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Dist. 5, Art. 2, Q. 3

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 5

Textus Latinus
p. 135

Quaestio III. Utrum ponenda sit intentio personalitatis in anima separata, omni unione circumscripta.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum sit ponere intentionem personalitatis in anima separata, omni unione circumscripta. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Primo patet per Magistrum in littera1: «Anima absoluta a corpore persona est, sicut Angelus»; sed Angelus vere et proprie persona est: ergo et anima separata. (Ad oppositum.)

2. Item, sicut consuevit communiter distingui: persona est res distincta proprietate ad dignitatem pertinente2; sed anima separata est distincta res, quod patet: ergo est persona.

3. Item, ratio, quare humana natura in Christo non est persona, est propter unionem ad dignius: sed cum anima unitur corpori, non unitur digniori rei, et anima, circumscripta assumtione et unione, complete habet illam rationem in se, quam ponit Boethius3: «Persona est individua substantia rationalis naturae»: ergo videtur, quod ratio personalitatis conveniat animae separatae et proprie et vere.

p. 136

4. Item, contingit, animam separatam comparari ad Angelum, et contingit, comparari ad alteram animam, et quae est comparatio unius Angeli ad alterum, eadem est comparatio unius animae ad alteram; sed anima separata differt secundum speciem ab Angelo, sicut et Angelus ab anima1b: ergo a simili, sicut inter unum Angelum et alterum est discretio personalis, sic inter unam animam et alteram. Sed quae habent discretionem personalem habent intentionem personalitatis: ergo plenam rationem personalitatis contingit reperiri in anima separata.

5. Item, cuicumque convenit loqui de se ut de se, est persona; sed animae separatae convenit loqui de se ut de se — contingit enim ad ipsam dirigere sermonem, sicut ad animam Petri et Pauli dirigimus; et constat2b, quod versa vice possunt nobis voluntatem suam exprimere, sicut aliquibus expresserunt — ergo videtur, quod anima separata vere et proprie sit persona.

6. Item, anima3b per separationem sui a corpore non habet conditionem deteriorem, sed statum digniorem; sed quamdiu spiritus rationalis erat in corpore et corpori unitus, non carebat ratione personali: ergo nec quando est a corpore separatus.

Sed contra: 1. Persona est per se una4b; sed quod venit aliquando ad constitutionem tertii non est per se unum et distinctum: ergo quod est natum uniri ad constitutionem tertii non est persona. Sed anima rationalis est huiusmodi: ergo etc. (Fundamenta.)

2. Item, persona dicit quid completissimum in genere substantiae, ita quod non est ordinatum5b ad ulteriorem perfectionem in eodem genere; sed anima rationalis est ordinata ad constituendum hominem: ergo non habet intentionem personae.

3. Item, anima rationalis, cum est unita carni, ut dicit Magister6b, non est persona: ergo si, quando est separata, habet rationem personae; igitur digniorem modum habet existendi extra corpus. Si ergo «natura semper desiderat quod melius est», videtur, quod anima nunquam desideret uniri corpori; videtur etiam ex hoc, quod cum anima unitur corpori, sit ei praeiudicium, et cum separatur, quod non sit ei poena, sed praemium; quae omnia falsa sunt et absurda: ergo et illud, ex quo sequitur, videlicet quod anima separata etc.

4. Item, si anima separata est persona; cum assumere sit actus personae conveniens7b, sicut divina persona dicitur corpus assumere, cum corpus ei unitur, et similiter Angelus, per consimilem modum anima diceretur assumere corpus proprium, cum eidem rursus coniungitur; quodsi hoc non recipitur, videtur, quod nec praemissum esset concedendum, scilicet quod anima separata sit persona, sicut Angelus.

Conclusio.

Anima separata a corpore non habet plene rationem personalitatis.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut apparet ex textu8b, opinio Magistri fuit, quod anima separata sit persona; et haec opinio fuit magistri Hugonis de sancto Victore. (Opinio Magistri et Hugonis.) Ratio autem, quae movit eos ad hoc ponendum, fuit actualis distinctio et completio reperta in anima separata, quoniam actus nobiles liberius exercet et perfectius, quam exerceat in corpore.

