Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 32, Art. 3, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 32

Textus Latinus

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Articulus III.

De aequitate divini iudicii in infusione et punitione animae.

Consequenter quaeritur de tertio, videlicet de aequitate divinae iustitiae, secundum quam animam tali carni infundit, ex qua contrahit reatum aeternae damnationis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum Deus illam maculam, quam anima contrahit, de iustitia debeat sibi imputare.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum deceat divinam iustitiam animam tali carni sociare.

Quaestio I.

Utrum illam maculam, quam anima contrahit ex carne, debeat Deus ipsi imputare.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum illam maculam, quam anima contrahit ex carne, debeat Deus sibi¹ imputare. Et quod non, videtur.

1. Augustinus in libro de Duabus Animabus contra Manichaeos²: « Reum teneri quemquam, quia non facit quod facere non potest, summae iniquitatis et insaniae est ». Si igitur anima parvuli in suo ortu habere non potest iustitiam, videtur, quod nullo modo sit ei originalis macula imputanda.

2. Item, sicut gloria respicit meritum, sic etiam poena respicit demeritum; sed meritum proprie consistit circa actum, ergo et demeritum: ergo nihil imputandum est alicui pro demerito, quod non sit ex actu proprio.

3. Item, in eo quod inest alicui naturaliter, nec est laudandus quis nec vituperandus³; sed talis culpa inest parvulo ex naturali coniunctione animae et carnis: igitur pro illa nec est parvulus laudandus nec vituperandus: igitur macula illa, quam contrahit, non debet sibi imputari ad poenam.

4. Item, pronior est Deus ad miserendum, quam sit homo; sed homo alium habet excusatum ex impossibilitate, nec punit eum qui non est rationis capax: si ergo talis conditio reperitur in parvulo, videtur, quod nihil quod sit in ipso, debeat ei imputari a Domino.

Sed contra:

1. Actuale peccatum reddit hominem indignum, propter hoc quod est ibi privatio alicuius boni, quod deberet inesse; sed originale peccatum in hoc communicat cum actuali, quia in eo est privatio alicuius boni, quod deberet inesse, utpote originalis iustitiae: ergo originale peccatum facit eum in quo est, dignum esse poena. Sed omne tale est a iusto iudice imputandum: ergo etc.

2. Item, originale, sicut prius⁴ probatum est, malum culpae est; sed culpa deordinat universum, nisi subsequatur poena, in qua ordinetur, secundum quod vult Augustinus: ergo si divina iustitia non debet dimittere aliquid inordinatum in universo, debet igitur punire originale peccatum in quocumque reperiatur, sive in parvulo, sive in adulto.

3. Item, iustum est, quod Deus ab omni anima exigat honorem sibi debitum: cum igitur pulcritudo imaginis in creatura rationali spectet ad honorem Dei, Deus a quacumque creatura rationali exigit illam pulcritudinem. Sed qui iuste exigit aliquid ab aliquo, si caret illo, recte imputat ei ad poenam: si ergo quicumque habet originale peccatum, caret illa pulcritudine, quam anima deberet habere; ergo omni tali debet imputari ad poenam a summa iustitia⁵.

4. Item, sicut secundus Adam fuit exemplum obediendi, sic primus Adam fuit exemplum praevaricandi, sicut Apostolus⁶ innuit: ergo sicut habens imaginem secundi Adae est dignus gloria, sic habens imaginem primi est dignus poena. Sed omnis qui regeneratur in baptismo Christi, hoc ipso quod habet imaginem Christi, videlicet gratiam baptismalem, reputatur a Deo dignus gloria aeterna, quamvis nihil

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boni vel mali fecerit: ergo per oppositum, omnis qui generatur ab Adam, cum hoc ipso gerat imaginem eius, debet a divina iustitia reputari indignus gloria et reus poena.

Conclusio

Conclusio. Divinam sapientiam, potentiam et iustitiam decet imputare animae culpam, quam contraxit ex carne.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod absque dubio Deus imputat originale peccatum ipsis parvulis in demeritum, quia in reatum poenae, saltem poenae damni. Hoc autem exigit divinae potentiae altitudo et sapientiae pulcritudo et iustitiae rectitudo.

