Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 16, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 16

Textus Latinus

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Quaestio III. Utrum Christus assumserit necessitatem patiendi.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum Christus necessitatem assumserit patiendi. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Ad Hebraeos nono^p349-8: Quemadmodum statutum est hominibus semel mori, post hoc autem iudicium, sic et Christus semel oblatus est; Glossa: « Eadem necessitate et iure naturae »: ergo secundum hoc mortuus est Christus secundum statum naturae; sed qui sic moritur, moriendi habet necessitatem: ergo etc.

2. Item, Augustinus ad Iulianum^p349-9: « Si talem carnem, qualem habuit Adam in primo statu, assumsit Christus, non solum caro Christi non esset caro peccati, sed nec similis carni peccati »: si ergo Christus fuit similis carni peccati, constat, quod non

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assumsit carnem secundum statum naturae institutae, sed secundum statum naturae lapsae. Sed haec caro habet necessitatem moriendi: ergo etc.

3. Item, Boethius in libro de Duabus Naturis et una persona Christi^p350-1 dicit, quod Christus de statu innocentiae assumsit peccati immunitatem, de statu vero naturae lapsae assumsit passibilitatem; sed passibilitas, quae est secundum statum naturae lapsae, est patiendi necessitas: ergo etc.

4. Item, Spiritus sanctus, cuius virtute illud corpus fabricatum fuit de utero Virginis, etsi purificaverit a foeditate corruptionis, non tamen purificavit a defectu passibilitatis^p350-2: ergo passibilitatem habuit per eum modum, per quem Virgo, quae eum genuit, excepto reatu peccati. Sed Virgo habuit necessitatem moriendi et patiendi: ergo et caro Christi: ergo et Christus.

5. Item, Christi corpus ita fuit passibile, sicut fuit animale et terrestre; sed corpus Christi propter animalitatem et terrestreitatem necessitatem habuit naturalem sumendi cibum et tendendi deorsum, aliter enim stare non potuisset nisi per miraculum: ergo pari ratione propter passibilitatem necessitatem habuit ad patiendum et moriendum.

6. Item, Christus assumsit omnes defectus naturales et generales, exceptis his qui ordinant ad peccatum^p350-3; sed necessitas patiendi est defectus in nobis naturalis et generalis, nec tamen ordinat ad peccatum: ergo Christus eam assumsit.

Sed contra:

1. Ioannis decimo^p350-4: Potestatem habeo ponendi animam meam et iterum sumendi eam; et paulo ante: Nemo tollet eam a me, sed ego pono eam a me ipso: ergo pati et mori erat in libertate voluntatis Christi: ergo non videtur, quod Christus aliquam ad hoc necessitatem habuerit.

2. Item, Augustinus super illud Ioannis tertio^p350-5: Qui desursum venit super omnes est: « Desursum venit, quia de altitudine humanae naturae ante peccatum accepit Verbum Dei humanam naturam »; sed in statu illo non habebat humana natura necessitatem ad moriendum: ergo nec prout fuit assumta a Christo.

3. Item, Anselmus in libro Cur Deus homo^p350-6: « Quoniam voluntas Dei nulla necessitate facit aliquid, sed sola potestate; et voluntas Christi fuit voluntas Dei: nulla igitur necessitate mortuus est, sed sola potestate ».

4. Item, hoc ipsum ostendit^p350-7 alia ratione tali: « Omnis necessitas aut est coactio, aut prohibitio, quae duae necessitates convertuntur ad invicem contrariae, sicut necesse et impossibile; sed in Christo non fuit coactio ad mori, vel prohibitio ad non mori: ergo in Christo nulla fuit necessitas ad moriendum », et ita nec ad patiendum.

5. Item, quandocumque aliqua proprietas necessario inest alicui subiecto, comparatur ad illud sicut ad causam et subiectum^p350-8; sed passio non habuit causam in Christo: ergo non fuit necessarium, Christum pati: ergo Christus non assumsit necessitatem patiendi.

6. Item, quod necessario inest alicui inest ei, velit nolit: ergo si in Christo fuit necessitas ad patiendum, passus fuisset, vellet nollet; sed nihil tale est plene voluntarium et meritorium^p350-9: ergo Christus in patiendo non habuisset plenum meritum. Quodsi hoc est falsum, restat, quod et primum, videlicet quod Christus habuit necessitatem ad patiendum.

