, sicut dispositio ad complementum, sicut via ad terminum; et ideo necesse est, meritum praecedere praemium vel tempore, vel secundum ordinem naturae. Neutro autem modo debuit in Christo praecedere nec praecessit, propter hoc quod anima Christi non esset ad unionem idonea, nisi esset beatissima et deiformissima, quod quidem fit per gloriae influentiam. Si ergo necesse fuit, unionem illam antecedere omnia merita secundum ordinem naturae, necesse etiam fuit, deiformitatem gloriae in Christo praecedere omnem usum gratiae; et ideo gloriap388-6 in Christo praecessit omnia merita propter summam dignitatem, quae fuit in anima Christi a sua creatione, videlicet propter unionem ipsius ad Verbum. — Et ideo concedendum est, quod Christus, proprie loquendo, non meruit sibi substantiale praemium. Et concedendae sunt rationes, quae ad hoc inductae sunt.

Ad opposita:

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sicut gratia ordinatur ad gloriam, ita meritum ad praemium; dicendum, quod quoad quid est simile, quoad quid non. Simile enim est quantum ad conditionem disponendi, sed non est simile quantum ad originem, pro eo quod tam gratia quam gloria est habitus infusus divinitus, non a nobis; sed meritum est usus procedens a libero arbitrio gratia informato. Ideo in Christo potuit esse ordo gratiae ad gloriam, salvo ordine utriusque ad unionem; non sic autem est de ordine meriti ad praemium, sicut ostensum est prius.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maxima caritas meretur maximum praemium; dicendum, quod illud est verum, si caritas teneat rationem merendi, secundum quod maxima; sed caritas Christi secundum motum ipsius in Deum, qui erat maximus et intensissimus, plus tenebat rationem praemii quam meriti, immo erat ipsum praemium; ideo cum esset ipsum praemium, non merebatur substantiale praemium.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod gloriosius est habere praemium per merita; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem in eis qui solum habent uniri Deo per conformitatem affectionis — in istis enim est gratia et gloria quasi accidentalis et per modum acquisitionis — et a natura sua nati sunt indifferenter esse boni et mali. Secus autem est de homine assumto a Verbo, qui non tantum unitus est Deo per conformitatem affectionis, sed etiam unione personali, ut non dicatur divinus, sed Deus; et pro tanto « isti homini gratia est quodam modo naturalisp388-7 », et multo gloriosius est ei habere gloriam a sua prima

p. 389

creatione, quam habere eam per acquisitionem; sicut multo gloriosius est esse Deum, quam esse Dei servum. Et ideo auctoritas illa non habet locum circa Christum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Angelip389-1 habuerunt simul gratiam et gloriam, meritum et praemium; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia in Angelis usus liberi arbitrii praecessit infusionem gratiae, et ideo in ipsa infusione gratiae motus liberi arbitrii gratia informatus, in quo consistit meritum, potuit praecedere ipsum praemium ordine naturae, quamvis esset simul tempore. Secus autem est in Christo, qui prius ordine naturae habuit deiformitatem gloriae quam usum voluntatis deliberativae, sicut prius ostensum est.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus subito faciendo nihil omittit de his quae successive concurrunt in operatione creaturae; dicendum, quod cum creaturap389-2 inducit aliquam perfectionem vel formam, duo est ibi considerare, videlicet qualitates et dispositiones a parte suscipientis, et operationes a parte agentis et praeparantis. Cum igitur dicitur, quod Deus nihil omittit operando subito de his quae natura introducit; hoc est verum de qualitatibus et dispositionibus informantibus susceptibile, sed non est verum de operibus praeambulis ad illas dispositiones. Et ideo ex ratione hac non potest concludi, quod merita in Christo praecesserunt praemium, cum meritum consistat in opere procedente a voluntate; sed hoc potest concludi, quod in Christo fuit perfectio virtutum et habituum, quae animam habilitant ad gloriam sive ad substantiale praemium.

Scholion

[ad Art. I, q. III — impressum in capite p. 387:]

I. Manifestum est, quod passio in se considerata et quatenus a principio extraneo infligitur, non est meritoria; sed ipsa meritoria ex parte sustinentis, qui caritate informatus est, quatenus est voluntarie acceptata, ut hic in solutionibus oppositorum explicatur (cfr. infra d. 20. dub. 3. 4.). — Plura alia de passione Christi, de causa, modo et effectibus eiusdem vide apud Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 18. et 19, nec non apud S. Thomam, S. III. q. 46-50, et etiam infra d. 19. a. 1. q. 1-4.

