Dist. 20, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 20
Articulus Unicus. De congruentia nostrae redemptionis factae per passionem Christi.
Quaestio I. Utrum congruum fuerit, humanam naturam a Deo reparari.
Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum congruum fuerit, humanam naturam a Deo reparari. Et quod sic, videtur per quatuor suppositiones manifestas, quae elici possunt ex dictis Anselmi in secundo Cur Deus homop416-3. Prima est haec: nullatenus decet summam stabilitatem permittere suum propositum infirmari. — Secunda est haec: nullatenus decet summam benignitatem pro peccato unius hominis totam posteritatem eiusp416-4 sempiternaliter damnari. — Tertia est haec: nullatenus decet summam sapientiam nobilissimam creaturam permittere universaliter fine suo fraudari. — Quarta est haec: nullatenus de
cet summam virtutem permittere, servum suum ab alio in sempiternum iniuste detineri.
1. Ex prima arguitur ita: si non decet Dei propositum infirmari; et Deus proposueratp417-1 hominem perducere ad beatitudinem, et perduci non habet, quamdiu manet in statu ruinae: ergo indecens est, hominem in tali statu relinqui: ergo ab oppositis decens est, ipsum reparari et relevari.
2. Ex secunda arguitur sic: non decetp417-2 totam posteritatem sempiternaliter damnari pro peccato unius hominis; sed tota sempiternaliter damnaretur, nisi reparatio interveniret: ergo congruum fuit et decens, ut Deus hominem repararet.
3. Ex tertia arguitur sic: non decet summam sapientiam permittere, universaliter nobilissimam creaturam fine suo fraudari; sed nisi reparatio interveniret, omnes homines fine suo essent fraudati, et ita vane omnes filii hominum essent constitutip417-3; quod divinae sapientiae non congruit, quae nihil incongruum facit: ergo restat, quod valde congruum fuit, genus humanum reparari.
4. Ex quarta arguitur sic: non decet summam virtutem permittere, servos suos iniuste et violenter ab adversario detineri; sed nisi reparatio interveniisset, multi servi Dei et Sancti detinerentur in limbo: ergo congruum fuit et decens, per reparationis beneficium subveniri generi humano.
Sed contra hoc obiicitur sic: 1. Si indecens fuisset, genus humanum non reparari, et inconveniens; et « quodlibet minimum inconveniens, sicut dicit Anselmus in primo Cur Deus homop417-4, Deo est impossibile»: ergo fuit impossibile, Deum genus humanum non reparare. Et ex hoc elicitur duplex inconveniens: unum, quod Deus non reparavit genus humanum propter misericordiam, sed potius propter vitandam indecentiam; aliud, quod non reparavit ex liberalitate, sed ex necessitate. Quod si verum est, non tenemur ei ad tantas gratiarum actiones; quod impium et crudelissimum est dicerep417-5.
2. Item, nobilior creatura est Angelus quam homo, et propter beatitudinem est facta, sicut homo; sed non decuit Deum relevare angelum a suo lapsup417-6: ergo nec decuit reparare genus humanum.
3. Item, sicut decet divinam sapientiam et bonitatem relevare cadentem, sic etiam decet sustentare stantem; sed non decuit Deum tenere genus humanum, ne labereturp417-7: ergo videtur, quod non decuit ipsum relevare post ipsum lapsum.
4. Item, non decet Deump417-8 facere contra suam iustitiam; sed homo, cum peccavit, meruit a Deo in aeternum separari: si ergo per reparationem Deo habet coniungi, videtur, quod nunquam decuit, genus humanum reparari.
5. Item, sicut homo meruit per peccatum mortem carnis, ita etiam meruit mortem sempiternae damnationis; sed non decuit Deum sic reparare genus humanum, ut non moreretur morte carnisp417-9: ergo non decuit sic reparare, ut non moreretur morte sempiternae damnationis.
6. Item, non decet Deum facere contra dispositionem suae sapientiae; sed Deus talem fecerat hominem, ut, si vellet stare, staret, et si vellet cadere, caderet: ergo sicut non decet Deum facere de stante, ut cadat, ita non decet ipsum facere de cadente, ut resurgat: ergo non decet eum reparare humanam naturamp417-10.
