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Dist. 3, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 3

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 3

Textus Latinus
p. 108

Quaestio III. Utrum discretio personalis sit a parte principii formalis, vel materialis.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum discretio personalis sit a parte principii formalis, vel materialis. Et quod a parte principii formalis:

1. Richardus1 dicit, « quod tam in Angelis, quam in hominibus est discretio personalis per qualitatem »; sed qualitas aut est forma, aut tenet se ex parte formae: ergo etc.

2. Item, si aliquid inest aliquibus et est in eis commune per analogiam, necesse est, quod insit per aliquid analogice repertum in eis2. Personalis autem discretio est in divinis et in Angelis analogice; sed in divinis nullo modo est a materia, quia Deus est pura forma: ergo etc.

3. Item, personalis discretio in creatura dicit maximam nobilitatem; sed quod magis nobile est maxime elongatur a materia et maxime accedit ad formam: ergo etc.

4. Item, personalis discretio dicit maximam actualitatem3 in creatura, quia quod tale est nullo modo est ad alterum possibile; omne autem tale consequitur formam, non materiam: ergo etc.

5. Item, nihil quod est unum in omnibus, est principium discretionis; materia, quantum est de se, unica est4: ergo nullo modo est principium discretionis: ergo nec discretionis personalis.

6. Item, « definitio, ut vult Philosophus5, est aggregati »: ergo cum definitur homo, non forma tantum, sed compositum ex materia et forma definitur: ergo si homo in communi claudit in se materiam, et natura rationalis similiter; si persona addit aliquid super naturam, cum non possit addere materiam, oportet, quod addat aliquid formale.

Contra: 1. Boethius6: « Species est totum esse individuorum »; sed esse est a forma: ergo individuum supra speciem non addit formam, ergo nec persona supra naturam. Si ergo aliquid addit, aut materiam, aut accidentia; sed per accidentia non potest esse discretio personalis vel individualis: ergo necesse est, quod per materiam.

2. Item, si persona adderet aliquam formam supra naturam, ergo sicut species est definibilis, quia addit differentiam et formam supra genus, ita p. 109 etiam individuum esset definibile; quod falsum est7.

3. Item, si individuum sive persona addit formam individuantem supra speciem specialissimam, quaero, utrum Conditor8 possit facere aliam formam per omnia illi consimilem. Constat, quod sic, quia nulla est forma accidentalis, cuius similem non possumus cogitare: ergo similiter in substantiali. Sed si facit similem, illa est communis pluribus; sed nihil tale est individuum: ergo impossibile est, discretionem personalem esse a principio formali superaddito speciei.

4. Item, ab eodem est discretio personalis, a quo est distinctio secundum numerum; sed illa est a materia, sicut dicit Philosophus in prima Philosophia9: « Omnino materia numerabiliter se habet »: ergo etc.

5. Item, ab eodem est personalis discretio, a quo est esse hoc, sive hic et nunc; sed hoc est materia, quia in libro de Caelo et mundo10 dicitur, « quod differt dicere caelum et hoc caelum, quia, cum dico caelum, dico formam; cum dico hoc caelum, dico materiam »: ergo etc.

6. Item, in creaturis, in quibus est personalis discretio per originem, non est ob aliud, nisi quia generans generat aliud; sed, ut dicit Philosophus11, « generans non generat aliud nisi propter materiam »: ergo in rebus creatis est personalis discretio propter materiam.

Conclusio

Quatenus personalis discretio dicit singularitatem, ipsa, sicut individuatio, consurgit ex coniunctione duplicis principii; quatenus dicit dignitatem, sequitur principaliter rationem formae.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod haec eadem est quaestio de individuatione, quae nunc movetur de personali discretione; et de ipsa fuit contentio inter philosophicos viros12.

Quidam enim innitentes verbo Philosophi dixerunt, quod individuatio venit a materia, quia individuum supra speciem non addit nisi materiam. Et hoc ponebant, quia dixerunt, universalia solum dicere formas; et tunc primo tangitur materia, quando pervenitur ad hoc aliquid13.

