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Dist. 3, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 3

Textus Latinus
p. 105

Quaestio II. Utrum personalis proprietas in Angelis sit substantialis, vel accidentalis.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum personalis proprietas sit in Angelis accidentalis, vel substantialis. Et quod accidentalis, videtur sic.

1. Boethius1 dicit, quod « omne proprium manat de genere accidentium, non solum proprium individui, sed etiam speciei »; sed individuum magis approximat accidentibus quam species: ergo multo fortius proprietas individualis de genere accidentium est. Sed discretio personalis est proprietas individualis: ergo etc.

2. Item, Richardus de sancto Victore2 ait, « quod in divinis est personalis discretio per originem, in Angelis per qualitatem, in hominibus utroque modo »: si ergo tam qualitas quam origo dicit proprietatem accidentalem in creaturis, patet etc.

3. Item, Porphyrius3 dicit, « quod individuum constat ex proprietatibus, quarum collectionem impossibile est in altero reperire »: sed tales sunt proprietates accidentales: ergo individuatio est per accidentia. Sed per eadem est personalis discretio, per quae est individuatio: ergo etc.

4. Item, humana natura in Christo non habuit personalitatem nec discretionem personalem; sed constat, quod habuit quae sunt essentialia substantiae rationali: ergo personalis discretio non est substantialis sive essentialis nec homini nec Angelo.

5. Item, circumscriptis omnibus accidentibus, res non cadit in sensu, sed solum in intellectu; sed « universale, dum intelligitur, singulare, dum sentitur4 »: ergo circumscriptis accidentibus, circumscribitur individuatio, ergo et personalis discretio, et sic idem quod prius.

6. Item, discretio personalis est discretio secundum numerum; sed circumscripta quantitate, non est intelligere numerum5: ergo nec discretionem personalem. Sed substantiale intelligitur, circumscripto accidentali: ergo si discretio personalis non potest intelligi, accidentibus circumscriptis, ergo non est substantialis Angelo, sed potius accidentalis.

Contra: 1. Arguitur primo per textum. Magister6 enim dicit, quod « prima consideratio est de substantia », et sub prima consideratione comprehendit personalem discretionem: ergo videtur, quod personalis discretio est Angelo substantialis.

2. Item, « persona non est aliud quam individua substantia rationalis naturae7 »; sed individua substantia, in quantum huiusmodi, est in genere substantiae non per reductionem, sed directe, secundum rectam lineam: ergo, in quantum huiusmodi, est in genere substantiae: ergo personalitas non est in genere accidentis, quia in eodem genere est album, in quantum album, et albedo: ergo in eodem genere personalitas et persona.

3. Item, « nullum accidens est nisi in substantia individua8 »: ergo omne accidens consequitur individuitatem essentiae, et tam in rationali quam in irrationali hoc habet veritatem: ergo prius per naturam est aliquid individuum substantiae rationalis, quam habeat accidens: ergo per prius persona: ergo et discretio in personalitate.

4. Item, quae differunt personalitate9 differunt in suis principiis substantialibus, sicut patet in Petro et Paulo; et quae sic differunt substantialiter discernuntur: ergo discretio personalis dicit differentiam substantialem: ergo non est proprietas accidentalis.

5. Item, non est maior discretio in accidentibus quam inter opposita; sed opposita non faciunt discretionem personalem, quia unus homo prius est albus, postea niger, prius puer, postea senex; et tamen idem individuum est et una persona10: ergo etc.

6. Item, accidentia diversa, cum sunt in uno p. 106 supposito, sunt unum numero, ut grammaticum et musicum11: sed hoc non esset, si diversitas secundum numerum vel secundum discretionem personalem veniret ab accidentibus: ergo etc.

Conclusio

Personalis proprietas non causatur ab accidentibus, sed ab actuali coniunctione principiorum, et in se est aliquid substantiale; quod autem ad hoc consequitur, hoc est aliquo modo in genere accidentium.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam notandum, quod circa hoc est triplex modus dicendi.

Quidam namque dicere voluerunt, quod personalis discretio est accidentalis proprietas, quia dicunt12, quod est in genere accidentis, et quod etiam causatur ab accidentibus, sicut discretio numeralis. Sed in hoc differentia est, quia discretio numeralis causatur a diversitate proprietatum, in quibus communicat creatura rationalis et irrationalis; sed discretio personalis a proprietatibus, quae insunt proprie rationali creaturae. — Sed illud improbatur in opponendo per multas rationes. Nec potest habere veritatem, quod distinctio individualis sit ab accidentibus, cum individua differant secundum substantiam, non solum secundum accidens; et similiter de discretione personali intelligendum est.

