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Dist. 5, Art. 2, Q. 4

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 5

Textus Latinus
p. 138

Quaestio IV. Utrum concedendum sit, quod Deus assumserit hominem.

Quarto quaeritur, utrum concedendum sit, quod Deus assumserit hominem. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Per illud quod dicitur in Psalmo1: Beatus quem eligisti et assumsisti; sed beatus stat ibi pro aliquo; non est autem dare aliquem nisi hominem: ergo etc. (Ad oppositum.)

2. Item, Augustinus in Expositione Symboli2: «Si quis dixerit, hominem a Christo assumtum depositum esse, anathema sit».

3. Item, Anselmus dicit in libro de Incarnatione3, quod «non assumsit hominem in communi, sed hunc hominem»; sed ad hunc hominem sequitur homo: ergo si hunc hominem assumsit, bene sequitur, quod assumserit hominem.

4. Item, proprietas unius partis denominat totum — unde Petrus dicitur albus, si solum corpus sit album4 — ergo multo fortius proprietas utriusque; sed verum est dicere, Christum assumsisse carnem et animam: ergo verum est dicere, quod assumserit hominem.

5. Item, Filius Dei assumsit animam et corpus et haec assumsit unita: ergo si corpus et anima unita faciunt hominem, ergo videtur, quod assumserit hominem. Si tu dicas, quod non fuerunt prius unita quam assumta5; per hoc non dissolvitur et effugitur ratio, quia, si anima et corpus non fuerunt ante unita quam assumta prioritate temporis, saltem simul fuerunt invicem tempore unita et assumta: ergo videtur, quod in sua assumtione hominem faciebant; et si hoc verum est, ergo etc.

6. Item, Filius Dei6 est homo, aut homo, quem assumsit, aut homo, quem non assumsit. Si homo, quem assumsit, ergo assumsit hominem; si est homo, quem non assumsit, ergo aut Petrus, vel Paulus, vel de ceteris. Si ergo nullum talium est dare, videtur ergo simpliciter esse verum, quod assumserit hominem.

Sed contra: 1. In libro de Regulis fidei7 dicitur, quod «assumens non est assumtum»: ergo si Filius Dei est homo, falsum est, Filium Dei assumsisse hominem. (Fundamenta.)

2. Item, si assumsit hominem et nunquam deponit quem assumsit, ergo semper fuit homo: ergo quando erat mortuus, erat homo; quod non videtur verum, cum sit «oppositio in adiecto»8.

3. Item, si assumsit hominem, aut hominem in communi, aut hunc hominem. Non hominem in communi, assumsit igitur hunc hominem9; sed hic homo nominat personam vel saltem hypostasim: ergo in Christo sunt duae personae vel duae hypostases. Sed hoc est falsum et fidei contrarium: ergo etc.

4. Item, assumtio dicit usum aliquem rei assumtae; sed usus rei tempore, vel natura consequitur ipsam rem: ergo prius est assumtum naturaliter, quam sit ipsum assumi. Si ergo homo dicit humanam naturam in comparatione ad hypostasim sive personam; necesse est, quod in Christo sit alia persona quam persona assumens, ad quam comparetur humanitas ante assumtionem. Quodsi hoc simpliciter est falsum, restat, quod et illud est falsum: Filius Dei assumsit hominem.

Conclusio.

Impropria est locutio: Filius Dei assumsit hominem.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod aliqui voluerunt sustinere locutionem istam, sicut illi qui fuerunt de prima opinione10, dicentes, quod Christus est duo, scilicet duae res naturae, homo videlicet et Deus. (Opinio 1.)

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Sed quia illud non potest rationabiliter sustineri, sicut infra1b videbitur, ideo alii distinguere voluerunt, quod est loqui de assumtione vel quantum ad fieri, vel quantum ad factum esse. Si loquamur de assumtione quantum ad fieri, sic falsum est, quod assumserit hominem, immo animam et carnem. Si autem loquamur de assumtione quantum ad terminum vel assumtum esse, concedere voluerunt, personam Dei assumsisse hominem. Tunc enim non videtur2b, quod homo ille fuerit ante assumtionem, sed quod ex ipsa assumtione aliquis factus est homo. (Opinio 2.) — Sed adhuc illud non videtur multum rationabiliter dictum. Nam si ex assumtione vestimenti vere possit aliquis dici vestitus esse, haec rationabiliter conceditur: hic assumit vestimentum; et haec non admittitur: iste assumit se vestitum, vel calceatum. Per hunc modum nec ista videtur esse admittenda: Filius Dei assumsit hominem, quamvis ex ipsa assumtione factus sit homo. (Non probatur.)