Aliis vero aliter visum est, scilicet quod individuatio esset a forma, et dixerunt, quod ultra formam speciei specialissimae est forma individualis. Et quod movit hos ponere illud fuit, quod intellexerunt, ordinem in formis secundum generationem et naturam esse per eundem modum, per quem ordinantur in genere, ita quod forma generis generalissimi primo advenit materiae; et sic descendendo usque ad speciem. Et adhuc forma illa non constituit individuum, quia non est omnino in actu, sed ultra hanc formam individualis subsequitur, quae est omnino in actu, sicut materia fuit omnino in potentia14.

Quaelibet istarum positionum aliquid habet, quod homini non15 multum intelligenti rationabiliter videri poterit improbabile. Quomodo enim materia, quae omnibus est communis, erit principale principium et causa distinctionis, valde difficile est videre. Rursus, quomodo forma sit tota et praecipua causa numeralis distinctionis, valde difficile est capere, cum omnis forma creata, quantum est de sui natura, nata sit habere aliam similem, sicut et ipse Philosophus16 dicit etiam in sole et luna esse. Vel quomodo dicemus, duos ignes differre formaliter, vel etiam alia, quae plurificantur et numero distinguuntur ex sola divisione continui, ubi nullius est novae formae inductio?

Ideo est tertia positio satis planior, quod individuatio consurgit ex actuali coniunctione materiae cum forma, ex qua coniunctione unum sibi appropriat alterum; sicut patet, cum impressio vel expressio fit multorum sigillorum in cera, quae prius erat una, nec sigilla plurificari possunt sine cera, nec cera numeratur, nisi quia fiunt in ea diversa sigilla. Si tamen quaeras, a quo veniat principaliter; dicendum, quod individuum est hoc aliquid. Quod sit hoc, principalius habet a materia, ratione cuius forma habet positionem in loco et tempore17. Quod p. 110 sit aliquid, habet a forma. Individuum enim habet esse, habet etiam existere. Existere18 dat materia formae, sed essendi actum dat forma materiae. — Individuatio igitur in creaturis consurgit ex duplici principio.

Personalis autem discretio dicit singularitatem et dignitatem. In quantum dicit singularitatem, hoc dicit ex ipsa coniunctione principiorum, ex quibus resultat ipsum quod est. Sed dignitatem dicit principaliter ratione formae; et sic patet, unde sit personalis discretio originaliter, in creaturis loquendo, sive in hominibus, sive in Angelis.

Quae ergo obiiciuntur ad primam partem, procedunt ratione nobilitatis et dignitatis, prout tamen est in ipso supposito, sive quod est, cuius distinctio venit in divinis ex origine, in creaturis ex principiis originalibus, sicut in primo libro19 fuit ostensum. Si autem quaeratur: quid est illud commune, secundum quod inest? dicendum, quod proprietas dignitatis incommunicabiliter existens in hypostasi; aliter tamen reperitur hic, aliter ibi20. Omnes rationes sequentes procedunt via praedicta.

1. 2. 3. Quod obiicitur ad oppositum, quod non possit esse a forma, sed a materia; dicendum, quod rationes illae probant, ut patet, quod non totaliter est a forma, quia forma nulla est individua, nisi propter coniunctionem sui cum materia. Et universalia similiter, quia dicunt formas21, non concernunt materiam nisi ratione suorum individuorum, pro quibus supponunt, quando definiuntur vel subiiciuntur. Unde illae rationes concedendae sunt, quod individuum non addit aliam formam, quae sit individualis de se.

4. 5. 6. Quod obiicitur, quod individuatio est a materia; dicendum, quod per illas auctoritates non datur intelligi, quod materia sit principium individuationis, nisi sicut causa sine qua non, non autem sicut tota causa. Nec tamen ita potest attribui materiae personalis discretio, sicut individuatio, propter hoc quod dicit dignitatem, quae principalius respicit formam, sicut ostendunt rationes ad primam partem22.

