Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 13, Art. 2, Q. 2

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 13

Textus Latinus

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Articulus II. De gratia capitis.

Quaestio II. Utrum gratia capitis sit alia quam gratia singularis personae et unionis.

Secundo quaeritur de gratia capitis quantum ad differentiam, utrum videlicet sit alia quam gratia singularis personae et gratia unionis. Et quod sit alia, videtur.

1. Communiter secundum doctores in Christo consuevit differentia gratiae poni, scilicet gratia singularis personae, gratia unionis et gratia capitis: si ergo divisio esse debet per opposita, vel saltem disparata^p286-1; videtur, quod ista differentia gratiae ab aliis sit diversa.

2. Item, gratia capitis aliis communicatur^p286-2; gratiam vero singularis personae, vel unionis Christus aliis non communicat, quia respiciunt ipsum solum: ergo sunt differentes gratiae.

3. Item, quod sit alia quam gratia singularis personae, videtur, quia, esto quod humanitas separetur a divinitate, adhuc tamen remanet gratia singularis personae; sed non remanet gratia capitis nec gratia unionis: ergo gratia capitis differt a gratia singularis personae.

4. Item, quod sit alia quam gratia unionis, videtur, quia gratia unionis non habuit esse nec efficaciam nisi in plenitudine temporum^p286-3, gratia capitis a primordio habuit effectum in Sanctis: ergo necesse est, eas ab invicem differre.

Sed contra: 1. In unica anima una est gratia gratum faciens, sicut una est vita^p286-4: ergo si anima Christi est una, aut gratia capitis non est gratum faciens, aut non differt a gratia unionis et singularis personae. Sed est gratum faciens: ergo etc.

2. Item, idem est habitus scientiae, quo quis novit in se, et quo potens est docere alios ut magister^p286-5: ergo pari ratione idem est habitus gratiae, quo in se perficitur et Deo unitur, et quo influit in membra et eis unitur; sed primus habitus gratiae dicitur gratia singularis personae et unionis, secundus vero dicitur gratia capitis: ergo gratia capitis et unionis sunt una gratia cum gratia singularis personae.

3. Item, eo ipso est ille homo caput Ecclesiae, quo assumtus est a Verbo in unitatem personae; sed hoc est per gratiam unionis: ergo gratia unionis et capitis sunt una gratia. Minor manifesta est; maior probatur per illud quod dicitur ad Ephesios primo^p286-6: Ipsum dedit caput etc.; Glossa: «Nullum maius donum praestare posset Deus hominibus, quam ut Verbum suum, per quod condidit omnia, faceret illis caput, ut esset filius Dei et filius hominis, unus Deus cum Patre, unus homo cum hominibus». Ex hoc expresse habetur, quod eo est ille homo caput, quo a Verbo Dei assumtus in unitatem personae.

4. Item, «quod per superabundantiam dicitur, uni soli convenit»^p286-7; sed «gratia unionis est summa gratia», ut dicit Augustinus decimo tertio de Trinitate, et habetur in principio praecedentis distinctionis: «In rebus per tempus ortis» etc.; gratia capitis est summa, sicut habetur in auctoritate praemissa: ergo gratia capitis non differt a gratia unionis.

5. Item, quod nec^p286-8 a gratia singularis personae, videtur: quoniam Christus est caput secundum illam gratiam, secundum quam est in ipso sensuum integritas et perfectio; et hoc est secundum gratiam singularis personae: ergo etc.

6. Item, secundum illam gratiam Christus est caput, secundum quam pro nobis satisfecit nobisque promeruit, gratiam quantum ad motum et sensum ad nos derivari; sed hoc fuit secundum gratiam personae singularis, quia quantum ad illam attenditur meritum: ergo idem quod prius.

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Conclusio. Gratia capitis a gratia unionis et singularis personae secundum diversas comparationes vel differt, vel est eadem, sed ut habitus non importat alium habitum, sed alias comparationes.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod gratia singularis personae proprie nominat habitum, secundum quem anima est Deo similis et accepta. Sed gratia unionis dicitur tripliciter, sicut praedictum fuit supra^p287-1. Uno namque modo dicitur gratia unionis gratia faciens unionem; et sic nominat divinam essentiam, quae sola est illius unionis causa. Alio modo gratia unionis dicitur gratia disponens ad unionem de congruo; et sic nominat qualitatem creatam, scilicet habitum animae. Tertio modo dicitur gratia unionis, id est ipsa unio gratis facta; et sic nominat ipsam relationem.

