Bonaventure

I. Recte dicitur a S. Bonav., quod Nestorius iuxta hic relatum tertium intelligendi modum haeresim suam docuerit. Nam quidquid non pauci in contrarium dixerint, constat ex ipsius Nestorii verbis (in suo 9. anathematismo), eum disertis verbis condemnasse errorem, qui a nostro auctore primo loco recensetur. — Multis decretis ecclesiasticis error Nestorii damnatus est, quorum unum transcribere libet, scilicet 2. anathematismum S. Cyrilli Alex., a Concilio Ephesino (an. 431) cum aliis anathematismis approbatum: «Si quis non confitetur, carni secundum substantiam [ita antiqua versio Latina reddit Graeca verba καθ' ὑπόστασιν] unitum Dei Patris Verbum, unumque esse Christum cum propria carne, eundem scilicet Deum et hominem, a. s.».

II. Constat igitur fide, distinctionem inter personam et naturam tum quoad divina tum quoad hominem omnino admittendam esse, ut salventur dogmata Trinitatis et incarnationis, pia, ut bene observatur hic in corp. quaestionis, eadem neglecta, pullulaverunt tot haereses, inter se oppositae, quae Ecclesiam per priora saecula perturbabant. Rationem autem personae, licet secundum analogiam de divina persona et humana dicatur (cfr. I. Sent. d. 25. a. 2. q. 2.), tamen multipliciter in utroque casu differre, exploratum est. Quid persona sit in divinis, diffuse tractatum est I. Sent. d. 23. a. 1, d. 25. per totam et d. 34. q. 1.2. Quaestio autem, quid sit persona vel suppositum, personalitas et subsistentia in creaturis, et in primis, quid ratio suppositi sive personae superaddat naturae singulari, occasionem dedit, ut scholae catholicae post Ss. Thomam et Bonaventuram diversas opiniones docuerint et quasi infinitis et subtilibus disputationibus defenderint. Ea quae de his controversiis in I. tomo d. 25. a. 1. q. 1. in scholio breviter notavimus, hic paulo distinctius explicare iuvat.

I. Conveniunt auctores catholici, praeterquam quod vulgares definitiones Boethii et Richardi a S. Vict. admittunt, praecipue in tribus: a) Ratio personae, dignitatem quandam prae se ferens, non convenit nisi naturis intellectualibus; suppositum autem de quacumque substantia subsistente dicitur, unde ad personam se habet ut conceptus superior ad inferiorem. b) Persona ita distinguitur a natura singulari, ut haec assumi possit, quin assumatur illa. Hinc communissime docetur, personalitatem sive subsistentiam dicere aliquid realiter distinctum et separabile a natura singulari, simulque improbatur opinio paucorum, scilicet Durandi et Nominalium, qui distinctionem illam ad diversum modum concipiendi reducunt. c) Ratio personae vel suppositi importat omnino negationem communicabilitatis (vel dependentiae) respectu alterius substantiae, ita ut in illa terminationem vel completionem habeat. Hinc eadem positive dicit quandam completionem et terminum in genere substantiae.

2. Differunt autem opiniones in solutione quaestionum, quid proprie sit illud quo distinguuntur natura singularis et persona; quid haec superaddat illi; et praesertim, utrum addat aliquid positivum, et quale, an potius aliquid negativum. Praescindendo a nonnullis obsoletis opinionibus, quatuor celebres sententiae circumferuntur, quarum duae primae conveniunt in hoc, quod illud superadditum revera sit aliquid positivum.

Prima sententia cum Caietano et Philippo a S. Trinitate aliisque ex schola S. Thomae affirmat, quod dictum superadditum sit aliquid positivum et ultimum complementum substantiae, distinctum a natura non solum tanquam modus a re modificata, sed tanquam res a re. Alii tamen eiusdem scholae volunt, distinctionem esse quidem realem, sed modalem tantum.

Secunda sententia cum Suarez, Lugo aliisque plurimis tenet, illud complementum esse aliquid positivum, ast tantum modum substantialem per se existendi, a re modificata virtualiter distinctum et naturaliter ex substantia individua resultantem, qui reddit ipsam substantiam incommunicabilem et independentem. Dicitur autem modus substantialis, ut distinguatur a modo accidentali existendi in subiecto, et partiali existendi in toto.