Et propterea est tertius modus dicendi communior et verior, quod haec est impropria: Filius Dei assumsit hominem. — Et ratio huius est, quia homo significat humanam formam sive naturam in concretione ad suppositum, de quo vere praedicatur secundum quandam identitatem. Et ideo de ipso supposito vere praedicatur, ut dicatur: iste est homo. Verbum autem assumendi de sua ratione plus importat, videlicet distinctionem assumentis ad assumtum, in hoc quod importat relationem; et ordinem etiam quendam importat respectu eius quod naturaliter antecedit ipsam assumtionem, et respectu eius quod consequitur. Nam res assumta naturaliter ipsam assumtionem antecedit, quamvis possit dici3b tempore simul; concretio vero et unio assumentis ad assumtum consequitur ipsam assumtionem. (Opinio 3 et conclusio 1.) — Et ideo dupliciter haec est falsa: Filius Dei assumsit hominem: tum propter defectum distinctionis, quia homo praedicatur de Filio Dei; tum propter defectum ordinis, quia comparatio4b humanitatis ad personam vel hypostasim consequitur ipsam assumtionem, et non antecedit, res autem assumta antecedit. — Et ideo praedictus sermo falsus est ex duplici causa, et rationes concedendae sunt ex ista parte. (Conclusio 2.)

Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:

Ad 1, 2, 3. Ad illas vero auctoritates in contrarium adductas dicendum, quod aliquid habent improprietatis et sunt exponendae. Sancti enim loquuntur aliquando multum expresse. Unde homo5b in praedictis auctoritatibus magis accipitur abstractive quam concretive, magis pro humana natura quam pro re naturae. Et per hunc modum ad consimiles auctoritates potest responderi unica responsione: quia hominis nomine humana natura habet intelligi; quamvis secundum communem usum et secundum virtutem vocabuli hoc nomen homo non ita consuetum sit accipi. (Solutio oppositorum.)

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod proprietas partis denominat totum; dicendum, quod illud habet instantiam in proprietatibus respectivis, quamvis veritatem habeat in proprietatibus absolutis. Quamvis enim verum sit, quod manus Petri sit minor Petro, vel quaelibet eius pars quodam modo; haec tamen est falsa: Petrus est minor Petro, vel differt a Petro. Per hunc etiam modum intelligendum est in proposito, quia assumens, sicut dictum est, vel assumi dicit aliquem ordinem, vel distinctionem, quae reperiri potest inter personam Christi et partes compositi6b hominis, quae sunt corpus et anima, quamvis ille respectus vel ordo inter personam Christi et ipsum Christum hominem reperiri non valeat. (Notandum.)

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod assumsit animam et corpus unita; dicendum, quod est unio animae et corporis respectu suppositi, in quo sunt, et respectu humanae naturae, quam constituunt; et utraque unio animae ad corpus fuit in ipsa assumtione. Et una quidem antecedebat secundum ordinem naturae, scilicet animae ad corpus ad constitutionem unius naturae; altera vero, scilicet animae ad corpus in unam personam vel hypostasim, consequebatur ipsam assumtionem, quia persona et hypostasis Verbi, assumendo carnem, carnem et animam similiter7b uniebat. (Duplex unio.) — Cum ergo dicitur, quod anima et corpus unita faciunt hominem; dicendum, quod verum est, secundum quod uniuntur isto duplici modo. Et quoniam alter istorum modorum consequitur ad assumtionem, ideo non conceditur ista, quod assumserit hominem, quamvis concedatur, quod assumserit animam et corpus coniuncta. — Posset etiam dici, quod non tenet illa consequentia: assumsit animam et corpus coniuncta8b, ergo assumsit hominem; quia homo supponit aliquem hominem, et ideo supponit aliquem, anima vero et corpus dicunt quid. Apud vero theologos reputatur fieri permutatio praedicamenti, cum proceditur ab eo quod dicitur quis, ad id quod praedicatur in quid, vel e converso, sicut in primo libro9b habitum fuit. (Alia solutio.)