Secundum hoc etiam intelligendum, quod gratia capitis potest his tribus modis accipi. Uno modo potest nominare principium effectivum sensus et motus spiritualis in membris Christi; et sic nominat ipsum Deum et per appropriationem Spiritum sanctum. Alio modo nominat ipsum, quod disponit per modum meriti et praeparationis ad influentiam motus et sensus respectu cuiuslibet membri; et sic nominat habitum animae Christi, per quem Christus nobis meruit. Tertio modo gratia capitis potest dici ipsa gratuita praesidentia, quam Deus gratis fecit, dum Verbum suum nobis praeposuit, sicut caput membris. Omnibus his modis in diversis Sanctorum auctoritatibus et Glossis invenitur gratia capitis accipi^p287-2.

Si igitur gratia capitis et unionis nominat principium effectivum illius coniunctionis et nostrae sanctificationis spiritualis; sic idem nominant et idem sunt quantum ad principale significatum, scilicet ipse Deus, vel Spiritus sanctus; et est differentia solum quantum ad connotatum, quia gratia unionis connotat effectum circa Christum, gratia capitis effectum circa membra Christi; et differunt a gratia singularis personae, sicut increatum a creato, sicut divina essentia ab habitu gratiae, quem infundit. — Si vero dicatur gratia unionis et capitis ipsa unio gratuita et praesidentia; sic sunt diversae relationes et comparationes, quae tamen non sunt fundatae super aliud et aliud, sed super idem. Homo enim ille eo ipso est caput aliorum hominum, quo est Verbo Dei unitus. Et hoc modo differt gratia unionis et capitis a gratia singularis personae, sicut illud, ad quod ordinatur dispositio, differt ab ipsa dispositione^p287-3. Gratia enim singularis personae sua perfectione reddit illam naturam idoneam, ut Deo uniatur, ac per hoc ceteris Sanctis praeficiatur, sicut caput membris. — Si vero gratia unionis et capitis dicatur habitus disponens ad unionem et aliorum sensificationem^p287-4, sicut gratia singularis personae dicitur habitus faciens animae et Dei assimilationem; hoc modo ista triplex gratia non est triplex ratione diversitatis habituum, sed ratione diversae comparationis eiusdem habitus. Nam ille habitus dicitur gratia singularis personae, in quantum disponit ad Dei assimilationem et in quantum facit animam deiformem, et per hoc ipsum consequenter^p287-5 disponit ad unionem personalem, et dicitur gratia unionis; et consequenter per hoc ipsum disponit ad redundantiam sive influentiam motus et sensus in cetera membra Christi, et sic dicitur gratia capitis. — Et sic patet, quod gratia capitis, in quantum habitus, non differt a gratia singularis personae, vel unionis secundum habituum diversitatem, sed secundum comparationum multiplicitatem^p287-6. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes ad hanc partem.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod in Christo ponitur gratia secundum triplicem differentiam; dicendum, quod illa divisio non est data penes differentiam gratiae quantum ad diversitatem habituum, sed quantum ad diversitatem comparationum atque respectuum, sive effectuum consequenter se habentium, qui non diversificant essentialiter habitus.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod gratia capitis communicatur; dicendum, quod gratia capitis non sic communicatur aliis, ut eis sit gratia capitis, sed sic, ut efficaciam habeat circa alios; et hoc quidem absque dubio competit gratiae singularis personae et unionis, quia ratione eius nobis meruit et pro nobis satisfecit. Quamvis autem gratia Christi, quocumque modo dicta, efficaciam habeat in nos, tamen non quocumque nomine datur intelligi eius efficacia in nos, sed solum per hoc nomen, quod est gratia capitis. Sic enim nominatur propter virtutem et efficaciam influendi.

