Dist. 3, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 3
Articulus I. De qualitate, quam Angelus habuit in sua creatione.
Quaestio I. Utrum Deus malum condiderit Angelum.
Quod autem Deus fecerit ipsum malum, videtur:
1. Per auctoritates, quas adducit Magister in littera1. Videtur etiam per rationes, quia oppositio mali ad bonum decorat universum, et confert saluti et gloriae Beatorum. Cum igitur Deus posset in omnem decorem et in omne quod utile est saluti electorum, et iterum ipsum facere sit conveniens; videtur, quod Deus non tantum fecerit Angelos bonos, sed etiam malos et caput malorum, scilicet ipsum luciferum. Et hoc est quod videtur dici Ecclesiastici trigesimo tertio2: « Contra malum bonum, et contra mortem vita, et contra virum iustum peccator: et sic intuere in omnia opera Altissimi ».
2. Item, hoc videtur ex ordine. Inter naturam, quae est apta nata habere iustitiam et habet, et p. 113 inter naturam, quae non est apta nata habere nec habet, cadit media illa natura, quae est apta nata habere et non habet iustitiam; sed Deus potest facere extrema et congruit eum facere: ergo pari ratione potest et congruit ei facere mediam: ergo naturam, quae est apta nata habere iustitiam, et non habentem congruit Deum facere. Sed talis est natura mala, scilicet creatura rationalis mala: ergo etc.
3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur a simili. Sicut natura rationalis est mala, quae non habet iustitiam, ad quam est nata, ita creatura irrationalis3 — unde canis, cum sit natus ad latrandum, si non habet latratum, est malus — ergo cum Deus possit creaturas facere deficientes operationibus, ad quas natae sunt, ut puta canem non latrantem et oculum caecum, pari ratione potest facere voluntatem carentem iustitia. Si tu dicas, quod non est simile, quia creatura rationalis immediate ordinatur ad Deum, non sic irrationalis4; obiicitur tunc ulterius, quod intellectus noster immediate ordinatur in Deum. Sed Deus potest facere intellectum carentem scientia, ad quam est sive quam debet habere, scilicet ignorantem; sicut dicit Augustinus in tertio libro de Libero Arbitrio5, quod si Deus talem condidisset hominem ante peccatum, qualis nunc est, nemo posset ex hoc accusare.
4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur a minori. Plus dependet materia a forma perfectiva et magis est imperfecta in genere creaturarum sive entium, quam faciat6 rationalis natura a iustitia — sed hoc manifestum est, quia materia sine forma est ens omnino incompletum — sed creatura rationalis sine iustitia habet quodam modo esse completum. Cum igitur Deus fecerit materiam informem, ad minus sine distinctione formarum, sicut dicunt multi Sancti7: ergo pari ratione potuit facere Angelum sine iustitia, quam debebat habere. Sed Anselmus dicit, « quod malum nihil aliud est quam privatio boni, ubi debet esse »: ergo videtur etc.
Contra: 1. Genesis primo8: Vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona: ergo, cum valde bona supponant bonum, cuncta quae Deus fecit, erant bona: ergo nihil malum.
2. Item, Dionysius9: « Optimi est optima adducere »: ergo si Deus est optimus, non potest ergo producere malum, ita quod faciat malitiam in eo. Et eodem libro de Divinis Nominibus dicit, « quod sicut a calido non egreditur nisi calidum, ita nec a summo bono nisi bonum ».
3. Item, omne quod Deus indidit unicuique rei a sua conditione, est ei naturale: ergo si Deus fecisset Angelum malum, esset ei malitia naturalis. Sed pro naturalibus nemo est vituperandus, nemo puniendus10: ergo nec vituperandus nec puniendus esset diabolus.
4. Item, si aliquod factum vitium facit aliquem dignum poena, magis facit actorem dignum quam alium11: si ergo diabolus ob suam malitiam dignus est poena, si Deus eum fecisset malum, magis esset Deus dignus poena quam diabolus; sed hoc est absurdissimum: ergo etc.
Conclusio
Falsum est et impossibile, Deum fecisse Angelum originaliter malum.
Respondeo: Ponere, quod diabolus a Deo habuit originaliter sibi innatam malitiam voluntatis, non tantum falsum est, immo haereticum; et est falsum12, quod in se habet evidentiam suae falsitatis, si quis advertat.