Conclusio.

In Christo fuit necessitas patiendi, sed assumta, non contracta.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod ad hoc voluerunt aliqui respondere distinguendo necessitatem secundum quatuor genera causarum. Est enim necessitas secundum causam formalem, secundum quam dicitur: necessarium est calidum calere. Est etiam necessitas secundum causam materialem, secundum quam dicitur, quod necesse est, calidum in summo converti in ignem. Est etiam necessitas secundum causam efficientem, quae dicitur necessitas secundum violentiam et coactionem; et secundum hanc dicimus, quod lapidem fortiter impulsum necesse est moveri. Et est necessitas secundum causam finalem, secundum quam dicimus, quod serram necesse est esse dentatam, quia est ad dividendum solida et dura^p350-10. Secundum hoc, cum quadrupliciter dicatur necessitas, solo quar-

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to modo necessitas patiendi fuit in Christo, videlicet propter nostram redemptionem. Quantum enim in se fuit, necessitatem ad patiendum non habuit, quia nec fuit in eo humanae conditionis corruptio, nec potuit esse coactio; et ideo non potest ei convenire necessitas secundum alia tria genera causarum. — Hic autem modus distinguendi satis rationabilis est in se et ad quaestionem propositam rationabiliter applicatur, si autem^p351-1 quaeratur de necessitate patiendi in Christo, prout necessitas patiendi in Christo non tantum includit tempus post assumtionem, sed etiam ante assumtionem; hoc est, si quaeratur, utrum necessarium fuerit, Christum nostras poenalitates assumere; tunc enim verum est dicere, quod non fuit necessarium nisi necessitate finis. Et hoc modo istam quaestionem tractat beatus Anselmus^p351-2.

Sed Magister aliter tractat istam quaestionem in littera. Quaerit enim, utrum iste defectus, qui est necessitas patiendi, cum sit in nobis per contractionem, fuerit in Christo per voluntariam assumtionem. Et ad hanc quaestionem dissolvi non potest per praedictam distinctionem. Et ideo aliter oportet dicere, non quia praedictus modus dicendi sit malus, sed quia non valet ad nostrum propositum.

— Sequentes igitur sententiam Magistri in littera, dicere possumus, quod Christus assumsit istum defectum, qui est necessitas patiendi. Quantum enim erat de lege naturae, corpus illud erat resolubile et mortale; et nisi fuisset conservatum miraculose, aliquando senio defecisset. — Attendendum est tamen, quod non omni modo fuit necessitas patiendi in Christo, per quem modum est in nobis, sed quodam modo sic, quodam modo aliter. Habet enim necessitas patiendi comparari ad tria, videlicet ad causam et ad subiectum et ad virtutem corporis regitivam. Si consideretur per comparationem ad causam, sic est in nobis ex duplici causa, videlicet propter foeditatem corruptionis culpabilis et propter qualitatem naturalis compositionis. Ideo enim habemus necessitatem ad patiendum, quia reatum originalis peccati contrahimus, et quia ex contrariis agentibus et patientibus constituti sumus, ita quod continua in corpore nostro sit resolutio. Christus autem necessitatem habuit solum ex altera causa; passibilis enim fuit non propter reatum peccati originalis, sed propter modum talis compositionis. — Similiter per comparationem ad subiectum, alio modo est necessitas patiendi in Christo et in nobis. In nobis enim est necessitas patiendi sive per comparationem ad naturam, sive per comparationem ad personam. In Christo autem necessitas erat ad patiendum non per comparationem ad personam, quia nulla poterat astringi necessitate, quia omnia erant ei subiecta^p351-3, sed per comparationem ad naturam assumtam. — Similiter per comparationem ad virtutem regitivam aliter est in nobis necessitas patiendi quam in Christo. Est enim in nobis virtus regitiva et a parte naturae et a parte voluntatis regitivae^p351-4; et respectu utriusque est necessitas patiendi in nobis. Etenim nec natura nec voluntas potest in nobis passionem prohibere; patimur enim, nolimus velimus. In Christo autem necessitas fuit respectu virtutis naturalis, sed non respectu voluntatis. Nihil enim invitus sustinuit nec sustinere potuit, quia non meruit.