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English Translation

Question III. Whether personal distinction is on the side of the formal principle, or the material.

Thirdly it is asked whether personal distinction is on the side of the formal principle, or the material. And that [it is] on the side of the formal principle:

1. Richard1 says, « that both in the angels and in men there is personal distinction by quality »; but quality is either form, or holds itself on the side of form: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, if something is present in certain [things] and is common in them by analogy, it is necessary that it be present through something analogically found in them2. But personal distinction is in divine [things] and in the angels analogically; but in divine [things] it is in no way from matter, because God is pure form: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, personal distinction in a creature states the greatest nobility; but what is more noble is most removed from matter and most approaches form: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, personal distinction states the greatest actuality3 in a creature, because what is such is in no way possible toward another; but everything such follows form, not matter: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, nothing which is one in all is a principle of distinction; matter, as far as it is of itself, is unique4: therefore in no way is it a principle of distinction: therefore neither of personal distinction.

6. Likewise, « a definition, as the Philosopher holds5, is of an aggregate »: therefore since man is defined, not the form only, but the composite of matter and form is defined: therefore if man in common encloses matter in himself, and the rational nature likewise; if a person adds something upon the nature, since it cannot add matter, it must be that it adds something formal.

On the contrary: 1. Boethius6: « The species is the whole being of individuals »; but being is from form: therefore the individual does not add form upon the species, therefore neither [does] the person [add form] upon the nature. If therefore it adds something, [it adds] either matter, or accidents; but through accidents there cannot be personal or individual distinction: therefore it is necessary that [it be] through matter.

2. Likewise, if a person added some form upon the nature, then just as the species is definable, because it adds a difference and form upon the genus, so p. 109 too the individual would be definable; which is false7.

3. Likewise, if the individual or person adds an individuating form upon the most special species, I ask whether the Creator8 can make another form altogether like to it. It is established that [He] can, because there is no accidental form whose like we cannot conceive: therefore likewise in a substantial [form]. But if He makes a like [one], that is common to several; but no such [thing] is an individual: therefore it is impossible that personal distinction be from a formal principle superadded to the species.

4. Likewise, personal distinction is from the same [source] from which is distinction according to number; but that is from matter, as the Philosopher says in the first Philosophy9: « Matter altogether behaves numerably »: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, personal distinction is from the same [source] from which is being this, or here and now; but this is matter, because in the book On the Heaven and the World10 it is said, « that it differs to say heaven and this heaven, because, when I say heaven, I say the form; when I say this heaven, I say the matter »: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, in creatures in which there is personal distinction by origin, it is not on account of anything else, except because the generator generates another; but, as the Philosopher says11, « the generator does not generate another except on account of matter »: therefore in created things personal distinction is on account of matter.

Conclusion

Insofar as personal distinction states singularity, it, like individuation, arises from the conjunction of a twofold principle; insofar as it states dignity, it follows principally the account of form.

I respond: It must be said that this is the same question of individuation which is now moved concerning personal distinction; and concerning it there was a contention among philosophical men12.

For some, leaning on the word of the Philosopher, said that individuation comes from matter, because the individual does not add upon the species except matter. And they posited this because they said that universals state only forms; and then matter is first touched when one arrives at this something13.

But to others it seemed otherwise, namely that individuation is from form, and they said that beyond the form of the most special species there is an individual form. And what moved these to posit that was that they understood the order in forms according to generation and nature to be by the same mode by which they are ordered in the genus, so that the form of the most general genus comes first to matter; and so descending down to the species. And still that form does not constitute the individual, because it is not wholly in act, but beyond this form an individual [form] follows, which is wholly in act, just as matter was wholly in potency14.