Haec tamen opinio non sustinetur communiter a doctoribus. (Non probatur.) Ratio huius est, quoniam ad completam rationem personae requiritur, ut dictum fuit supra9b, distinctio singularitatis et incommunicabilitatis et supereminentis dignitatis. (Tria in persona.) Quamvis autem in anima separata sit reperire singularitatem et dignitatem, non est tamen reperire incommunicabilitatem, quia appetitum et aptitudinem habet, ut uniatur corpori ad constitutionem tertii. Et ideo necesse est, ipsam carere distinctione personalitatis; (Conclusio.) quoniam, si completior est anima, dum appetitus eius terminatur, quem habet respectu corporis resumendi, sicut vult Augustinus duodecimo super Genesim ad litteram10b, et tunc non habet in se intentionem personae; necessario sequitur, quod personalitate careat, cum est separata a corpore. Alioquin sequerentur praedicta inconvenientia, videlicet quod unio esset praeternaturalis, et separatio non esset poenalis; iterum, quod unio esset in animae praeiudicium, et separatio in praemium; quorum quodlibet falsum est.

p. 137

Et ideo non immerito in hac opinione communiter non sustinent11b Magistrum, quamvis aliqui velint dicere, quod Magister intellexerit de anima separata, circumscripta unibilitate ad corpus; et hoc est potius verbi palliatio quam expositio, sicut patet aspiciendo ad verba ipsius. (Excusat auctor.) Praeterea, unibilitas sive aptitudo uniendi cum corpore non est animae accidentalis, sed est ipsi animae essentialis, et ita non potest ab ea separari vel circumscribi, salva ipsius natura, sicut superius in secundo libro1c ostensum fuit. — Posset tamen dici ob reverentiam ipsius, quod non voluit dicere, quod tota ratio personalitatis competeret animae separatae, sed quod, hoc supposito, quod anima separata esset persona, adhuc non esset persona in Christo, quia esset coniuncta cum divina persona. Quidquid autem sit de intentione Magistri, hoc concedendum est, quod ratio personalitatis non est plene circa animam separatam. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc inductae.

Solutio oppositorum. 1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de auctoritate Magistri, iam patet responsio per iam dicta.

2. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod anima separata est res distincta proprietate ad dignitatem pertinente; dicendum, quod non est ibi ratio distinctionis, secundum quod convenit personae intentioni secundum illam triplicem conditionem, quae superius2c assignata est.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod cum anima unitur corpori, non unitur digniori rei, et ita unibilitas ad corpus non aufert animae personae3c proprietatem; dicendum, quod hoc verum esset, si anima esset persona per se; tunc enim ratione personae non privaretur ex hoc, quod corpori coniungeretur. Si ergo ratione personae caret, cum corpori coniungitur, patet, quod non est persona, cum est a corpore separata. Hoc autem non est propter defectum dignitatis, sed propter defectum incommunicabilitatis; quamvis non incongrue posset dici, quod ad ipsam unibilitatem per modum compositionis sequitur quaedam indigentia et defectus a completione dignissima. (Notandum.)

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima differt specie ab Angelo, secundum quod ei comparatur; dicendum, quod ratio personalitatis plus dicit completionem quam intentio speciei.4c Nam Christus secundum humanam naturam continetur sub specie hominis, quamvis secundum illam naturam non habeat intentionem personalitatis. Et ideo non sequitur, quodsi animae separatae conveniat specifica differentia respectu Angeli, quod propter hoc conveniat et discretio personalis respectu alterius animae. Nec sequitur: differt numero ab alia anima, ergo differt personaliter; quia distinctio secundum numerum in plus est quam distinctio5c personalis. (Notandum.)

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod cui competit loqui de se ut de se etc.; dicendum, quod verum est, accipiendo large personam, secundum quod persona dicitur esse in nomine vel pronomine, secundum quod reddit suppositum verbo; hoc autem modo non loquimur hic de persona, quia haec est consideratio grammatici, non theologi; sic enim magis respicit modum significandi quam proprietatem rei6c. (Notandum.)

6. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod anima gloriosa propter separationem a corpore non habet conditionem deteriorem; dicendum, quod illa ratio deficit dupliciter: primo quidem, quia, quamvis non habeat conditionem deteriorem quantum ad bene esse, utpote quantum ad Dei fruitionem7c, minus tamen bonam habet conditionem quantum ad esse naturae. Personalitas tamen non attenditur quantum ad bene esse vel esse gratiae, sed quantum ad esse naturae sive ad esse primum. (Dupliciter ratio deficit.) — Alius etiam defectus est, quoniam intentio personalitatis consequitur animam unitam corpori, ita tamen, quod nec anima nec corpus est persona, sed totum coniunctum. Et ideo non sequitur, quod talis dignitas remaneat in anima separata vel proprietas; sicut nec risibilitas, quae est proprietas respectu coniuncti8c, post separationem nec remanet in anima nec circa corpus.