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Ad 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Christus homo est, aut quem assumsit, aut quem non assumsit; dico, quod non recte dividis et sufficienter, quia contradictio non accipitur per negationem, quae fertur ad implicationem, sed per negationem, quae fertur ad principale praedicatum; et ideo non sic est dividendum: aut est homo assumtus, aut non assumtus; immo sic: aut est homo assumtus, aut non est homo assumtus, secundum legem contradictionis1c. (Notandum.) Sed si obiiciatur, quod homo sufficienter dividitur per assumtum et non assumtum, tanquam per immediata; tunc respondendum est ad aliam inductionem: ergo vel est Petrus, vel Paulus etc.; quia nec est Petrus nec Paulus nec Virgilius, sed Iesus; et Iesus non est homo assumtus a Filio Dei, quamvis natura eius sit assumta. Iesus enim non est nomen impositum naturae, sed nomen impositum personae2c.

Scholion

I. Communiter antiqui Scholastici docent, locutionem, de qua agitur, impropriam esse nec in sensu formali admittendam, licet non raro in libris Ss. Patrum et ipsius Augustini occurrat (cfr. hic solut. ad 1. 2. 3.), sicut etiam ab aliquibus recentioribus admittitur. Haec doctrina sponte fluit ex duobus principiis, quorum primum est, quod id quod assumitur secundum intellectum praecedit unionem, unde in locutione homo assumtus saltem natura prius homo esse ponitur, quam assumatur. Alterum est, quod homo, proprie loquendo, non significat humanam naturam in abstracto, sed in concreto, scilicet ut quid subsistens; unde supponit pro supposito subsistente in natura humana. Manifestum autem est, quod Christi suppositum sive persona non potest dici assumtum. — Secundam rationem sumsit S. Bonav. ex ipso verbo assumere, quod implicat distinctionem, cum assumens non sit assumtum. Recte quidem dicitur: Filius Dei est homo, at non bene dicitur: est homo, quem assumsit, sed potius est homo, cuius humanam naturam assumsit (ita S. Thom., III. Sent. d. 6. q. 1. a. 2. ad 2; S. III. q. 4. a. 3. ad 3.). Eundem sensum habet hic solut. ad 6. — Tota haec quaestio magis explicatur pluribus quaestionibus distinctionum 6. et 7.

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English Translation

Question IV. Whether it is to be conceded that God assumed a man.

Fourth, it is asked whether it is to be conceded that God assumed a man. And that He did, it seems:

1. By that which is said in the Psalm1: Blessed is he whom Thou hast chosen and taken up; but "blessed" stands there for some [individual]; and there is no one to point to except a man: therefore etc. (To the opposite.)

2. Likewise, Augustine in the Exposition of the Creed2: "If anyone shall say that the man assumed by Christ was laid down, let him be anathema."

3. Likewise, Anselm says in the book On the Incarnation3 that "He did not assume a man in general, but this man"; but from "this man" there follows "man": therefore if He assumed this man, it well follows that He assumed a man.

4. Likewise, the property of one part denominates the whole — whence Peter is called white if only his body is white4 — therefore much more the property of both; but it is true to say that Christ assumed flesh and soul: therefore it is true to say that He assumed a man.

5. Likewise, the Son of God assumed soul and body, and He assumed them united: therefore if body and soul united make a man, it therefore seems that He assumed a man. If you should say that they were not united before they were assumed5; by this the reasoning is not dissolved and evaded, because, if soul and body were not united before they were assumed by priority of time, at least they were simultaneously united and assumed to one another in time: therefore it seems that in His assumption they were making a man; and if this is true, therefore etc.

6. Likewise, the Son of God6 is a man, either a man whom He assumed, or a man whom He did not assume. If a man whom He assumed, then He assumed a man; if He is a man whom He did not assume, then either Peter, or Paul, or of the rest. If, then, none of such can be pointed to, it therefore seems simply to be true that He assumed a man.

On the contrary: 1. In the book On the Rules of Faith7 it is said that "the assumer is not the assumed": therefore if the Son of God is a man, it is false that the Son of God assumed a man. (The grounds.)