Conclusio.
Genus humanum reparari, congruum et decens est tum ex parte Dei, tum ex parte hominis.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod absque dubio congruum est et decens, reparari genus humanum; congruum, inquam, est et decens non solum ex parte Dei, sed etiam ex parte hominis. Ex parte Dei, quia decet Dei sapientiam et misericordiam, sicut in opponendo monstratum est suprap417-11. — Ex parte vero hominis congruentia est similiter, si consideretur dignitas hominis conditi et modus labendi et status lapsi. — Dignitas namque hominis tanta erat, ut propter ipsum facta sunt uni
versap418-1. Si ergo homo careret suo fine, iam omnia essent suo fine defraudata. — Modus vero labendi fuit, quod humana natura totaliter cecidit, alio peccante, et alio suggerente; et ideo decens fuit, ipsam per alium relevari, ut, sicut filii peccaverunt in parente, et parens peccavit, diabolo suggerente, sic etiam homo repararetur, Domino relevante. — Status etiam hominis lapsi reparationi congruit, quia in illo statu simul fuit poenitentia cum miseria; et poenitentia quodam modo placabat divinam iustitiam, miseria vero provocabat misericordiam.
Et sic patet, quod per omnem modum congruum fuit, reparari genus humanum, congruum, inquam, ex parte opificis, et congruum ex parte operis. Sed congruitas ex parte operis pura congruentia est, ita quod non ponit necessitatem. Congruitas vero ex parte opificis ponit necessitatem, necessitatem, inquam, non inevitabilitatis, quae dividitur in coactionem et prohibitionem, sed necessitatem immutabilitatis, quae consurgit ex stabilitate et immutabilitate divinae dispositionis. Haec autem non arctat divinam potentiam ad oppositum, sed eam determinat ad tale propositum. Unde Anselmus in secundo Cur Deus homop418-2: « Cum dicimus, Deum aliquid facere necessitate, intelligendum est, quod hoc facit necessitate servandi honestatem, quae necessitas non est aliud quam immutabilitas honestatis».
Ex his quae dicta sunt, patet responsio ad propositam quaestionem. Si enim quaeratur, utrum congruum sit, reparari genus humanum; concedendum est simpliciter, quod verum est. Si vero quaeratur, utrum sit necessarium; non est simpliciter respondendum, sed distinguendum. Est enim necessarium ex parte Dei, non ex parte nostri; et ex parte Deip418-3 non quacumque necessitate, sed necessitate immutabilitatis, quae non opponitur libertati voluntatis, ac per hoc nec gratiae nec liberalitati.
1. Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum obiectum; non enim sequitur, si Deus reparat necessitate suae immutabilitatis, quod propter hoc non reparet ex liberalitate suae benignitatis; haec enim simul possunt starep418-4.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod creatura angelica nobilior est etc.; dicendum, quod quamvis Angelus nobilior sit creaturap418-5, non tamen est adeo ad reparationem idoneus, sicut homo, propter modum labendi et statum hominis lapsi. Homo enim poenituit, angelus vero obstinatus fuit; homo totaliter, angelus particulariter cecidit; homo per alium, angelus per se ipsum; et haec sunt quae faciunt angelum ad reparationem minus idoneum.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non decuit Deum tenere hominem, ne caderet; dicendum, quod si homo voluisset stare, nunquam Deus dereliquisset eum, ut caderet; sed quia stare noluit, non debuit ipsum conservare invitum; sed quia homo post lapsum voluit resurgere, ideo decuit Deum sibi manum porrigere, ita quod manus ista ad illos se extendit, qui voluntarie resurguntp418-6, non ad eos qui nolunt resurgere.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non decet Deum facere contra suam iustitiam; dicendum, quod verum est. Decet tamen aliquid ipsum facere praeter rigorem iustitiae, quia reparatio humani generis non repugnat divinae iustitiae. Concurrunt enim in illa simul misericordia et veritas, sicut videbitur infrap418-7. Unde quod dicitur, quod homo meruit per peccatum in aeternum separari a Deo; hoc verum est, quantum est de se; possunt tamen alia merita intervenire, quae infringent illam obligationem, et in quibus servabitur ordo iustitiae divinae.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod per peccatum meruit homo ita puniri poena sempiternae damnationis, sicut poena mortis; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia de poena mortis statim fuit sententia lata, de poena vero sempiternae damnationis adhuc differtur sententia. Et quia divina sententia est irrevocabilis, postquam lata est — licet mutari possit sententia per prophetiam praedicata, sicut patet in Ionap418-8 — antequam feratur, potest remedium inveniri; ideo reparari potuit genus humanum, ut non incurreret poenam damnationis sempiternae in aliqua eius parte, quamvis non fuerit liberatum, ut non incurreret poenam mortis. — Et si tu quaeras, quare sententia ista fuit lata, et illa dilata, cum homo meruisset utramque de se; dicendum, quod prima est via poenitentiae, secunda vero aufert locum poenitentiae; ideo non debebat secunda sententia inferri contra hominem, quamdiu erat in statu viae.