Et sic patet, quod necessitas patiendi assumta fuit a Christo et in Christo fuit per assumtionem, tamen non eo modo, quo in nobis est per contractionem^p351-5. Ideo Christus quasi medium tenet inter nos et statum naturae institutae. Nam in nobis natura et voluntas passioni subest; in Adam vero tam natura quam voluntas passioni praeerat; in Christo vero passioni suberat natura, sed praeerat voluntas. Et hoc est quod dicit Damascenus^p351-6, quod « in Christo etsi passiones fiebant secundum legem naturae, non tamen coacte, sed voluntarie ». — Concedendum est igitur, quod in Christo fuit necessitas patiendi et moriendi non contracta, sed assumta. Concedendae ergo sunt rationes et auctoritates, quae sunt ad partem istam.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium de decimo^p351-7 Ioannis: Ego pono animam meam etc.; dicendum, quod illud est verbum personae Filii Dei, cuius non fuit necessitas patiendi vel moriendi; nullus enim ipsum poterat laedere, nisi ipse voluntarie permitteret: unde verbum illud non intelligit effective, sed permissive, nec excludit necessitatem respectu naturae, sed respectu personae.

2. Ad illud Augustini quod dicitur, quod assumsit carnem de altitudine humanae naturae; dicendum, quod hoc intelligit Augustinus, sicut exponit Boethius^p351-8 quantum ad peccandi immunitatem, non quantum ad passibilitatem. Dicit enim idem Boethius, quod « de omni statu aliquid assumsit: de statu innocentiae peccati immunitatem, de statu gloriae peccandi impossibilitatem, de statu naturae lapsae passibilitatem »; unde secundum passibilitatem plus assimilatur naturae lapsae quam naturae institutae

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3. 4. Ad illud Anselmi de voluntate Christi iam patet responsio; non enim excludit necessitatem simpliciter, sed necessitatem respectu voluntatis divinae. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens, quod obiicitur, quod omnis necessitas aut est prohibitionis, aut coactionis; dicendum enim, quod hoc intelligitur de necessitate, quae repugnat voluntati, sicut dicit idem Anselmus; de ea autem necessitate, quae voluntati subest, non habet veritatem. Ideo ratio illa non probat, quod nulla fuit in Christo necessitas patiendi, sed quia non fuit aliqua eius voluntati contraria.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod proprietas, necessario inhaerens alicui, comparatur ad illud sicut ad subiectum et causam; responderi potest, quod verum est. Cum autem assumit, quod passio non habebat causam in Christo; dicendum, quod causa passionis dupliciter potest determinari: vel in genere moris, vel in genere naturae. In genere moris causa passionis est meritum peccati in nobis; et hoc verum est, quod non fuit in Christo. Causa vero in genere naturae est compositio ex contrariis secundum statum pugnae et actionis mutuae, et huiusmodi in Christo fuit mera voluntate; et pro hac causa dicimus in Christo fuisse patiendi necessitatem. Et hinc est, quod patiendi necessitas in Christo voluntatem non excludit, sed potius includit.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod illud quod necessario inest alicui inest ei, velit nolit; dicendum, quod illud non habet veritatem nisi de ea necessitate, quae est contra voluntatem, non de ea quae est ex voluntate et subest voluntati; et talis necessitas non diminuit de ratione meriti, sicut ponit Anselmus^p352-1 exemplum de eo qui voluntarie se obligavit ad opera supererogationis. Et si obiiciatur, quod ista duo non possunt simul stare, quod aliquid sit necessarium et voluntarium, cum voluntarium possit sic et aliter se habere, necessarium vero minime^p352-3; dicendum, quod illud verum est de voluntate, quae habet secum annexam vertibilitatem, sed de voluntate invertibili non est verum. Christus enim voluntarie benefecit, et tamen necessarium fuit, ipsum bene facere; sic et voluntarie passibilitatem nostram assumsit, ita quod impossibile fuit, eum poenitere de hoc, quod assumserat defectum talem.