2. Likewise, if He assumed a man and never lays down whom He assumed, then He always was a man: therefore when He was dead, He was a man; which does not seem true, since it is "a contradiction in the predicate"8.

3. Likewise, if He assumed a man, then either a man in general, or this man. Not a man in general; therefore He assumed this man9; but this man names a person or at least a hypostasis: therefore in Christ there are two persons or two hypostases. But this is false and contrary to faith: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, assumption asserts some use of the thing assumed; but the use of a thing follows the thing itself either in time or in nature: therefore the assumed is prior naturally to the assuming itself. If, then, "man" asserts human nature in comparison to a hypostasis or person; it is necessary that in Christ there be a person other than the assuming person, to which the humanity is compared before the assumption. But if this is simply false, it remains that that too is false: the Son of God assumed a man.

Conclusion.

The expression "the Son of God assumed a man" is improper.

I respond: It must be said that some wished to maintain that expression, like those who held the first opinion10, saying that Christ is two things, namely two things of nature, that is, a man and God. (Opinion 1.)

But because that cannot be reasonably maintained, as will be seen below1b, therefore others wished to distinguish, that there is a speaking of assumption either as to its becoming (fieri), or as to its being-done (factum esse). If we speak of assumption as to its becoming, then it is false that He assumed a man, but rather a soul and flesh. But if we speak of assumption as to its term or being-assumed, they wished to concede that the person of God assumed a man. For then it does not seem2b that that man existed before the assumption, but that from the assumption itself someone was made a man. (Opinion 2.) — But still that does not seem to have been said very reasonably. For if from the assuming of a garment someone can truly be said to be clothed, this is reasonably conceded: "this one assumes a garment"; and this is not admitted: "this one assumes himself clothed, or shod." In this manner neither does this seem to be admissible: "the Son of God assumed a man," although from the assumption itself He was made a man. (Not proven.)

And therefore there is a third, more common and more true, manner of speaking, namely that this is improper: "the Son of God assumed a man." — And the reason for this is that man signifies the human form or nature in concretion with the supposit, of which it is truly predicated according to a certain identity. And therefore it is truly predicated of the supposit itself, so that it is said: "this one is a man." But the verb to assume of its very account asserts more, namely the distinction of the assumer to the assumed, in this that it asserts a relation; and it also asserts a certain order with respect to that which naturally precedes the assumption itself, and with respect to that which follows. For the thing assumed naturally precedes the assumption itself, although it can be said3b to be simultaneous in time; whereas the concretion and union of the assumer to the assumed follows the assumption itself. (Opinion 3 and conclusion 1.) — And therefore in two ways this is false: "the Son of God assumed a man": both on account of a defect of distinction, because man is predicated of the Son of God; and on account of a defect of order, because the comparison4b of the humanity to the person or hypostasis follows the assumption itself, and does not precede it, whereas the thing assumed precedes. — And therefore the aforesaid statement is false from a twofold cause, and the reasons [against it] are to be conceded on that side. (Conclusion 2.)

To the arguments for the affirmative part:

To 1, 2, 3. As for those authorities adduced to the contrary, it must be said that they have something of impropriety and are to be expounded. For the saints sometimes speak very expressly. Whence man5b in the aforesaid authorities is taken rather abstractly than concretely, rather for the human nature than for the thing of nature. And in this manner the like authorities can be answered with a single response: because by the name of a man the human nature is to be understood; although according to common usage and according to the force of the word this name man is not so customarily taken. (Solution of the opposing arguments.)

To 4. As for what is objected, that the property of a part denominates the whole; it must be said that this has an instance [to the contrary] in respective properties, although it has truth in absolute properties. For although it is true that Peter's hand is smaller than Peter, or any part of him in a certain manner; nevertheless this is false: "Peter is smaller than Peter," or "differs from Peter." In this manner too it is to be understood in the matter proposed, because assuming, as has been said, or being-assumed asserts some order, or distinction, which can be found between the person of Christ and the parts of the composite6b man, which are body and soul, although that respect or order between the person of Christ and Christ the man himself cannot be found. (Note.)