Scholion

I. In solutione huius quaestionis posteriores Scholastici conveniunt, reprobantes tum opinionem Magistri et Hugonis a S. Victore, quod anima separata, proprie loquendo, sit persona, tum alteram, ex falsa sententia Platonis de unione animae corporisque ortam, quae tenet, quod anima coniuncta in se sola sit persona, quasi pars personae iam sit persona (cfr. hic solut. ad 6.). Communis autem scholae sententia est, quod ubi ipsa natura non est completa, nec ratio personalitatis est perfecta.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 4. m. 6. in fine. — Scol., Quodl. 9. n. 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 2; S. I. q. 29. a. 1. ad 5, q. 74. a. 4. ad 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 15. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., a. 2. q. 1.

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English Translation

Question III. Whether an intention of personality is to be posited in the separated soul, every union being set aside.

Thirdly it is asked, whether an intention of personality is to be posited in the separated soul, every union being set aside. And that it is so, seems [to be the case].

1. First it is plain through the Master in the text1: «A soul released from the body is a person, just as an Angel»; but an Angel is truly and properly a person: therefore the separated soul also. (To the contrary.)

2. Likewise, as it is commonly accustomed to be distinguished: a person is a thing distinct by a property pertaining to dignity2; but the separated soul is a distinct thing, which is plain: therefore it is a person.

3. Likewise, the reason why the human nature in Christ is not a person is on account of the union to something more worthy: but when the soul is united to the body, it is not united to a more worthy thing, and the soul, the assumption and union being set aside, completely has in itself that account which Boethius posits3: «A person is an individual substance of a rational nature»: therefore it seems that the account of personality befits the separated soul both properly and truly.

4. Likewise, it happens that the separated soul is compared to an Angel, and it happens to be compared to another soul, and what is the comparison of one Angel to another, the same is the comparison of one soul to another; but the separated soul differs in species from an Angel, just as also an Angel from a soul1b: therefore by a similar [reasoning], just as between one Angel and another there is a personal distinction, so between one soul and another. But things that have a personal distinction have an intention of personality: therefore it happens that the full account of personality is found in the separated soul.

5. Likewise, to whatever it befits to speak of itself as of itself, that is a person; but it befits the separated soul to speak of itself as of itself — for it happens that one directs speech to it, just as we direct it to the soul of Peter and Paul; and it is established2b that conversely they can express their will to us, just as they have expressed it to some — therefore it seems that the separated soul truly and properly is a person.

6. Likewise, the soul3b by its separation from the body does not have a worse condition, but a more worthy state; but as long as the rational spirit was in the body and united to the body, it did not lack a personal account: therefore neither when it is separated from the body.

On the contrary: 1. A person is one through itself4b; but what at some time comes to the constitution of a third is not one through itself and distinct: therefore what is born to be united to the constitution of a third is not a person. But the rational soul is of this sort: therefore etc. (Fundamenta.)

2. Likewise, a person signifies what is most complete in the genus of substance, in such a way that it is not ordered5b to a further perfection in the same genus; but the rational soul is ordered to constituting a human being: therefore it does not have the intention of a person.

3. Likewise, the rational soul, when it is united to flesh, as the Master says6b, is not a person: therefore if, when it is separated, it has the account of a person; then it has a more worthy mode of existing outside the body. If therefore «nature always desires what is better», it seems that the soul would never desire to be united to a body; it also seems from this, that when the soul is united to the body, it is to its prejudice, and when it is separated, that it is not a punishment to it, but a reward; all of which are false and absurd: therefore also that from which it follows, namely that the separated soul etc.

4. Likewise, if the separated soul is a person; since to assume is an act befitting a person7b, just as a divine person is said to assume a body, when a body is united to it, and similarly an Angel, by a like mode a soul would be said to assume its own body, when it is again conjoined to it; but if this is not received, it seems that neither should the premise be conceded, namely that the separated soul is a person, just as an Angel.

Conclusion.

The soul separated from the body does not fully have the account of personality.

I respond: It must be said that, as appears from the text8b, the opinion of the Master was that the separated soul is a person; and this opinion was that of master Hugh of Saint Victor. (The opinion of the Master and of Hugh.) But the reason that moved them to posit this was the actual distinction and completion found in the separated soul, since it exercises noble acts more freely and more perfectly than it exercises [them] in the body.

