Dist. 17, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 17
Articulus I. De voluntate Christi.
Quaestio I. Utrum in Christo fuerint plures voluntates.
Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum in Christo fuerit voluntatum pluralitas. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Ioannis sextop363-4: Non veni facere voluntatem meam, sed voluntatem eius qui misit me, ergo alia est voluntas ipsius Christi, alia voluntas mit- p. 364 tentis; sed voluntas Christi secundum Divinitatem eadem est cum voluntate mittentis: ergo necesse est, quod Christus habuerit voluntatem secundum humanitatem et secundum Divinitatem: ergo habuit plures voluntates.
2. Item, Damascenus, tertio librop364-1: « Habere eum dicimus in duabus naturis duplicia ea quae sunt duarum naturarum naturalia, duas voluntates naturales, et divinam et humanam ».
3. Item, cuilibet naturae intellectuali respondet voluntas; sed in Christo fuerunt plures naturae intellectuales, sicut in praecedentibusp364-2 monstratum est: ergo plures voluntates.
4. Item, Christus meruitp364-3, sed meritum non est nisi secundum voluntatem creatam; Christus etiam omnia creavit, sed creatio non est nisi a voluntate increata: ergo Christus habuit voluntatem increatam et creatam: ergo habuit plures voluntates.
Contra: 1. Damascenus, in libro tertiop364-4: « Quorum substantia est eadem, horum et voluntas est eadem; et quorum diversa voluntas, horum diversa substantia »; sed divina natura et humana uniuntur in Christo in unitate hypostasis, quae est substantia individua, ita quod in Christo non sunt plures hypostases, sed una: ergo si in Christo non est reperire plures hypostases, nec plures voluntates.
2. Item, voluntas facit volentem, ergo plures voluntates faciunt plures volentes; sed Christus est unicus volens: ergo unicam tantum habuit voluntatemp364-5.
3. Item, voluntas est illud in homine, penes quod residet regimen et dominium omnium eorum quae aguntur in ipso et per ipsum; hoc autem in Christo non potest esse nisi unum solum, quia non possunt esse plura dominantia in uno et eodem absque controversiap364-6: ergo necesse est, in Christo esse voluntatem unam solam.
4. Item, in Christo est tantum una personalitas, quia personalitas dicit nobilissimam conditionem, quae reperitur in substantia rationalip364-7; sed voluntas est nobilissimum et supremum substantiae rationalis: ergo sicut in Christo est una tantum personalitas, ita videtur, quod sit tantum una voluntas.
Conclusio
In Christo plures sunt voluntates.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum in Christo sint plures naturae intellectuales, videlicet divina et humana, necesse est, in Christo plures esse voluntates. — Sicut enim in una natura corporali nobili ista duo se concomitantur, videlicet lux et calor; sic et in natura spirituali perfecta necesse est duo reperiri his duobus correspondentia, videlicet cognitionem et affectionem; sed cognitio est actus rationis, et affectiop364-8 voluntatis. Cum ergo in Christo sint plures naturae spirituales, necessarium est in Christo ponere plures intellectus et plures voluntates; et hoc manifestat Magister in litterap364-9 per multimodas Sanctorum auctoritates. — Unde et concedendae sunt rationes ad hanc partem inductae.
1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod quorum substantia est eadem, et voluntas est eadem; dicendum, quod substantia dicitur multipliciter: uno modo dicitur substantia idem quod essentia vel natura; alio modo dicitur substantia idem quod suppositump364-10. Damascenus autem in praedicta auctoritate accipit substantiam pro essentia vel natura. Argumentum vero in contrarium adductum procedit de substantia-supposito sive substantia, quae est individua; et hoc patet per ipsum Damascenump364-11. Ipse enim dicit sic: « Naturales, et non hypostaticas, id est personales, aimus voluntates »; et hoc probat ipse, quia in tribus personis una est voluntas, non propter unitatem in personis, sed propter unitatem in natura. p. 365
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod voluntas facit volentem; dicendum, quod hoc, per se loquendo, intelligitur de natura, per consequens autem intelligitur de persona; et quoniam plures naturae possunt esse in una persona: hinc est, quod ad pluralitatem voluntatum, etsi consequatur pluralitas naturarum, non tamen consequitur personarum pluralitas. Ideo non sequitur: sunt plures voluntates, ergo plures, qui volunt; sed bene sequitur: sunt plures naturae, secundum quas insunt. Et hoc est quod dicit Damascenusp365-1: « Quia duas naturas Christi duas eius naturales voluntates et naturales actus aimus. Quoniam autem una duarum naturarum est hypostasis, unum aimus et volentem et agentem naturaliter secundum ambas ».