6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non decebat Deum facere contra ordinem suae sapientiae; dicendum, quod genus humanum reparando contra sapientiam suam non fecit, quia ex sapientia sua fecerat ipsum reparabilem, praevidens eius lapsum. Nec valet illud quod obiicit: nec decuit facere de stante, ut caderet: ergo nec decuit de labente, ut resurgeret; quia, quamvis « nullo sapiente fiat homo deteriorp418-9 », aliquo tamen sapiente potest fieri melior. Et licet non deceat Deum de bono facere malum, decet tamen de malo facere bonum.
I. In quaestionibus huius distinctionis solvendis Scholastici sequuntur praecipue S. Anselmi librum Cur Deus homo, cum quadam tamen restrictione, de qua vide infra q. 6. — Solutione huius I. quaestionis illustratur doctrina supra d. 2. a. I. q. 2. (de congruentia incarnationis) et II. Sent. d. 7. p. I. a. I. q. 1. (de obstinatione daemonum) explicata; nec circa conclusionem dubium esse potest. A congruentia auctor in responsione transit ad necessitatem quandam incarnationis, quam secundum S. Anselmum et Alexandrum Hal. nominat necessitatem immutabilitatis. Sed istud vocabulum sumitur hoc loco non in sensu absoluto, ut alibi, sed conditionato, ut ipsa verba auctoris hic manifestant et magis infra q. 6. Bene dicit Alex. Hal. (S. p. III. q. I. m. 3.): « Secundum Anselmum proprie dicitur necessitas, quae est coactionis et prohibitionis; necessitas autem immutabilitatis proprie non debet dici, sed improprie ». Eadem necessitas a S. Thoma (hic a. I. quaestiunc. 3; cfr. S. III. q. 46. a. 2.) vocatur necessitas ex suppositione, quam distinguit a necessitate coactionis et necessitate absoluta, et addit, quod non sit necessitas « ex suppositione finis, quia non est dubium, quin Deus ad aliquem finem possit inducere multis aliis viis... sed ex suppositione alicuius, quod est in ipso, scilicet praescientiae, vel voluntatis, quae mutari non possunt; secundum quem modum dicitur, quod necessarium est, praedestinatum salvari. Et haec dicitur necessitas immutabilitatis a quibusdam. Et per hunc modum necessarium fuit ex parte Dei, humanam naturam reparari ». — De hac et aliis necessitatis speciebus cfr. S. Bonav., I. Sent. d. 6. q. I. et scholion, d. 38. a. 2. q. I. et scholion; II. Sent. d. 7. p. II. a. I. q. 3, d. 25. p. II. q. 2. 3; III. Sent. d. II. a. I. q. 3. ad 4, d. 16. a. I. q. 3. — Verba in solut. ad 3. non nimis premenda sunt, quasi sine gratia praeveniente Christi homo lapsus voluerit resurgere, at homo innocens noluerit surgere. Sed ibi respicitur haec veritas, quod gratia Christi de facto non salvat adultos, nisi volentes resurgere, dum protoparentes de facto noluerunt stare.
