← Back to Distinction 17

Dist. 17, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 17

Textus Latinus
p. 367

Articulus I. De pluralitate voluntatum in Christo.

Quaestio III. Utrum istae voluntates in Christo fuerint conformes, vel repugnantes.

Tertio quaeritur de illarum voluntatum conformitate et concordia, et quaeritur, utrum istae voluntates fuerint in Christo conformes, vel repugnantes. Et quod sint repugnantes, videtur:

1. Ex ipsa dominica oratione, qua dicebat: Non sicut ego volo, sed sicut tu visp367-8: ergo aliud volebat Christus, secundum quod homo, et oppositum, secundum quod Deus: ergo voluntas humana non erat conformis divinae.

2. Item, Augustinus, super Psalmum trigesimum secundump367-9: « Quantum distat Deus ab homine, tantum distat voluntas Dei a voluntate hominis; unde gerens hominem, Christus ostendit privatam quandam hominis voluntatem »: ergo si privata voluntas est voluntas repugnans voluntati divinae, videtur etc.

3. Item, Christus flebat de destructione Ierusalemp367-10, ergo volebat Ierusalem non destrui; et secundum divinam iustitiam volebat eam destrui: ergo voluntas humana adversabatur divinae.

p. 368

4. Item, videtur, quod voluntas rationis et sensualitatis adversentur sibi invicem, quia, secundum quod dicit Augustinus de Trinitatep368-1, voluntates sunt contrariae, quae sunt contrariorum volitorum; sed voluntas rationis volebat mori, voluntas sensualitatis volebat vivere: ergo sensualitatis et rationis erant voluntates contrariae.

5. Item, pavor et securitas sunt affectiones contrariae; sed in voluntate rationis erat securitas, in voluntate sensualitatis erat timiditasp368-2: ergo contrario modo afficiebatur voluntas rationalis et voluntas sensualis. Sed tales sunt voluntates sibi invicem adversantes: ergo etc.

6. Item, aut ratio assentiebat sensualitati refutantip368-3 mortem, aut repugnabat. Si assentiebat: ergo assentiebat in contrarium voluntati divinae: ergo peccabat mortaliter. Si repugnabat: ergo voluntas rationis et sensualitatis fuerunt in Christo repugnantes.

Sed contra: 1. Voluntas humana secundum rectum ordinem debet esse subiecta divinae: ergo si in Christo repugnabat, videtur, quod in Christo erat inordinatio et culpa.

2. Item, omnis motus, qui adversatur voluntati divinae, est motus ad illicitum, et omnis talis motus est peccatum: ergo si Christus secundum humanam voluntatem aliquid volebat adversum voluntati divinae, ergo in Christo erat peccatum. Sed hoc est falsum: ergo etc.

3. Item, aut voluntas sensualitatis in Christo subiacebat omnino rationi, aut adversabatur. Si omnino subiacebat: ergo nulla erat ibi repugnantia. Si adversabatur in aliquo: ergo caro in Christo concupiscebat adversus spiritum. Sed « nonnullum vitium est, cum caro concupiscit adversus spiritump368-4 »: ergo in Christo fuisset vitium et peccatum.

4. Item, aeque ordinatus vel ordinatior fuit Christus in se ipso, sicut Adam in statu innocentiae; sed in statu innocentiae nulla fuit in Adam repugnantia voluntatump368-5: ergo nec in Christo fuit aliqua repugnantia voluntatis sensualitatis ad rationalem, nec rationis ad divinam: ergo nulla.

<!-- page 368 R-column -->

Conclusio.

In Christo fuit voluntatum concordia, quamvis ex parte voliti non esset identitas.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod conformitas voluntatis ad voluntatem in duobus consistit, videlicet in volito et in ratione volendi. Conformitatem in volito dico, quando diversae voluntates unum et idem volunt. Conformitatem in ratione volendi dico, quando idem eodem modo volunt, vel altera earum vult illud eodem modo, quo superior vult eam velle. Cum igitur ad perfectam conformitatem ista duo concurrant, alterum eorum est de necessitate conformitatis, videlicet conformitas in modo, alterum vero aliquando de necessitate, aliquando de congruitate, aliquando praeter necessitatem et congruitatem, videlicet conformitas in volito. Possibile est enim, quod voluntates sint conformes, ita quod una subsit alteri; et tamen non volunt idem, quia voluntas superior non vult inferiorem velle, quod ipsa vult, sed magis velle contrarium.