Scholion

I. Haec quaestio iam tacta est supra d. 15. a. I. q. 3. De eadem, praecipue quoad necessitatem moriendi, pluribus quaestionibus tractant S. Thom. (hic q. I. a. 1-3.) aliique Commentatores, scilicet utrum necessitas moriendi sit homini ex peccato; utrum haec in Christo fuerit; denique, utrum haec in Christo subfuerit humanae voluntati. Ad hanc ultimam S. Thom. respondet negative (dubitantibus, vel contradicentibus aliis); sed in Sum. (III. q. 14. a. 2.) convenientius eam adhibita distinctione resolvit ac negat, in Christo fuisse hanc necessitatem « neque per respectum ad voluntatem humanam absolute, prout sequitur voluntatem deliberantem, sed solum secundum naturalem motum voluntatis, prout scilicet naturaliter refugit mortem et etiam corporis nocumentum ». Quae doctrina bene convenit cum iis, quae a S. Bonav. hic in corp. dicuntur de virtute regitiva animae, scilicet quod in Christo necessitas fuerit respectu virtutis naturalis, sed non respectu voluntatis.

II. Primus modus distinguendi ponitur ab Alexandro Hal. (S. p. III. q. 18. m. 3. a. 1.); at bene observat noster auctor, quod Magister (hic c. 3.) in alio sensu quaestionem hanc intelligit ac Alexander. — Solutio auctoris communiter approbatur; tamen Richard. a Med. respectu virtutis regitivae immerito contradicit asserens, in natura Christi assumta nullam fuisse virtutem regitivam, nec naturalem nec desuper infusam, qua se a morte praeservare potuisset.

III. Praeter laudatos: Scot., in utroque Scripto hic q. I. — B. Albert., hic a. I. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. I. a. 1-4. — Richard. a Med., hic a. I. q. 1-3. — Durand., hic q. I. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. I. — Biel, hic q. unica.

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English Translation

Question III. Whether Christ assumed the necessity of suffering.

Thirdly it is asked whether Christ assumed the necessity of suffering. And that he did, it seems.

1. To the Hebrews, ninth chapter^p349-8: As it is appointed unto men once to die, but after this the judgment, so Christ was once offered; Gloss: « By the same necessity and right of nature »: therefore according to this Christ died according to the state of nature; but he who dies thus has the necessity of dying: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Augustine to Julian^p349-9: « If Christ assumed such flesh as Adam had in the first state, not only would Christ's flesh not be flesh of sin, but neither would it be like the flesh of sin »: if therefore Christ was like the flesh of sin, it is clear that he did not

assume flesh according to the state of nature as instituted, but according to the state of fallen nature. But this flesh has the necessity of dying: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, Boethius in the book On the Two Natures and the one person of Christ^p350-1 says that Christ from the state of innocence assumed immunity from sin, but from the state of fallen nature assumed passibility; but passibility, which is according to the state of fallen nature, is the necessity of suffering: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the Holy Spirit, by whose power that body was fashioned from the womb of the Virgin, although it purified it from the foulness of corruption, did not however purify it from the defect of passibility^p350-2: therefore it had passibility through that mode through which the Virgin who bore him had it, except for the guilt of sin. But the Virgin had the necessity of dying and suffering: therefore also the flesh of Christ: therefore also Christ.

5. Likewise, Christ's body was passible just as it was animal and earthly; but Christ's body, on account of its animality and earthliness, had a natural necessity of taking food and tending downward, for otherwise it could not have stood except by a miracle: therefore by parity of reasoning, on account of passibility, it had a necessity of suffering and dying.

6. Likewise, Christ assumed all natural and general defects, except those which are ordered to sin^p350-3; but the necessity of suffering is a defect in us natural and general, and yet it is not ordered to sin: therefore Christ assumed it.

On the contrary:

1. John, tenth chapter^p350-4: I have power to lay down my soul and to take it up again; and a little before: No man takes it from me, but I lay it down of myself: therefore to suffer and to die was in the freedom of Christ's will: therefore it does not seem that Christ had any necessity for this.

2. Likewise, Augustine on that text of John, third chapter^p350-5: He that comes from above is above all: « He comes from above, because from the height of human nature before sin the Word of God took human nature »; but in that state human nature did not have a necessity of dying: therefore neither as it was assumed by Christ.

3. Likewise, Anselm in the book Why God Became Man^p350-6: « Since the will of God does nothing by any necessity, but by power alone; and the will of Christ was the will of God: by no necessity therefore did he die, but by power alone ».