Nam opus Dei, eo ipso quod opus Dei est, necesse est, ipsum esse laudabile, ordinabile, acceptabile, perfectum vel perfectibile.
Nihil enim facit Deus quod non deceat suam maiestatem. Si ergo magnus Dominus et laudabilis nimis13, et in tantum laudabilis, quod non tantum in se, sed etiam in nullo opere potest vituperari iuste, immo in omnibus digne laudari: impossibile est, quod faciat opus vituperabile, quantum est de ipso auctore. Sed malum, eo ipso quod malum culpae, dignum est vituperio: ergo impossibile est, quod aliqua creatura ab ipso habeat istam conditionem. Et rursus, non tantum malum dignum est vituperio, immo est14 quodam modo in Dei vituperium. Si ergo Deus faceret creaturam malam, ipse faceret sibi vituperium et contumeliam.
Necesse est etiam15 esse ordinabile, quia nihil facit, nisi quod deceat suam sapientiam; sed nihil quod Deus facit, est ordinabile in poena, quia tunc Deus destrueret opera sua, et ita se praevaricatorem constitueret. « Deus enim illius rei est ultor, cuius non est auctor16 ». Ergo si Deus facit creaturam malam malitia culpae, erit ergo ordinabilis; et non in poena: ergo malum culpae maneret inultum sive impunitum, salvo ordine universi. Sed hoc est impossibile per se, quia tunc malum esset bonum per se, si aliter esset ordinatum: ergo si Deus faceret creaturam malam, creatura non esset mala.
Necesse est etiam, quod sit acceptabile. Nihil enim facit Deus, nisi quod vult; sed omne quod Deus vult, iusta et bona17 voluntate vult: ergo cum omne quod iusta et aequa voluntas approbat, sit omnibus acceptabile, si Deus faceret malum, malum esset omnibus acceptabile: ergo acceptare malum esset bonum, pari ratione et facere: ergo malum esset bonum.
Necesse est etiam, quod omne quod Deus facit, sit perfectum vel perfectibile, cum Dei perfecta sint opera18. Ergo omne quod est in opere Dei a Deo, vel est de perfectione, vel inclinat ad perfectionem. Si ergo malitia est a Deo in creatura rationali, ergo vel est de perfectione Angeli, vel disponit ad perfectionem; sed nihil tale deordinat: ergo malum non deordinaret, et si non deordinaret, non noceret: ergo malum esset aliquid et non noceret.
Cum igitur hic sint quatuor incompossibilia manifesta, manifestum est, quod falsum est et impossibile, Deum fecisse Angelum originaliter malum. Et venit ista impossibilitas ex summa perfectione et nobilitate19 operantis et vilitate mali culpae: privat enim illas quatuor conditiones nobiles, quas necesse est esse in omni divino opere, non quia Deus teneatur operi illas dare, sed quia non decet eius voluntatem aliter operari vel facere.
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod facit ad decorem; dico, quod est mali productio, et producti ordinatio. Productio mali foedat et turpat, quantum est de se, sed ordinatio decorat. Et quoniam Deus non potest foedare, sed decorare; ideo non potuit producere, sed ordinare secundum antithesim. Et secundum hoc intelligit Ecclesiasticus: Contra bonum malum, non quia Deus fecerit, sed quia quod in suis operibus factum invenit ordinavit.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de natura, quae nata est habere iustitiam etc.; dicendum, quod cum dico naturam privatam iustitia, duo dico, scilicet quod natura est, et quod privata. In quantum natura, tenet medium et sequitur argumentum; in quantum vero privata, non tenet medium, immo locum infimum, immo ipsa privatio nullum20, quantum est de se, quia nihil est. Et ideo non valet, quod eam privatam fecerit. Et si tu obiicias, quod maior privatio est non habere nec actum nec aptitudinem, quam habere aptitudinem et non actum; dicendum, quod maior est privatio, si accipiatur large privatio21; sed tamen ista est deformis, illa non. Unde cum dico: lignum non videt, dico negationem, sed non deformitatem; cum dico: homo non videt, dico utrumque. Et sic patet illud.