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3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod remaneret gratia singularis personae, si deponeretur natura assumta, sed non gratia capitis; dicendum, quod verum est; sed ex hoc non sequitur, quod gratia capitis ab illa differat per essentiam; sed verum est, quod^p288-1 aliquam comparationem et efficaciam dicit, quam, inquam, non esset reperire post separationem. Gratia enim capitis, quae attenditur in influentia et praesidentia Christi respectu aliorum, naturali ordine praesupponit unionem, ratione cuius ille homo ceteris ineffabiliter antecellit.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod gratia unionis habet efficaciam solum in fine temporum; dicendum, quod si efficacia gratiae unionis attendatur in hoc, quod animam Christi reddat idoneam ad unionem, verum est, quod solum in plenitudine temporum efficaciam habuit. Si autem efficacia gratiae unionis attendatur, quantum^p288-2 ab aliis creditur, qui mediante illa fide iustificantur, sic efficaciam habuit a principio, et hoc ipso gratia capitis potest appellari. Et sic patet, quod gratia capitis secundum unam suam acceptionem, quae communior est, secundum essentiam habitus non differt ab aliis, sed solum secundum comparationem, ut visum est.

Scholion

I. De triplici modo, quo dicitur gratia unionis, cfr. supra d. 2. a. 3. q. 2. ad 6. et d. 4. a. 2. q. 3. in corp. A Petro a Tar. (hic q. 3. a. I.) his tribus modis additur etiam quartus, quo significetur «effectus consequens unionem, id est attributorum communicatio gratuita». — Principia ad solvendas has duas quaestiones coniunctas iam in praecedenti quaestione tacta sunt. In solutione concordant S. Thom., Alex. Hal., Petr. a Tar., aliique communiter. — Ex solut. ad 3.–4. licet arguere, quod S. Bonav. cum communi sententia gratiam capitis proprie dictam ponat in gratia Christi habituali.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 12. m. I. a. 2, m. 3. a. I. — Scot. rem tangit III. Sent. d. 9. q. unica n. 9. seqq. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 2. quaestiunc. 1.2; S. III. q. 8. a. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. quaestiunc. I. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 3.

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English Translation

Article II. On the grace of the Head.

Question II. Whether the grace of the Head is other than the grace of the singular person and of the union.

Secondly, inquiry is made about the grace of the Head with respect to its difference, namely whether it is other than the grace of the singular person and the grace of the union. And that it is other, it seems.

1. Commonly, according to the doctors, in Christ a difference of grace is wont to be posited, namely the grace of the singular person, the grace of the union, and the grace of the Head: if therefore the division ought to be made through opposites, or at least through disparates^p286-1, it seems that this difference of grace is distinct from the others.

2. Likewise, the grace of the Head is communicated to others^p286-2; but the grace of the singular person, or of the union, Christ does not communicate to others, because they regard him alone: therefore they are different graces.

3. Likewise, that it is other than the grace of the singular person, it seems, because, granted that the humanity be separated from the divinity, nevertheless the grace of the singular person still remains; but the grace of the Head does not remain, nor the grace of the union: therefore the grace of the Head differs from the grace of the singular person.

4. Likewise, that it is other than the grace of the union, it seems, because the grace of the union had neither being nor efficacy except in the fullness of times^p286-3, whereas the grace of the Head had its effect in the Saints from the beginning: therefore it is necessary that they differ from one another.

On the contrary: 1. In a single soul there is one grace making-pleasing, just as there is one life^p286-4: therefore if the soul of Christ is one, either the grace of the Head is not grace-making-pleasing, or it does not differ from the grace of the union and of the singular person. But it is grace-making-pleasing: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the habit of knowledge by which one knows in himself, and by which he is able to teach others as a master, is the same^p286-5: therefore by parity of reasoning the habit of grace by which one is perfected in himself and united to God, and by which he flows into the members and is united to them, is the same; but the first habit of grace is called the grace of the singular person and of the union, while the second is called the grace of the Head: therefore the grace of the Head and of the union are one grace with the grace of the singular person.