To 5. As for what is objected, that He assumed soul and body united; it must be said that there is a union of soul and body with respect to the supposit, in which they are, and with respect to the human nature, which they constitute; and both unions of soul to body were in the assumption itself. And the one indeed preceded according to the order of nature, namely [the union] of soul to body for the constitution of one nature; but the other, namely [the union] of soul to body into one person or hypostasis, followed the assumption itself, because the person and hypostasis of the Word, by assuming flesh, was likewise7b uniting flesh and soul. (Twofold union.) — When therefore it is said that soul and body united make a man; it must be said that it is true, according as they are united in this twofold manner. And since one of these manners follows upon the assumption, therefore this is not conceded, that He assumed a man, although it is conceded that He assumed soul and body conjoined. — It could also be said that this consequence does not hold: "He assumed soul and body conjoined8b, therefore He assumed a man"; because man supposits for some man, and therefore supposits for someone, whereas soul and body assert a what. But among theologians it is reckoned that a change of predicament occurs, when one proceeds from that which is said who to that which is predicated in [the category of] what, or conversely, as was held in the first book9b. (Another solution.)

To 6. As for what is objected, that Christ is a man, either whom He assumed or whom He did not assume; I say that you do not divide rightly and sufficiently, because the contradiction is not taken by the negation that bears upon the implication, but by the negation that bears upon the principal predicate; and therefore it is not to be divided thus: either He is a man assumed, or not assumed; but rather thus: either He is an assumed man, or He is not an assumed man, according to the law of contradiction1c. (Note.) But if it be objected that "man" is sufficiently divided by "assumed" and "not assumed," as by immediates; then a response must be made to the other inference: "therefore either He is Peter, or Paul, etc."; because He is neither Peter nor Paul nor Virgil, but Jesus; and Jesus is not a man assumed by the Son of God, although His nature is assumed. For "Jesus" is not a name imposed on a nature, but a name imposed on a person2c.