3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur a simili in aliis naturis, et a minori in ipsa materia; dico, quod non est ibi locus a simili nec a minori, si bene consideretur. Malum enim culpae aliter importat deordinationem sive privationem ordinis quam malum naturae vel poenae, quia, sicut dictum est distinctione quadragesima septima primi libri22, malum culpae dicit deordinationem sive privationem ordinis principalis, qui scilicet est imaginis ad Deum immediate; malum vero naturae vel poenae deordinationem ordinis non principalis, sed particularis. Et hinc est, quod Deus, salva condecentia suae bonitatis et sapientiae, potest facere rem malam malitia poenae, vel defectu naturae23, non sic privatam ordine iustitiae ex ea parte, qua procedit ab ipsa dispositione divinae sapientiae. Unde non sequitur: potest Deus facere hominem caecum: ergo potest facere iniquum.
I. Quod Angelus in primo instanti fuerit malus, dupliciter potest intelligi: vel quod a Deo creatus fuerit malus, vel quod bonus creatus ipse in primo instanti se fecerit malum. De quaestione in primo sensu hic agitur, de altera in seq. quaest. Haec prima militat contra pestiferos Manichaeos et contra omnes, qui malum culpae eodem modo, sicut malum poenae, Deo auctori attribuere non erubescunt. De hoc dicit Concil. Later. cap. Firmiter: « Diabolus et alii daemones a Deo quidem natura creati sunt boni, sed ipsi per se facti sunt mali ». De Manichaeis cfr. supra d. 1. p. 1. a. 2. q. 1.
II. Alex. Hal. S. p. II. q. 98. m. 1. a. 3. — Scoti loci collecti a Montefortino in Sum. t. II. p. I. q. 63. a. 4. — S. Thom., S. I. q. 63. a. 4; S. c. Gent. III. c. 107; de Malo, q. 16. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 13; S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 18. a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 8. q. 1. — Ægid. R., hic p. II. q. 1. a. 1. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. II. Sent. d. 4. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 4. — Biel, de hac et seq. q. II. Sent. d. 4. q. unica circa finem.
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Article I. On the quality which the angel had in its creation.
Question I. Whether God made the angel evil.
That God made it evil, seems [so]:
1. By the authorities which the Master adduces in the text1. It seems also by reasons, because the opposition of evil to good adorns the universe, and contributes to the salvation and glory of the Blessed. Since therefore God could [contribute] to every adornment and to everything which is useful to the salvation of the elect, and again to make it [evil] is fitting; it seems that God made not only good angels, but also evil [ones] and the head of the evil, namely Lucifer himself. And this is what seems to be said in Ecclesiasticus the thirty-third2: « Against evil [is] good, and against death life, and against the just man the sinner: and so look upon all the works of the Most High ».
2. Likewise, this seems [so] from order. Between the nature which is apt and born to have justice and has [it], and p. 113 between the nature which is not apt and born to have [it] nor has [it], there falls that middle nature which is apt and born to have and does not have justice; but God can make the extremes and it befits Him to make [them]: therefore by parity of reason He can and it befits Him to make the middle [one]: therefore it befits God to make the nature which is apt and born to have justice, and not having [it]. But such is the evil nature, namely the evil rational creature: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, this same [thing] seems [so] from a likeness. Just as the rational nature is evil which does not have the justice for which it is born, so [is] the irrational creature3 — whence a dog, since it is born for barking, if it does not have barking, is bad — therefore since God can make creatures deficient in the operations for which they are born, as for instance a non-barking dog and a blind eye, by parity of reason He can make a will lacking justice. If you say that it is not alike, because the rational creature is immediately ordered to God, not so the irrational4; it is objected then further, that our intellect is immediately ordered to God. But God can make an intellect lacking the knowledge which it [is born for] or ought to have, namely an ignorant [one]; as Augustine says in the third book On Free Choice5, that if God had made such a man before sin as he now is, no one could from this accuse [Him].
4. Likewise, this same [thing] seems [so] from the lesser. Matter depends more on the perfective form and is more imperfect in the genus of creatures or beings, than the rational nature [would be made imperfect]6 by [the lack of] justice — but this is manifest, because matter without form is a being altogether incomplete — but the rational creature without justice has in a certain way a complete being. Since therefore God made unformed matter, at least without the distinction of forms, as many Saints say7: therefore by parity of reason He could make an angel without the justice which it ought to have. But Anselm says, « that evil is nothing other than the privation of a good, where it ought to be »: therefore it seems etc.