De hac I. quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 2. 3, et q. 18. m. 3. a. I. — Scot., de hac et seqq. qq. in utroque Scripto hic q. unica. — S. Thom., hic a. I. quaestiunc. I. 3; tangitur etiam S. III. q. 46. a. I, praesertim ad 3, et q. I. a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. I. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. 2. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic q. I. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. I. — Biel, hic q. unica.
II. In seq. (2.) quaestione Seraphicus egregie explicat rationes congruentiae pro conclusione, de qua inter Christianos non potest esse controversia.
De eadem quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 4, et q. 18. m. I. a. I. — S. Thom., hic a. I. quaestiunc. 2; cfr. S. III. q. 46. a. 1. 3. — B. Albert. tangit quaestionem hic a. 1. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 3.
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Article, the Only One. On the fittingness of our redemption accomplished through the passion of Christ.
Question I. Whether it was fitting for human nature to be repaired by God.
Concerning the first, one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether it was fitting for human nature to be repaired by God. And that it was so seems to be the case from four manifest suppositions, which can be drawn from what Anselm says in the second [book] of Cur Deus homop416-3. The first is this: it in no way befits supreme stability to permit its own purpose to be weakened. — The second is this: it in no way befits supreme benignity that for the sin of one man his whole posterityp416-4 should be damned for ever. — The third is this: it in no way befits supreme wisdom to permit the noblest creature to be universally defrauded of its end. — The fourth is this: it in no way be
fits supreme power to permit its own servant to be unjustly held by another for ever.
1. From the first it is argued thus: if it does not befit that God's purpose be weakened; and God had purposedp417-1 to lead man through to beatitude, and he cannot be led through so long as he remains in the state of ruin: therefore it is unfitting that man be left in such a state: therefore from the opposites it is fitting that he be repaired and raised up.
2. From the second it is argued thus: it does not befitp417-2 that the whole posterity be damned for ever for the sin of one man; but the whole would be damned for ever, unless repair intervened: therefore it was fitting and becoming that God should repair man.
3. From the third it is argued thus: it does not befit supreme wisdom to permit the noblest creature to be universally defrauded of its end; but unless repair intervened, all men would be defrauded of their end, and thus in vain would all the sons of men be constitutedp417-3; which does not befit the divine wisdom, which does nothing unfitting: therefore it remains that it was very fitting for the human race to be repaired.
4. From the fourth it is argued thus: it does not befit supreme power to permit its servants to be unjustly and violently held by the adversary; but unless repair had intervened, many servants of God and Saints would be held in limbo: therefore it was fitting and becoming that the human race be succored through the benefit of repair.
On the contrary, against this it is objected thus: 1. If it had been unfitting that the human race not be repaired, and unbecoming; and « every least unbecoming thing, as Anselm says in the first [book] of Cur Deus homop417-4, is impossible for God»: therefore it was impossible for God not to repair the human race. And from this a twofold unbecoming thing is drawn: one, that God did not repair the human race on account of mercy, but rather to avoid unbecomingness; the other, that he did not repair it out of liberality, but out of necessity. But if this is true, we are not bound to give him so great thanks; which it is impious and most cruel to sayp417-5.
2. Likewise, an Angel is a nobler creature than man, and was made for the sake of beatitude, just as man; but it did not befit God to raise the angel up from his fallp417-6: therefore neither did it befit him to repair the human race.
3. Likewise, just as it befits the divine wisdom and goodness to raise up the one falling, so also it befits to sustain the one standing; but it did not befit God to hold the human race so that it might not fallp417-7: therefore it seems that it did not befit him to raise it up after its fall.
4. Likewise, it does not befit Godp417-8 to act against his own justice; but man, when he sinned, deserved to be separated from God for ever: if therefore through repair he is to be joined to God, it seems that it was never fitting for the human race to be repaired.