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod voluntas dicit illud, penes quod residet regimen et imperium eorum quae sunt in ipso volente; dicendum, quod imperans et dominans est per privationem coactionis, et est imperans et dominans per privationem subiectionis. Primo modo accipiendo imperans convenit ipsi voluntati generaliterp365-2; et hoc modo possibile est, plura imperantia reperiri in eodem, in quo reperiuntur plura a coactione libera, sicut in Christo est reperire liberum arbitrium secundum divinam naturam et humanam. Si autem dicatur imperans et dominans per privationem omnis subiectionis; sic bene concedendum est, quod necesse est esse unum solum. Sed tale imperium non competit omni voluntati; non enim competit voluntati humanae, quae debet esse subiecta divinae, sed illi voluntati competit, quae nihil habet superius se. Ideo ex hoc non potest argui, quod in Christo non sint plures voluntates, sed quod non sint plures voluntates divinae.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod voluntas est proprietas spectans ad dignitatem, sicut et personalitas; dicendum, quod aliter et aliter dicitur haec proprietas et illa ad dignitatem spectare, secundum quod aliquid per superabundantiam dicitur dupliciter: vel absolute, sicut dicitur albissimus, id est valde albus; vel in comparatione, sicut dicitur albissimus omnium. Et quod dicitur per superabundantiam absolute potest pluribus convenire; quod autem dicitur per superabundantiam in comparatione convenit uni soli. Dico ergo, quod personalitas accipitur penes dignitatem excellentiae respectu omnium, quae sunt in ipsa persona, et ideo in uno non potest esse nisi una personalitas; voluntas autem non sic, quia dicit potentiam substantiae rationalis nobilem et perfectam. Et ideo sicut plures naturae nobiles possunt se compati in una persona in Christo, sic et plures voluntates.
I. Error Monothelitarum, reprobatus iam a Concilio Chalcedonensi (an. 451), magis explicite a Concilio Constantinopolitano III. (an. 680) damnatur his verbis: « Duas naturales voluntates in eo (Christo) et duas naturales operationes indivise, inconvertibiliter, inseparabiliter, inconfuse secundum Ss. Patrum doctrinam praedicamus; et duas naturales voluntates non contrarias » etc. (cfr. supra d. 12. a. 2. q. I, scholion).
II. Alex. Hal., de hac et seq. q. S. p. III. q. 13. m. I. — Scot., de hac et seq. q. in utroque Scripto hic q. unic. — S. Thom., hic n. I. quaestiunc. 1; S. III. q. 18. a. I. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 2. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. I. — Richard. a Med., de hac et seq. q. hic a. I. q. I. — Durand., de hac et 2. seqq. qq. hic q. I. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et 2. seqq. qq. hic q. I. — Biel, hic q. unica.
III. Quoad 2. quaestionem conveniunt magistri in hoc, quod appetitus « sensitivus, qui dicitur sensualitas » (S. Thom., S. III. q. 18. a. 2.), cum pertineat ad perfectionem naturae humanae, fuerit in Christo, et quod hic appetitus vocari possit voluntas in sensu largiore et quasi per participationem, quia in homine natus est obedire rationi. — Quadruplicis divisionis voluntatis, hic ex Hugone allatae, alii auctores non faciunt mentionem. Et notandum, quod haec voluntas pietatis hic in penultima solutione argg. recte dicitur esse conditionata. — Duo actus voluntatis rationalis, qui a Ioanne Damasceno vocantur thelesis et bulesis (hic arg. 3. ad oppos.) et a Magistro voluntas ut natura et voluntas ut ratio, ab aliis autem voluntas naturalis et deliberativa, diffuse explicantur a S. Bonav., II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 3. De eisdem respectu Christi S. Thom. (hic a. I. quaestiunc. 3; S. loc. cit. a. 3.) cum Petr. a Tar. speciali quaestione tractat (cfr. etiam Scotus, loc. cit. n. 3-5). Communiter docetur, hanc divisionem tantum respicere actus, non ipsam potentiam. — De 2. quaestione: S. Thom., hic a. I. quaestiunc. 2; S. loc. cit. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 2. 3.