Tertia sententia cum Scoto eiusque schola docet, subsistentiam vel personalitatem esse quidem ultimam actualitatem, constituentem substantiam in esse omnino incommunicabile et non ordinabile ad ulteriorem actum, sed non addere naturae singulari nisi duplicem negationem communicationis ut quo, tum actualis, tum aptitudinalis; (cfr. Scotus, III. Sent. d. 1. q. 1. n. 5. seqq., d. 5. q. 2. n. 4. 5. (cum diffuso commentario Pontii); Quodl. 19; I. Sent. d. 13. q. unica n. 9. 10, d. 23. q. unica n. 7, ubi asserit, quod persona non aliquam dignitatem ex formali significato, sed ex natura intellectuali connotata importet. Huic sententiae favent etiam Henr. Gand. (Quodl. 5. q. 8.) aliique.

Quarta vero sententia reapse a sententia Scoti vix nisi in modo explicandi et probandi discedit, cum doceat, quamlibet creatam substantiam singularem per propriam essentiam habere potentiam per se et in se subsistendi, quin aliqua additione ad hoc indigeat, ast etiam quin excludatur possibilitas, quod a Deo ita uniatur alii substantiae, ut non subsistat nisi dependenter ab illa, cui communicatur. Hinc quaelibet substantia subsistentiam etiam actualem in se habet eo ipso, quod non uniatur alii substantiae subsistenti. Quodsi S. Thom. aliique antiqui dicunt, quod suppositum addat aliquid naturae, tunc hoc intelligendum esse volunt de natura, quatenus significat essentiam speciei. Ita non pauci nec spernendi recentiores, duce Claudio Tipliano S. I. (Declaratio ac defensio scholastica doctrinae Ss. Patrum Doctorisque angelici de hypostasi ac persona, Mussiponti 1634); qui etiam Ss. Thomam et Bonaventuram sibi suffragari volunt.