On the contrary: 1. Genesis the first8: God saw all the [things] which He had made, and they were very good: therefore, since [things] very good presuppose good, all the [things] which God made were good: therefore nothing [was] evil.
2. Likewise, Dionysius9: « It belongs to the best to bring forth the best [things] »: therefore if God is the best, He cannot then produce evil, so that He make malice in it. And in the same book On the Divine Names he says, « that just as from the hot nothing goes forth but the hot, so neither from the highest good [anything] but good ».
3. Likewise, everything which God implanted in each thing from its making is natural to it: therefore if God had made the angel evil, malice would be natural to it. But for natural [things] no one is to be blamed, no one to be punished10: therefore neither would the devil be [one] to be blamed nor punished.
4. Likewise, if some committed fault makes someone deserving of punishment, it makes the agent deserving more than another11: if therefore the devil on account of its malice is deserving of punishment, [then] if God had made it evil, God would be more deserving of punishment than the devil; but this is most absurd: therefore etc.
Conclusion
It is false and impossible that God made the angel originally evil.
I respond: To posit that the devil had from God originally an innate malice of will is not only false, but rather heretical; and it is false12 [in such a way] that it has in itself the evidence of its falsity, if anyone attend.
For the work of God, by the very fact that it is the work of God, must necessarily itself be laudable, orderable, acceptable, perfect or perfectible.
For God makes nothing which does not befit His majesty. If therefore [He is] a great Lord and exceedingly laudable13, and so laudable that not only in Himself, but also in no work can He justly be blamed, but rather worthily praised in all: it is impossible that He make a blameworthy work, so far as is from the author Himself. But evil, by the very fact that it is evil of fault, is worthy of blame: therefore it is impossible that any creature have this condition from Him. And again, not only is evil worthy of blame, but rather it is14 in a certain way unto the blame of God. If therefore God made an evil creature, He would make for Himself blame and contumely.
It must necessarily also15 be orderable, because He makes nothing except what befits His wisdom; but nothing which God makes is orderable in punishment, because then God would destroy His own works, and thus would constitute Himself a transgressor. « For God is the avenger of that thing of which He is not the author16 ». Therefore if God makes an evil creature by evil of fault, it will then be orderable; and not in punishment: therefore the evil of fault would remain unavenged or unpunished, the order of the universe being preserved. But this is impossible in itself, because then evil would be good in itself, if it were ordered otherwise: therefore if God made an evil creature, the creature would not be evil.
It must necessarily also be acceptable. For God makes nothing except what He wills; but everything which God wills, He wills with a just and good17 will: therefore since everything which a just and equitable will approves is acceptable to all, [then] if God made evil, evil would be acceptable to all: therefore to accept evil would be good, and by parity of reason also to make [it]: therefore evil would be good.
It must necessarily also be that everything which God makes is perfect or perfectible, since the works of God are perfect18. Therefore everything which is in the work of God from God either is of perfection, or inclines to perfection. If therefore malice is from God in the rational creature, then either it is of the angel's perfection, or it disposes to perfection; but nothing such disorders: therefore the evil would not disorder, and if it did not disorder, it would not harm: therefore the evil would be something and would not harm.
Since therefore here there are four manifest incompossibles, it is manifest that it is false and impossible that God made the angel originally evil. And this impossibility comes from the highest perfection and nobility19 of the agent and the vileness of the evil of fault: for it deprives [it of] those four noble conditions which must necessarily be in every divine work, not because God is bound to give them to His work, but because it does not befit His will to operate or make otherwise.
1. To that therefore which is objected, that it contributes to adornment; I say that there is a production of the evil, and an ordering of the produced. The production of evil befouls and disfigures, so far as is of itself, but the ordering adorns. And since God cannot befoul, but [can] adorn; therefore He could not produce, but [could] order according to antithesis. And according to this Ecclesiasticus understands: Against good [is] evil, not because God made [it], but because what He found made in His works He ordered.
2. To that which is objected concerning the nature which is born to have justice etc.; it must be said that when I say a nature deprived of justice, I say two [things], namely that it is a nature, and that it is deprived. Insofar as [it is] a nature, it holds the middle and the argument follows; but insofar as [it is] deprived, it does not hold the middle, but rather the lowest place, but rather the privation itself [holds] no [place]20, so far as is of itself, because it is nothing. And therefore it does not hold that He made it deprived. And if you object that a greater privation is to have neither act nor aptitude, than to have aptitude and not act; it must be said that the privation is greater, if privation be taken broadly21; but yet that [one] is deformed, this [one] is not. Whence when I say: wood does not see, I state a negation, but not a deformity; when I say: a man does not see, I state both. And so that is plain.