Each of these positions has something which to a man not much understanding could reasonably15 seem improbable. For how matter, which is common to all, will be the principal principle and cause of distinction, is very difficult to see. Again, how form would be the whole and chief cause of numerical distinction is very difficult to grasp, since every created form, as far as is of its nature, is born to have another like [itself], just as the Philosopher16 himself says it to be even in the sun and the moon. Or how shall we say that two fires differ formally, or also the other [things] which are multiplied and distinguished in number from the mere division of the continuous, where there is no induction of a new form?

Therefore there is a third position, sufficiently plainer, that individuation arises from the actual conjunction of matter with form, from which conjunction one appropriates the other to itself; as is plain, when the impression or expression of many seals is made in wax which previously was one, and the seals cannot be multiplied without the wax, nor is the wax numbered, except because there come to be in it diverse seals. If however you ask from what it comes principally; it must be said that the individual is this something. That it be this, it has more principally from matter, by reason of which form has its position in place and time17. That p. 110 it be something, it has from form. For the individual has being, has also to-exist. To-exist18 matter gives to form, but the act of being form gives to matter. — Individuation therefore in creatures arises from a twofold principle.

But personal distinction states singularity and dignity. Insofar as it states singularity, this it states from the very conjunction of principles, from which results the that-which-is itself. But dignity it states principally by reason of form; and so it is plain whence personal distinction is originally, speaking in creatures, whether in men or in the angels.

What therefore is objected against the first part proceeds by reason of nobility and dignity, as it is however in that supposit, or that-which-is, whose distinction comes in divine [things] from origin, in creatures from original principles, as in the first book19 was shown. But if it be asked: what is that common [thing] according to which it is present? it must be said [that it is] the property of dignity incommunicably existing in the hypostasis; yet it is found otherwise here, otherwise there20. All the following reasons proceed by the aforesaid way.

1. 2. 3. As to what is objected on the opposite side, that it cannot be from form, but from matter; it must be said that those reasons prove, as is plain, that it is not wholly from form, because no form is individual except through the conjunction of itself with matter. And universals likewise, because they state forms21, do not concern matter except by reason of their individuals, for which they stand when they are defined or made subjects. Whence those reasons are to be conceded, that the individual does not add another form which would be individual of itself.