Scholion

I. The ancient Scholastics commonly teach that the expression in question is improper and not to be admitted in the formal sense, although it occurs not rarely in the books of the holy Fathers and of Augustine himself (cf. here the solution to 1, 2, 3), as it is also admitted by certain more recent [authors]. This doctrine flows of itself from two principles, of which the first is that what is assumed precedes the union according to the understanding, whence in the expression assumed man the man is at least by nature posited as being a man before he is assumed. The second is that man, properly speaking, does not signify the human nature in the abstract, but in the concrete, namely as something subsisting; whence it supposits for the supposit subsisting in the human nature. But it is manifest that Christ's supposit or person cannot be said to be assumed. — The second reason St. Bonaventure took from the very word to assume, which implies a distinction, since the assumer is not the assumed. It is indeed rightly said: "the Son of God is a man," but it is not well said: "He is a man whom He assumed," but rather "He is a man whose human nature He assumed" (so St. Thomas, III Sent. d. 6, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2; S. [Th.] III, q. 4, a. 3, ad 3). The solution to 6 here has the same sense. — This whole question is more fully explained in several questions of distinctions 6 and 7.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Psalm. 64, 5. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.
    Psalm 64:5 [Vulgate]. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3.
  2. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.
    See here the text of the Master, c. 3.
  3. Sive de Fide Trinitatis, c. 6. — In minori codd. A G (T a prima manu) U V omittunt ad.
    Or On the Faith of the Trinity, c. 6. — In the lesser [edition], codices A G (T, by a first hand) U V omit ad.
  4. Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 24. (c. 3.) ait: Cum enim sint partes totius, et id in quo, et id quod in hoc, dicetur totum in se ipso [esse]; dicitur enim et secundum partes, ut albus, quia superficies alba sit; et sciens, quia ratiocinativum.
    Aristotle, Physics IV, text 24 (c. 3) says: For since there are parts of the whole, both that in which and that which [is] in this, the whole will be said to be in itself; for it is also called [such] according to its parts, as "white," because the surface is white; and "knowing," because the reasoning [part is so].
  5. De quo vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. et supra d. II. c. 3, et Comment. d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 2. — Mox pro et effugitur codd. F U nec effugitur, cod. Y vel effugitur.
    On which see here the text of the Master, c. 3, and above d. 2, c. 3, and the Commentary on d. 3, p. 2, a. 3, q. 2. — Presently, for et effugitur codices F U read nec effugitur, codex Y vel effugitur.
  6. Vocem Dei, quae a Vat. abest, adiecimus fide codd. K P S (U a prima manu) Z bb.
    The word Dei, which is absent from the Vatican [edition], we have added on the authority of codices K P S (U, by a first hand) Z bb.
  7. Alani ab Insul., regula 101: «Sicut pars non potest esse totum, vel constituens constitutum, ita assumens non potest esse assumtum». Quam regulam Alanus sic probat: Omnis clamat philosophia, quod nihil potest esse de se ipso, nihil apud se; pars ergo totum esse non potest, quia de toto est; similiter componens compositum. A simili, cum assumtum de assumenti sit, ipsum assumens esse non potest. — Ambros., de Incarn. domin. sacram. c. 6. n. 61. ait: Aliud est enim quod assumsit, et aliud quod assumtum est.
    Alan of Lille, rule 101: "Just as a part cannot be the whole, or the constituent the thing constituted, so the assumer cannot be the assumed." Alan proves this rule thus: All philosophy proclaims that nothing can be from itself, nothing in regard to itself; a part therefore cannot be the whole, because it is of the whole; likewise the composing [element cannot be] the composite. By a similar [argument], since the assumed is of the assumer, it cannot be the assumer itself. — Ambrose, On the Sacrament of the Lord's Incarnation c. 6, n. 61, says: For it is one thing that He assumed, and another that was assumed.
  8. Aristot. II. Periherm. c. 2. (c. 11.). — Cfr. infra d. 22. q. I. — In maiori Vat. cum nonnullis codd. pro deponit exhibet deposuit; et quod ibi profertur noto illo nititur axiomate theologico: «Quod Verbum semel assumsit nunquam dimisit»; quod axioma ab aliis Gregorio Nysseno, ab aliis Damasceno tribuitur. Ille dicit II. contra Eunomium (ed. Migne, col. 548): «Χωρισθεῖσα δὲ οὐδετέρου ᾧ ἅπαξ συνανεκράθη» i. e. a neutro [corpore scil. et anima] separata est [scil. divinitas], cui semel contemperata est». Simili modo eloquitur Damasc., III. de Fide orthod. c. 27, ibid. IV. c. 1, et Homil. in Sabbat. sanct. n. 29.
    Aristotle, On Interpretation II, c. 2 (c. 11). — Cf. below d. 22, q. 1. — In the greater Vatican [edition], with several codices, for deponit it presents deposuit; and what is there brought forward rests on that well-known theological axiom: "What the Word once assumed it never let go"; which axiom is ascribed by some to Gregory of Nyssa, by others to the Damascene. The former says in Against Eunomius II (ed. Migne, col. 548): "Χωρισθεῖσα δὲ οὐδετέρου ᾧ ἅπαξ συνανεκράθη," i.e. [the divinity] is separated from neither [body, namely, and soul] with which it was once commingled. In a similar manner the Damascene speaks, On the Orthodox Faith III, c. 27, and ibid. IV, c. 1, and in the Homily on Holy Saturday, n. 29.