Et ideo alius modus est dicendi, quod discretio personalis dicit proprietatem accidentalem, quae tamen non causatur ab accidentibus, sed a substantia13 sive principiis substantialibus; sicut unitas, quae est principium numeri, est in genere accidentis, tamen immediate habet ortum a substantia. — Sed cum persona dicat idem quod suppositum rationalis naturae, ut est in genere substantiae; non videtur probabile, quod personalis discretio dicat proprietatem accidentalem solum.

Et ideo est tertius modus dicendi, quod discretio personalis, etsi videatur dicere accidens, quia dicit per modum accidentis, tamen principaliter dicit quid substantiale; et si aliquo modo importat accidens, hoc est consequenter; illud tamen immediate habet ortum a principiis substantialibus. — Et hoc patet sic. Discretio personalis addit supra discretionem individualem; discretio autem individualis duo dicit, scilicet individuationem et consequenter distinctionem. Individuatio autem est ex principiorum indivisione14 et appropriatione; ipsa enim rei principia, dum coniunguntur, invicem se appropriant et faciunt individuum. Sed ad hoc consequitur esse discretum sive esse distinctum ab alio, et surgit ex hoc numerus, et ita accidentalis proprietas15, consequens ad substantiam. — Et sic individualis discretio dicit aliquid accidentale, et aliquid substantiale; personalis autem addit supra hanc dignitatem personalitatis. Dignitas autem illa duo dicit, scilicet nobilitatem rationalis naturae, quae est, quod natura rationalis tenet principatum inter naturas creatas; unde non est ordinabilis ad perfectiorem formam. Et haec nobilitas, etsi per modum qualitatis habeat intelligi, tamen essentialis est naturae rationali. — Dicit etiam illa nobilitas actualem eminentiam, ita quod in supposito nulla sit alia natura ita principalis, ut natura rationalis, ut quasi sit per se sonans16. Et ideo, quia hoc deficit ei in Christo, natura rationalis creata non facit personalitatem, et hoc est accidentale. — Dicendum igitur, quod quemadmodum individualis discretio est ex existentia formae naturalis in materia, sic personalis discretio ex existentia naturae nobilis et supereminentis in supposito. Et ideo, quamvis utrobique importetur quid substantiale, et similiter accidentale consequens — hoc dico in creatura — non tamen importatur accidentale, quod causetur vel ortum habeat ab accidente, sed potius consequitur formam in materia, vel naturam in supposito.

Ex his patet veritas problematis et dissolutio obiectionum pro parte. Si enim quaeratur, utrum personalis discretio sit proprietas substantialis, vel accidentalis; si substantialis proprietas dicatur, quia immediate sequitur substantiam; sic dicendum est, esse substantiale. Si substantiale dicatur, quia non exit genus substantiae; dicendum, quod quodammodo sic, et quodammodo non. Similiter si dicatur accidentalis proprietas, quia causatur ab accidentibus; sic dicendum simpliciter, quod non; si vero accidentalis, quia est in genere accidentis; sic potest dici, quod quodammodo sic, quodammodo non, secundum distinctionem primo factam.

Quod ergo obiicitur, quod personalis discretio pertinet ad substantiam, et non causatur ab accidentibus; hoc totum concedendum est.

1. Quod obiicitur in oppositum, quod proprium omne manat de genere accidentium; dicendum, quod Boethius loquitur de propria passione, et hanc p. 107 dicit manare de genere accidentium, non quia non causetur ex principiis subiecti, sed quia, etsi ex ipsis causetur, formaliter tamen est in genere accidentium17. Dupliciter ergo deficit illa ratio. Primo, quia peccat in intellectu huius nominis proprium. Est enim proprietas quantum ad rem, et est proprietas quantum ad modum; et Boethius intelligit de eo quod realiter est propria passio, non de eo quod est proprietas quantum ad modum. Proprietas autem individualis aut proprietas personalis, etsi videatur dicere proprietatem consequentem esse, sicut accidens, realiter tamen non dicit nisi appropriationem principiorum per indivisionem; hoc dico quantum ad proprietatem individualem. Similiter proprietas personalis non dicit ultra hoc nisi dignitatem sive nobilitatem naturae rationalis, quae nobilitas non est ei accidentalis, immo simpliciter et omnino essentialis.

Peccat etiam praedicta ratio in malo intellectu praedicati, quia proprium dicitur manare de genere accidentium, non quia manat ab accidentibus, sed quia manat a substantia, existens de genere accidentium; sic in proposito. Unde sicut unitas, quae est principium numeri, ortum habet a principiis substantiae, accidentaliter ad ipsam relatis, non autem a principio aliquo, quod sit in genere accidentis; sic intelligi potest de discretione personali, secundum id quod in ea accidentale est, utpote comparatio ad alteram personam, respectu cuius habet distingui et numerari; et eminentia dignitatis in supposito respectu alterius naturae, quam non habuit humana natura in Christo.