4. 5. 6. As to what is objected, that individuation is from matter; it must be said that through those authorities it is not given to be understood that matter is the principle of individuation, except as a cause without which not, but not as the whole cause. Nor however can personal distinction be attributed to matter in the same way as individuation, on account of this, that it states dignity, which more principally regards form, as the reasons to the first part show22.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Libr. IV. de Trin. c. 14. Cfr. supra pag. 104, nota 5. Minorem insinuat Aristot., XI. Metaph. c. 5. (X. c. 6.): Substantia vero secundum quale, hoc enim determinatae naturae, quantum vero indeterminatae est. — Paulo superius post formalis codd. U aa supplent videtur.
    Book IV On the Trinity c. 14. Cf. above p. 104, note 5. The minor is insinuated by Aristotle, XI Metaphysics c. 5 (X, c. 6): But substance [is] according to quale, for this [is] of a determinate nature, but the quantum is indeterminate. — A little above, after formalis, codices U aa supply videtur.
  2. Vide supra pag. 26, nota 5. Minor iam probata est I. Sent. d. 25. a. 2. q. 2.
    See above p. 26, note 5. The minor has already been proved, I Sentences d. 25, a. 2, q. 2.
  3. Ita codd. F U Y; alii codd. auctoritatem, Vat. auctoritatem et actualitatem. Verbum auctoritas, quod minus placet, intelligendum esset, ut sit proprietas ad nobilitatem pertinens (I. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 1; d. 25. a. 1. q. 2.), vel principalitas (ibid. d. 9. dub. 11.).
    Thus codices F U Y; other codices auctoritatem, the Vatican [edition] auctoritatem et actualitatem. The word auctoritas, which pleases less, would have to be understood so that it be a property pertaining to nobility (I Sent. d. 23, a. 1, q. 1; d. 25, a. 1, q. 2), or principality (ibid. d. 9, dub. 11).
  4. Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 2.
    Cf. above a. 1, q. 2.
  5. Libr. VIII. Metaph. text 9. (VII. c. 3.) dicit, substantiae compositae dari definitionem, non tamen eorum, ex quibus primo componitur, cum sint simplicia, « siquidem aliquid de aliquo significat ratio definitiva; et oportet hoc quidem ut materiam, illud vero ut formam esse ». Quae verba Averroes ita exponit: « Impossibile enim est, ut formae ultimae in definitionibus habeant definitionem; quoniam formae ultimae sunt simplices, et definitiones sunt compositorum; definitiones enim rerum sunt ex materiis et formis » etc. Idem dicit ibid. text. 16. respectu altissimorum generum, v. g. entis, unius. Cfr. text. 6. et VII. Metaph. text. 40. seqq. (VI. c. 11.). — Paulo inferius post non forma tantum codd. F K adiungunt vel materia tantum. Dein aliqui codd. ut F aa et naturam pro et natura.
    Book VIII Metaphysics text 9 (VII, c. 3) says that to a composite substance a definition is given, yet not of those [things] from which it is first composed, since they are simple, « if indeed the definitive account signifies something of something; and it is necessary that this be as matter, that as form ». Which words Averroes thus expounds: « For it is impossible that the ultimate forms have a definition in definitions; because the ultimate forms are simple, and definitions are of composites; for definitions of things are from matters and forms » etc. He says the same ibid. text 16 with respect to the highest genera, e.g. of being, of one. Cf. text 6 and VII Metaphysics text 40 ff. (VI, c. 11). — A little below, after non forma tantum, codices F K add vel materia tantum. Then some codices, like F aa, [read] et naturam for et natura.
  6. Libr. III. Comment. in Porphyr. agens de Specie ait: Homo vero Socratis atque Ciceronis tota substantia est. — Quod forma det esse, docet Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 60. (VI. c. 17.), et Boeth., de Unitate et Uno.
    Book III of the Commentary on Porphyry, treating of Species, says: But man is the whole substance of Socrates and of Cicero. — That form gives being, Aristotle teaches, VII Metaphysics text 60 (VI, c. 17), and Boethius, On Unity and the One.
  7. Ut ostendit Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 38-41. (VI. c. 10. seq.).
    As Aristotle shows, VII Metaphysics text 38–41 (VI, c. 10 f.).
  8. Plures codd. conditio, aliqui cogitatio, Vat. additio; perperam et contra maiorem partem mss. et ed. 1.
    Several codices [read] conditio, some cogitatio, the Vatican [edition] additio; wrongly and against the greater part of the manuscripts and ed. 1.
  9. Libr. XIV. c. 8. (XIII. c. 5.). Cfr. supra pag. 89, nota 7.
    Book XIV, c. 8 (XIII, c. 5). Cf. above p. 89, note 7.
  10. Libr. I. text. 92. et 93. (c. 9.).
    Book I, text 92 and 93 (c. 9).