II. De hac quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. q. 17. m. 3. a. 3. — S. Thom., hic a. 5; S. III. q. 47. a. 2, q. 49. a. 1-6. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 4. — Durand., hic q. 3.

[ad hanc quaest. — impressum in calce p. 389:]

I. Gulielmus Antissiodorensis (Sum. aurea III. tr. 1. c. 7.) cum paucis aliis docuit, Christum sibi meruisse « vitam aeternam, iam habitam ad similitudinem Angelorum »: quam opinionem etiam B. Albert. (hic a. 1.) censuit esse non improbabilem. Sed alii doctores cum S. Bonav., Alexandro Hal. (S. p. III. q. 17. m. 3. a. 1. ad 2.), S. Thoma et Scoto communius hoc negant tum respectu gloriae essentialis, tum respectu gratiae habitualis, si tamen de facto quaeritur; quod etiam in simili quaestione respectu Angelorum (cfr. II. Sent. d. 5. a. 3. q. 2.) docuerunt. Si autem quoad hoc quaeritur de possibili, tunc (ut etiam in aliis de possibili quaestionibus vulgo fit) dissentiunt auctores, dum nonnulli putant, Christum de potentia absoluta sibi gloriam potuisse mereri; cui opinioni favent aliqui loci Scoti (hic q. unica n. 7. 8. 13.) et etiam Alexandri Hal. Alii autem cum Henrico Gandav. (Quodl. 6. q. 6.) et plurimis discipulis S. Thomae dicunt, hoc penitus implicare.

II. De hac quaestione praeter laudatos: S. Thom., hic a. 1. quaestiunc. 4; S. III. q. 19. a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1.

---

English Translation
p. 387

Article II. On the merit of Christ as to the fruit or reward.

Consequently, inquiry is made concerning the merit of Christ as to the fruit, that is, as to the reward. And concerning this three [questions] are asked.

First it is asked, whether Christ merited for himself the fruition of God.

Second it is asked, whether he meritedp387-1 the glorification of [his] body.

Third it is asked, whether he merited for us the opening of the gate.

Question I. Whether Christ merited for himself the fruition of God, that is, the substantial reward.

Concerning the first one proceeds thus and asks, whether Christ merited for himself the fruition of God, that is, the substantial reward. And that he did, it seems:

1. Because, as grace stands to glory, so merit stands to rewardp387-2; but Christ had grace ordered to glory: therefore he had merit ordered to reward. But glory consists in the fruition of God, which is the substantial reward: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, he who merits from charity merits something the greater, the greater the charity he hasp387-3; but the charity of Christ was the greatest: therefore the greatest reward was due to him. But the greatest reward is none other than the substantial reward, which is God: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, it is more glorious to have a reward through merits than without meritsp387-4; but Christ in glory excels all the Saints: therefore if the other Saints had the substantial reward through merits, much more strongly [does this seem] concerning Christ.

4. Likewise, the holy Angels had the substantial reward through merits, according to the common opinion of all; but the Angels had grace and glory simultaneously, as was shown in the second bookp387-5: therefore if the grace in Christ was not of lesser efficacy than in the Angels, it seems that Christ merited the substantial reward, although the merit did not precede the reward in time.

5. Likewise, when God induces some form suddenly, which a creature acquires through succession, God omits nothing of those dispositions which nature would introduce successively; as is clear, if God were suddenly to make fire from water, he would introduce into the nature of water rarity and dryness and heatp387-6: therefore if a creature is born to attain the reward of glory through the merits of grace, it seems that merits were not lacking to Christ, although glory was conferred on him from the very beginning of his conception.

On the contrary: 1. Augustine, in the thirteenth book On the Trinityp387-7: « Among things that arise through time, that is the highest grace, by which a man is joined to God in unity of person »; and in the Enchiridion he says, that « with no preceding merits that man was united to God »; but that union could not be without the fruition of God,

p. 388

which is the substantial reward: therefore it does not seem, that Christ had the substantial reward through any merit.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the Enchiridionp388-1: « In a certain way that grace became natural to that man, by which he could admit no sin »; but such grace is consummated grace, which is nothing other than glory, that is, the substantial reward: therefore the substantial reward was in a certain way natural to Christ. But nothing of the sort is acquired through merits: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, merit naturally precedes the reward; but the use or act of virtue naturally follows the habitp388-2: since therefore the habit of grace and of glory were simultaneously in Christ, it seems that merits followed upon the substantial reward: therefore they are not ordered in Christ to meriting the substantial reward.