3. 4. To that which is objected from a likeness in other natures, and from the lesser in matter itself; I say that there is no place there from a likeness nor from the lesser, if it be well considered. For the evil of fault implies disorder or privation of order otherwise than the evil of nature or of punishment, because, as was said in the forty-seventh distinction of the first book22, the evil of fault states a disorder or privation of the principal order, which namely is [the order] of the image to God immediately; but the evil of nature or of punishment [states] a disorder of an order not principal, but particular. And hence it is that God, the becomingness of His goodness and wisdom being preserved, can make a thing evil with the evil of punishment, or by a defect of nature23, [a thing] not so deprived of the order of justice on that side by which it proceeds from the very disposition of the divine wisdom. Whence it does not follow: God can make a man blind: therefore He can make [him] iniquitous.
I. That the angel was evil in the first instant can be understood in two ways: either that it was created evil by God, or that, created good, it itself made itself evil in the first instant. The question is treated here in the first sense, the other in the following question. This first [question] militates against the pestiferous Manichees and against all who do not blush to attribute the evil of fault, in the same mode as the evil of punishment, to God as author. On this the Lateran Council says, in the chapter Firmiter: « The devil and the other demons were indeed created good by God as to nature, but they themselves by themselves became evil ». On the Manichees cf. above d. 1, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1.
II. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 98, m. 1, a. 3. — The Scotus passages collected by Montefortino in the Summa, t. II, p. I, q. 63, a. 4. — St. Thomas, Summa I, q. 63, a. 4; Summa contra Gentiles III, c. 107; On Evil, q. 16, a. 2. — Blessed Albert, here a. 13; Summa p. II, tr. 4, q. 18, a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 8, q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here p. II, q. 1, a. 1. — Durandus, on this and the following question, II Sent. d. 4, q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question, here q. 4. — Biel, on this and the following question, II Sent. d. 4, the sole question near the end.
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- Hic c. 4.Here, c. 4.
- Vers. 15. — Hoc argumentum insinuatur ab Augustino, XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 17; Enchirid. c. 10. seq.; III. de Lib. Arb. c. 9. n. 24. seqq.Verse 15. — This argument is insinuated by Augustine, XI On the City of God, c. 17; Enchiridion c. 10 f.; III On Free Choice c. 9, n. 24 ff.
- Supple cum codd. A cc et ed. 1 si non habet operationem, ad quam [cod. A si non habet ad quod] nata est.Supply, with codices A cc and ed. 1, if it does not have the operation for which [cod. A if it does not have that for which] it is born.
- Cfr. infra d. 15. a. 2. q. 1. et d. 16. a. 1. q. 1.Cf. below d. 15, a. 2, q. 1, and d. 16, a. 1, q. 1.
- Cap. 9. n. 23. et c. 20. n. 56. seqq. — In fine argumenti cod. W supplet Deum, pro quo codd. U Y exhibent eum.Chapter 9, n. 23, and c. 20, n. 56 ff. — At the end of the argument codex W supplies Deum, for which codices U Y exhibit eum.
- Cod. aa sit. — Vocem faciat interpretare dependeat.Codex aa [reads] sit. — Interpret the word faciat [as] dependeat.
- Vide infra d. 12. a. 1. q. 2. — Verba Anselmi, de Casu diaboli, c. 11, sunt: Malum non est aliud quam non bonum aut absentia boni, ubi debet et expedit esse bonum.See below d. 12, a. 1, q. 2. — The words of Anselm, On the Fall of the Devil, c. 11, are: Evil is nothing other than not-good or the absence of a good, where a good ought to and is expedient to be.
- Vers. 31.Verse 31.