Quoniam igitur conformitas in ratione volendi fuit in omnibus voluntatibus Christi, quia sic volebat sensualitas, sicut volebat ratio eam velle; sic volebat etiam ratio Christi, sicut divina voluntas volebat ipsam velle: ideo concedendum est, quod in Christo fuit voluntatum concordia et consonantia, quamvis ex parte voliti non esset identitas, quia unaquaeque voluntas quod suum erat volebat. — Et hoc est quod dicit magister Hugop368-6: « Secundum divinam voluntatem quod iustum erat voluit; secundum voluntatem rationis iustitiae consensit et iustitiam approbavit; secundum autem voluntatem pietatis sine odio intime condoluit miseriae, quemadmodum secundum voluntatem carnis iustitiam non accusabat, sed poenam recusabat. Unaquaeque voluntas quod suum erat operabatur, et quod ad se pertinebat sequebatur: voluntas divina iustitiam, voluntas rationalis obedientiam, voluntas humanitatis misericordiam, voluntas carnis naturam; neque

p. 369

altera alteri contraria erat. Sicut enim Deitati natura erat iustitiam non deserere, sic carni intererat naturam servare, et pietati alienam miseriam non amare. Iustum itaque carni erat, quod passionem suam noluit, quia hoc erat secundum naturam; et iustum Deo erat, quod passionem illius voluit, quia hoc erat secundum iustitiam ». Et sic patet, quod licet diversa essent volita, voluntates tamen in Christo habuerunt consonantiam. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod voluntates in Christo non fuerunt repugnantes, nec humana voluntas divinae, nec sensualis rationali; alioquin sequeretur, in Christo fuisse peccatum transgressionis et vitium corruptionis, sicut obiectum fuit; quorum utrumque est alienum a Christo, in quo fuerunt omnes motus rationales recti, et omnes motus sensualitatis pacati, iuxta illud, quod dicit Augustinusp369-1 signatum fuisse per animalia, quae fuerunt in arca Noe quieta et pacata.

Ad argumenta:

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de oratione Domini: Non sicut ego volo, sed sicut tu vis; respondent aliquip369-2, quod ex hoc non concluditur, contrarietatem voluntatum fuisse in Christo, pro eo quod alius et alius modus volendi non inducunt contrarietatem, nisi prout considerantur secundum idem. Unde quia alius et alius modus volendi consideratur circa aliam et aliam voluntatem, ideo non inducunt contrarietatem nec repugnantiam. — Sed iste modus respondendi non sufficit, quoniam, si aliqui duo homines, qui habent diversas voluntates, contrario modo se habeant circa aliquod volitum, dicuntur habere voluntates contrarias.

Et propterea potest aliter dici, quod conformitas voluntatis ad voluntatem dupliciter attenditur, vel secundum assimilationem, vel secundum subiectionem. Dominus autem a voluntate sensualitatis non requirebat conformitatem assimilationis, ut idem vellet, quod ipse vellet; sed conformitatem subiectionis, ut id vellet, quod Deus ordinavit eam velle; et Dominus in praedicta petitione tollit conformitatem assimilationis, cum dicit: Non sicut egop369-3, et

<!-- page 369 R-column -->

ponit conformitatem subiectionis in hoc, quod ostendit, se velle divinae voluntati subesse. Unde in praedicto verbo insinuatur duplex voluntas in Christo, una videlicet rationis, quae erat similis et subiecta divinae voluntati; altera vero sensualitatis, quam ratio subiiciebat voluntati divinae, licet ipsa sensualitas contrarium appeteret; et ita, quamvis non esset similis, erat tamen subiecta, ac per hoc non erat contraria.

