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Dist. 17, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 17

Textus Latinus
p. 365

Quaestio II. De numero et sufficientia voluntatum in Christo.

Secundo quaeritur de voluntatum numero et sufficientia; dividit enim Magisterp365-5 voluntates Christi in tria membra, quorum unum est voluntas divinitatis, aliud voluntas rationis et tertium voluntas carnis seu sensualitatis. Sed quod ista divisiop365-1 sit superfluap365-2p365-3p365-4, videtur:

p. 366

Argumenta pro parte 1:

1. Primo auctoritate Damasceni in tertio librop366-1: « Duas, inquit, naturas Christi, duas eius voluntates naturales et naturales actus aimus »: ergo si divisio Damasceni est completa, quae est per duo membra, videtur, quod praedicta divisio sit superflua.

2. Item, Philosophus dicit in tertio de Anima et etiam in Topicisp366-2, quod « voluntas est in sola rationali »: ergo nulla voluntas videtur esse sensualitatis; et si hoc, tertium membrum praedictae divisionis superfluit.

3. Item, penes voluntatem attenditur liberum arbitriump366-3; sed in Christo non sunt nisi duo libera arbitria: ergo non nisi duae voluntates: ergo etc.

4. Item, voluntas consequitur naturamp366-4; sed in Christo sunt tantum duae naturae: ergo tantum duae voluntates.

Sed contra: Quod sint non tantum duae, sed etiam plures quam tres, videtur:

1. Auctoritate Hugonis in libello, quem fecit de Voluntatibus Christip366-5, ubi ait sic: « Fuit in Christo voluntas Deitatis et voluntas rationis et voluntas pietatis et voluntas carnis »: ergo quatuor differentiae voluntatis.

2. Item, sicut Christus habuit sensualitatem, ita habuit synderesim; et sicut sensualitatis est appetere bonum carnis, ita synderesis est appetere bonum honestatisp366-6: ergo sicut ponitur aliqua voluntas in Christo secundum sensualitatem, ita videtur, quod deberet poni secundum synderesim, et ita quatuor voluntatis differentiae.

3. Item, voluntas secundum Damascenump366-7 dividitur prima divisione in thelesim et bulesim, hoc est in naturalem et deliberativam; istae duae differentiae constat quod fuerunt in Christo, sicut et praedictae: ergo videtur, quod Christus habuerit voluntates plures quam tres.

4. Item, voluntas sequitur cognitionem; sed in Christo est reperire quatuor genera virtutum cognoscitivarum, quia in ipso cognoscebat sensus exterior, cognoscebat sensus interior, cognoscebat intellectus humanus, cognoscebat intellectus divinusp366-8: si ergo cuilibet cognitioni respondet affectio, et cuilibet affectioni voluntas; videtur, quod in Christo fuerit quadruplex voluntatis differentia.

Est igitur quaestio de praedictae divisionis sufficientia.

### Conclusio. Secundum duas naturas in Christo sunt duae voluntates, secundum potentias sunt tres, secundum actum volendi vero quatuor.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod voluntasp366-9 tripliciter habet considerari: aut secundum naturam, aut secundum potentiam, per quam quis vult, aut secundum modum volendi. Et secundum istam triplicem considerationem tripliciter habet dividi voluntas in Christo. — Secundum enim comparationem ad naturam dividi habet divisione bimembri. Duplex enim in Christo est voluntas, divina videlicet et humana secundum duas naturas; et sic considerat Damascenus voluntatem Christi, cum eam dividit in duo membra.

Si autem consideretur voluntas secundum potentiasp366-10, per quas quis vult, sic dividi habet divisione trimembri. Nam in Christo fuit potentia divina et potentia rationalis creata et potentia sensitiva, per quarum quamlibet in actum volendi exibat. Et sic dividit Magister in littera per tria membra, ita quod illa tria habent reduci ad divisiones duas bimembres, quae sunt per differentias immediatas, quia voluntas in Christo fuit aut divina, aut humana; et si humana, aut sequens cognitionem sensitivam, aut sequens cognitionem intellectivam. Et sic patet sufficientia praedictae divisionis in tria membra.