- De Div. Nom. c. 4. § 19. iuxta versionem Scoti Erigenae: « Neque enim ignis frigere, neque optimi non optima adducere »; iuxta aliam versionem [in operibus S. Thomae]: « Neque enim ignis est infrigidare, neque boni non bona producere ». Quibus verbis contineri videtur etiam textus, qui mox allegatur, de quo et cfr. ibid. § 21, ubi dicitur: Etenim neque in igne frigus, neque ille vitiatur eo et malum bono existente.On the Divine Names c. 4, § 19, according to the version of Scotus Eriugena: « For neither [is it] for fire to be cold, nor for the best not to bring forth the best [things] »; according to another version [in the works of St. Thomas]: « For neither is it for fire to cool, nor for the good not to produce good [things] ». By which words there seems to be contained also the text which is presently alleged, on which cf. also ibid. § 21, where it is said: For neither [is there] cold in fire, nor is it vitiated by [the good] and by evil while the good exists.
- Cod. P adiungit secundo Ethicorum, c. 5, ubi ostendit Aristot., virtutem non esse affectus neque potentias naturales, quia his neque laudamur neque vituperamur. III. Ethic. c. 5. ait: Qui enim natura deformes sunt, eos reprehendit nemo. Cfr. II. Eudem. c. 7. (c. 6.): Vituperantur autem laudanturque non quae a necessitate vel natura vel fortuna insunt, sed quorum ipsi causa sumus.Codex P adds in the second [book] of the Ethics, c. 5, where Aristotle shows that virtue is not affections nor natural potencies, because by these we are neither praised nor blamed. III Ethics c. 5 says: For those who are by nature misshapen, no one reproves them. Cf. II Eudemian [Ethics] c. 7 (c. 6): But [those things] are blamed and praised not which are present from necessity or nature or fortune, but of which we ourselves are the cause.
- Sub quo respectu Aristot., V. Ethic. c. 11. dicit, quod deterius sit iniustitiam facere quam iniustitiam accipere. — Codd. aa bb auctorem pro actorem. Ultimam prop. argumenti sed hoc est absurdissimum: ergo etc. fide codd. E F I K P Q U Y X bb adiunximus.Under which respect Aristotle, V Ethics c. 11, says that it is worse to do injustice than to receive injustice. — Codices aa bb [read] auctorem for actorem. The last proposition of the argument, sed hoc est absurdissimum: ergo etc., we have added on the faith of codices E F I K P Q U Y X bb.
- Cod. aa tale falsum, Vat. et ita est falsum.Codex aa [reads] tale falsum, the Vatican [edition] et ita est falsum.
- Psalm. 47, 2.Psalm 47:2.
- Fide codd. K U bb substituimus est pro etiam; codd. E cc et ed. 1 immo etiam quodam modo redundat [codd. I Y aa est] in etc.On the faith of codices K U bb we substitute est for etiam; codices E cc and ed. 1 [read] immo etiam quodam modo redundat [codices I Y aa est] in etc.
- Supple cum cod. Q opus Dei, et dein post quia nihil facit cum cod. W Deus.Supply, with codex Q, opus Dei, and then after quia nihil facit, with codex W, Deus.
- Fulgent., I. ad Monimum, c. 19.Fulgentius, I To Monimus, c. 19.
- Cod. W aequa; Vat. paulo inferius bona pro aequa.Codex W [reads] aequa; the Vatican [edition], a little below, bona for aequa.
- Deut. 32, 4.Deuteronomy 32:4.
- Fere omnes codd. voluntate; perperam et contra cod. cc cum ed. 1.Almost all codices [read] voluntate; wrongly and against codex cc with ed. 1.
- Subaudi cum codd. F (Q T a secunda manu) locum tenet; Vat. cum nonnullis codd. et primis edd. supplet habet medium, sed minus congrue.Understand, with codices F (Q T by a second hand), locum tenet [holds a place]; the Vatican [edition], with some codices and the first editions, supplies habet medium, but less fittingly.
- Scil. prout idem est ac negatio.Namely, insofar as it is the same as negation.
- Quaest. 3. 4. — Paulo superius Vat. magis importat pro aliter importat, quae etiam circa initium solutionis ponit in prima materia pro in ipsa materia. Eadem Vat. paulo inferius quae scilicet pro qui scilicet.Questions 3, 4. — A little above the Vatican [edition reads] magis importat for aliter importat, which also, about the beginning of the solution, puts in prima materia for in ipsa materia. The same Vatican [edition], a little below, [reads] quae scilicet for qui scilicet.
- Plures codd. cum ed. 1 vel defectum naturae.Several codices, with ed. 1, [read] vel defectum naturae. ---