4. Likewise, he shows^p350-7 the same thing by another reasoning of this kind: « Every necessity is either compulsion or prohibition, which two necessities are converted into one another as contraries, just as the necessary and the impossible; but in Christ there was no compulsion to die, or prohibition against not dying: therefore in Christ there was no necessity of dying », and so neither of suffering.

5. Likewise, whenever some property necessarily inheres in some subject, it is related to it as to a cause and subject^p350-8; but the passion had no cause in Christ: therefore it was not necessary that Christ suffer: therefore Christ did not assume the necessity of suffering.

6. Likewise, what necessarily inheres in something inheres in it whether it will or not: therefore if in Christ there was a necessity for suffering, he would have suffered whether he willed or not; but nothing of this sort is fully voluntary and meritorious^p350-9: therefore Christ in suffering would not have had full merit. But if this is false, it remains that the first too is true, namely that Christ had a necessity for suffering.

Conclusion.

In Christ there was a necessity of suffering, but assumed, not contracted.

I respond: For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that to this some have wished to respond by distinguishing necessity according to the four genera of causes. For there is a necessity according to the formal cause, according to which it is said: it is necessary that what is hot be hot. There is also a necessity according to the material cause, according to which it is said that it is necessary that what is hot in the highest degree be converted into fire. There is also a necessity according to the efficient cause, which is called necessity according to violence and compulsion; and according to this we say that a stone strongly impelled must necessarily be moved. And there is a necessity according to the final cause, according to which we say that a saw must necessarily be toothed, because it is for dividing solid and hard things^p350-10. According to this, since necessity is said in four ways, only in the fourth

way was there a necessity of suffering in Christ, namely on account of our redemption. For as far as it lay in himself, he did not have a necessity for suffering, because there was in him neither corruption of the human condition, nor could there be compulsion; and therefore necessity according to the other three genera of causes cannot belong to him. — But this mode of distinguishing is reasonable enough in itself and is reasonably applied to the question proposed, if however^p351-1 it be asked about the necessity of suffering in Christ, inasmuch as the necessity of suffering in Christ includes not only the time after the assumption, but also before the assumption; that is, if it be asked whether it was necessary that Christ assume our penalties; for then it is true to say that it was not necessary except by the necessity of the end. And in this way blessed Anselm treats this question^p351-2.

But the Master treats this question otherwise in the text. For he asks whether this defect, which is the necessity of suffering, since it is in us through contraction, was in Christ through voluntary assumption. And to this question it cannot be resolved by the aforesaid distinction. And therefore it must be said otherwise, not because the aforesaid mode of speaking is bad, but because it does not avail for our purpose.

— Following therefore the opinion of the Master in the text, we can say that Christ assumed this defect, which is the necessity of suffering. For as far as it was of the law of nature, that body was dissoluble and mortal; and unless it had been preserved miraculously, it would at some time have failed through old age. — It must be noted, however, that the necessity of suffering was not in Christ in every mode in which it is in us, but in a certain mode thus, in a certain mode otherwise. For the necessity of suffering can be compared to three things, namely to the cause and to the subject and to the governing power of the body. If it is considered by comparison to the cause, thus it is in us from a twofold cause, namely on account of the foulness of culpable corruption and on account of the quality of natural composition. For we have a necessity for suffering, because we contract the guilt of original sin, and because we are constituted of contrary agents and patients, so that there is continual dissolution in our body. But Christ had the necessity only from the other cause; for he was passible not on account of the guilt of original sin, but on account of the mode of such a composition. — Likewise, by comparison to the subject, the necessity of suffering is in another mode in Christ and in us. For in us there is a necessity of suffering either by comparison to nature, or by comparison to person. But in Christ the necessity for suffering was not by comparison to the person, because it could be bound by no necessity, since all things were subject to him^p351-3, but by comparison to the nature assumed. — Likewise, by comparison to the governing power the necessity of suffering is in us otherwise than in Christ. For there is in us a governing power both on the part of nature and on the part of the governing will^p351-4; and with respect to both there is the necessity of suffering in us. For neither nature nor will can prohibit suffering in us; for we suffer whether we will or not. But in Christ the necessity was with respect to the natural power, but not with respect to the will. For he endured nothing unwillingly, nor could he so endure, because he did not deserve it.