4. Likewise, a natural disposition precedes that to which it disposes; but the deiformity of glory disposed the soul of Christ to union with the Divinity, by a disposition, I say, of congruityp388-3: therefore the deiformity of glory in Christ naturally preceded the personal union, although it was simultaneous in time. But the personal union in Christ naturally preceded merit and the use of free choice: therefore in Christ merits followed upon the substantial reward according to the order of nature: therefore the same returns as before.

5. Likewise, the merit of the substantial reward consists chiefly in the act and affection of charity, according to whichp388-4 the soul is moved toward God; but according to that affection Christ was not in the state of a wayfarer, but in the state of a comprehensor: if therefore he did not merit insofar as a comprehensor, but insofar as a wayfarer, he did not merit according to that affection of charity, in which the merit of the substantial reward consists: therefore it seems, that he did not merit the substantial reward.

Conclusion.

Christ, properly speaking, did not merit for himself the substantial reward.

I respond: It must be said, that it is not commonly granted, that Christ merited for himself the substantial reward; and this the Master intimates in the textp388-5 quite expressly.

But the reason for this is: for merit signifies an ordering to the reward, as a disposition to the completion, as a way to the terminus; and therefore it is necessary that merit precede the reward either in time, or according to the order of nature. But in neither way did it have to precede in Christ, nor did it precede, on account of this, that the soul of Christ would not be fit for the union, unless it were most blessed and most deiform, which indeed comes about through the influence of glory. If therefore it was necessary that all merits precede that union according to the order of nature, it was also necessary that the deiformity of glory in Christ precede every use of grace; and therefore gloryp388-6 in Christ preceded all merits on account of the supreme dignity which was in the soul of Christ from its creation, namely on account of its union with the Word. — And therefore it must be granted, that Christ, properly speaking, did not merit for himself the substantial reward. And the reasons which have been adduced for this are to be granted.

To the opposing [arguments]:

1. To that which is objected, that as grace is ordered to glory, so merit to reward; it must be said, that in one respect it is similar, in another not. For it is similar as to the condition of disposing, but it is not similar as to its origin, in that both grace and glory are a habit infused divinely, not from us; but merit is a use proceeding from free choice informed by grace. Therefore in Christ there could be an order of grace to glory, the order of both to the union being preserved; but it is not so concerning the order of merit to reward, as was shown before.

2. To that which is objected, that the greatest charity merits the greatest reward; it must be said, that this is true, if charity holds the character of meriting, insofar as [it is] greatest; but the charity of Christ, according to its movement into God, which was greatest and most intense, held the character of reward rather than of merit, nay, was itself the reward; therefore since it was the reward itself, he did not merit the substantial reward.

3. To that which is objected, that it is more glorious to have a reward through merits; it must be said, that this holds true in those who only have to be united to God through a conformity of affection — for in these grace and glory are as it were accidental and by way of acquisition — and by their nature they are born to be indifferently good and evil. But it is otherwise concerning the man assumed by the Word, who is not only united to God through a conformity of affection, but also by a personal union, so that he is called not divine, but God; and for so much « to this man grace is in a certain way naturalp388-7 », and it is much more glorious for him to have glory from his first

p. 389

creation, than to have it through acquisition; just as it is much more glorious to be God, than to be a servant of God. And therefore that authority has no place concerning Christ.

4. To that which is objected, that the Angelsp389-1 had grace and glory, merit and reward, simultaneously; it must be said, that it is not similar, because in the Angels the use of free choice preceded the infusion of grace, and therefore in the very infusion of grace the movement of free choice informed by grace, in which merit consists, could precede the reward itself in the order of nature, although it was simultaneous in time. But it is otherwise in Christ, who prior in the order of nature had the deiformity of glory rather than the use of deliberative will, as was shown before.

5. To that which is objected, that God in acting suddenly omits nothing of those things which successively concur in the operation of a creature; it must be said, that when a creaturep389-2 induces some perfection or form, there are two things to be considered there, namely the qualities and dispositions on the part of the recipient, and the operations on the part of the agent and the one preparing. When therefore it is said, that God omits nothing in acting suddenly of those things which nature introduces; this is true of the qualities and dispositions informing the receivable [subject], but it is not true of the works preliminary to those dispositions. And therefore from this reasoning it cannot be concluded, that merits in Christ preceded the reward, since merit consists in a work proceeding from the will; but this can be concluded, that in Christ there was a perfection of virtues and habits, which render the soul fit for glory, that is, for the substantial reward.