2. 3. Quod obiicitur, quod discretio personalis est per qualitatem; dicendum, quod intelligitur de qualitate, quae est in genere qualitatis quantum ad modum, non autem quantum ad rem. His enim duobus18 distinguuntur praedicamenta vel quantum ad essentiam, vel quantum ad modum; et aliquid est in genere substantiae, quod nihilominus habet modum accidentis; unde etiam consuevit distingui qualitas duplex, scilicet substantialis et accidentalis19. — Vel dicendum, quod Richardus loquitur de distinctione personali quantum ad nostram cognitionem; et quia cognitio nostra est per accidentales qualitates, dixit, personas creatas distingui qualitate. — Et per hunc modum intelligitur verbum Porphyrii, qui dicit, individuum constare ex collectione proprietatum; loquitur enim secundum rationem et cognitionem, non secundum rem; et sic patet tertium.

4. Quod obiicitur, quod in Christo humana natura non habuit personalitatem; dicendum, quod hoc est ratione illius eminentiae, quae consequitur ad nobilitatem; et illa supereminentia dicit quandam dignitatem accidentalem, sicut prius ostensum est, quae amitti potest non solum per deperditionem, sed etiam per dignioris superinductionem, sicut alibi melius dicetur20.

5. Quod obiicitur de sensu et intellectu, dicendum, quod etsi sensus solummodo sit singularium, intellectus tamen potest esse non solum universalium, sed etiam singularium; unde non est intelligenda illa differentia cum praecisione. Et hoc patet, quia solus intellectus comprehendit intrinseca principia Petri et Platonis; et circumscriptis omnibus accidentibus, dicit, eos esse discretos et distinctos21.

6. Quod obiicitur de numero, dicendum, quod sicut unitatem substantialem consequitur unitas accidentalis inseparabiliter, quae non est principium indivisionis, sed consequens ad illam; sic diversitatem substantialem consequitur numerus inseparabiliter; tamen secundum rem et naturam distinctio illa est a substantiali principio, non accidentali22. Et sic patet totum.

Scholion

I. In hanc quaestionem incidit problema de principio individuationis in substantiis sive corporalibus sive spiritualibus, quod famosum est magis infinitis disputationibus quam evidenti solutione, cum recte dicat Phil. de Ss. Trinitate in sua celebri Summa philosophica, p. III. q. 5. in princ.: « In hac re quot capita, tot sensus ».

1. Scotus (hic q. 1-5.) quoad substantias corporales quinque enumerat opiniones, quas distinctis quaestionibus nititur evertere, et sunt haec: 1. Substantia naturalis ex ipsa sua natura est individua vel singularis; quae est sententia Nominalium. — 2. Individuatio fit non per aliquod positivum, sed per duplicem negationem; ita Henr. Gand., Quodl. 2. q. 8. — 3. Individuatio fit per actualem existentiam, ita Durand. (hic q. 2.), qui dicit: « Natura communis et individuum solum differunt ut concepta et existens ». — 4. Ipsa fit per quantitatem in materia; quae opinio attribuitur Ægidio R. — 5. Ipsa fit per materiam, ut vult S. Thomas. — Tandem Scotus (q. 6.), dissentiens a SS. Thoma et Bonav., ponit, quod substantia materialis est individua per entitatem quandam essentiae specificae superadditam et ex parte rei formaliter ab ipsa distinctam, quae est differentia individualis, a nonnullis vocata haecceitas, per quam simili modo constituitur individuum, sicut natura specifica per differentiam specificam. Eadem principia Scotus applicat ad individua in spiritualibus creaturis.

2. Quoad sententiam S. Thomae discipuli eius conveniunt in hoc, quod secundum ipsum formae substantiales individuantur per materiam, ita ut materia individua sit radix individuationis formae, et quod formaliter individuantur per ordinem intrinsecum p. 108 et essentialem ad materiam individuam; item, quod substantiae materialis completae primum principium individuationis sit materia prima signata quantitate. Sed quomodo hoc fiat, non eodem modo ab omnibus explicatur. — Quoad puros spiritus, cum secundum Angelicum non sint plures in una specie, iam non requiritur aliud principium individuationis; unde ipse dicit (hic q. 1. a. 2.): « Incommunicabilitas [personalitas] est in homine ex hoc, quod ipsius natura receptibilis in materiae fundamento per materiam determinatur; sed in Angelo in se determinata est ex hoc, quod in aliquo sicut forma determinabilis recipi non potest; et ex hoc ipso satis incommunicabilis est, et non per determinationem recipientis » (cfr. S. I. q. 50. a. 4.). Idem de Angelis sentit Ægid. R. (hic p. 1. q. 2. a. 1.).