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Article I. On the will of Christ.
Question I. Whether in Christ there were several wills.
Concerning the first the procedure is thus, and it is asked whether in Christ there was a plurality of wills. And that there was, it seems.
1. John, chapter sixp363-4: I came not to do my own will, but the will of him that sent me; therefore the will of Christ himself is one thing, and the will of the one sending is another; but the will of Christ according to Divinity is the same as the will of the one sending: therefore it is necessary that Christ had a will according to humanity and according to Divinity: therefore he had several wills.
2. Likewise, Damascene, in the third bookp364-1: « We say that he has in two natures, in twofold manner, those things which are the natural properties of the two natures: two natural wills, both divine and human ».
3. Likewise, to every intellectual nature a will corresponds; but in Christ there were several intellectual natures, as was shown in what precedesp364-2: therefore several wills.
4. Likewise, Christ meritedp364-3, but merit is only according to a created will; Christ also created all things, but creation is only from an uncreated will: therefore Christ had an uncreated and a created will: therefore he had several wills.
On the contrary: 1. Damascene, in the third bookp364-4: « Of those whose substance is the same, the will also is the same; and of those whose will is diverse, the substance is diverse »; but the divine nature and the human are united in Christ in the unity of the hypostasis, which is an individual substance, so that in Christ there are not several hypostases, but one: therefore if several hypostases are not to be found in Christ, neither are several wills.
2. Likewise, the will makes the one willing; therefore several wills make several willing ones; but Christ is a single one willing: therefore he had only a single willp364-5.
3. Likewise, the will is that in a man in which resides the governance and dominion of all the things which are done in him and through him; but this in Christ can only be one alone, because there cannot be several ruling things in one and the same without conflictp364-6: therefore it is necessary that in Christ there is one will alone.
4. Likewise, in Christ there is only one personality, because personality denotes the noblest condition, which is found in a rational substancep364-7; but the will is the noblest and supreme [part] of a rational substance: therefore just as in Christ there is only one personality, so it seems that there is only one will.
Conclusio
In Christ there are several wills.
I respond: It must be said that since in Christ there are several intellectual natures, namely the divine and the human, it is necessary that in Christ there are several wills. — For just as in one noble corporeal nature these two accompany each other, namely light and heat; so also in a perfect spiritual nature it is necessary that two things be found corresponding to these two, namely cognition and affection; but cognition is an act of reason, and affectionp364-8 of the will. Since therefore in Christ there are several spiritual natures, it is necessary to posit in Christ several intellects and several wills; and the Master makes this manifest in the textp364-9 through the manifold authorities of the Saints. — Hence the reasons adduced for this side are to be conceded.
1. To that which is objected, that of those whose substance is the same the will also is the same; it must be said that substance is said in many ways: in one way substance is said as the same as essence or nature; in another way substance is said as the same as suppositp364-10. But Damascene in the aforesaid authority takes substance for essence or nature. The argument adduced to the contrary, however, proceeds concerning substance-supposit or substance which is individual; and this is clear through Damascene himselfp364-11. For he says thus: « We affirm wills that are natural, and not hypostatic, that is, personal »; and he proves this, because in the three persons the will is one, not on account of the unity in the persons, but on account of the unity in nature.
2. To that which is objected, that the will makes the one willing; it must be said that this, speaking per se, is understood of nature, but consequently is understood of person; and since several natures can be in one person: hence it is that to a plurality of wills, even if a plurality of natures follows, nevertheless a plurality of persons does not follow. Therefore it does not follow: there are several wills, therefore several who will; but it does well follow: there are several natures, according to which they are present. And this is what Damascene saysp365-1: « Because we affirm the two natures of Christ to be his two natural wills and natural acts. But since the one [hypostasis] of the two natures is the hypostasis, we affirm one who both wills and acts naturally according to both ».
3. To that which is objected, that the will denotes that in which resides the governance and command of the things which are in the one willing; it must be said that there is a commanding and dominating through the privation of coercion, and there is a commanding and dominating through the privation of subjection. Taking commanding in the first way, it belongs to the will generallyp365-2; and in this way it is possible that several commanding things be found in the same [subject], in which several things free from coercion are found, just as in Christ there is to be found free choice according to the divine nature and the human. But if commanding and dominating be understood through the privation of all subjection; then it is well to be conceded that it is necessary for it to be one alone. But such command does not belong to every will; for it does not belong to the human will, which ought to be subject to the divine, but it belongs to that will which has nothing above itself. Therefore from this it cannot be argued that in Christ there are not several wills, but [only] that there are not several divine wills.