This opinion, however, is not commonly upheld by the doctors. (It is not proved.) The reason for this is that for the complete account of a person there is required, as was said above9b, a distinction of singularity and of incommunicability and of supereminent dignity. (Three things in a person.) But although in the separated soul singularity and dignity are to be found, yet incommunicability is not to be found, because it has an appetite and an aptitude to be united to a body for the constitution of a third. And therefore it is necessary that it lack the distinction of personality; (Conclusion.) since, if the soul is more complete, while the appetite which it has with respect to resuming the body is terminated, as Augustine wills in the twelfth [book] on Genesis according to the letter10b, and then it does not have in itself the intention of a person; it follows necessarily that it lacks personality, when it is separated from the body. Otherwise the aforesaid unsuitable consequences would follow, namely that the union would be preternatural, and the separation would not be penal; again, that the union would be to the soul's prejudice, and the separation [its] reward; each of which is false.

And therefore not without reason in this opinion do they commonly not uphold11b the Master, although some wish to say that the Master understood it of the separated soul, the unibility to the body being set aside; and this is rather a glossing-over of the words than an exposition, as is plain by looking at his words. (The author excuses [the Master].) Furthermore, the unibility or aptitude for uniting with the body is not accidental to the soul, but is essential to the soul itself, and thus cannot be separated or set aside from it, its nature being preserved, as was shown above in the second book1c. — Yet it could be said, out of reverence for him, that he did not wish to say that the whole account of personality belonged to the separated soul, but that, this being supposed, that the separated soul were a person, even so it would not be a person in Christ, because it would be conjoined with the divine person. But whatever may be the case about the Master's intention, this must be conceded, that the account of personality is not fully present in the separated soul. — Hence the reasons adduced for this are to be conceded.

Solution of the opposing [arguments]. 1. To that which is objected from the authority of the Master, the response is already plain through the things already said.

2. To that which is objected, that the separated soul is a thing distinct by a property pertaining to dignity; it must be said that there is not there an account of distinction according to which it befits the intention of a person according to that threefold condition which was assigned above2c.

3. To that which is objected, that when the soul is united to the body, it is not united to a more worthy thing, and thus the unibility to the body does not take away from the soul the property of a person3c; it must be said that this would be true, if the soul were a person through itself; for then it would not be deprived of the account of a person from this, that it were conjoined to a body. If therefore it lacks the account of a person when it is conjoined to a body, it is plain that it is not a person when it is separated from the body. But this is not on account of a defect of dignity, but on account of a defect of incommunicability; although it could not unsuitably be said that to that very unibility, by way of composition, there follows a certain neediness and a defect from the most worthy completion. (Note.)

4. To that which is objected, that the soul differs in species from an Angel, according as it is compared to it; it must be said that the account of personality signifies completion more than the intention of the species.4c For Christ according to his human nature is contained under the species of a human being, although according to that nature he does not have the intention of personality. And therefore it does not follow, that if a specific difference befits the separated soul with respect to an Angel, that on account of this there should also befit it a personal distinction with respect to another soul. Nor does it follow: it differs in number from another soul, therefore it differs personally; because distinction according to number extends further than distinction5c of personality.

5. To that which is objected, that to whatever it befits to speak of itself as of itself etc.; it must be said that it is true, taking «person» broadly, according as a person is said to be in a noun or a pronoun, according as it renders a supposit to a verb; but in this way we do not here speak of a person, because this is the consideration of the grammarian, not of the theologian; for thus it regards the mode of signifying more than the property of the thing6c. (Note.)

6. To that which is objected last, that the glorified soul on account of its separation from the body does not have a worse condition; it must be said that that reasoning fails in two ways: first indeed, because, although it does not have a worse condition as regards well-being, namely as regards the enjoyment of God7c, yet it has a less good condition as regards the being of nature. Yet personality is not considered as regards well-being or the being of grace, but as regards the being of nature or first being. (The reasoning fails in two ways.) — There is also another defect, since the intention of personality follows the soul united to the body, yet in such a way that neither the soul nor the body is a person, but the whole conjoined thing. And therefore it does not follow that such a dignity or property remains in the separated soul; just as neither does risibility, which is a property with respect to the conjoined thing8c, after the separation remain either in the soul or about the body.

Scholion

I. In the solution of this question the later Scholastics agree, rejecting both the opinion of the Master and of Hugh of Saint Victor, that the separated soul, properly speaking, is a person, and also the other [opinion], arising from the false view of Plato concerning the union of soul and body, which holds that the soul conjoined in itself alone is a person, as though a part of a person were already a person (cf. here the solution to [argument] 6). But the common view of the school is that, where the nature itself is not complete, neither is the account of personality perfect.

II. Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. III. q. 4. m. 6, at the end. — Scotus, Quodlibet 9, n. 4. — St. Thomas, here q. 3, a. 2; Summa I. q. 29, a. 1, ad 5, q. 74, a. 4, ad 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 15. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, a. 2, q. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Hic c. 3. — De minori vide II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. seqq. — Paulo ante edd. omittunt patet.
    Here c. 3. — On the minor [premise] see II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. and following. — A little before, the editions omit patet.
  2. De hac definitione vide I. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 2. in fine. — Mox post quod patet Vat. sola ex seq. arg. apponit verba: anima etiam circumscripta assumtione... et proprie et vere, quibus verbis adiungit conclusionem ergo est persona. Pro distingui cod. K dici.
    On this definition see I. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 2. at the end. — Soon after quod patet the Vatican [edition] alone, from the following argument, adds the words: anima etiam circumscripta assumtione... et proprie et vere, to which words it joins the conclusion ergo est persona. For distingui codex K [reads] dici.
  3. Libr. de Una Persona et duabus naturis, c. 3. — In hoc tertio arg. codd. et edd. 1, 2 omittunt verba cum anima nititur corpori, non unitur digniori rei, quam omissionem non nisi incuriae librariorum tribuimus, qui, cum immediate post iterum verbum anima occurrat, verbo praecedente et a nobis e solutione huius obiect. restituta non animadvertisse videntur. Quod necesse fuerit ea restituere, ex ipsa solut. elucescit. Vat., quae, ut iam notavimus, verbo subinde seqq. anima [etiam] circumscripta assumtione... et proprie et vere cum praeced. arg. annexuit, hic post digniori rei e solutione infra habita suo marte addit ergo unibilitas vel unio ad corpus non aufert ipsi animae proprietatem personae. Sed tota hac mutatione argumenti vis debilitatur.
    The book On the One Person and the Two Natures, c. 3. — In this third argument the codices and editions 1, 2 omit the words when the soul is united to the body, it is not united to a more worthy thing, an omission which we attribute to nothing but the carelessness of the copyists, who, since immediately afterward the word anima occurs again, seem not to have noticed [it] in the preceding word, which has been restored by us from the solution of this objection. That it was necessary to restore them is clear from the solution itself. The Vatican [edition], which, as we have already noted, joined to the preceding argument the words next following anima [also] the assumption being set aside... and properly and truly, here after digniori rei, from the solution given below, on its own authority adds therefore unibility or union to a body does not take away from the soul itself the property of a person. But by this whole alteration the force of the argument is weakened.
  4. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 1. p. II. a. 3. q. 1. — Cod. Z ab Angelo.
    Cf. II. Sent. d. 1. p. II. a. 3. q. 1. — Codex Z [reads] ab Angelo.
  5. Codd. H K Z bb constans est.
    Codices H, K, Z, bb [read] constans est.
  6. Vat. addit gloriosa, quod etiam infra in solut. habetur. Subinde pro per codd. M O post.
    The Vatican [edition] adds gloriosa, which is also had below in the solution. Thereupon for per codices M, O [read] post.
  7. Alanus ab Insul., Theolog. Regul., regul. 102: Persona, id est res per se una. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 405, nota 9.
    Alan of Lille, Theological Rules, rule 102: A person, that is, a thing one through itself. Cf. tom. I. p. 405, note 9.
  8. Codd. T U ordinata.
    Codices T, U [read] ordinata.
  9. Hic c. 3. — Seq. testimonium est Aristot., II. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 59. (c. 10.). — Paulo inferius pro sit ei praeiudicium edd. fit ei praeiudicium.
    Here c. 3. — The following testimony is from Aristotle, II. On Generation and Corruption, text 59 (c. 10). — A little lower, for sit ei praeiudicium the editions [read] fit ei praeiudicium.
  10. Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1. seqq. — Circa finem arg. pro praemissum esset concedendum edd. praemissa esset concedenda.
    Cf. above a. 1, q. 1, and following. — Near the end of the argument, for praemissum esset concedendum the editions [read] praemissa esset concedenda.