Scholion

[on Art. I, q. III — printed at the head of p. 387:]

I. It is manifest, that the passion considered in itself, and inasmuch as it is inflicted by an external principle, is not meritorious; but it is itself meritorious on the part of the one sustaining it, who is informed by charity, inasmuch as it is voluntarily accepted, as is here explained in the solutions of the opposing [arguments] (cf. below d. 20, dub. 3, 4). — Many other things concerning the passion of Christ, concerning its cause, mode, and effects, see in Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. III, q. 18 and 19, and also in St. Thomas, Summa III, q. 46–50, and also below d. 19, a. 1, q. 1–4.

II. On this question: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit., q. 17, m. 3, a. 3. — St. Thomas, here a. 5; Summa III, q. 47, a. 2, q. 49, a. 1–6. — Bl. Albert, here a. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 4. — Durandus, here q. 3.

[on this question — printed at the foot of p. 389:]

I. William of Auxerre (Summa aurea III, tr. 1, c. 7) with a few others taught, that Christ merited for himself « eternal life, already possessed in the likeness of the Angels »: which opinion Bl. Albert also (here a. 1) judged to be not improbable. But other doctors, with St. Bonaventure, Alexander of Hales (Summa, p. III, q. 17, m. 3, a. 1, ad 2), St. Thomas, and Scotus, more commonly deny this, both with respect to essential glory and with respect to habitual grace, if indeed inquiry is made as a matter of fact; which they also taught in a similar question with respect to the Angels (cf. II Sent., d. 5, a. 3, q. 2). But if inquiry is made as to this concerning the possible, then (as is also commonly done in other questions concerning the possible) the authors disagree, since some hold that Christ by absolute power could have merited glory for himself; to which opinion some passages of Scotus are favorable (here q. unica, n. 7, 8, 13) and also of Alexander of Hales. But others, with Henry of Ghent (Quodlibet 6, q. 6) and very many disciples of St. Thomas, say, that this involves an outright contradiction.

II. On this question, besides those cited: St. Thomas, here a. 1, quaestiunc. 4; Summa III, q. 19, a. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1, quaestiunc. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2, q. 1.