4. To that which is objected, that the will is a property pertaining to dignity, just as personality also; it must be said that this property and that are said to pertain to dignity in different ways, according as something is said by superabundance in two ways: either absolutely, as one is said to be whitest, that is, very white; or in comparison, as one is said to be whitest of all. And what is said by superabundance absolutely can belong to several; but what is said by superabundance in comparison belongs to one alone. I say therefore that personality is taken according to the dignity of excellence with respect to all the things which are in that person, and therefore in one [person] there can only be one personality; the will, however, is not so, because it denotes a noble and perfect power of a rational substance. And therefore just as several noble natures can be compatible in one person in Christ, so also several wills.
I. The error of the Monothelites, already reproved by the Council of Chalcedon (year 451), is more explicitly condemned by the Third Council of Constantinople (year 680) in these words: « We preach two natural wills in him (Christ) and two natural operations, indivisibly, unchangeably, inseparably, unconfusedly, according to the doctrine of the holy Fathers; and two natural wills not contrary [to one another] » etc. (cf. above d. 12. a. 2. q. I, scholion).
II. Alexander of Hales, on this and the following question, P. III, q. 13, m. I. — Scotus, on this and the following question, in both Writings here, q. unic. — St. Thomas, here n. I, quaestiuncula 1; S. III, q. 18, a. I. — B. Albert, on this and the following question, here a. 2, 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. I. — Richard of Mediavilla, on this and the following question, here a. I, q. I. — Durandus, on this and the following 2 questions, here q. I. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following 2 questions, here q. I. — Biel, here q. unica.
III. As to the second question, the masters agree in this, that the « sensitive appetite, which is called sensuality » (St. Thomas, S. III, q. 18, a. 2), since it pertains to the perfection of human nature, was in Christ, and that this appetite can be called a will in a broader sense and as it were by participation, because in man it is born to obey reason. — Of the fourfold division of the will, here brought in from Hugh, the other authors make no mention. And it is to be noted that this will of piety, here in the penultimate reply to the arguments, is rightly said to be conditioned. — The two acts of the rational will, which are called by John Damascene thelesis and bulesis (here arg. 3 to the contrary) and by the Master will as nature and will as reason, but by others natural and deliberative will, are explained at length by St. Bonaventure, II Sent. d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 3. Concerning these same things with respect to Christ, St. Thomas (here a. I, quaestiuncula 3; S. loc. cit. a. 3) together with Peter of Tarentaise treats in a special question (cf. also Scotus, loc. cit. n. 3-5). It is commonly taught that this division regards only acts, not the power itself. — On the second question: St. Thomas, here a. I, quaestiuncula 2; S. loc. cit. a. 2. — B. Albert, here a. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit. a. 2, 3.
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- Vers. 38: Quia descendi de caelo, non ut faciam voluntatem meam etc. — Plurimi codd. allegant Matth. 5, ubi v. 17. legitur: Nolite putare, quoniam veni solvere Legem etc. — Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.Verse 38: Because I came down from heaven, not to do my own will etc. — Very many codices cite Matthew 5, where v. 17 reads: Do not think that I have come to abolish the Law etc. — See here the text of the Master, c. 2.
- De Fide orthod. c. 13.On the Orthodox Faith, c. 13.