Per comparationem autem voluntatis ad modum volendi habet multiplicari voluntas in Christo divisione quadrimembri; et sic consideravit magister Hugo voluntatem Christi, cum eam per quatuor membra divisit. Ait enim sicp366-11: « In Christo fuit voluntas Divinitatis et voluntas rationis et voluntas pietatis et voluntas carnis: voluntas Divinitatis per iustitiam sententiam dictabat, voluntas rationalis per obedientiam veritatem approbabat, voluntas pietatis per compassionem in malo alieno suspirabat, voluntas carnis per passionem in malo proprio murmurabat ». — Et sic patet secundump366-12 diversos modos dividendi voluntatum Christi numerus et sufficientia, quia secundum diversas considerationes multiplicari habet modo divisione bimembri, modo divisione trimembri, modo divisione quadrimembri sine aliqua repugnantia. Et in hoc manifesta est responsio ad

p. 367

obiecta, praecipue ad auctoritatem Hugonis et Damasceni.

Ad argumenta pro parte 1:

2. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de verbo Philosophi, quod voluntas est in sola rationali; dicendum, quod Philosophus accipit voluntatem stricte, videlicet pro appetitu ratiocinativop367-1; Magister autem et Sancti accipiunt voluntatem large ad omnem humanum affectum, sive procedat ex ratione, sive procedat ex sensu.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod penes voluntatem attenditur liberum arbitrium; consimili modo respondendum est, quod hoc intelligitur de voluntate proprie dicta; et sic verum est, quod in Christo non habet nisi duas differentias; Magister autem accipit nomen voluntatis pro appetitup367-2.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod voluntas consequitur naturam; dicendum, quod voluntas consequitur naturam, sicut potentia consequitur substantiam; et quia in una substantia possunt esse plures potentiae, nihil impedit, in Christo reperiri plures voluntatesp367-3 ex parte unius naturae, scilicet naturae humanae, et unam ex parte divinae naturae, et ita in universo tres.

Ad argumenta pro parte 2:

1. 2. 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod multo plures deberent esse per auctoritatem Hugonisp367-4 et propter synderesim et thelesim et bulesim; dicendum, quod ex illis auctoritatibus non potest argui, quod in Christo sint plures voluntates quam tres, nisi accipiatur divisio voluntatis secundum modos volendi; per quem modum rationalis voluntas multiplicari habet in voluntatem rationis et pietatis, hoc est secundum conditionalem et absolutamp367-5, dividi etiam habet in naturalem et deliberativam. Sed per hoc non potest argui, quod praedicta divisio sit insufficiens, quia accepta est secundum potentias; uni enim potentiae possunt respondere plures modi volendi.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quadruplex est in Christo cognitio, et ita quadruplex debet esse affectio; dicendum, quod cognitio sensitiva exterior non habet perfectionem absque interiori. Sicut enim vult Augustinus, non est perfecta visio ex concursu organi et obiecti, nisi adsit interior intentio copulans unum cum altero, sicut dicitur in libro de Trinitate undecimop367-6. Illam autem intentionem vocat Augustinus sensualitatem, dicens, quod sensualitas est illa, « per quam intenditur in corporis sensus »; et penes hanc attenditur appetitus carnis. Et ideo Magister ex parte cognitionis sensitivae unam tantum ponit voluntatem, scilicet voluntatem sensualitatis; si enim acciperet secundum sensus exteriores, iam non una, sed quinque essent voluntates secundum quinque differentias sensuum exteriorump367-7.

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English Translation

Question II. On the number and sufficiency of the wills in Christ.

Secondly it is asked about the number and sufficiency of the wills; for the Masterp365-5 divides the wills of Christ into three members, of which one is the will of the divinity, another the will of reason, and the third the will of the flesh or sensuality. But that this divisionp365-1 is superfluousp365-2p365-3p365-4 seems [to be the case]:

Arguments for part 1:

1. First by the authority of Damascene in the third bookp366-1: « We affirm, he says, two natures of Christ, two natural wills of his and natural acts »: therefore if Damascene's division is complete, which is by two members, it seems that the aforesaid division is superfluous.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher says in the third book On the Soul and also in the Topicsp366-2, that « will is only in the rational [part] »: therefore no will seems to be of sensuality; and if this is so, the third member of the aforesaid division is superfluous.

3. Likewise, free choice is regarded in respect of the willp366-3; but in Christ there are only two free choices: therefore only two wills: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the will follows naturep366-4; but in Christ there are only two natures: therefore only two wills.