III. S. Bonav. hic et alibi de ratione unionis hypostaticae nihil dicit, quod non optime conveniat cum doctrina S. Thomae. Praedicta autem quaestio philosophica, quid persona addat supra naturam singularem humanam (quae sane conneetitur cum profundissimis problematibus metaphysicis), a nostro Doctore explicite non tractatur. Hinc ei a diversis auctoribus diversae sententiae de hac re attribuuntur. P. Barthol. a Barberiis (Curs. theologic. l. 11. disp. 2. q. 1.) cum aliis eum exponit iuxta secundam opinionem, afferendo illos locos, qui aliquod positivum rationi personae attribuunt. P. Matthias Hauzeur (Collatio totius theol. t. II. col. 267 seqq.) non sine acumine Bonaventuram et Scotum sic exponit, ut non sibi contradicant, sed potius invicem suppleant. Similiter defensores quartae sententiae asserunt, ea quae in hac quaest. et alibi in hoc libro III. Sent. occurrunt, suam causam aperte sustinere. — Iudicium de his sapienti lectori remittentes, notamus tantum praecipuos locos et modos loquendi ad hanc rem spectantes, qui etiam in aliis huius libri quaestionibus inveniuntur. Hic in solut. ad 1. 2. 3. tria ad rationem personae requiruntur, scilicet singularitas, incommunicabilitas, dignitas (cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 4. m. 6, ubi eadem ponuntur), quin tamen ratio formalis personae indicetur, sicut nec infra d. 10. a. 1. q. 3, praesertim in fine, ubi de individuo et supposito agitur. Ibid. q. 2. ad 2. docetur, quod Christus ut homo est res completa omni completione absoluta, non autem respectiva, quae est dignitas superexcellentiae. Ibid. ad 3. dicitur, quod natura hypostatice unita digniori non potest habere suam propriam personalitatem, sed bene natura dignior unita minus dignae. Item ad 4. legitur, quod persona duo dicit, scilicet hypostasim, in qua est subsistentia totius esse rei, et proprietatem supereminentis dignitatis; insuper quod in hypostasi divina substantificatur totum esse Christi. Deinde ad 5. docetur, quod natura humana Christi, si separaretur, eo ipso alium modum existendi [scilicet substantialem] haberet et fieret persona. Ibid. q. 3. suppositum nominatur fundamentum totius existentiae naturalis, «in quo totum esse rei stabilitur et fundatur». Insuper cfr. ibi seqq. qq., et d. 6. a. 1. q. 1. praesertim ad 6. et q. 3, a. 2. q. 1. 2, d. 1. a. 1. q. 2, d. 2. a. 3. q. 4. in fine (de gratia unionis) et hic q. praeced. ad 2. 3. 4. In his aliisque locis passim occurrit phrasis, quod in hypostasi sive in supposito sive in persona totum esse rei substantificatur. Verbum substantificari sumtum est ex Latina versione Dionysii de Div. Nom. (c. 4. § 20.) ac Epist. 4. ad Caium, et exprimit Graecum verbum οὐσιοῦσθαι, ut iam notavimus tom. II. pag. 812, nota 6, et supra pag. 10, nota 4. S. Bonav. verbum substantificare intelligit de eo fundamento, quod hypostasis dat naturae. Eodem verbo utitur etiam S. Thom. (Quaest. disput. de Unione Verbi incarn. a. 4.), sed non in eodem sensu, cum dicat de persona Filii, quod «simpliciter substantificatur per naturam divinam». — Alii loci S. Bonav. ad hanc quaestionem spectantes videri possunt in citato scholio, I. Sent. d. 25. a. 1. q. 1, ubi etiam expressa auctoris verba afferuntur, quod privatio communitatis in persona magis sit positio quam privatio. Cfr. etiam II. Sent. d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. in corp., ubi auctor diversos gradus subsistentiae distinguit atque substantiis spiritualibus, ut formis subsistentibus, altiorem gradum in genere substantiae et subsistentiae vindicat. De personali discretione in Angelis agitur ibid. a. 2. q. 2. Quidquid autem sit de hac quaestione philosophica, quid ratio personae humanae addat humanae naturae; extra controversiam est, quod unio hypostatica in Christo fit per «additionem alicuius, quod est supra humanam naturam, quod est unio ad divinam personam» (S. Thom., S. III. q. 4. a. 2. ad 2.), quo humanae in Christo naturae confertur modus existendi et subsistendi prorsus unicus et dignitas infinita.

IV. De ipsa quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 4. m. 6. — Scot., in utroque Scripto hic q. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3, q. 3. a. 3, S. III. q. 2. a. 2. q. 4. a. 2; S. c. Gent. IV. c. 34. 38; Quaest. disp. de Unione Verbi etc. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 14. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2, a. 4. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 3, q. 3. a. 2. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. unica.

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I. It is rightly said by St. Bonaventure that Nestorius, according to the third mode of understanding here related, taught his heresy. For whatever not a few have said to the contrary, it is established from the very words of Nestorius (in his 9th anathematism) that he in express words condemned the error which is recounted in the first place by our author. — By many ecclesiastical decrees the error of Nestorius has been condemned, one of which it is pleasing to transcribe, namely the 2nd anathematism of St. Cyril of Alexandria, approved by the Council of Ephesus (a.d. 431) with the other anathematisms: "If anyone does not confess that the Word of God the Father is united to flesh according to substance [thus the ancient Latin version renders the Greek words καθ' ὑπόστασιν], and that Christ is one with his own flesh, that is, the same one who is God and man, let him be anathema."

II. It is established therefore by faith that the distinction between person and nature, both as regards the divine and as regards man, is altogether to be admitted, in order that the dogmas of the Trinity and of the incarnation be preserved; for, as is well observed here in the body of the question, when it was neglected, so many heresies, opposed to one another, sprang up, which troubled the Church through earlier ages. But that the account of person, although it is said by analogy of a divine person and a human one (cfr. I. Sent. d. 25. a. 2. q. 2.), nevertheless differs in many ways in either case, is well explored. What person is in things divine has been treated at length in I. Sent. d. 23. a. 1, d. 25. throughout, and d. 34. q. 1.2. But the question, what person or suppositum, personality, and subsistence is in creatures, and chiefly, what the account of suppositum or person superadds to a singular nature, gave occasion for the Catholic schools after Sts. Thomas and Bonaventure to teach diverse opinions and defend them with almost infinite and subtle disputations. The things which we noted briefly concerning these controversies in the first volume, d. 25. a. 1. q. 1, in the scholion, it is helpful to explain here a little more distinctly.