2. Ad illud Augustini quo dicitur, quod voluntas humana in Christo distabat a voluntate divina; dicendum, quod Augustinus intendit ibi ponere distantiam quantum ad diversitatem voluntatum et quantum ad distantiam volitorum, non autem quantum ad subiectionis ordinem in volendo; et ideo illa distantia non ponit controversiam.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Christus nolebat Ierusalem destrui, voluntate humana; dicendum, sicut Hugop369-4 dicit, quod illa erat voluntas pietatis, quae ideo flebat, quia misericordiam diligebat; et quia Deus sic volebat eam velle, ideo divinae voluntati non repugnabat; erat enim ibi conformitas in ratione volendi, quamvis non esset in volito. Quod enim sic vellet, hoc habebat a Deo, et Deus volebat eam sic velle.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod voluntas sensualitatis repugnabatp369-5 rationi, quia volebat contrarium; dicendum, quod contrarietas ex parte voliti non dicit contrarietatem in voluntate, nisi sint tales voluntates, quae non tantum sunt natae conformari per subiectionem, sed etiam per identitatem ex parte voliti.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod contrariis affectionibus disponebantur, utpote securitate, timore, gaudio et tristitia; dicendum, quod una illarum affectionum subiecta erat alteri et quodam modo materialis; sicut dictum fuit suprap369-6, quod gaudium in Christo non contrariebatur dolori, quia gaudebat de ipso dolore; sic et in proposito intelligendum est.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ratio consentiebat sensualitati, aut dissentiebat; dicendum, quod

p. 370

quodam modo consentiebat, quodam modo dissentiebat, secundum quod aliquis potest alicui dupliciter consentire, aut volendo idem, quod ipse vult, aut volendo ipsump370-marginal velle. Ratio autem sensualitati consentiebat volendo, eam sic moveri, et hoc idem erat licitum sensualitati, unde non volebat nisi licitum; non autem consentiebat volendo idem ipsum, quod sensualitas, hoc enim esset illicitum voluntati rationis. Et hoc non ponebat, carnem concupiscere adversus spiritum, sive rebellionem sensualitatis ad rationem; illa enim rebellio ponit utrumque dissensum.

Scholion

I. Quaestio haec procedit de conformitate voluntatum in praecedenti quaestione enumeratarum; et supponitur distinctio inter velle efficaciter et absolute et velle imperfecte (velleitas) et sub conditione. Constat autem, ut supra d. 12. a. 2. q. I. tactum est, actum efficacem voluntatis rationalis in Christo semper fuisse divinae voluntati conformem tum in ratione volendi (obiecto formali) tum in volito (obiecto materiali). Item constat, quod nec ipse Deus vult, creatam voluntatem semper in volito idem actu velle, quod ipse, salva tamen conformitate respectu supremae rationis volendi (cfr. I. Sent. d. 48. a. 2. q. 2.); aliis verbis, ut praeclare dicitur (hic ad I.), Deus vult conformitatem secundum subiectionem, sed non semper secundum assimilationem. Unde sequitur, quod hoc modo etiam in Christo voluntas sensualitatis, voluntas rationalis ut natura, voluntas pietatis (quae est in comparatione ad sua membra) aliquid aliud velle potuerunt ac Deus, quin tamen simpliciter fuerit contrarietas voluntatum. — In solutione ad 1. primus modus, quem sequuntur Alex. Hal., S. Thom. aliique, non placet nostro auctori nec B. Alberto. S. Thomas (S. III. q. 18. a. 6.) axioma, cui innititur ista solutio, ita exprimit: « Contrarietas non potest esse, nisi oppositio attendatur in eodem et secundum idem; si autem secundum diversa et in diversis existat diversitas, non sufficit hoc ad rationem contrarietatis, sicut nec ad rationem contradictionis ». Tamen in sequentibus idem ita explicat hoc axioma, ut minime neget, posse interdum esse contrarietatem voluntatis, licet agatur de diversis voluntatibus. — Solutio autem S. Bonaventurae bona est, quidquid quidam dixerint, dummodo attendatur mens ipsius, quae est, quod voluntas humana Christi ut natura refugiebat inefficaciter mortem, sed ut deliberativa tum mortem tum horrorem naturalem mortis efficaciter acceptabat.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 15. m. 2. — Scot., III. Sent. d. 15. n. 22. seqq., et Report. ibid. n. 8. — S. Thom., hic a. 2. quaestiunc. 1-3; S. loc. cit. — B. Albert., hic a. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1-3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. 3. 4.