On the contrary: That there are not only two, but even more than three, seems [to be the case]:

1. By the authority of Hugh in the little book which he made On the Wills of Christp366-5, where he says thus: « There was in Christ the will of the Deity and the will of reason and the will of piety and the will of the flesh »: therefore four differences of will.

2. Likewise, just as Christ had sensuality, so he had synderesis; and just as it belongs to sensuality to desire the good of the flesh, so it belongs to synderesis to desire the good of moral uprightnessp366-6: therefore just as some will is posited in Christ according to sensuality, so it seems that one ought to be posited according to synderesis, and thus four differences of will.

3. Likewise, the will according to Damascenep366-7 is divided by the first division into thelesis and bulesis, that is, into natural and deliberative; it is agreed that these two differences were in Christ, just as the aforesaid ones: therefore it seems that Christ had more than three wills.

4. Likewise, the will follows cognition; but in Christ four kinds of cognitive powers are to be found, for in him the exterior sense knew, the interior sense knew, the human intellect knew, the divine intellect knewp366-8: if therefore to every cognition there corresponds an affection, and to every affection a will; it seems that in Christ there was a fourfold difference of will.

There is therefore a question concerning the sufficiency of the aforesaid division.

### Conclusion. According to the two natures in Christ there are two wills, according to the powers there are three, and according to the act of willing four.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that the willp366-9 can be considered in three ways: either according to nature, or according to the power by which one wills, or according to the mode of willing. And according to this threefold consideration the will in Christ is to be divided in three ways. — For according to comparison with nature it is to be divided by a two-membered division. For twofold is the will in Christ, namely divine and human according to the two natures; and thus Damascene considers the will of Christ, when he divides it into two members.

But if the will be considered according to the powersp366-10 by which one wills, then it is to be divided by a three-membered division. For in Christ there was a divine power and a created rational power and a sensitive power, by each of which he went forth into the act of willing. And thus the Master divides in the text by three members, in such a way that those three are to be reduced to two two-membered divisions, which are by immediate differences, because the will in Christ was either divine or human; and if human, either following sensitive cognition or following intellective cognition. And thus the sufficiency of the aforesaid division into three members is evident.

But by comparison of the will with the mode of willing, the will in Christ is to be multiplied by a four-membered division; and thus master Hugh considered the will of Christ, when he divided it by four members. For he says thusp366-11: « In Christ there was the will of the Divinity and the will of reason and the will of piety and the will of the flesh: the will of the Divinity by justice dictated the sentence, the will of reason by obedience approved the truth, the will of piety by compassion sighed at another's evil, the will of the flesh by passion murmured at its own evil ». — And thus is evident, according top366-12 the diverse modes of dividing, the number and sufficiency of the wills of Christ, since according to the diverse considerations they are to be multiplied now by a two-membered division, now by a three-membered division, now by a four-membered division without any contradiction. And in this is the manifest reply to

obiections, especially to the authority of Hugh and Damascene.

To the arguments for part 1:

2. But to that which is objected concerning the word of the Philosopher, that the will is only in the rational [part]; it must be said that the Philosopher takes the will strictly, namely for the ratiocinative appetitep367-1; but the Master and the Saints take the will broadly for every human affection, whether it proceed from reason or proceed from sense.

3. To that which is objected, that free choice is regarded in respect of the will; in a similar manner it must be responded that this is understood of the will properly so called; and thus it is true that in Christ it has only two differences; but the Master takes the name of will for appetitep367-2.

4. To that which is objected, that the will follows nature; it must be said that the will follows nature, just as a power follows substance; and because in one substance there can be several powers, nothing prevents several willsp367-3 being found in Christ from the part of one nature, namely the human nature, and one from the part of the divine nature, and thus three in all.

To the arguments for part 2:

1. 2. 3. To that which is objected, that there ought to be many more by the authority of Hughp367-4 and on account of synderesis and thelesis and bulesis; it must be said that from those authorities it cannot be argued that in Christ there are more than three wills, unless the division of the will be taken according to the modes of willing; by which mode the rational will is to be multiplied into the will of reason and of piety, that is, according to the conditional and the absolutep367-5, and it is also to be divided into natural and deliberative. But by this it cannot be argued that the aforesaid division is insufficient, because it was taken according to the powers; for to one power several modes of willing can correspond.