II. S. Bonav. (hic q. 3. in corp. et ad 1. 2.) non approbat opinionem Scoti, quod ultra formam speciei specialissimae sit forma individualis superaddita. In hoc praeter S. Thomam consentiunt etiam Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 20. m. 4. a. 3.), Richard. a Med. (hic a. 4. q. 1.) et Durand. (loc. cit.). — Deinde S. Bonav., quippe qui etiam in spiritualibus creaturis ponat materiam, sed non extensam, hic docet, individuationem in omnibus creaturis consurgere ex duplicis principii coniunctione, qua unum sibi appropriat alterum, ut clare explicat in quaest. 3. in corp. — Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 2. a. 1.), aliorum referens opiniones, nihil determinat.

III. Quod autem principium individuationis non sit in genere accidentis, sed substantiae, communiter docetur. Nihilominus S. Bonav. etiam sententiae primo loco relatae aliquid veri inesse fatetur, quatenus id quod individuationem consequitur, scil. distinctio ab aliis et numerus, sit accidentalis proprietas; quod magis explicatur in solut. ad 1. De ratione unitatis et numeri cfr. I. Sent. d. 24. a. 1. q. 1, Scholion.

IV. Discretionem personalem in homine distinctam esse a discretione individuali, constat, quia humana Christi natura est quidem individua, non autem est persona humana, unde (hic in corp.) dicitur: « Discretio personalis addit super discretionem individualem ». De hoc plura iam dicta sunt I. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 3; d. 25. a. 1. q. 1, a. 2. q. 1. 2. et d. 34. q. 1, quae hic confirmantur et mira claritate et profunditate magis explicantur.

V. De seq. quaest. 3. commentatores Magistri explicite non tractant, praeter B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 15. m. 2. et Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 2, qui tantum aliqua ex S. Bonav. transcribit); plurimi autem iam ideo de hoc non agunt, quia non admittunt principium materiale in Angelis. — Etiam de hac q. 2. pauci tractant: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 20. m. 4. a. 3. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 15. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 1.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether the personal property in the angels is substantial, or accidental.

Secondly it is asked whether the personal property is in the angels accidental, or substantial. And that [it is] accidental, seems [so] thus.

1. Boethius1 says that « every property flows from the genus of accidents, not only the property of an individual, but also of a species »; but the individual approximates accidents more than the species [does]: therefore much more strongly is an individual property of the genus of accidents. But personal distinction is an individual property: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Richard of St. Victor2 says, « that in divine [things] there is personal distinction by origin, in the angels by quality, in men by either mode »: if therefore both quality and origin state an accidental property in creatures, it is plain etc.

3. Likewise, Porphyry3 says, « that the individual is constituted from properties, the collection of which it is impossible to find in another »: but such are accidental properties: therefore individuation is through accidents. But personal distinction is through the same [things] through which individuation is: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, human nature in Christ did not have personality nor personal distinction; but it is established that it had the [things] which are essential to a rational substance: therefore personal distinction is not substantial or essential either to man or to angel.

5. Likewise, all accidents being circumscribed, a thing does not fall under sense, but only under intellect; but « the universal [is grasped] while it is understood, the singular while it is sensed4 »: therefore, accidents being circumscribed, individuation is circumscribed, therefore also personal distinction, and so the same as before.

6. Likewise, personal distinction is a distinction according to number; but, quantity being circumscribed, it is not [possible] to understand number5: therefore neither [to understand] personal distinction. But the substantial is understood, the accidental being circumscribed: therefore if personal distinction cannot be understood, accidents being circumscribed, therefore it is not substantial to an angel, but rather accidental.

On the contrary: 1. It is argued first through the text. For the Master6 says that « the first consideration is concerning substance », and under the first consideration he comprehends personal distinction: therefore it seems that personal distinction is substantial to an angel.

2. Likewise, « a person is nothing other than an individual substance of a rational nature7 »; but an individual substance, insofar as [it is] of this kind, is in the genus of substance not by reduction, but directly, according to a straight line: therefore, insofar as [it is] of this kind, it is in the genus of substance: therefore personality is not in the genus of accident, because in the same genus is the white, insofar as white, and whiteness: therefore personality and person [are] in the same genus.