---

English Translation

Article I. On the plurality of wills in Christ.

Question III. Whether these wills in Christ were conformed, or in conflict.

Thirdly there is inquiry concerning the conformity and concord of those wills, and it is asked whether these wills in Christ were conformed, or in conflict. And that they are in conflict seems to be the case:

1. From the Lord's prayer itself, in which he said: Not as I will, but as you willp367-8: therefore Christ willed one thing insofar as he was man, and the opposite insofar as he was God: therefore the human will was not conformed to the divine.

2. Likewise, Augustine, on the thirty-second Psalmp367-9: « As far as God is distant from man, so far is the will of God distant from the will of man; whence, bearing man, Christ showed a certain private will of man »: therefore if a private will is a will in conflict with the divine will, it seems etc.

3. Likewise, Christ wept over the destruction of Jerusalemp367-10, therefore he willed Jerusalem not to be destroyed; and according to the divine justice he willed it to be destroyed: therefore the human will was opposed to the divine.

4. Likewise, it seems that the will of reason and that of sensuality are opposed to each other, because, according to what Augustine says On the Trinityp368-1, those wills are contrary which are of contrary things-willed; but the will of reason willed to die, the will of sensuality willed to live: therefore the wills of sensuality and of reason were contrary.

5. Likewise, fear and security are contrary affections; but in the will of reason there was security, in the will of sensuality there was timidityp368-2: therefore the rational will and the sensual will were affected in a contrary manner. But such wills are mutually opposed to each other: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, either reason assented to sensuality refusingp368-3 death, or it resisted. If it assented: then it assented to what was contrary to the divine will: therefore it sinned mortally. If it resisted: then the will of reason and that of sensuality were in conflict in Christ.

On the contrary: 1. The human will according to right order ought to be subject to the divine: therefore if in Christ it was in conflict, it seems that in Christ there was disorder and fault.

2. Likewise, every motion which is opposed to the divine will is a motion toward the illicit, and every such motion is sin: therefore if Christ according to his human will willed something contrary to the divine will, then in Christ there was sin. But this is false: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, either the will of sensuality in Christ was wholly subject to reason, or it was opposed. If it was wholly subject: then there was no conflict there. If it was opposed in anything: then the flesh in Christ lusted against the spirit. But « it is no small fault, when the flesh lusts against the spiritp368-4 »: therefore in Christ there would have been fault and sin.

4. Likewise, Christ was equally well-ordered, or better ordered, in himself, as was Adam in the state of innocence; but in the state of innocence there was in Adam no conflict of willsp368-5: therefore neither in Christ was there any conflict of the will of sensuality toward the rational, nor of reason toward the divine: therefore none.

Conclusion.

In Christ there was concord of wills, although on the part of the thing-willed there was not identity.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that conformity of one will to another consists in two things, namely in the thing-willed and in the ground of willing. I call conformity in the thing-willed when diverse wills will one and the same thing. I call conformity in the ground of willing when they will the same thing in the same manner, or when one of them wills that thing in the same manner in which the superior wills it to will. Since therefore for perfect conformity these two concur, one of them is of the necessity of conformity, namely conformity in manner, while the other is sometimes of necessity, sometimes of congruity, sometimes beyond necessity and congruity, namely conformity in the thing-willed. For it is possible that wills be conformed, such that one is subordinate to the other; and yet they do not will the same, because the superior will does not will the inferior to will what it itself wills, but rather to will the contrary.