3. Likewise, that man is Head of the Church by the very fact by which he is assumed by the Word into unity of person; but this is through the grace of the union: therefore the grace of the union and of the Head are one grace. The minor is manifest; the major is proved through what is said to the Ephesians, first chapter^p286-6: Him he gave as head etc.; the Gloss: «No greater gift could God bestow on men than that he should make his Word, through which he founded all things, their head, so that he might be the Son of God and the Son of man, one God with the Father, one man with men». From this it is expressly had that that man is Head by that whereby he was assumed by the Word of God into unity of person.

4. Likewise, «what is said by superabundance belongs to one alone»^p286-7; but «the grace of the union is the highest grace», as Augustine says in the thirteenth book On the Trinity, and as is had at the beginning of the preceding distinction: «In things arisen through time» etc.; the grace of the Head is the highest, as is had in the authority cited above: therefore the grace of the Head does not differ from the grace of the union.

5. Likewise, that neither [is it other]^p286-8 than the grace of the singular person, it seems: for Christ is Head according to that grace, according to which there is in him the integrity and perfection of the senses; and this is according to the grace of the singular person: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, Christ is Head according to that grace according to which he made satisfaction for us and merited for us that grace, as to motion and sense, should be derived to us; but this was according to the grace of the singular person, since the merit is regarded with respect to it: therefore the same as before.

Conclusion. The grace of the Head, according to diverse comparisons, either differs from the grace of the union and of the singular person, or is the same, but as a habit does not import another habit, but other comparisons.

I respond: For an understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that the grace of the singular person properly names a habit according to which the soul is like God and acceptable. But the grace of the union is said in three ways, as was said above^p287-1. For in one way the grace of the union is called the grace that makes the union; and thus it names the divine essence, which alone is the cause of that union. In another way the grace of the union is called the grace disposing to the union by congruity; and thus it names a created quality, namely a habit of the soul. In a third way the grace of the union is said, that is, the union itself freely made; and thus it names the relation itself.

According to this it must also be understood that the grace of the Head can be taken in these three ways. In one way it can name the effective principle of sense and of spiritual motion in the members of Christ; and thus it names God himself and, by appropriation, the Holy Spirit. In another way it names that which disposes, by way of merit and preparation, to the influx of motion and sense with respect to any member whatever; and thus it names the habit of Christ's soul, through which Christ merited for us. In a third way the grace of the Head can be called the gratuitous presidency itself, which God freely made when he set his Word over us, as a head over members. In all these ways, in diverse authorities of the Saints and in Glosses, the grace of the Head is found to be taken^p287-2.

If therefore the grace of the Head and of the union names the effective principle of that conjunction and of our spiritual sanctification; thus they name the same thing and are the same as to their principal signification, namely God himself, or the Holy Spirit; and there is a difference only as to the connotation, because the grace of the union connotes an effect about Christ, the grace of the Head an effect about the members of Christ; and they differ from the grace of the singular person, as the uncreated from the created, as the divine essence from the habit of grace which it infuses. — But if the grace of the union and of the Head be called the gratuitous union and presidency itself; thus they are diverse relations and comparisons, which nevertheless are not founded upon one thing and another, but upon the same. For that man is Head of other men by the very thing by which he is united to the Word of God. And in this way the grace of the union and of the Head differs from the grace of the singular person, as that to which a disposition is ordained differs from the disposition itself^p287-3. For the grace of the singular person by its perfection renders that nature fit to be united to God, and through this is set before the other Saints, as a head over the members. — But if the grace of the union and of the Head be called a habit disposing to the union and to the making-sensible of others^p287-4, as the grace of the singular person is called a habit making the soul's assimilation to God; in this way this threefold grace is not threefold by reason of a diversity of habits, but by reason of the diverse comparison of the same habit. For that habit is called the grace of the singular person, inasmuch as it disposes to assimilation to God and inasmuch as it makes the soul deiform, and through this very thing it consequently^p287-5 disposes to the personal union, and is called the grace of the union; and consequently through this very thing it disposes to the redundance or influx of motion and sense into the other members of Christ, and thus it is called the grace of the Head. — And thus it is plain that the grace of the Head, inasmuch as it is a habit, does not differ from the grace of the singular person, or of the union, according to a diversity of habits, but according to a multiplicity of comparisons^p287-6. — Hence the reasons for this side are to be granted.