  11. Libr. VII. Metaph. text. 28. (VI. c. 8.), ubi impugnat formas Platonicas hac ratione, quod nihil prosint ad generationes, et dicit: Sed generans sufficiens est, ut faciat et causa sit formae in materia; tota vero iam talis forma in his carnibus et ossibus, Callias et Socrates; et diversa quidem propter materiam [versio Arabico-latina: aliud propter materiam] etc.
    Book VII Metaphysics text 28 (VI, c. 8), where he attacks the Platonic forms by this reason, that they avail nothing toward generations, and says: But the generator is sufficient, that it make and be the cause of the form in matter; but the whole such form [is] now in these flesh and bones, Callias and Socrates; and [they are] diverse indeed on account of matter [the Arabic-Latin version: another on account of matter] etc.
  12. Cod. aa philosophos nostros; ed. 1 physicos viros. Dein plures codd. cum ed. 1 verbis pro verbo.
    Codex aa [reads] philosophos nostros; ed. 1 physicos viros. Then several codices, with ed. 1, [read] verbis for verbo.
  13. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Substantia: Omnis autem substantia videtur hoc aliquid significare. In primis [singularibus] igitur substantiis indubitabile et verum est, quod hoc aliquid significant. Individuum enim et unum numero est quod significatur. In secundis vero substantiis [generibus, speciebus] videtur quidem similiter... non tamen verum est, sed magis quale aliquid significant; neque enim unum est quod subiectum est, quemadmodum prima substantia, sed de multis homo dicitur et animal.
    Aristotle, Categories, the chapter On Substance: But every substance seems to signify this something. In the first [singular] substances therefore it is indubitable and true that they signify this something. For it is the individual and the one in number that is signified. But in the second substances [genera, species] it seems indeed similarly... yet it is not true, but rather they signify a what-of-a-certain-sort; for neither is that which is the subject one, just as a first substance, but man and animal are said of many.
  14. Hanc opinionem proponit Averroes, Comment. super I. Metaph. text. 17.
    This opinion Averroes proposes, Commentary on I Metaphysics text 17.
  15. Vat., contradicentibus mss. et tribus prioribus edd., homini multum intelligenti, omissa particula non. — Verba in textu nostro S. Doctori a sua humilitate inspirata sunt. — Aliquanto inferius codd. I bb post quae omnibus addunt creaturis.
    The Vatican [edition], the manuscripts and the three prior editions contradicting [it, reads] homini multum intelligenti, the particle non being omitted. — The words in our text were inspired in the Holy Doctor by his humility. — Somewhat below, codices I bb after quae omnibus add creaturis.
  16. Libr. VII. Metaph. text. 55. (VI. c. 15.). Cfr. etiam I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 92. (c. 9.).
    Book VII Metaphysics text 55 (VI, c. 15). Cf. also I On the Heaven and the World, text 92 (c. 9).
  17. Cfr. supra d. 2. p. 1. a. 1. q. 2. in corp. De iis quae sequuntur, vide hic a. 1. q. 2. in corp.
    Cf. above d. 2, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2, in the body. On the [things] which follow, see here a. 1, q. 2, in the body.
  18. In alio sensu ac recentiores s. Doctor intelligit terminum existere; cfr. p. 96, nota 5.
    In another sense than the more recent [authors] the Holy Doctor understands the term existere; cf. p. 96, note 5.
  19. Dist. 34. q. 1, cfr. Schol. ad q. 2. — Paulo supra nonnulli codd. sive qui est pro sive quod est.
    Distinction 34, q. 1, cf. the Scholion to q. 2. — A little above some codices [read] sive qui est for sive quod est.
  20. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 25. a. 2. q. 1. et etiam q. 2, ex qua insuper patet, quomodo intelligenda sint verba: quid est illud commune, secundum quod inest, scil. proprietas personalis. Nam v. g. Petrus et Paulus nomen personae habent commune.
    Cf. I Sentences d. 25, a. 2, q. 1, and also q. 2, from which it is moreover plain how the words are to be understood: what is that common [thing] according to which it is present, namely the personal property. For e.g. Peter and Paul have the name person in common.
  21. Fere omnes codd. in hac prop. omittunt coniunctionem quia, pro qua cod. cc et ed. 1 substituunt quae ac hic addunt particulam et; cod. bb vero substituit prout; cod. F hic adiicit quae, cod. Q ponit nec pro non, cod. I non tamen, cod. I non autem.
    Almost all codices in this proposition omit the conjunction quia, for which codex cc and ed. 1 substitute quae and here add the particle et; codex bb however substitutes prout; codex F here adds quae, codex Q puts nec for non, codex I non tamen, codex I non autem.
  22. Vide Schol. ad praeced. quaest.
    See the Scholion to the preceding question. ---
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