5. Likewise, just as man through sin deserved the death of the flesh, so also he deserved the death of eternal damnation; but it did not befit God so to repair the human race that it should not die the death of the fleshp417-9: therefore it did not befit him so to repair it that it should not die the death of eternal damnation.
6. Likewise, it does not befit God to act against the disposition of his own wisdom; but God had made man such that, if he willed to stand, he would stand, and if he willed to fall, he would fall: therefore just as it does not befit God to make the one standing fall, so it does not befit him to make the one falling rise again: therefore it does not befit him to repair human naturep417-10.
Conclusion.
That the human race be repaired is fitting and becoming both on the part of God and on the part of man.
I respond: It must be said that without doubt it is fitting and becoming that the human race be repaired; fitting, I say, and becoming not only on the part of God, but also on the part of man. On the part of God, because it befits God's wisdom and mercy, as was shown above in the objectingp417-11. — On the part of man, however, the fittingness is similar, if one considers the dignity of man as created, and the manner of his falling, and the state of the fallen. — For the dignity of man was so great that for his sake all things were madep418-1.
If therefore man were to lack his end, then all things would be defrauded of their end. — But the manner of falling was this, that human nature fell totally, with another sinning and another suggesting; and therefore it was becoming that it be raised up by another, so that, just as the sons sinned in the parent, and the parent sinned at the devil's suggestion, so also man should be repaired with the Lord raising him up. — The state also of fallen man befits repair, because in that state there was at once penitence together with misery; and penitence in a certain manner appeased the divine justice, while misery provoked mercy.
And thus it is clear that in every manner it was fitting that the human race be repaired, fitting, I say, on the part of the maker, and fitting on the part of the work. But the fittingness on the part of the work is pure fittingness, such that it posits no necessity. The fittingness on the part of the maker, however, posits necessity, necessity, I say, not of inevitability, which is divided into compulsion and prohibition, but the necessity of immutability, which arises from the stability and immutability of the divine disposition. This, however, does not constrain the divine power to the opposite, but determines it to such a purpose. Hence Anselm in the second [book] of Cur Deus homop418-2: « When we say that God does something by necessity, it must be understood that he does this by the necessity of preserving honorableness, which necessity is nothing other than the immutability of honorableness».
From the things that have been said, the response to the proposed question is clear. For if it be asked whether it is fitting that the human race be repaired; it must be conceded simply that it is true. But if it be asked whether it is necessary; it must not be answered simply, but a distinction must be made. For it is necessary on the part of God, not on our part; and on the part of Godp418-3 not by any necessity whatever, but by the necessity of immutability, which is not opposed to the freedom of the will, and through this neither to grace nor to liberality.
1. And through this the response to the first objection is clear; for it does not follow, if God repairs by the necessity of his immutability, that on account of this he does not repair out of the liberality of his benignity; for these can stand together at oncep418-4.
2. To that which is objected, that the angelic creature is nobler etc.; it must be said that although the Angel is a nobler creaturep418-5, nevertheless he is not so suited to repair as man, on account of the manner of falling and the state of fallen man. For man repented, but the angel was obstinate; man fell totally, the angel partially; man through another, the angel through himself; and these are the things that make the angel less suited to repair.
3. To that which is objected, that it did not befit God to hold man lest he fall; it must be said that if man had willed to stand, God would never have abandoned him so that he should fall; but because he was unwilling to stand, he ought not to have preserved him against his will; but because man after the fall willed to rise again, therefore it befitted God to stretch out his hand to him, in such a way that this hand extends itself to those who rise willinglyp418-6, not to those who are unwilling to rise.
4. To that which is objected, that it does not befit God to act against his own justice; it must be said that it is true. Yet it does befit him to do something beyond the rigor of justice, because the repair of the human race is not repugnant to the divine justice. For in it mercy and truth concur together, as will be seen belowp418-7. Hence, as to what is said, that man deserved through sin to be separated from God for ever; this is true so far as it is of itself; yet other merits can intervene which will break that obligation, and in which the order of divine justice will be preserved.