4. To that which is objected, that the cognition in Christ is fourfold, and so the affection ought to be fourfold; it must be said that the exterior sensitive cognition does not have perfection without the interior. For as Augustine holds, vision is not perfect from the concurrence of the organ and the object, unless there be present an interior intention coupling the one with the other, as is said in the eleventh book On the Trinityp367-6. And that intention Augustine calls sensuality, saying that sensuality is that « by which there is an attending to the senses of the body »; and in respect of this the appetite of the flesh is regarded. And therefore the Master, from the part of sensitive cognition, posits only one will, namely the will of sensuality; for if he were to take it according to the exterior senses, then there would be not one, but five wills according to the five differences of the exterior sensesp367-7.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 14: Quoniam igitur duae Christi naturae sunt, duas proinde eius etc. (ed. Migne). — Maximus, Disputat. cum Pyrrho, argumentum retorquens respondet: Si enim concedatur una cum voluntatibus induci volentes, omnino etiam consentanea reciprocatione cum volentibus inducendae erunt voluntates occurrentque, vestra sententia... Deitatis [in Deo]; idcirco quidem quod eius una voluntas, una quoque hypostasis ac persona, errore Sabellii; quod vero tres personae, tres etiam voluntates, ac proinde tres naturae, errore Arii; siquidem, ut Patrum definitiones habent atque regulae, voluntatum distinctio distinctionem quoque naturarum infert.
    Book III of On the Orthodox Faith c. 14: Since therefore the two natures of Christ exist, [we affirm] consequently two of his etc. (Migne edition). — Maximus, Disputation with Pyrrhus, turning the argument back, replies: For if it be granted that, along with the wills, willers are introduced, then by an entirely consistent reciprocation willers must also be introduced along with the willing, and they will occur — your view... of the Deity [in God]; for this reason indeed, that his will is one, [there is] also one hypostasis and person, by the error of Sabellius; but that [there are] three persons, [there are] also three wills, and consequently three natures, by the error of Arius; since, as the definitions and rules of the Fathers hold, a distinction of wills also implies a distinction of natures.
  2. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 25. p. II. q. 1. in corp. et q. 4. seq. — Paulo superius pro regimen edd. regnum.
    Cf. II Sentences d. 25, part II, q. 1 in the body and q. 4 following. — A little above, for regimen the editions [read] regnum.
  3. Maximus, loc. cit., eandem obiectionem paulo aliter solvit.
    Maximus, in the place cited, resolves the same objection a little differently.
  4. Sicut docet Priscian., de quo vide tom. II. pag. 399, nota 4. Cfr. etiam Aristot., VII. Topic. c. 1. — Paulo superius pro omnium cod. K hominum.
    As Priscian teaches, concerning whom see vol. II, p. 399, note 4. Cf. also Aristotle, Topics VII c. 1. — A little above, for omnium codex K [reads] hominum.
  5. Hic in lit. c. 2.
    Here in the text [of the Master], c. 2.
  6. De Fide orthod. c. 14. Vide supra pag. 365, nota 1.
    On the Orthodox Faith c. 14. See above, p. 365, note 1.
  7. Libr. III. de Anima, text. 42. (c. 9.) et IV. Topic. c. 5. Vide supra pag. 364, nota 2.
    Book III On the Soul, text 42 (c. 9), and Topics IV c. 5. See above, p. 364, note 2.
  8. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 25. p. I. q. 2. seqq.
    Cf. II Sentences d. 25, part I, q. 2 and following.
  9. Vide supra pag. 364, nota 2.
    See above, p. 364, note 2.
  10. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 858, nota 6. — In fine arg. post ergo quatuor cod. K supplet sunt.
    Cf. vol. I, p. 858, note 6. — At the end of the argument, after ergo quatuor codex K supplies sunt.
  11. Vide II. Sent. d. 39. a. 2. q. 1.
    See II Sentences d. 39, a. 2, q. 1.
  12. Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 22. et III. c. 14. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 565, nota 1.
    Book II of On the Orthodox Faith c. 22 and book III c. 14. Cf. vol. II, p. 565, note 1.
  13. Ut ostensum est supra d. 14. a. 3. q. 1.
    As was shown above, d. 14, a. 3, q. 1.