- Dist. 2. a. 2. q. 2; d. 14. a. 3. q. I. seq. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Quod in maiori enuntiatur, ab Aristot., IV. Topic. c. 5, nec non III. de Anima, text. 42. (c. 9.) sic exprimitur: In ratiocinativa enim voluntas fit. Cfr. ibid. text. 50. (c. 10.). — Maximus, Disputat. cum Pyrrho, hoc arg. in hunc modum profert: Siquidem igitur natura inest intelligentibus motus liberae potestatis; igitur omne intelligens etiam facultate voluntatis praeditum est... Quodsi omne intelligens etiam natura voluntatis facultate praeditum est, Deusque Verbum vere caro ratione utentium ac intelligentium more animata factus est; plane fit, ut, et qua homo erat, idem substantialiter voluntatis facultate praeditus esset. Cfr. Damasc., III. de Fide orthod. c. 14. et 18. nec non eiusdem opusc. de Duabus in Christo voluntatibus. Cfr. etiam Martini I, Epist. 3. et 4.Dist. 2, a. 2, q. 2; d. 14, a. 3, q. I and following. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 2. — What is stated in the major [premise] is expressed by Aristotle, IV Topics c. 5, and also III On the Soul, text 42 (c. 9), thus: For in the ratiocinative [part] the will arises. Cf. ibid. text 50 (c. 10). — Maximus, Disputation with Pyrrhus, brings forward this argument in this manner: If therefore there is by nature in intelligent beings a movement of free power; then everything intelligent is also endowed with the faculty of will... But if everything intelligent is also by nature endowed with the faculty of will, and the Word of God truly became flesh, animated after the manner of those using reason and understanding; it plainly follows that, even insofar as he was man, he was substantially endowed with the faculty of will. Cf. Damascene, III On the Orthodox Faith c. 14 and 18, and also his work On the Two Wills in Christ. Cf. also Martin I, Letters 3 and 4.
- Cfr. infra d. 18. per totam. — De minori cfr. supra pag. 350, nota 9.Cf. below d. 18 throughout. — On the minor [premise] cf. above page 350, note 9.
- De Fide orthod. c. 14, pluribus interiectis post voluntas est eadem. Cfr. Basil., Epist. 189. (alias 80.) n. 6. et 8.On the Orthodox Faith c. 14, with several things interposed after the will is the same. Cf. Basil, Letter 189 (otherwise 80) n. 6 and 8.
- Maximus, Disputat. cum Pyrrho: « Si igitur unus Christus, tanquam unus omnino etiam volebat. Quodsi tanquam unus volebat, una prorsus est et eius voluntas, non duae... Non potest fieri, quin una cum voluntatibus etiam volentes inducantur ». Huius obiectionis fundamentum est illud axioma: Actiones sunt suppositorum.Maximus, Disputation with Pyrrhus: « If therefore there is one Christ, then as one he also willed entirely. But if he willed as one, his will too is altogether one, not two... It cannot happen that along with the wills the willing ones too are not introduced ». The foundation of this objection is that axiom: Actions belong to supposits.
- Pyrrhus in memorata Disputatione ait: Fieri non potest, ut in una persona duae sint, alia alii compositae, voluntates absque contrarietate (ἄνευ ἐναντιώσεως).Pyrrhus in the cited Disputation says: It cannot happen that in one person there be two wills, composed one with another, without contrariety (ἄνευ ἐναντιώσεως).
- Cfr. supra d. 5. a. 2. q. 2, d. 6. a. 2. q. I, d. 10. a. I. q. 2. — De minori cfr. II. Sent. d. 25. p. I. q. 6, scholion. — Paulo superius pro una personalitas codd. F T una sola personalitas.Cf. above d. 5, a. 2, q. 2; d. 6, a. 2, q. I; d. 10, a. I, q. 2. — On the minor [premise] cf. II Sent. d. 25, p. I, q. 6, scholion. — A little above, for one personality codices F T [read] one sole personality.
- Edd. hic repetunt actus.The editions here repeat act.
- Hic c. 2. — Pro multimodas cod. Z multas.Here c. 2. — For manifold codex Z [reads] many.
- Vide Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Substantia, et VII. Metaph. text. 7. et 53. (VI. c. 3. et 18.).See Aristotle, Categories, chapter on Substance, and VII Metaphysics text 7 and 53 (VI c. 3 and 18).
- Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 14. Probatio, de qua fit mentio, est ibidem: Si enim personales esse concesserimus, tres sanctae Trinitatis personas diversae inter se voluntatis atque actionis necessario dicemus (ed. Migne). — Voci individua Vat. adiicit natura. In cod. A scriptum est sive quae est substantia individua.Book III On the Orthodox Faith c. 14. The proof which is mentioned is in the same place: For if we concede [them] to be personal, we shall necessarily say that the three persons of the holy Trinity are of a will and action diverse among themselves (Migne edition). — To the word individual the Vatican [edition] adds nature. In codex A it is written or which is an individual substance.
- Quia duas naturas Christi duas eius naturales voluntates et naturales actus aimus. (Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.)Because we affirm the two natures of Christ to be his two natural wills and natural acts. (See here the text of the Master, c. 2.)
- (Cfr. supra de imperio voluntatis, II. Sent. d. 25.)(Cf. above on the command of the will, II Sent. d. 25.)