  11. Hic c. 3. — Hug. de S. Vict., II. de Sacram. p. I. c. 11. — Ante magistri Hugonis cod. K interiicit etiam.
    Here c. 3. — Hugh of St. Victor, II. On the Sacraments, p. I. c. 11. — Before magistri Hugonis codex K interposes etiam.
  12. Quaest. praeced. ad 1.
    The preceding question, to [argument] 1.
  13. Cap. 35. n. 68: Inest ei naturalis quidam appetitus corpus administrandi. Cfr. VII. c. 27. n. 38.
    Chapter 35, n. 68: There is in it a certain natural appetite for governing a body. Cf. VII. c. 27. n. 38.
  14. Codd. K Z bb supplent doctores. — B. Albertus quoque, hic a. 15, ait: Si autem volumus sustinere Magistrum, tunc dicendum est, quod absoluta a corpore dicitur duobus modis, scil. absoluta i. e. divisa a corpore, et sic non est verum; vel absoluta a corpore i. e. ab ordine ad corpus, et tunc loquitur Magister per hypothesim, scil. si ponatur absolvi a dependentia, quam habet ad corpus; quia tunc erit Intelligentia quaedam de natura simili Angelorum.
    Codices K, Z, bb supply doctores. — Bl. Albert also, here a. 15, says: But if we wish to uphold the Master, then it must be said that «released from the body» is said in two ways, namely «released» i.e. divided from the body, and thus it is not true; or «released from the body» i.e. from the ordering to a body, and then the Master speaks by hypothesis, namely if it be posited to be released from the dependence which it has on the body; because then it would be a certain Intelligence of a nature similar to the Angels.
  15. Hist. I. p. II. a. 3. q. 2. Cfr. ibid. d. 17. a. 1. q. 3.
    [II. Sent.] dist. 1. p. II. a. 3. q. 2. Cf. ibid. d. 17. a. 1. q. 3.
  16. Quaest. praeced. ad 1. — Paulo superius post ad dignitatem pertinente Vat. propter immutationem ab ea in ipsa obiect. factam addit et quod, circumscripta assumtione et unione, complete habet rationem personae, illam ponit Boethius.
    The preceding question, to [argument] 1. — A little above, after ad dignitatem pertinente, the Vatican [edition], on account of the alteration made by it in the objection itself, adds and that, the assumption and union being set aside, it completely has the account of a person, which Boethius posits.
  17. Multi codd. perperam omittunt personae.
    Many codices wrongly omit personae.
  18. Cfr. d. 2. a. 2. q. 3. — Paulo superius pro quam intentio speciei edd. cum paucis codd. quam intentionem [cod. K subiicit in modo] speciei.
    Cf. d. 2. a. 2. q. 3. — A little above, for quam intentio speciei the editions with a few codices [read] quam intentionem [codex K subjoins in modo] speciei.
  19. Codd. K P Q Z bb discretio.
    Codices K, P, Q, Z, bb [read] discretio.
  20. Priscian., VIII. Grammat. c. 18: In verbo vero et nomine et pronomine et participio omnes voces vel singulares habent numeros, vel plurales, et personas simul cum numero vel finitas vel infinitas... Sunt igitur personae verborum tres. Prima est, quae de se loquitur vel sola vel cum aliis, ut dico, dicimus... Et prima quidem et secunda verborum persona finitae sunt; praesentes enim demonstrantur; tertia vero infinita est; itaque eget plerumque pronomine, ut definiatur etc. — Paulo superius pro theologi non pauci codd. theologici.
    Priscian, VIII. Grammar, c. 18: But in the verb and the noun and the pronoun and the participle all words, whether singular or plural, have numbers, and persons together with number, whether finite or infinite... There are therefore three persons of verbs. The first is that which speaks of itself, whether alone or with others, as «I say,» «we say»... And the first and second person of verbs indeed are finite; for they are demonstrated as present; but the third is infinite; and so it generally needs a pronoun, that it may be defined, etc. — A little above, for theologi not a few codices [read] theologici.
  21. Cod. Z et edd. 1, 2 similitudinem. Paulo inferius pro Personalitas tamen [scil. autem] edd. Personalitas enim.
    Codex Z and editions 1, 2 [read] similitudinem. A little lower, for Personalitas tamen [namely autem] the editions [read] Personalitas enim.
  22. Cfr. Aristot. III. de Part. animal. c. 10. et Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Proprio. — Pro risibilitas Vat. visibilitas.
    Cf. Aristotle III. On the Parts of Animals, c. 10, and Porphyry, On the Predicables, the chapter on the Proper. — For risibilitas the Vatican [edition] [reads] visibilitas.
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