3. Likewise, « no accident is except in an individual substance8 »: therefore every accident follows the individuality of the essence, and both in the rational and in the irrational this holds true: therefore prior by nature is something individual of a rational substance, before it has an accident: therefore prior [is] the person: therefore also the distinction in personality.

4. Likewise, [things] which differ in personality9 differ in their substantial principles, as is plain in Peter and Paul; and [things] which thus differ are discerned substantially: therefore personal distinction states a substantial difference: therefore it is not an accidental property.

5. Likewise, there is no greater distinction in accidents than between opposites; but opposites do not make personal distinction, because one man is first white, afterwards black, first a boy, afterwards an old man; and yet he is the same individual and one person10: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, diverse accidents, when they are in one p. 106 supposit, are one in number, like the grammatical and the musical11: but this would not be [so], if diversity according to number or according to personal distinction came from accidents: therefore etc.

Conclusion

The personal property is not caused from accidents, but from the actual conjunction of principles, and in itself is something substantial; but that which follows upon this is in some mode in the genus of accidents.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that about this there is a threefold mode of speaking.

For some wished to say that personal distinction is an accidental property, because they say12 that it is in the genus of accident, and that it is also caused from accidents, like numerical distinction. But in this there is a difference, because numerical distinction is caused from a diversity of properties in which rational and irrational creature share; but personal distinction [is caused] from properties which are present properly to a rational creature. — But that is disproved in objecting through many reasons. Nor can it hold true that individual distinction is from accidents, since individuals differ according to substance, not only according to accident; and likewise it is to be understood concerning personal distinction.

And therefore another mode is of speaking, that personal distinction states an accidental property, which however is not caused from accidents, but from substance13 or substantial principles; just as unity, which is the principle of number, is in the genus of accident, yet immediately has its rise from substance. — But since person states the same as a supposit of a rational nature, as it is in the genus of substance; it does not seem probable that personal distinction states an accidental property only.

And therefore there is a third mode of speaking, that personal distinction, although it seems to state an accident, because it states [it] through the mode of an accident, yet principally states something substantial; and if in some mode it imports an accident, this is consequently; that [accident] however immediately has its rise from substantial principles. — And this is plain thus. Personal distinction adds upon individual distinction; but individual distinction states two [things], namely individuation and consequently distinction. But individuation is from the indivision14 and appropriation of the principles; for the principles of a thing themselves, while they are conjoined, mutually appropriate one another and make an individual. But upon this follows being discrete or being distinct from another, and from this arises number, and so an accidental property15, consequent upon substance. — And so individual distinction states something accidental, and something substantial; but the personal adds upon this the dignity of personality. But that dignity states two [things], namely the nobility of a rational nature, which is that a rational nature holds the primacy among created natures; whence it is not orderable to a more perfect form. And this nobility, although it be understood through the mode of a quality, yet is essential to a rational nature. — That nobility also states an actual eminence, so that in the supposit there be no other nature so principal as the rational nature, so that it be as it were per se sonans [self-sounding]16. And therefore, because this is lacking to it in Christ, created rational nature does not make personality, and this is accidental. — It must be said therefore that, just as individual distinction is from the existence of a natural form in matter, so personal distinction [is] from the existence of a noble and supereminent nature in a supposit. And therefore, although on both sides something substantial be imported, and likewise an accidental consequent — this I say in a creature — yet there is not imported an accidental [thing] which is caused or has its rise from an accident, but rather it follows the form in matter, or the nature in the supposit.

From these [things] is plain the truth of the problem and the dissolution of the objections in part. For if it be asked whether personal distinction is a substantial, or an accidental, property; if it be called a substantial property, because it immediately follows substance; thus it must be said to be substantial. If it be called substantial, because it does not exit the genus of substance; it must be said that in a certain mode yes, and in a certain mode no. Likewise if it be called an accidental property, because it is caused from accidents; thus it must be said simply that no; but if [it be called] accidental, because it is in the genus of accident; thus it can be said that in a certain mode yes, in a certain mode no, according to the distinction first made.

As to what therefore is objected, that personal distinction pertains to substance, and is not caused from accidents; this whole [thing] is to be conceded.

1. As to what is objected on the opposite side, that every property flows from the genus of accidents; it must be said that Boethius speaks of a proper passion, and says that this p. 107 flows from the genus of accidents, not because it is not caused from the principles of the subject, but because, although it be caused from them, formally it is nevertheless in the genus of accidents17. In two ways therefore that reason is defective. First, because it errs in the understanding of this name property. For there is a property as to the thing, and there is a property as to the mode; and Boethius understands of that which really is a proper passion, not of that which is a property as to the mode. But an individual property or a personal property, although it seem to state a property consequent upon being, like an accident, really nevertheless states nothing but the appropriation of principles through indivision; this I say as to the individual property. Likewise the personal property states beyond this nothing but the dignity or nobility of a rational nature, which nobility is not accidental to it, but rather simply and altogether essential.