And thus it is clear that the necessity of suffering was assumed by Christ and in Christ it was through assumption, yet not in the mode in which it is in us through contraction^p351-5. Therefore Christ holds as it were a middle between us and the state of nature as instituted. For in us nature and will are subject to suffering; but in Adam both nature and will were superior to suffering; but in Christ nature was subject to suffering, yet the will was superior. And this is what Damascene says^p351-6, that « in Christ, although the passions came about according to the law of nature, yet not by compulsion, but voluntarily ». — It must therefore be granted that in Christ there was a necessity of suffering and dying, not contracted, but assumed. The reasons and authorities therefore which are for this part are to be granted.

1. But to that which is objected to the contrary from the tenth chapter^p351-7 of John: I lay down my soul etc.; it must be said that this is the word of the person of the Son of God, whose there was no necessity of suffering or dying; for no one could harm him, unless he himself voluntarily permitted it: hence that word does not mean effectively, but permissively, nor does it exclude necessity with respect to the nature, but with respect to the person.

2. To that of Augustine which is said, that he assumed flesh from the height of human nature; it must be said that Augustine means this, as Boethius expounds^p351-8, as regards immunity from sinning, not as regards passibility. For the same Boethius says that « from every state he assumed something: from the state of innocence immunity from sin, from the state of glory the impossibility of sinning, from the state of fallen nature passibility »; hence as regards passibility he is more assimilated to fallen nature than to nature as instituted.

3. 4. To that of Anselm concerning the will of Christ the response is already clear; for it does not exclude necessity absolutely, but necessity with respect to the divine will. — And by this the response is clear to what follows, which is objected, that every necessity is either of prohibition or of compulsion; for it must be said that this is understood of the necessity which is repugnant to the will, as the same Anselm says; but of that necessity which is subject to the will, it does not hold true. Therefore that reasoning does not prove that there was no necessity of suffering in Christ, but that there was none contrary to his will.

5. To that which is objected, that a property necessarily inhering in something is related to it as to a subject and cause; it can be answered that this is true. But when he assumes that the passion had no cause in Christ; it must be said that the cause of passion can be determined in two ways: either in the genus of morals, or in the genus of nature. In the genus of morals the cause of passion is the merit of sin in us; and this is true, that it was not in Christ. But the cause in the genus of nature is composition from contraries according to a state of struggle and mutual action, and this in Christ was from pure will; and for this cause we say that there was in Christ a necessity of suffering. And hence it is that the necessity of suffering in Christ does not exclude the will, but rather includes it.

6. To that which is objected, that what necessarily inheres in something inheres in it whether it will or not; it must be said that this does not hold true except of that necessity which is against the will, not of that which is from the will and is subject to the will; and such necessity does not diminish from the character of merit, as Anselm sets out^p352-1 the example of one who voluntarily bound himself to works of supererogation. And if it be objected that these two cannot stand together, that something be necessary and voluntary, since the voluntary can be thus and otherwise, but the necessary by no means^p352-3; it must be said that this is true of a will which has annexed to it changeableness, but of an unchangeable will it is not true. For Christ did good voluntarily, and yet it was necessary that he do good; so too he voluntarily assumed our passibility, in such a way that it was impossible for him to repent of this, that he had assumed such a defect.

Scholion

I. This question has already been touched above, d. 15, a. I, q. 3. Concerning the same, especially as regards the necessity of dying, St. Thomas (here q. I, a. 1-3) and other Commentators treat in several questions, namely whether the necessity of dying is in man from sin; whether this was in Christ; finally, whether this in Christ was subject to the human will. To this last St. Thomas responds negatively (others doubting or contradicting); but in the Summa (III, q. 14, a. 2) he more fittingly resolves it with a distinction applied, and denies that there was in Christ this necessity « either by respect to the human will absolutely, inasmuch as it follows the deliberating will, but only according to the natural motion of the will, namely inasmuch as it naturally shrinks from death and even from harm of the body ». This doctrine accords well with what is said here in the body by St. Bonaventure concerning the governing power of the soul, namely that in Christ the necessity was with respect to the natural power, but not with respect to the will.