5. To that which is objected, that through sin man deserved to be punished with the punishment of eternal damnation just as with the punishment of death; it must be said that it is not alike, because concerning the punishment of death the sentence was passed at once, but concerning the punishment of eternal damnation the sentence is still deferred. And because the divine sentence is irrevocable, after it has been passed — although a sentence proclaimed through prophecy can be changed, as is clear in Jonahp418-8 — before it is passed, a remedy can be found; therefore the human race could be repaired so that it should not incur the punishment of eternal damnation in any part of it, although it was not freed so as not to incur the punishment of death. — And if you ask why this sentence was passed and that one deferred, since man deserved both of himself; it must be said that the first is the way of penitence, but the second takes away the place of penitence; therefore the second sentence ought not to be inflicted against man so long as he was in the state of the way.
6. To that which is objected, that it did not befit God to act against the order of his own wisdom; it must be said that in repairing the human race he did not act against his own wisdom, because out of his wisdom he had made it repairable, foreseeing its fall. Nor does that which he objects avail: it did not befit him to make the one standing fall: therefore neither did it befit him to make the one falling rise again; because, although « by no wise man is a man made worsep418-9 », nevertheless by some wise man he can be made better. And although it does not befit God to make evil out of good, nevertheless it does befit him to make good out of evil.
I. In solving the questions of this distinction the Scholastics follow chiefly St. Anselm's book Cur Deus homo, with a certain restriction, however, concerning which see below, q. 6. — By the solution of this first question the doctrine explained above at d. 2, a. I, q. 2 (on the fittingness of the incarnation) and at II Sent. d. 7, p. I, a. I, q. 1 (on the obstinacy of the demons) is illustrated; nor can there be doubt concerning the conclusion. From fittingness the author passes in the response to a certain necessity of the incarnation, which, following St. Anselm and Alexander of Hales, he names the necessity of immutability. But this term is taken here not in an absolute sense, as elsewhere, but in a conditioned sense, as the very words of the author here manifest and more so below, q. 6. Alexander of Hales rightly says (Summa, p. III, q. I, m. 3): « According to Anselm, necessity is properly said of that which is of compulsion and prohibition; but the necessity of immutability ought not properly to be called [necessity], but improperly ». The same necessity is called by St. Thomas (here a. I, quaestiuncula 3; cf. S. III, q. 46, a. 2) necessity from supposition, which he distinguishes from the necessity of compulsion and from absolute necessity, and he adds that it is not a necessity « from the supposition of the end, because there is no doubt that God can bring about some end by many other ways... but from the supposition of something which is in him, namely of foreknowledge or of will, which cannot be changed; according to which manner it is said that it is necessary that the predestined be saved. And this is called by some the necessity of immutability. And in this manner it was necessary on the part of God that human nature be repaired ». — On this and on other species of necessity cf. St. Bonaventure, I Sent. d. 6, q. I and scholion, d. 38, a. 2, q. I and scholion; II Sent. d. 7, p. II, a. I, q. 3, d. 25, p. II, q. 2. 3; III Sent. d. II, a. I, q. 3 ad 4, d. 16, a. I, q. 3. — The words in the solution to [objection] 3 are not to be pressed too far, as though without prevenient grace the fallen man of Christ willed to rise again, but the innocent man was unwilling to rise. But there is regarded this truth, that the grace of Christ in fact does not save adults except those willing to rise, while the first parents in fact were unwilling to stand.
On this first question: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. m. 2. 3, and q. 18, m. 3, a. I. — Scotus, on this and the following questions in both Writings here, one question. — St. Thomas, here a. I, quaestiuncula I. 3; it is also touched on at S. III, q. 46, a. I, especially ad 3, and q. I, a. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. I. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 1. 2. — Durandus, on this and the following question, here q. I. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question, here q. I. — Biel, here one question.
II. In the following (2nd) question the Seraphic Doctor excellently explains the reasons of fittingness for the conclusion, concerning which there can be no controversy among Christians.
On the same question: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. m. 4, and q. 18, m. I, a. I. — St. Thomas, here a. I, quaestiuncula 2; cf. S. III, q. 46, a. 1. 3. — B. Albert touches on the question here a. 1. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 4. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 3.