Since therefore conformity in the ground of willing was in all the wills of Christ, because sensuality so willed as reason willed it to will; so also the reason of Christ willed as the divine will willed it to will: therefore it must be granted that in Christ there was concord and consonance of wills, although on the part of the thing-willed there was not identity, because each will willed what was its own. — And this is what master Hugh saysp368-6: « According to the divine will he willed what was just; according to the will of reason he consented to justice and approved justice; but according to the will of piety he intimately grieved without hatred at the misery, just as according to the will of the flesh he did not accuse justice, but refused the punishment. Each will worked what was its own, and followed what pertained to itself: the divine will justice, the rational will obedience, the will of humanity mercy, the will of the flesh nature; nor

was one contrary to the other. For just as it belonged to the Deity not to abandon justice, so it pertained to the flesh to preserve nature, and to piety not to love another's misery. It was therefore just for the flesh that he did not will his own passion, because this was according to nature; and it was just for God that he willed that passion, because this was according to justice ». And so it is clear that, although the things-willed were diverse, the wills nevertheless in Christ had consonance. — Therefore the arguments showing that the wills in Christ were not in conflict, neither the human will to the divine, nor the sensual to the rational, are to be granted; otherwise it would follow that in Christ there was the sin of transgression and the fault of corruption, as was objected; both of which are foreign to Christ, in whom all rational motions were upright, and all motions of sensuality were peaceful, according to what Augustine saysp369-1 was signified by the animals which were quiet and peaceful in Noah's ark.

To the arguments:

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary concerning the Lord's prayer: Not as I will, but as you will; some respondp369-2 that from this it is not concluded that there was contrariety of wills in Christ, for the reason that one manner of willing and another do not induce contrariety, except insofar as they are considered according to the same thing. Whence, because one manner of willing and another is considered with regard to one will and another, therefore they do not induce contrariety nor conflict. — But this manner of responding does not suffice, since, if any two men, who have diverse wills, behave in a contrary manner with regard to some thing-willed, they are said to have contrary wills.

And therefore it can be said otherwise, that conformity of one will to another is regarded in two ways, either according to assimilation, or according to subjection. But the Lord did not require of the will of sensuality conformity of assimilation, that it should will the same thing which he willed; but conformity of subjection, that it should will what God ordained it to will; and the Lord in the aforesaid petition removes conformity of assimilation, when he says: Not as I [will]p369-3, and

posits conformity of subjection in this, that he shows that he wills to be subject to the divine will. Whence in the aforesaid word a twofold will in Christ is intimated, one namely of reason, which was similar to and subject to the divine will; the other indeed of sensuality, which reason subjected to the divine will, although sensuality itself sought the contrary; and so, although it was not similar, it was nevertheless subject, and thereby it was not contrary.

2. To that of Augustine by which it is said that the human will in Christ was distant from the divine will; it must be said that Augustine there intends to posit distance with respect to the diversity of the wills and with respect to the distance of the things-willed, but not with respect to the order of subjection in willing; and therefore that distance does not posit controversy.

3. To that which is objected, that Christ willed Jerusalem not to be destroyed by his human will; it must be said, as Hugh saysp369-4, that this was the will of piety, which therefore wept because it loved mercy; and because God so willed it to will, therefore it was not in conflict with the divine will; for there was there conformity in the ground of willing, although there was not in the thing-willed. For that it should so will, this it had from God, and God willed it so to will.

4. To that which is objected, that the will of sensuality was in conflictp369-5 with reason, because it willed the contrary; it must be said that contrariety on the part of the thing-willed does not bespeak contrariety in the will, unless they be such wills as are born to be conformed not only by subjection, but also by identity on the part of the thing-willed.

5. To that which is objected, that they were disposed by contrary affections, namely security, fear, joy and sadness; it must be said that one of those affections was subject to the other and in a certain manner material; just as was said abovep369-6, that joy in Christ was not contrary to sorrow, because he rejoiced over the sorrow itself; so also it must be understood in the present matter.

6. To that which is objected, that reason consented to sensuality, or dissented; it must be said that

in a certain manner it consented, in a certain manner it dissented, according as one can consent to another in two ways, either by willing the same thing which he himself wills, or by willing himp370-marginal to will. Now reason consented to sensuality by willing that it should be so moved, and this same thing was licit for sensuality, whence it willed nothing but the licit; but it did not consent by willing the same thing as sensuality, for this would be illicit to the will of reason. And this did not posit the flesh's lusting against the spirit, or the rebellion of sensuality against reason; for that rebellion posits each kind of dissent.