II. The first mode of distinguishing is set out by Alexander of Hales (S[umma], p. III, q. 18, m. 3, a. 1); but our author rightly observes that the Master (here c. 3) understands this question in a different sense than Alexander. — The author's solution is commonly approved; yet Richard of Mediavilla undeservedly contradicts him with respect to the governing power, asserting that in the assumed nature of Christ there was no governing power, neither natural nor infused from above, by which he could have preserved himself from death.

III. Besides those praised: Scotus, in both Writings here q. I. — Blessed Albert, here a. I. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. I, a. 1-4. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. I, q. 1-3. — Durandus, here q. I. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. I. — Biel, here the single question.

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Apparatus Criticus

Vers. 27. seq. — Glossa ut interlinearis habetur et apud Petr. Lombard. et apud Lyranum. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3, ubi etiam Glossa ordinaria habetur. — Pro iure naturae plurimi codd. iuvamine naturae. Mox pro statum mallemus statutum.
Verse 27 ff. — The Gloss is found as interlinear both in Peter Lombard and in Lyra. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3, where also the ordinary Gloss is found. — For by the right of nature very many codices have by the support of nature. Soon, for state we should prefer that which is appointed.
Sive contra Iulian. Pelagian., V. c. 15. n. 84. Cfr. IV. Op. imperf. contra Iulian. 79. et VI. c. 33.
Or Against Julian the Pelagian, V, c. 15, n. 84. Cf. Unfinished Work against Julian IV, 79, and VI, c. 33.
Cap. 8. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 4.
Chapter 8. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 4.
Cfr. supra d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. I. seq. — Mox post per quem Virgo cod. F supplet habuit.
Cf. above, d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. I and following. — Soon after through whom the Virgin, codex F supplies had.
Vide supra d. 15. a. I. q. 2. — Vat. ordinantur ad peccatum.
See above, d. 15, a. I, q. 2. — The Vatican edition reads are ordered to sin.
Vers. 18, ubi et seq. testimonium.
Verse 18, where also the following testimony is found.
Vers. 31. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 4, et August., VI. Op. imperf. c. 22; Serm. 362. (alias 121. de Diversis) c. 14. n. 16.
Verse 31. See here the text of the Master, c. 4, and Augustine, Unfinished Work VI, c. 22; Sermon 362 (otherwise 121, On Various Matters) c. 14, n. 16.
Libr. II. c. 17.
Book II, c. 17.
Libr. II. Cur Deus homo, c. 18., ubi maior propositio hic allata ad verbum habetur, minor tamen et conclusio sententialiter tantum. — Pro ostendit edd. et complures codd. ostenditur. Pro ad mori cod. N substituit ad moriendum et dein omittit ad non mori.
Book II, Why God Became Man, c. 18, where the major proposition here adduced is found word for word, but the minor and the conclusion only in substance. — For he shows the editions and several codices have it is shown. For to die codex N substitutes to dying and then omits against not dying.
Cfr. supra d. 4. a. 2. q. 3. in corp.
Cf. above, d. 4, a. 2, q. 3, in the body.
Alan. ab Insul., Theolog. Regul. regul. 71: Omne meritum est voluntarium aut voluntate originis, aut origine voluntatis. Omne enim meritum, sive bonum sive malum, aut habet voluntatem praecedentem, aut concomitantem; et ita voluntarium est aut voluntate a qua, aut voluntate cum qua. — De merito Christi agitur infra d. 18. per totam. — Paulo superius pro fuit necessitas cod. A fuisset necessitas.
Alan of Lille, Theological Rules, rule 71: Every merit is voluntary either by the will of origin, or by the origin of the will. For every merit, whether good or evil, has either a preceding will or a concomitant one; and so it is voluntary either by the will from which, or by the will with which. — The merit of Christ is treated below, throughout d. 18. — A little above, for there was a necessity codex A has there would have been a necessity.