I. Catholic authors agree, besides that they admit the common definitions of Boethius and Richard of St. Victor, chiefly in three things: a) The account of person, bearing a certain dignity before it, does not belong except to intellectual natures; but suppositum is said of any subsisting substance whatsoever, whence it stands to person as a higher concept to a lower. b) Person is so distinguished from a singular nature that the latter can be assumed without the former being assumed. Hence it is most commonly taught that personality or subsistence signifies something really distinct and separable from a singular nature, and at the same time the opinion of a few is reproved, namely of Durandus and of the Nominalists, who reduce that distinction to a diverse mode of conceiving. c) The account of person or of suppositum implies altogether a negation of communicability (or of dependence) with respect to another substance, in such a way that in it there is a termination or completion. Hence the same thing positively signifies a certain completion and term in the genus of substance.

2. They differ, however, the opinions, in the solution of the questions, what properly is that by which a singular nature and a person are distinguished; what the latter superadds to the former; and especially, whether it adds something positive, and of what sort, or rather something negative. Setting aside some obsolete opinions, four celebrated views are in circulation, of which the first two agree in this, that that superadded thing is really something positive.

The first view, with Cajetan and Philip of the Holy Trinity and others of the school of St. Thomas, affirms that the said superadded thing is something positive and an ultimate complement of the substance, distinct from the nature not only as a mode from the thing modified, but as a thing from a thing. Others nevertheless of the same school hold that the distinction is indeed real, but only modal.

The second view, with Suárez, Lugo, and very many others, holds that that complement is something positive, but only a substantial mode of existing per se, virtually distinct from the thing modified and naturally resulting from the individual substance, which renders the substance itself incommunicable and independent. And it is called a substantial mode, that it may be distinguished from the accidental mode of existing in a subject, and the partial mode of existing in a whole.

The third view, with Scotus and his school, teaches that subsistence or personality is indeed an ultimate actuality, constituting the substance in a being altogether incommunicable and not orderable to a further act, but adds to a singular nature nothing but a twofold negation of communication as that by which, both actual and aptitudinal; (cfr. Scotus, III. Sent. d. 1. q. 1. n. 5. seqq., d. 5. q. 2. n. 4. 5. (with the diffuse commentary of Pontius); Quodl. 19; I. Sent. d. 13. q. unica n. 9. 10, d. 23. q. unica n. 7, where he asserts that person implies not some dignity from its formal signification, but from a connoted intellectual nature. To this view are favorable also Henry of Ghent (Quodl. 5. q. 8.) and others.

But the fourth view in fact departs from the view of Scotus scarcely except in the mode of explaining and proving, since it teaches that any created singular substance whatsoever has through its own essence the power of subsisting per se and in itself, without needing any addition to this, but also without excluding the possibility that it be so united by God to another substance that it subsist only dependently on that to which it is communicated. Hence any substance has subsistence, even actual, in itself by the very fact that it is not united to another subsisting substance. But if St. Thomas and the other ancients say that the suppositum adds something to the nature, then they wish this to be understood of nature insofar as it signifies the essence of the species. So not a few, and not to be despised, of the more recent authors, with Claude Tiphaine, S.J., as their leader (Declaration and Scholastic Defense of the Doctrine of the Holy Fathers and of the Angelic Doctor on Hypostasis and Person, Mussiponti 1634), who also wish Sts. Thomas and Bonaventure to support them.