Scholion

I. This question proceeds concerning the conformity of the wills enumerated in the preceding question; and the distinction is presupposed between willing efficaciously and absolutely and willing imperfectly (velleity) and under condition. Now it is established, as was touched above at d. 12, a. 2, q. I, that the efficacious act of the rational will in Christ was always conformed to the divine will, both in the ground of willing (the formal object) and in the thing-willed (the material object). Likewise it is established that not even God himself wills that the created will should always actually will in the thing-willed the same thing which he wills, with conformity nevertheless preserved with respect to the supreme ground of willing (cf. I Sent., d. 48, a. 2, q. 2); in other words, as is excellently said (here to 1), God wills conformity according to subjection, but not always according to assimilation. Whence it follows that in this way also in Christ the will of sensuality, the rational will as nature, the will of piety (which is in comparison to its members) could will something other than God, without there being simply a contrariety of wills. — In the solution to 1, the first manner, which Alexander of Hales, St. Thomas and others follow, does not please our author nor blessed Albert. St. Thomas (S. III, q. 18, a. 6) expresses the axiom on which this solution rests thus: « There cannot be contrariety unless the opposition is regarded in the same thing and according to the same; but if there exists diversity according to diverse things and in diverse things, this does not suffice for the character of contrariety, just as neither for the character of contradiction ». Yet in what follows he so explains this axiom that he by no means denies that there can sometimes be a contrariety of will, even though it is a matter of diverse wills. — But the solution of St. Bonaventure is good, whatever certain men may have said, provided his own mind be attended to, which is, that the human will of Christ as nature inefficaciously shrank from death, but as deliberative efficaciously accepted both death and the natural horror of death.

II. Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. III, q. 15, m. 2. — Scotus, III Sent., d. 15, n. 22 ff., and Reportata ibid. n. 8. — St. Thomas, here a. 2, quaestiunculae 1–3; Summa loc. cit. — Blessed Albert, here a. 7. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1–3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 2, 3, 4.