1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that in Christ a grace is posited according to a threefold difference; it must be said that that division is not given on the basis of a difference of grace as to a diversity of habits, but as to a diversity of comparisons and respects, or of effects following one upon another, which do not essentially diversify the habits.

2. To that which is objected, that the grace of the Head is communicated; it must be said that the grace of the Head is not communicated to others in such a way that it is to them the grace of the Head, but in such a way that it has efficacy about others; and this indeed without doubt belongs to the grace of the singular person and of the union, since by reason of it he merited for us and made satisfaction for us. But although the grace of Christ, said in whatever way, has efficacy in us, nevertheless its efficacy in us is not given to be understood under whatever name, but only through this name, which is the grace of the Head. For thus it is named on account of the virtue and efficacy of influencing.

3. To that which is objected, that the grace of the singular person would remain if the assumed nature were laid aside, but not the grace of the Head; it must be said that this is true; but from this it does not follow that the grace of the Head differs from it by essence; but it is true that^p288-1 it states a certain comparison and efficacy, which, I say, would not be found after the separation. For the grace of the Head, which is regarded in the influx and presidency of Christ with respect to others, in the natural order presupposes the union, by reason of which that man ineffably surpasses the rest.

4. To that which is objected, that the grace of the union has efficacy only at the end of times; it must be said that if the efficacy of the grace of the union be regarded in this, that it renders the soul of Christ fit for the union, it is true that it had efficacy only in the fullness of times. But if the efficacy of the grace of the union be regarded inasmuch as^p288-2 it is believed by others, who are justified through that faith, thus it had efficacy from the beginning, and by this very thing it can be called the grace of the Head. And thus it is plain that the grace of the Head, according to one of its acceptations, which is more common, according to the essence of the habit does not differ from the others, but only according to comparison, as has been seen.

Scholion

I. On the threefold way in which the grace of the union is said, cf. above d. 2, a. 3, q. 2, ad 6, and d. 4, a. 2, q. 3, in the body. By Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 3, a. I) a fourth way is also added to these three, by which is signified «the effect following the union, that is, the gratuitous communication of attributes». — The principles for solving these two conjoined questions have already been touched upon in the preceding question. In the solution there agree St. Thomas, Alexander of Hales, Peter of Tarentaise, and others commonly. — From the solution to [objections] 3–4 it is permissible to argue that St. Bonaventure, with the common opinion, places the grace of the Head, properly so called, in the habitual grace of Christ.

II. Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. III, q. 12, m. I, a. 2, m. 3, a. I. — Scotus touches on the matter, III Sent. d. 9, q. unica, n. 9 ff. — St. Thomas, here q. 3, a. 2, little-question 1.2; Summa III, q. 8, a. 5. — Bl. Albert, here a. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 2, little-question I. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question, here q. 3.