III. St. Bonaventure here and elsewhere says nothing concerning the account of the hypostatic union that does not most fittingly agree with the doctrine of St. Thomas. But the aforesaid philosophical question, what a person adds above a singular human nature (which is surely connected with the most profound metaphysical problems), is not explicitly treated by our Doctor. Hence diverse views about this matter are attributed to him by diverse authors. Fr. Bartholomew a Barberiis (Theological Course, l. 11. disp. 2. q. 1.) with others expounds him according to the second opinion, adducing those passages which attribute something positive to the account of person. Fr. Matthias Hauzeur (Collation of the Whole Theology, t. II. col. 267 seqq.) not without acumen so expounds Bonaventure and Scotus that they do not contradict one another, but rather mutually supplement one another. Likewise the defenders of the fourth view assert that those things which occur in this question and elsewhere in this book III of the Sentences openly support their cause. — Leaving the judgment about these things to the wise reader, we note only the chief passages and ways of speaking pertaining to this matter, which are found also in other questions of this book. Here in the solution to 1. 2. 3. three things are required for the account of person, namely singularity, incommunicability, dignity (cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 4. m. 6, where the same are posited), without however the formal account of person being indicated, just as neither below in d. 10. a. 1. q. 3, especially at the end, where the individual and the suppositum are treated. There q. 2. ad 2. it is taught that Christ as man is a thing complete with every absolute completion, but not with a respective one, which is the dignity of superexcellence. There ad 3. it is said that a nature hypostatically united to a more worthy one cannot have its own personality, but well a more worthy nature united to a less worthy one. Likewise ad 4. it is read that person signifies two things, namely the hypostasis, in which is the subsistence of the whole being of the thing, and the property of supereminent dignity; and moreover that in the divine hypostasis the whole being of Christ is substantified. Then ad 5. it is taught that the human nature of Christ, if it were separated, by that very fact would have another mode of existing [namely a substantial one] and would become a person. There q. 3. the suppositum is named the foundation of the whole natural existence, "in which the whole being of the thing is established and founded." And further cfr. there the following questions, and d. 6. a. 1. q. 1. especially ad 6. and q. 3, a. 2. q. 1. 2, d. 1. a. 1. q. 2, d. 2. a. 3. q. 4. at the end (on the grace of union) and here the preceding question ad 2. 3. 4. In these and other passages there occurs everywhere the phrase that in the hypostasis or in the suppositum or in the person the whole being of the thing is substantified. The word substantificari is taken from the Latin version of Dionysius On the Divine Names (c. 4. § 20.) and Epistle 4 to Caius, and it expresses the Greek word οὐσιοῦσθαι, as we have already noted in volume II, p. 812, note 6, and above p. 10, note 4. St. Bonaventure understands the word substantificare of that foundation which the hypostasis gives to the nature. The same word is used also by St. Thomas (Disputed Question on the Union of the Incarnate Word, a. 4.), but not in the same sense, since he says of the person of the Son that "it is simply substantified through the divine nature." — Other passages of St. Bonaventure pertaining to this question can be seen in the cited scholion, I. Sent. d. 25. a. 1. q. 1, where also the express words of the author are adduced, that the privation of commonness in a person is rather a position than a privation. Cfr. also II. Sent. d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. in the body, where the author distinguishes diverse grades of subsistence and to spiritual substances, as to subsisting forms, vindicates a higher grade in the genus of substance and of subsistence. Concerning personal discreteness in the Angels it is treated ibid. a. 2. q. 2. But whatever may be the case concerning this philosophical question, what the account of a human person adds to a human nature; it is beyond controversy that the hypostatic union in Christ comes about through "the addition of something which is above the human nature, which is union to a divine person" (S. Thom., S. III. q. 4. a. 2. ad 2.), by which to the human nature in Christ is conferred a mode of existing and subsisting altogether unique and an infinite dignity.

IV. On the question itself: Alex. of Hales, S. p. III. q. 4. m. 6. — Scotus, in each Writing here q. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 3, q. 3. a. 3, S. III. q. 2. a. 2. q. 4. a. 2; S. against the Gentiles IV. c. 34. 38; Disputed Question on the Union of the Word etc. a. 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 14. — Peter of Tarantasia, here q. 4. a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2. q. 2, a. 4. q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here q. 2. a. 3, q. 3. a. 2. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2. — Biel, here q. unica.

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