  14. Vat. adiicit Christi. Mox pro secundum naturam, quam lectionem ut veriorem et subnexis congruentem ex cod. T restituimus, edd. nec non complures codd. secundum naturalem voluntatem, alii codd. secundum naturam voluntatem, cod. A secundum voluntatum, scil. naturam, quae vox supplenda erit. Nobis non sine veritatis specie esse videtur, quod librarii vocem voluntatem substituerint pro volentem, et quod prima lectio fuerit haec: secundum naturam volentem.
    The Vatican [edition] adds Christi. Shortly after, for secundum naturam — which reading, as truer and consistent with what follows, we have restored from codex T — the editions and also several codices [read] secundum naturalem voluntatem, other codices secundum naturam voluntatem, codex A secundum voluntatum, namely naturam, which word will have to be supplied. It seems to us not without a semblance of truth that the copyists substituted the word voluntatem for volentem, and that the first reading was this: secundum naturam volentem.
  15. Cod. X potentiam, per quam.
    Codex X [reads] potentiam, per quam.
  16. Libell. de Quatuor Voluntat. in Christo. Cod. K cum textu origin. voluntas rationis pro voluntas rationalis.
    The little book On the Four Wills in Christ. Codex K, with the original text, [reads] voluntas rationis for voluntas rationalis.
  17. Ita codd. A (K a secunda manu) N Q in aliis et edd. per.
    Thus codices A (K by a second hand) N Q; in others and in the editions [read] per.
  18. Multi codd. ratiocinato.
    Many codices [read] ratiocinato.
  19. Appetitus autem sequitur sensum, ut Aristot. docet, II. de Anima, text. 20. (c. 2.) dicens: Si autem sensum [habet], et imaginationem et appetitum; ubi enim sensus est, et dolor et voluptas consequitur; ubi autem haec sunt, ex necessitate et desiderium est.
    But appetite follows sense, as Aristotle teaches in On the Soul II, text 20 (c. 2), saying: But if [it has] sense, [it has] also imagination and appetite; for where there is sense, pain and pleasure also follow; but where these are, there is of necessity also desire.
  20. Post voluntates edd., posito commate, inserunt duas.
    After voluntates the editions, placing a comma, insert duas.
  21. Vat. absque auctoritate codd. et inconvenienter hic subiicit Damasceni; inconvenienter, aimus, quippe cum in divisione voluntatis a Damasc. facta non sit sermo de synderesi.
    The Vatican [edition], without the authority of the codices and inappropriately, here subjoins Damasceni [Damascene]; inappropriately, we say, seeing that in the division of the will made by Damascene there is no mention of synderesis.
  22. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 48. a. 2. q. 2: Voluntate rationis debemus etiam velle malum poenae, quod scimus Deum velle; sed voluntate pietatis possumus conditionaliter, sive quantum est in nobis, si Deo placet, non velle. Nam et ipse Deus, quantum in se est, non vult etc. Vide etiam ibid. dub. 4. — Subinde pro etiam habet cod. K etiam potest.
    Cf. I Sentences d. 48, a. 2, q. 2: By the will of reason we ought also to will the evil of punishment, which we know God wills; but by the will of piety we can conditionally, that is, so far as is in us, if it please God, not will [it]. For God himself too, so far as is in himself, does not will [it] etc. See also there, dub. 4. — Just after, for etiam habet codex K [reads] etiam potest.
  23. Cap. 2. n. 2. seqq. — Definitio sensualitatis deinde ex August. allata invenitur in eius lib. XII. de Trin. c. 12. n. 17: Qui in corporis sensus intenditur sensualis animae motus. Cfr. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XXIV. c. 4. seq. et ibid. Comment. p. dub. 3. — Paulo superius pro interior intentio edd. 1, 2 interior attentio, Vat. interior attentio seu intentio. Paulo inferius pro intentionem edd. cum non paucis codd. attentionem. Inferius etiam post attenditur Vat. adiungit sive intenditur.
    Chapter 2, n. 2 and following. — The definition of sensuality then adduced from Augustine is found in his book XII On the Trinity c. 12, n. 17: That motion of the soul, [called] sensual, which is directed to the senses of the body. Cf. the text of the Master's Sentences, d. XXIV, c. 4 and following, and the Commentary on the same place, p[receding] dub. 3. — A little above, for interior intentio editions 1, 2 [read] interior attentio, the Vatican [edition] interior attentio seu intentio. A little below, for intentionem the editions, with not a few codices, [read] attentionem. Below too, after attenditur the Vatican [edition] adds sive intenditur.
  24. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion to the preceding question. ---
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