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Apparatus Criticus

Cfr. tom. II. pag. 937, nota 5. De disparatis vide supra pag. 225, nota 5. De gratia singularis personae vide art. praeced.
Cf. vol. II, p. 937, note 5. On disparates see above p. 225, note 5. On the grace of the singular person see the preceding article.
Influendo motum et sensum in membra Ecclesiae, ut dictum est in quaest. praeced. — Paulo inferius pro respiciunt edd. respicit.
By flowing motion and sense into the members of the Church, as was said in the preceding question. — A little below, for respiciunt the editions read respicit.
Gal. 4, 4: At ubi venit plenitudo temporis, misit Deus Filium suum etc. De subnexis cfr. quaest. seq. ad 6.
Gal. 4:4: But when the fullness of time came, God sent his Son etc. On what follows, cf. the next question, ad 6.
Cfr. II. Sent. d. 26. q. 5. et d. 27. a. I. q. I. — Pro una est gratia... una est vita codd. H U unica est gratia... unica est vita.
Cf. II Sent. d. 26, q. 5, and d. 27, a. I, q. I. — For one is the grace... one is the life codices H U read single is the grace... single is the life.
Aristot., I. Metaph. c. I: Et prorsus signum scientis est posse docere. Cfr. V. Ethic. c. I, ubi Aristot. docet, eandem esse virtutem, qua quis in se perfectus sit, et iustitiam legalem, qua perficiatur in ordine ad bonum commune.
Aristotle, Metaphysics I, c. I: And altogether the sign of one who knows is the ability to teach. Cf. Ethics V, c. I, where Aristotle teaches that the virtue by which one is perfect in himself is the same as legal justice, by which one is perfected in order to the common good.
Vers. 22. — Glossa, quae sumta est ex August., Enarrat. in Ps. 85. n. 1, habetur apud Petr. Lombardum in hunc loc. Textus origin. post faceret illis caput addit et illos ei tanquam membra coaptaret. — In fine arg. cod. A omittit Dei post quo a Verbo; cod. H pro Dei substituit dicitur et edd. 1, 2 cum pluribus codd. perperam mutarunt Dei in Deus. Subinde post assumtus codd. Y bb supplent est.
Verse 22. — The Gloss, which is taken from Augustine, Enarrat. in Ps. 85, n. 1, is had in Peter Lombard on this passage. The original text after he should make them a head adds and fit them to him as members. — At the end of the argument cod. A omits of God after whereby [assumed] by the Word; cod. H substitutes is said for of God, and edd. 1, 2 with several codices wrongly changed Dei into Deus. Then after assumed codd. Y bb supply is.
De hoc dicto Aristot. cfr. supra pag. 43, nota 2, et verba August. (XIII. de Trin. c. 19. n. 24.) vide in praeced. dist. lit. Magistri, c. I. — Auctoritas, quae deinde respicitur, est Glossa in fundam. praeced. allegata.
On this dictum of Aristotle cf. above p. 43, note 2, and for the words of Augustine (On the Trinity XIII, c. 19, n. 24) see in the preceding distinction, the text of the Master, c. I. — The authority next referred to is the Gloss cited in the preceding fundamentum.
Supple cum cod. M differat; in codd. G N U W cc et edd. 1, 2 perperam scriptum est quod nec sit gratia, in Vat. legitur quod haec sit a gratia. Quoad minorem huius arg. et maiorem seq. vide quaest. praeced.
Supply with cod. M differs; in codd. G N U W cc and edd. 1, 2 it is wrongly written that there is not a grace, in the Vatican edition it reads that this is from a grace. As to the minor of this argument and the major of the following one, see the preceding question.
Dist. 2. a. 3. q. 2. ad 6. — Paulo superius pro secundum quem cod. F per quem.
D. 2, a. 3, q. 2, ad 6. — A little above, for according to which cod. F reads through which.
Auctoritates pro primo et secundo modo accipiendi gratiam capitis habes in corp. quaest. praeced., pro tertio modo hic in fundam. 3. — Paulo superius pro potest dici cod. F dicitur.
Authorities for the first and second way of taking the grace of the Head you have in the body of the preceding question, for the third way here in fundamentum 3. — A little above, for can be said cod. F reads is said.
Edd. cum cod. cc disponente.
The editions, with cod. cc, read disposing.
Edd. cum paucis codd. sanctificationem.
The editions, with a few codices, read sanctification.
Codd. L M O X Z aa bb convenienter (cfr. supra d. 2. a. 3. q. 2.). Paulo inferius pro et consequenter codd. L X aa bb iterum exhibent et convenienter.
Codd. L M O X Z aa bb read suitably (cf. above d. 2, a. 3, q. 2). A little below, for and consequently codd. L X aa bb again exhibit and suitably.
Edd. cum uno alteroque cod. comparationem multiplicem.
The editions, with one or another codex, read a manifold comparison.
Pro quod non pauci codd. et edd. 1, 2 per. Paulo inferius post respectu aliorum cod. F subiicit hominum, et in fine solut. pro ceteris Vat. cum aliquot codd. substituit ceteros.
For that not a few codices and edd. 1, 2 read through. A little below, after with respect to others cod. F adds of men, and at the end of the solution, for the rest the Vatican edition with several codices substitutes the others.
Codd. P Q in quantum. Circa finem solut. pro secundum essentiam habitus multi codd. habent secundum suam essentiam habitus, edd. secundum suam essentiam habitu.
Codd. P Q read inasmuch as. Toward the end of the solution, for according to the essence of the habit many codices have according to its essence of the habit, the editions according to its essence by the habit.

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