---

Apparatus Criticus
  1. Matth. 26, 39. — Paulo superius ante istae voluntates cod. A interserit omnes, et plerique codd. pro fuerint substituunt essent. Etiam postea pro sint codd. A K bb exhibent essent.
    Matthew 26:39. — A little above, before these wills, codex A inserts all, and most codices substitute were (essent) for were (fuerint). Also afterward, for be (sint), codices A K bb give be (essent).
  2. Vers. 1: Exsultate iusti in Domino, rectos etc., in Enarrat. 2. n. 2. Textus origin. post Christus [edd. homo Christus] sic prosequitur: et regulam nobis proponens, docens nos vivere, et praestans nobis vivere, ostendit hominis quandam privatam voluntatem. Cfr. lit. Magistri, hic c. 2. — Codd. et edd. falso allegant Ps. 35.
    Verse 1: Rejoice in the Lord, O you righteous, [praise befits] the upright etc., in Enarration 2, n. 2. The original text after Christ [the editions: the man Christ] continues thus: and proposing to us a rule, teaching us to live, and bestowing on us to live, he showed a certain private will of man. Cf. the Master's text, here c. 2. — The codices and editions falsely cite Ps. 35.
  3. Luc. 19, 41.
    Luke 19:41.
  4. Libr. XI. c. 6. n. 10, hoc utens exemplo: « Voluntas videndi fenestram, finem habet fenestrae visionem; altera est enim quae ex ista nectitur voluntas per fenestras videndi transeuntes, cuius item finis est visio transeuntium ». Cfr. II. Sent. d. 38. lit. Magistri, c. 3. Planius de hac re August. loquitur XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 6: Omnes [motus voluntatis] nihil aliud quam voluntates sunt... Et omnino pro varietate rerum, quae appetuntur atque fugiuntur, sicut allicitur vel offenditur voluntas hominis, ita in hos vel illos affectus mutatur et vertitur. Cfr. etiam 83 Qq. q. 40. Demum lectorem remittimus ad consulendos illos locos, quibus August. refutat sententiam Manichaeorum, qui, ut causam explicarent pugnae inter carnem et spiritum, duas animas in homine statuebant, bonam aliam, et malam alteram; de quo videsis VIII. Confess. c. 10. n. 22. seqq.
    Book XI, c. 6, n. 10, using this example: « The will to see a window has as its end the seeing of the window; for there is another will linked to that one, of seeing through the windows those passing by, whose end likewise is the seeing of the passers-by ». Cf. II Sent., d. 38, the Master's text, c. 3. Augustine speaks more plainly on this matter in On the City of God XIV, c. 6: All [motions of the will] are nothing other than wills... And entirely, according to the variety of things which are sought after and fled, just as the will of man is allured or offended, so it is changed and turned into these or those affections. Cf. also 83 Questions, q. 40. Finally we refer the reader to consult those passages in which Augustine refutes the opinion of the Manichaeans, who, to explain the cause of the conflict between flesh and spirit, posited two souls in man, one good and the other evil; on which see Confessions VIII, c. 10, n. 22 ff.
  5. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2, et supra d. 15. a. 2. q. 2. nec non dub. 3. — Mox pro rationalis et sensualis codd. A H K rationis et sensualitatis. Deinde pro adversantes codd. U X repugnantes.
    Cf. here the Master's text, c. 2, and above d. 15, a. 2, q. 2, as also dub. 3. — Presently, for rational and sensual, codices A H K read of reason and of sensuality. Then, for opposed (adversantes), codices U X read in conflict (repugnantes).
  6. Cod. K recusanti. Hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. legitur: Sensu autem carnis refugit et recusat. Secundum Du Cange, Glossar. etc., refutare idem est ac respuere, reiicere, repellere; in quo sensu occurrit apud S. Thom., hic a. 2. quaestiunc. 2. arg. 2.
    Codex K refusing (recusanti). Here in the Master's text, c. 2, it is read: But by the sense of the flesh he shrinks back and refuses. According to Du Cange, Glossary etc., refutare is the same as to spurn, reject, repel; in which sense it occurs in St. Thomas, here a. 2, quaestiuncula 2, arg. 2.
  7. August., XIX. de Civ. Dei, c. 4. n. 3: Neque enim nullum est vitium, cum, sicut dicit Apostolus (Gal. 5, 17.), caro concupiscit etc.
    Augustine, On the City of God XIX, c. 4, n. 3: For it is not no fault, when, as the Apostle says (Gal. 5:17), the flesh lusts etc.
  8. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 30. a. 1. q. 1. — Paulo superius cod. bb vel etiam ordinatior.
    Cf. II Sent., d. 30, a. 1, q. 1. — A little above, codex bb reads or even better ordered.
  9. In libello de Quatuor Voluntat. in Christo. Textus origin. in testimonio allegato post sine odio adiicit (etiam cod. U) iustitiae, et deinde inferius tum post contraria erat, tum post miseriam non amare non pauca addit, quae in codd. et edd. desiderantur.
    In the little book On the Four Wills in Christ. The original text in the testimony cited adds, after without hatred (also codex U), of justice, and then below, both after was contrary, and after not to love misery, adds not a few things which are lacking in the codices and editions.