  9. Vide verba Damasc. supra q. I. in fine argg. allata. Inferius sumitur hypostasis pro supposito.
    See the words of the Damascene adduced above in q. 1 at the end of the arguments. Below, hypostasis is taken for supposit.
  10. Tres enim opiniones de hac re, scil. de modo unionis divinae naturae cum humana in Christo, a Magistro in lit. d. VI. c. 2. seqq. afferuntur, quae in Comment., et quidem in divisione textus, accuratius explicantur.
    For three opinions on this matter, namely on the manner of the union of the divine nature with the human in Christ, are brought forward by the Master in the text of d. 6, c. 2 ff., which are more accurately explained in the Commentary, and indeed in the division of the text.
  11. Dist. 6. a. 1. q. 1. — Subinde pro distinguere voluerunt codd. U distinguunt.
    Dist. 6, a. 1, q. 1. — Thereupon, for distinguere voluerunt codices U [read] distinguunt.
  12. Codd. H (K a prima manu) z notatur, cod. bb sequitur.
    Codices H (K, by a first hand) z [read] notatur, codex bb sequitur.
  13. Codd. K Z possit esse.
    Codices K Z [read] possit esse.
  14. Vat. concretio, quae mutatio contra auctoritatem codd. et edd. non videtur esse necessaria. Sensus autem est: in nomine concreto homo iam praesupponitur in Christo suppositum infinitum, cui assumtum (cfr. hic ad 5. et d. 6. a. 1. q. 1.); sed in locutione assumere hominem res assumta, scilicet homo, vi verbi antecedit hanc unionem, non consequitur.
    The Vatican [edition reads] concretio, which change against the authority of the codices and editions does not seem to be necessary. But the sense is: in the concrete name man there is already presupposed in Christ the infinite supposit, to which [is] the assumed (cf. here ad 5 and d. 6, a. 1, q. 1); but in the expression to assume a man the thing assumed, namely man, by force of the verb precedes this union, [and] does not follow it.
  15. Edd. voci homo praemittunt hoc nomen.
    The editions prefix to the word homo [the words] hoc nomen.
  16. Pro compositi, quod codd. K bb prorsus omittunt, codd. A G H I L N T U V aa et edd. 1, 2 indiligenter substituerunt corporis.
    For compositi, which codices K bb omit altogether, codices A G H I L N T U V aa and editions 1, 2 carelessly substituted corporis.
  17. Pro similiter codd. K P Q Z sibi (i. e. ad invicem), Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. simul. Proxime ante perquam multi codd. et edd. 1, 2 semel vocem carnem omittunt.
    For similiter codices K P Q Z [read] sibi (i.e. "to one another"), the Vatican [edition], with one or another codex, simul. Just before, very many codices and editions 1, 2 omit the word carnem once.
  18. Codd. W X unita.
    Codices W X [read] unita.
  19. Dist. 5. a. 1. q. 1. ad 3. et d. 26. q. I. in fine corp. — Paulo superius pro Apud vero theologos edd. Apud veros ergo theologos.
    Dist. 5, a. 1, q. 1, ad 3, and d. 26, q. 1, at the end of the body. — A little above, for Apud vero theologos the editions [read] Apud veros ergo theologos.
  20. Cfr. Aristot., I. Periherm. c. 6. (c. 7.) nec non II. c. 1. (c. 10.), quo ultimo loco agitur de oppositione terminorum infinitorum v. gr. non-homo (non assumtus), qui quidem contradictionis speciem prae se ferunt, revera autem contradictionem non efficiunt. — Per implicationem intelligitur propositio relativa, subiectum propositionis determinans. Cfr. Petr. Hispan., Summul. tr. de Restrictione. — Paulo inferius pro aliam edd. illam. Vox aliam opponitur primae distinctioni.
    Cf. Aristotle, On Interpretation I, c. 6 (c. 7) and also II, c. 1 (c. 10), in which last place there is treated the opposition of infinite terms, e.g. non-man (not assumed), which indeed bear the appearance of a contradiction, but in reality do not effect a contradiction. — By implication is understood the relative proposition determining the subject of the proposition. Cf. Peter of Spain, Summulae, tract On Restriction. — A little below, for aliam the editions [read] illam. The word aliam is opposed to the first distinction.
  21. Vide Anselm., de Fide Trin. c. 6.
    See Anselm, On the Faith of the Trinity, c. 6.
  22. (Scholion source-reference — no body marker.) Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 4. m. 7. q. incid. — Scot., in utroque Scripto III. Sent. d. 6. q. 3. — S. Thom., artt. supra citt. — B. Albert., hic a. 11. — Petr. a Tar., III. Sent. d. 6. q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., III. Sent. d. 6. a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., III. Sent. d. 6. q. 2. a. 2. — Dionys. Carth., III. Sent. d. 6. q. 4. — Biel, III. Sent. d. 6. q. 1.
    (Scholion source-reference — no body marker.) Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III, q. 4, m. 7, incidental q. — Scotus, in both Writings, III Sent. d. 6, q. 3. — St. Thomas, the articles cited above. — Bl. Albert, here a. 11. — Peter of Tarentaise, III Sent. d. 6, q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, III Sent. d. 6, a. 1, q. 2. — Giles of Rome, III Sent. d. 6, q. 2, a. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, III Sent. d. 6, q. 4. — Biel, III Sent. d. 6, q. 1.
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