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- Cap. 4, ubi tres priores suppositiones insinuantur his verbis: Ex his est facile cognoscere, quoniam aut hoc de humana natura perficiet Deus, quod incepit, aut in vanum fecit tam sublimem naturam ad tantum bonum. At si nihil pretiosius agnoscitur Deus fecisse quam rationalem naturam ad gaudendum de se, valde alienum est ab eo, ut ullam rationalem naturam penitus perire sinat. Ibid. l. c. 4: « Genus humanum, tam scil. pretiosum opus eius, omnino perierat, nec decebat, ut quod Deus de homine proposuerat, penitus annihilaretur». Quoad quartam suppositionem cfr. ibid. l. c. 7. et c. 22. seq. nec non II. c. 16, ubi docetur (quod infra in i. fundam. tangitur), ianuam paradisi omnibus clausam fuisse; de quo cfr. supra pag. 66, nota 7, et Damasc., III. de Fide orthod. c. I.Ch. 4, where the three prior suppositions are intimated in these words: From these it is easy to recognize that either God will perfect concerning human nature what he began, or he made so sublime a nature for so great a good in vain. But if nothing more precious is recognized as having been made by God than a rational nature for rejoicing in him, it is quite foreign to him that he should let any rational nature perish utterly. Ibid. l.c. 4: « The human race, namely so precious a work of his, had wholly perished, nor was it becoming that what God had purposed concerning man should be utterly annihilated». As to the fourth supposition cf. ibid. l.c. 7 and c. 22 f., and also II, c. 16, where it is taught (which is touched on below in the first fundamentum) that the gate of paradise was closed to all; on which cf. above p. 66, note 7, and Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith III, c. I.
- Vat. hic inserit permittere.The Vatican edition here inserts permittere.
- Codd. C I. U aa proposuit, codd. B D G H I M N O T V proposuerit.Codices C, I, U, aa read proposuit; codices B, D, G, H, I, M, N, O, T, V proposuerit.
- Cod. R. supplet summam clementiam.Codex R supplies summam clementiam (supreme clemency).
- Psalm. 88, 18: Numquid enim vane constituisti omnes filios hominum?Psalm 88:18 [89:47]: For hast thou indeed constituted all the sons of men in vain?
- Cap. 20. Cfr. ibid. c. 10, et de Fide Trin. c. 8. Pro Deo, quam lectionem fide codd. D F K M conservavimus, textus origin. in Deo, edd. erga Deum. — Subinde pro ergo fuit impossibile cod. B ergo decuit, et pro reparare multi codd. et edd. 1, 2 vitiose reparari.Ch. 20. Cf. ibid. c. 10, and On the Faith of the Trinity c. 8. For Deo, which reading we have preserved on the faith of codices D, F, K, M, the original text has in Deo, the editions erga Deum. — Then for ergo fuit impossibile codex B has ergo decuit, and for reparare many codices and editions 1, 2 corruptly reparari.
- Hoc duplex inconveniens tangit Anselm., II. Cur Deus homo, c. 5. dicens: Sed si ita est, videtur quasi cogi Deus necessitate vitandi indecentiam, ut salutem procuret humanam. Quomodo ergo negari poterit, plus hoc propter se facere quam propter nos? At si ita est, quam gratiam illi debemus pro eo quod facit propter se? Quomodo etiam nostram imputabimus salutem eius gratiae, si nos salvat necessitate?This twofold unbecoming thing Anselm touches on, II Cur Deus homo, c. 5, saying: But if it is so, God seems as it were compelled by the necessity of avoiding unbecomingness to procure human salvation. How then can it be denied that he does this more for his own sake than for ours? But if it is so, what thanks do we owe him for that which he does for his own sake? How too shall we impute our salvation to his grace, if he saves us by necessity?
- Vide Anselm., II. Cur Deus homo, c. 21, et supra d. 2. a. I. q. 2.See Anselm, II Cur Deus homo, c. 21, and above d. 2, a. I, q. 2.