Ut insinuat Aristot., II. Phys. text. 88. et 90. (c. 9.), et I. de Partib. animal. c. 5. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 10, nota 9. De aliis speciebus necessitatis vide Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis; II. Poster. c. 11. (c. 10.); V. Metaph. text. 6. (IV. c. 5.); XII. text. 38. (XI. c. 7.); V. de Generat. animal. c. 8. et III. Ethic. c. 1.
As Aristotle suggests, Physics II, text 88 and 90 (c. 9), and On the Parts of Animals I, c. 5. Cf. tom. I, pag. 10, note 9. On the other species of necessity see Aristotle, Categories, chapter on the Opposites; Posterior [Analytics] II, c. 11 (c. 10); Metaphysics V, text 6 (IV, c. 5); XII, text 38 (XI, c. 7); On the Generation of Animals V, c. 8, and Ethics III, c. 1.
Ita fere omnes codd. et edd. I. 2 (melius esset tamen); sed deest in Vat. et cod. A.
So nearly all the codices and editions I and 2 (it would be better to read however); but it is lacking in the Vatican edition and codex A.
Libr. II. Cur Deus homo, c. 17. seqq. — Sententia Magistri habetur hic in lit. c. 3. — Paulo inferius pro Et ad hanc quaestionem dissolvi [Vat. responderi] codd. K Sed haec quaestio dissolvi, edd. I, 2 Et ideo hanc quaestionem dissolvere. Post pauca pro modus dicendi codd. N U modus distinguendi.
Book II, Why God Became Man, c. 17 ff. — The opinion of the Master is found here in the text, c. 3. — A little below, for And to this question it cannot be resolved [Vat. be answered] codices K [read] But this question be resolved, editions I, 2 And therefore to resolve this question. After a few words, for mode of speaking codices N U [read] mode of distinguishing.
Epist. I. Cor. 15, 27.
1 Corinthians 15, 27.
Cfr. II. Sent. d. 19. a. 2. q. I. ad I. et a. 3. q. I. — Pro et a parte naturae multi codd. ex parte naturae. Codd. K Z prosequuntur et ex parte voluntatis.
Cf. II Sent., d. 19, a. 2, q. I, ad I, and a. 3, q. I. — For and on the part of nature many codices have from the part of nature. Codices K Z continue and from the part of the will.
Vide supra d. 15. a. I. q. 3.
See above, d. 15, a. I, q. 3.
Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 20. — Paulo inferius pro Concedendae ergo sunt cod. A Concedendae sunt etiam.
Book III, On the Orthodox Faith, c. 20. — A little below, for therefore they are to be granted codex A has they are also to be granted.
Vers. 18. — Inferius pro permitteret Vat. permisisset.
Verse 18. — Below, for he would permit the Vatican edition reads he had permitted.
De Una Persona et duab. natur. c. 8. — Paulo inferius pro peccati immunitatem edd. peccandi immunitatem. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 4, et supra d. 12. a. 2. q. I. ad 4.
On the One Person and Two Natures, c. 8. — A little below, for immunity from sin the editions read immunity from sinning. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 4, and above, d. 12, a. 2, q. I, ad 4.
Libr. II. Cur Deus homo, c. 18, ubi inter alia dicit haec: Et si vis omnium quae [Christus] fecit et quae passus est, veram scire necessitatem, scito, omnia ex necessitate fuisse, quia ipse voluit; voluntatem vero eius nulla praecessit necessitas etc. Cfr. ibid. c. 5, et de Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb. q. I. c. 2. Vide etiam infra solut. ad 6. — Paulo inferius pro quod nulla codd. G 1 L N U V Z quia nulla, et subinde pro quia non edd. quod non.
Book II, Why God Became Man, c. 18, where among other things he says this: And if you wish to know the true necessity of all that [Christ] did and suffered, know that all came about of necessity, because he himself willed it; but no necessity preceded his will etc. Cf. ibid. c. 5, and On the Concord of God's Foreknowledge with Free Choice, q. I, c. 2. See also below, the solution to 6. — A little below, for that none codices G 1 L N U V Z have because none, and thereupon for because not the editions have that not.
Aristot., IV. Metaph. text. 23. (III. c. 5.): Necessarium enim non contingit aliter et aliter se habere; quare si quid necessario est, non ita et non ita habebit. — In fine solut. pro assumserat codd. F T assumserit, cod. V assumsit.
Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, text 23 (III, c. 5): For the necessary cannot be otherwise and otherwise; wherefore if anything is necessarily, it will not be thus and not thus. — At the end of the solution, for he had assumed codices F T [read] he assumed [subjunctive], codex V he assumed.

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