The aforesaid reason also errs in the bad understanding of the predicate, because property is said to flow from the genus of accidents, not because it flows from accidents, but because it flows from substance, existing of the genus of accidents; so in the matter proposed. Whence just as unity, which is the principle of number, has its rise from the principles of substance, accidentally related to it, but not from any principle which is in the genus of accident; so it can be understood concerning personal distinction, according to that which in it is accidental, namely the comparison to another person, with respect to which it has to be distinguished and numbered; and the eminence of dignity in the supposit with respect to another nature, which human nature did not have in Christ.

2. 3. As to what is objected, that personal distinction is through quality; it must be said that it is understood of a quality which is in the genus of quality as to the mode, but not as to the thing. For by these two18 the predicaments are distinguished either as to essence, or as to mode; and something is in the genus of substance which nevertheless has the mode of an accident; whence also it has been customary to distinguish a twofold quality, namely substantial and accidental19. — Or it must be said that Richard speaks of personal distinction as to our cognition; and because our cognition is through accidental qualities, he said that created persons are distinguished by quality. — And through this mode is understood the word of Porphyry, who says that the individual is constituted from a collection of properties; for he speaks according to reason and cognition, not according to the thing; and thus the third [objection] is plain.

4. As to what is objected, that in Christ human nature did not have personality; it must be said that this is by reason of that eminence which follows upon nobility; and that supereminence states a certain accidental dignity, as was shown before, which can be lost not only through loss, but also through the super-induction of a worthier [nature], as will be better said elsewhere20.

5. As to what is objected concerning sense and intellect, it must be said that although sense is only of singulars, the intellect nevertheless can be not only of universals, but also of singulars; whence that difference is not to be understood with precision. And this is plain, because the intellect alone comprehends the intrinsic principles of Peter and Plato; and, all accidents being circumscribed, it says them to be discrete and distinct21.

6. As to what is objected concerning number, it must be said that just as upon substantial unity there follows accidental unity inseparably, which is not the principle of indivision, but consequent upon it; so upon substantial diversity there follows number inseparably; yet according to the thing and nature that distinction is from a substantial principle, not an accidental [one]22. And so the whole is plain.

Scholion

I. Into this question falls the problem of the principle of individuation in substances whether corporeal or spiritual, which is more famous for its infinite disputations than for an evident solution, since the Philosopher of the Holy Trinity rightly says, in his celebrated philosophical Summa, p. III, q. 5, in the beginning: « In this matter [there are] as many opinions as heads ».

1. Scotus (here q. 1-5) as to corporeal substances enumerates five opinions, which he strives to overthrow in distinct questions, and these are: 1. A natural substance from its very nature is individual or singular; which is the opinion of the Nominalists. — 2. Individuation is made not through anything positive, but through a twofold negation; thus Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 2, q. 8. — 3. Individuation is made through actual existence, thus Durandus (here q. 2), who says: « The common nature and the individual differ only as conceived and existing ». — 4. It is made through quantity in matter; which opinion is attributed to Giles of Rome. — 5. It is made through matter, as St. Thomas holds. — Finally Scotus (q. 6), dissenting from Sts. Thomas and Bonaventure, posits that a material substance is individual through a certain entity superadded to the specific essence and on the part of the thing formally distinct from it, which is the individual difference, by some called haecceity, through which the individual is constituted in a similar mode as the specific nature through the specific difference. The same principles Scotus applies to individuals in spiritual creatures.

2. As to the opinion of St. Thomas his disciples agree in this, that according to him substantial forms are individuated through matter, so that individual matter is the root of the individuation of the form, and that they are formally individuated through an intrinsic p. 108 and essential order to individual matter; likewise, that of a complete material substance the first principle of individuation is prime matter signed by quantity. But how this comes about is not explained in the same mode by all. — As to pure spirits, since according to the Angelic [Doctor] there are not several in one species, another principle of individuation is now not required; whence he himself says (here q. 1, a. 2): « Incommunicability [personality] is in man from this, that its nature, receptible in the foundation of matter, is determined through matter; but in an angel it is in itself determined from this, that it cannot be received in something as a determinable form; and from this very [fact] it is sufficiently incommunicable, and not through the determination of a recipient » (cf. Summa I, q. 50, a. 4). The same of the angels Giles of Rome holds (here p. 1, q. 2, a. 1).