- Cfr. II. Sent. d. 23. a. I. q. I. seq. — Pro ne laberetur edd. 1, 2 ante lapsum, quae verba Vat. verbis ne laberetur adiungit. Mox pro post ipsum lapsum codd. A K Z bb et edd. 1, 2 post lapsum.Cf. II Sent. d. 23, a. I, q. I f. — For ne laberetur editions 1, 2 have ante lapsum, which words the Vatican edition adjoins to the words ne laberetur. Soon for post ipsum lapsum codices A, K, Z, bb and editions 1, 2 have post lapsum.
- Pro Deum multi codd. ipsum.For Deum many codices have ipsum.
- August., II. de Peccat. merit. et remiss. etc. c. 31. n. 50: Poterat autem etiam hoc donare credentibus, ut nec istius experirentur corporis mortem, sed si hoc fecisset, carni quaedam felicitas adderetur, minueretur autem fidei fortitudo... Quid enim magnum erat, videndo, non mori eos qui crederent, credere, se non moriturum? Quanto est maius, quanto fortius, quanto laudabilius ita credere, ut se speret moriturus sine fine victurum? etc. Vide etiam Anselm., de Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb. q. 3. c. 9. — Post pauca pro sic reparare non pauci codd. sic reparari.Augustine, II On the Merits and Remission of Sins etc. c. 31, n. 50: He could indeed also have granted this to believers, that they should not experience the death even of this body; but if he had done this, a certain felicity would be added to the flesh, while the fortitude of faith would be diminished... For what great thing was it, by seeing that those who believed did not die, to believe that one would not die oneself? How much greater, how much stronger, how much more praiseworthy is it so to believe that one, though to die, hopes to live without end? etc. See also Anselm, On the Concord of God's Foreknowledge with Free Choice q. 3, c. 9. — A little after, for sic reparare not a few codices have sic reparari.
- Cod. Y genus humanum.Codex Y has genus humanum.
- Hic in fundam. Cfr. etiam supra d. I. a. 2. q. 1. — De rationibus ex parte hominis cfr. supra d. 2. a. I. q. 2, et II. Sent. d. 21. a. 3. q. 2.Here in the fundamentum. Cf. also above d. I, a. 2, q. 1. — On the reasons on the part of man cf. above d. 2, a. I, q. 2, and II Sent. d. 21, a. 3, q. 2.
- Cfr. II. Sent. d. 15. a. 2. q. 1. — Voci hominis edd. adtexunt conditi.Cf. II Sent. d. 15, a. 2, q. 1. — To the word hominis the editions attach conditi.
- Cap. 5, ubi textus origin. post necessitate, cui voci praefigit quasi, addit vitandi inhonestatem, quam utique non timet, potius. Cfr. supra pag. 350, nota 7. et pag. 352, nota 2.Ch. 5, where the original text after necessitate, to which word it prefixes quasi, adds vitandi inhonestatem (of avoiding dishonorableness), which indeed he does not fear, rather. Cf. above p. 350, note 7, and p. 352, note 2.
- Vat. subiicit necessarium quidem.The Vatican edition subjoins necessarium quidem.
- Cfr. Anselm., II. Cur Deus homo, c. 5. — Pro reparet multi codd. reparat.Cf. Anselm, II Cur Deus homo, c. 5. — For reparet many codices have reparat.
- Edd. addunt quam homo.The editions add quam homo (than man).
- Edd. qui volunt resurgere.The editions read qui volunt resurgere (who will to rise again).
- Quaest. seq.The following question.
- Cap. 3, 4. seqq. — Pro licet mutari cod. O licet aliquo modo mutari; inferius pro debebat cod. A decebat.Ch. 3, 4 ff. [Jonah]. — For licet mutari codex O has licet aliquo modo mutari; further down for debebat codex A has decebat.
- August., 83 Qq. q. 3. — De ult. propos. solutionis cfr. I. Sent. d. 46. q. 2. seqq. — Paulo superius ante de labente supple: facere.Augustine, 83 Questions, q. 3. — On the last proposition of the solution cf. I Sent. d. 46, q. 2 ff. — A little above, before de labente, supply: facere.