  10. In locis, ubi August. de arca eiusque significatione tractat, scil. I. Quaest. in Pentateuch. q. 4. seqq., XII. contra Faustum, c. 14. seqq., et XV. de Civ. Dei, c. 27, sententia Augustino hic tributa non occurrit. Guliel. Antissiodor., S. p. III. tr. 1. c. 6. q. 1, Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 15. m. 2, et S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2, qui etiam Augustinum pro hac sententia allegant, subiungunt super Genesim; sed « nec ibi, nec alibi, ut P. Nicolai in ed. Commentarii S. Thom. observat, occurrit. Insinuat de iustis vetus Glossa ». Cfr. Gregor., II. in Ezech. homil. 4. n. 10. seq. — Post Augustinus codd. K O inserunt hoc, et pro signatum codd. V X exhibent significandum.
    In the passages where Augustine treats of the ark and its signification, namely Questions on the Pentateuch I, q. 4 ff., Against Faustus XII, c. 14 ff., and On the City of God XV, c. 27, the opinion here attributed to Augustine does not occur. William of Auxerre, Summa, p. III, tr. 1, c. 6, q. 1, Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. III, q. 15, m. 2, and St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2, quaestiuncula 2, who also cite Augustine for this opinion, add on Genesis; but « neither there, nor elsewhere, as P. Nicolai observes in his edition of the Commentary of St. Thomas, does it occur. The old Gloss intimates it concerning the just ». Cf. Gregory, On Ezechiel II, homily 4, n. 10 f. — After Augustine, codices K O insert this, and for signified, codices V X give to be signified.
  11. Guliel. Antissiodor., S. p. III. tr. 1. c. 6. q. 1: Dicimus, quod penes diversitatem vel contrarietatem volitorum attendenda est diversitas vel contrarietas voluntatum, nec tamen quolibet modo nec quarumlibet voluntatum, sed earum tantum, quae sunt in eodem susceptibili; sed voluntas rationis, qua Christus voluit mori, erat in vi rationali... voluntas autem sensualitatis erat in vi brutali... Voluntas etiam sensualitatis non proprie dicitur voluntas... unde tales duae voluntates non sunt positae sub eodem genere proximo. Praeterea, voluntate sensualitatis vult homo non mori, sive fugit mortem secundum se, non propter aliud; voluntate vero rationis vult homo mori non secundum se, sed secundum accidens, nec propter se, sed propter aliud... et ideo, quia illarum voluntatum secundum se non sunt contraria secundum se volita, patet, quod non sunt contraria (contrariae?).
    William of Auxerre, Summa, p. III, tr. 1, c. 6, q. 1: We say that according to the diversity or contrariety of the things-willed the diversity or contrariety of the wills is to be regarded, yet not in any manner whatever nor of any wills whatever, but only of those which are in the same subject; but the will of reason, by which Christ willed to die, was in the rational power... while the will of sensuality was in the brute power... The will of sensuality also is not properly called a will... whence such two wills are not placed under the same proximate genus. Moreover, by the will of sensuality a man wills not to die, or flees death in itself, not for the sake of another; but by the will of reason a man wills to die not in itself, but accidentally, nor for its own sake, but for the sake of another... and therefore, since the things-willed of those wills are not in themselves contrary in themselves, it is clear that they are not contrary (contrary [contrariae]?).
  12. Edd., paulo ante pro petitione substituta voce locutione, cum paucis codd. adiiciunt volo. Paulo superius pro ut id vellet codd. A H K N bb ut idem vellet.
    The editions, a little before having substituted the word speech (locutione) for petition, with a few codices add I will. A little above, for that it should will it (ut id vellet), codices A H K N bb read that it should will the same (ut idem vellet).
  13. Vide in corp. quaest. — In fine solut. pro eam sic velle edd. finit sic velle.
    See in the body of the question. — At the end of the solution, for it so to will (eam sic velle), the editions read finit sic velle.
  14. Ita codd. A K M O; alii et edd. repugnat.
    So codices A K M O; the others and the editions read is in conflict (repugnat).
  15. Dist. 16. a. 2. q. 2. — Post materialis edd. supplent fuit talis tristitia (?).
    Dist. 16, a. 2, q. 2. — After material, the editions supply was such sadness (?).
  16. Marginal gloss to the body, set beside note 2 of p.370: De triplici statu quoad consensum et dissensum. (The numbered apparatus of p.370 — notes 3–5 on petitione/locutione, Vide in corp. quaest., and Cap. 5 — belongs to the following Article II, q. 1, not to this question.)
    Marginal gloss to the body, set beside note 2 of p.370: On the threefold state with respect to consent and dissent. (The numbered apparatus of p.370 — notes 3–5 — annotates the body of the following Article II, q. 1, and so is carried into that chunk.)
← Dist. 17, Art. 1, Q. 2Dist. 17, Art. 2, Q. 1→