II. St. Bonaventure (here q. 3, in the body and in reply to 1, 2) does not approve the opinion of Scotus, that beyond the form of the most special species there is a superadded individual form. In this, besides St. Thomas, agree also Alexander of Hales (Summa p. II, q. 20, m. 4, a. 3), Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 4, q. 1), and Durandus (loc. cit.). — Then St. Bonaventure, inasmuch as he posits matter also in spiritual creatures, but not extended, here teaches that individuation in all creatures arises from the conjunction of a twofold principle, by which one appropriates the other to itself, as he clearly explains in question 3, in the body. — Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 2, a. 1), reporting the opinions of others, determines nothing.

III. That the principle of individuation is not in the genus of accident, but of substance, is commonly taught. Nevertheless St. Bonaventure confesses that there is also some truth in the opinion related in the first place, insofar as that which follows individuation, namely distinction from others and number, is an accidental property; which is more explained in the solution to 1. On the account of unity and number cf. I Sent. d. 24, a. 1, q. 1, Scholion.

IV. That personal distinction in man is distinct from individual distinction is established, because Christ's human nature is indeed individual, but is not a human person, whence (here in the body) it is said: « Personal distinction adds upon individual distinction ». On this many [things] have already been said, I Sent. d. 23, a. 1, q. 3; d. 25, a. 1, q. 1, a. 2, q. 1, 2, and d. 34, q. 1, which here are confirmed and with wondrous clarity and profundity are more explained.