---

Apparatus Criticus
  1. Edd. sui corporis.
    The editions [read] of his body.
  2. quid [in textu] in edd. desideratur, cod. C quidem [habet].
    quid [in the text] is wanting in the editions; codex C indeed [has it]. (Marginal gloss: in oppositum.)
  3. Non enim fructus est bonus, ut ait August., de Spiritu et lit. c. 14. n. 26, qui de caritatis radice non surgit.
    For the fruit is not good, as Augustine says, On the Spirit and the Letter, c. 14, n. 26, which does not spring from the root of charity.
  4. August., XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 6. n. 8: Probatur et exercetur virtus, et est palma gloriosior non consensisse tentatum, quam non potuisse tentari. — Mox pro excellit codd. F T V Z excessit.
    Augustine, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis XI, c. 6, n. 8: Virtue is proved and exercised, and the palm [of victory] is more glorious to have not consented when tempted, than not to have been able to be tempted. — Soon, for excellit codices F T V Z [read] excessit.
  5. Dist. 5. a. 3. q. 2. Cfr. ibid. d. 4. a. 1. q. 1. seq.
    Dist. 5, a. 3, q. 2. Cf. ibid. d. 4, a. 1, q. 1 and following.
  6. Aristot., II. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 24. (c. 4.), de generatione elementorum agens ait: Generatio enim in contraria et ex contrariis... His enim ambae contrariae [differentiae], ut igni et aquae; illud enim siccum et calidum, hoc autem frigidum et humidum. Cfr. IV. Meteor. text. 1. (c. 1.). Et de raro dicit, de Praedicam. c. de Quali: Spissum [Densum] enim dicitur, eo quod partes sibi ipsis propinquae sint, rarum vero, eo quod distent a se invicem. — Pro naturam Vat. cum paucis codd. materiam. Paulo inferius pro non defuerunt Christo edd. 1, 2 cum nonnullis codd. perperam nondum fuerunt in Christo, Vat. fuerunt in Christo.
    Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption II, text 24 (c. 4), treating of the generation of the elements, says: For generation is into contraries and from contraries... For both of these are contrary [differences], as for fire and water; for the former is dry and hot, but the latter cold and moist. Cf. Meteorology IV, text 1 (c. 1). And concerning the rare he says, in the Categories, in the chapter on Quality: For the dense is so called, because its parts are near to one another, but the rare, because they stand apart from each other. — For naturam the Vatican [edition] with a few codices [reads] materiam. A little below, for non defuerunt Christo editions 1, 2 with several codices wrongly [read] nondum fuerunt in Christo, the Vatican [edition] fuerunt in Christo.
  7. Cap. 19. n. 24. In textu origin. pro qua habetur quod. Testimonium seq., ex Enchirid. sumtum, invenitur ibi c. 40. n. 12. Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. IV. c. 2.
    Chapter 19, n. 24. In the original text, for qua there stands quod. The following testimony, taken from the Enchiridion, is found there, c. 40, n. 12. Cf. above the Master's text, d. IV, c. 2.
  8. Cap. 40. n. 12. — Paulo inferius codd. IL aa voci Christo praefigunt in.
    Chapter 40, n. 12. — A little below, codices IL aa prefix in to the word Christo.
  9. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6: Dicendum est igitur, omnem virtutem et ipsum id, cuius est virtus, bene affectum reddere et opus eius bene efficere; ex. gr. oculi virtus et oculum ipsum et opus ipsius bonum facit, quippe cum oculi virtute fiat, ut bene inspiciamus. — Pro naturaliter edd. 1, 2 cum aliquot codd. naturale.
    Aristotle, Ethics II, c. 6: It must be said therefore, that every virtue renders both that very thing, of which it is the virtue, well-disposed, and makes its work to be well accomplished; for example, the virtue of the eye makes both the eye itself and its work good, since indeed it is by the virtue of the eye that we see well. — For naturaliter editions 1, 2 with several codices [read] naturale.
  10. Cfr. supra d. 2. a. 3. q. 2. et d. 13. a. 1. q. 1. 3. et a. 2. q. 2. — Mox pro naturaliter codd. G H I L T aa naturalem.
    Cf. above d. 2, a. 3, q. 2, and d. 13, a. 1, q. 1 and 3, and a. 2, q. 2. — Soon, for naturaliter codices G H I L T aa [read] naturalem.
  11. Hic c. 2. quam, edd. quae. [Cod. A]
    Here c. 2. quam, the editions [read] quae. [Codex A.]
  12. Codd. A et ideo illa [deiformitas] in gloria. Idem cod. A cum cod. K. in fine corp. inducuntur pro inductae sunt.
    Codices [read] and therefore that [deiformity] in glory. The same codex A with codex K, at the end of the body, [read] inducuntur for inductae sunt.
  13. Hoc dictum August. fusius expositum est supra d. 4. a. 2. q. 3. — De solut. obiecti cfr. II. Sent. d. 23. dub. 2. — Maior obiectionis infra vocatur auctoritas; tamen nihil invenimus nisi locum Augustini non satis aptum, allegatum pag. 387, nota 4. Paulo superius pro accidentalis cod. O substituit accidentaliter et proxime post edd. omittunt et ante per modum.
    This saying of Augustine is more fully expounded above d. 4, a. 2, q. 3. — On the solution of the objection cf. II Sent., d. 23, dub. 2. — The major [premise] of the objection is below called an authority; yet we find nothing but a passage of Augustine not sufficiently apt, cited on p. 387, note 4. A little above, for accidentalis codex O substitutes accidentaliter, and immediately after, the editions omit et before per modum.
  14. (Verba August., Enchirid. c. 40. n. 12, iam supra allegata.)
    (The words of Augustine, Enchiridion c. 40, n. 12, already cited above.)
  15. Codd. K bb adiiciunt boni. Inferius pro consistit cod. Z consideratur.
    Codices K bb add good. Below, for consistit codex Z [reads] consideratur.
  16. Cod. K natura. Aliquanto inferius pro praecesserunt codd. G I L N U aa bb praecesserint. Deinde pro sed hoc Vat. sed ex hoc.
    Codex K [reads] natura. Somewhat below, for praecesserunt codices G I L N U aa bb [read] praecesserint. Then for sed hoc the Vatican [edition reads] sed ex hoc.
← Dist. 18, Art. 1, Q. 3Dist. 18, Art. 2, Q. 2→