V. On the following question 3 the commentators of the Master do not explicitly treat, except Blessed Albert, Summa p. II, tr. 4, q. 15, m. 2, and Dionysius the Carthusian (here q. 2, who only transcribes some [things] from St. Bonaventure); but very many, for this very reason, do not deal with this, because they do not admit a material principle in the angels. — Also concerning this q. 2 few treat: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 20, m. 4, a. 3. — Blessed Albert, Summa p. II, tr. 4, q. 15, m. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1, little question 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4, q. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Comment. in Porphyr. (a se ipso translat.), libr. III. de Specie circa finem; libr. IV. c. de Proprio; libr. V. de Communit. et differentiis speciei et proprii.
    Commentary on Porphyry (translated by himself), book III On Species near the end; book IV, the chapter On the Proper; book V On the Community and Differences of Species and of the Proper.
  2. Libr. IV. de Trin. c. 13.
    Book IV On the Trinity c. 13.
  3. De Praedicab. c. de Specie.
    On the Predicables, the chapter On Species.
  4. In cod. T in marg. additur Boethius in Commentario super Praedicamenta (! Praedicabilia Porphyrii), ubi in fine libri I. ait: Ita quoque generibus et speciebus, id est singularitati et universalitati, unum quidem subiectum est, sed alio modo universale est, cum cogitatur, alio singulare, cum sentitur in rebus his, in quibus habet esse suum. — Codd. aa cc et ed. 1 post universale subiungunt est.
    In codex T, in the margin, is added Boethius in [his] Commentary on the Categories (! the Predicables of Porphyry), where at the end of book I he says: So too to genera and species, that is to singularity and universality, there is indeed one subject, but in another mode it is universal, when it is thought, in another singular, when it is sensed in those things in which it has its being. — Codices aa cc and ed. 1 after universale subjoin est.
  5. Nam secundum Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Quantitate, numerus est discreta quantitas; et secundum Damasc., III. de Fide orthod. c. 5, numerus significat quantitatem dumtaxat earum rerum, quae in numerum cadunt.
    For according to Aristotle, Categories, the chapter On Quantity, number is discrete quantity; and according to Damascene, III On the Orthodox Faith c. 5, number signifies the quantity only of those things which fall into number.
  6. Hic c. 2.
    Here, c. 2.
  7. Boeth., de Duabus Naturis et una persona, c. 3. — De prop. seq. cfr. supra pag. 48, nota 1.
    Boethius, On the Two Natures and the One Person, c. 3. — On the following proposition cf. above p. 48, note 1.
  8. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Substantia, in cuius expositione Boeth. ait: « Principaliter vero individuae substantiae dictae sunt, quod omne accidens prius in individua, post vero in secundas substantias venit. Nam quoniam Aristarchus grammaticus est, homo vero est Aristarchus, est homo grammaticus: ita prius omne accidens in individuum venit, secundo vero loco etiam in species generaque substantiarum accidens illud venire putabitur ». Aristoteles ibidem hanc rationem addit: Color in corpore est; ergo et in quodam corpore; nam si non in aliquo esset singulorum, nec omnino in corpore. — Paulo inferius cod. L substantiae rationali, quam habet pro substantiae rationalis, quam habeat.
    Aristotle, Categories, the chapter On Substance, in the exposition of which Boethius says: « But individual substances are said [to be substances] principally, because every accident comes first into individuals, and then into second substances. For since Aristarchus is a grammarian, and a man is Aristarchus, a man is a grammarian: so first every accident comes into the individual, but in the second place that accident will be thought to come also into the species and genera of substances ». Aristotle in the same place adds this reason: Color is in a body; therefore also in some [particular] body; for if it were not in some one of the singulars, it would not be in body at all. — A little below codex L [reads] substantiae rationali, quam habet for substantiae rationalis, quam habeat.
  9. Codd. I bb in personalitate.
    Codices I bb [read] in personalitate.
  10. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Substantia: Substantia vero, cum unum et idem numero sit, susceptiva contrariorum est, ut quidam homo, cum unus et idem sit, aliquando quidem albus, aliquando fit niger etc. A Porphyrio, de Praedicab. c. de Differentia, haec discretio vocatur alteritas.
    Aristotle, Categories, the chapter On Substance: But substance, since it is one and the same in number, is receptive of contraries, as a certain man, since he is one and the same, is sometimes white, sometimes becomes black, etc. By Porphyry, On the Predicables, the chapter On Difference, this distinction is called otherness.
  11. Aristot., I. Topic. c. 6. (c. 5.): Tertium vero [aliquid idem dicitur], quando ab accidente, ut sedens vel musicum Socrati; omnia enim haec unum numero volunt significare. Cfr. V. Metaph. text. 16. (IV. c. 9.).
    Aristotle, I Topics c. 6 (c. 5): But a third [thing is said to be the same], when [it is so] from an accident, like the sitting or the musical to Socrates; for all these wish to signify [something] one in number. Cf. V Metaphysics text 16 (IV, c. 9).
  12. Multi codd. dubiae sunt lectionis: legi siquidem potest dicunt vel dicit, quod etiam edd. 2, 3 ponunt.
    Many codices are of doubtful reading: for it can be read dicunt or dicit, which edd. 2, 3 also put.
  13. In cod. T additur sive substantiis.
    In codex T is added sive substantiis.
  14. Cod. U subiungit quae sunt materia et forma, cod. M coniunctione. Sola Vat. bis substituit indivisio pro individuatio.
    Codex U subjoins quae sunt materia et forma, codex M coniunctione. The Vatican [edition] alone twice substitutes indivisio for individuatio.
  15. Vat. hic interserit dicit.
    The Vatican [edition] here interposes dicit.
  16. Haec etymologia nominis personae invenitur in Boeth., de Duabus Naturis et una persona, c. 3. Cfr. tom. I. p. 405, nota 11. Plura de re, quae hic proponitur, vide I. Sent. d. 34. per totam, et III. Sent. d. 5. a. 2. q. 2. seqq. ac d. 10. a. 1. q. 2. seq. — Paulo superius cod. V specialem eminentiam pro actualem eminentiam. Aliquanto inferius Vat. bis omittit particulam ex voci existentia praefixam.
    This etymology of the name persona is found in Boethius, On the Two Natures and the One Person, c. 3. Cf. tom. I, p. 405, note 11. For more on the matter which is here proposed, see I Sent. d. 34 throughout, and III Sent. d. 5, a. 2, q. 2 ff., and d. 10, a. 1, q. 2 f. — A little above codex V [reads] specialem eminentiam for actualem eminentiam. Somewhat below the Vatican [edition] twice omits the particle ex prefixed to the word existentia.
  17. Vat., contradicentibus mss. et ed. 1, etsi ex ipsis formatur causaliter, tamen est etc., quae etiam in fine solutionis post non habuit addit nec habet.
    The Vatican [edition], the manuscripts and ed. 1 contradicting [it, reads] etsi ex ipsis formatur causaliter, tamen est etc., which also at the end of the solution after non habuit adds nec habet.
  18. Supple cum codd. K Y modis. Dein cod. cc et ed. 1 substituunt praedicata pro praedicamenta.
    Supply, with codices K Y, modis. Then codex cc and ed. 1 substitute praedicata for praedicamenta.
  19. Cfr. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 19. (IV. c. 14.).
    Cf. Aristotle, V Metaphysics text 19 (IV, c. 14).
  20. Libr. III. Sent. d. 5. a. 2. q. 2. seqq. et d. 10. a. 1. q. 2. seq.
    Book III Sentences d. 5, a. 2, q. 2 ff., and d. 10, a. 1, q. 2 f.
  21. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 2. ad 2.
    Cf. I Sentences d. 39, a. 1, q. 2, in reply to 2.
  22. Vat. individuationis.
    The Vatican [edition reads] individuationis. ---
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