Altitudo divinae potentiae hoc exigit, ob quam Deus semper debet quaerere gloriam suam et honorem; et ideo, si anima rationalis honorem Deo non reddit, cum in se non habeat decus imaginis divinae, per quod Deus honorari habet; necesse est, quod Deus dedecus culpae recompenset in decorem iustitiae⁷. — Pulcritudo etiam sapientiae hoc requirit, quia non patitur aliquid turpe vel inordinatum reperiri intra universum. Et quoniam omne peccatum, sive sit actuale, sive contractum, est « privatio modi, speciei et ordinis⁸ »; necesse est, quod inordinationem naturae recompenset Deus per ordinem poenae, ut sic pulcritudo universi ex nulla parte remaneat deturpata. — Rectitudo etiam divinae iustitiae hoc requirit, quia Deus id a creatura exigit, quod ei dedit. Quoniam igitur Deus humanam naturam in primo homine instam fecerat, voluntatis iustitiam non solum a primo parente, sed etiam ab omnibus posteris, in quibus natura illa reperitur, debet exigere. In quocumque igitur est illius iustitiae carentia, merito sibi imputatur a divina iustitia. Et hoc est quod dicit Anselmus in libro de Conceptu virginali, capitulo vigesimo octavo⁹: « Dicendum est, quod aliter Deus erga infantes debeat agere, et aliter homo. Nam homo non debet exigere a natura quod sibi non dedit et quod sibi non debetur; nec iuste redarguit homo hominem cum culpa nasci, sine qua ipse non exstitit, et de qua non nisi per alium sanatur. Deus vero recte exigit a natura quod ipse dedit, et quod sibi iuste debetur ». Sic ergo patet, quod decet Deum culpam imputare animae, quam contraxit ex carne. Hoc enim exigit tam potentia, quam sapientia, quam etiam iustitia. Ideo concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de verbis Augustini in libro de Duabus Animabus¹⁰, dicendum est, quod ratio ista dupliciter deficit. Primo quidem, quia ex malo intellectu auctoritatis procedit. Augustinus enim loquitur de impossibilitate, quae inest simpliciter homini ex natura, non de ea, in quam homo intrusus est per voluntatem et culpam, sicut supra distinctione vigesima octava positum fuit exemplum de servo eunte ad nundinas. Haec autem impossibilitas servandi rectitudinem iustitiae non fuit indita homini ex conditione naturae, sed potius intrusa fuit ex voluntaria transgressione Adae. — Secundo etiam deficit in assumtione¹¹, pro eo quod Deus non imputat parvulo peccatum originale ex hoc, quod non facit quod facere non potest, sed ex hoc, quod non habet quod habere debet. Et hoc bene imputatur homini, secundum illud Lucae¹²: Omni habenti dabitur, et abundabit; non habenti vero etc. Et Apostolus dicit, quod ignorans ignorabitur. Et eiectus fuit¹³ homo a nuptiis non solum propter enormitatem actualis praevaricationis, sed etiam propter carentiam vestis nuptialis, qua quia caret homo in originali conceptus, nisi vestiatur in baptismate, non permittitur aulam superni regis intrare, exigente hoc illius supernae aulae dignitate.

2. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod demeritum respicit actum; dicendum, quod sicut parvuli habentes gratiam digni sunt vita aeterna, pro eo quod illam gratiam habent¹⁴ per Sacramenta Christi, qui eis vitam aeternam sua gratia et passione promeruit, ita quod alia est gratia in parvulis quam in Christo: sic et in proposito intelligendum est, quod maculam peccati contrahit anima ex sua generatione in ipsa propagatione, et hoc ab ipso Adam, qui ex actu suo naturam humanam foedavit. Et ideo in ipso Adam dicimur peccasse et demeruisse, et per eius inobedientiam peccatores constituti esse¹⁵. Alia tamen est in nobis culpa, quam fuerit in ipso: habet tamen haec rationem demeriti ab illa, ex qua processit. Et hoc est quod dicit Anselmus de Conceptu

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virginali, capitulo vigesimo septimo¹⁶: « Originale peccatum aliud intelligere nequeo in parvulis, nisi ipsam factam per inobedientiam Adae iustitiae debitae nuditatem, per quam omnes sunt filii irae, quoniam et naturam accusat spontanea quam fecit iustitiae desertio; nec personas excusat impotentia recuperandi, quam comitatur beatitudinis nuditas, ut, sicut sunt sine omni iustitiae rectitudine, ita sint absque omni beatitudine ».

3. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod non est aliquis laudandus vel vituperandus pro eo quod ei naturaliter inest; dicendum, quod si intelligatur de natura instituta, nec est laudandus nec vituperandus, nec apud Deum nec apud homines, quia ipse Deus naturam instituit nec debet culpare quod fecit. Si vero intelligatur de eo quod naturaliter inest secundum statum naturae lapsae; sic dico, quod non est homo apud homines vituperandus, sicut dicit Anselmus, et habitum est in responsione, quia homines quantum ad talia pares sunt; nec debet homo quod non dedit ab homine exigere. Apud vero Deum, qui aliter naturam instituit, vituperandus est, quia in se non habet quod Deus iuste ab ipso exigit¹⁷. Illud igitur verbum Philosophi, quod dicit, quod pro naturalibus nec laudamur nec vituperamur, aut est intelligendum de naturalibus quantum ad naturae institutionem, aut si de aliis intelligatur, hoc intelligitur quantum ad iudicium humanum, non quantum ad iudicium divinum.

4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod pronior est Deus ad miserendum quam homo; dicendum, quod verum est, pro eo quod plenam misericordiam praestat ei cui sibi placuerit misereri; nihilominus tamen districtissime iudicat, sicut ex illo verbo colligitur in Matthaei duodecimo¹⁸: De omni verbo otioso reddent homines rationem in die iudicii. Unde multa sunt peccata, quae apud homines tolerantur et non puniuntur, utpote sunt spiritualia et interiora, de quibus oportebit in die iudicii nos reddere rationem. Misericordia enim viam iustitiae non praecludit.

Scholion

I. Duae huius articuli quaestiones intime cohaerent. In 1. quaest. peccatum originale consideratur sub ratione culpae, quae a capite seu stipite generis humani per moralem quandam imputationem transit in animas posterorum. In 2. quaest. vero agitur de hoc, quod Deus cum infecta carne uniat animam ab ipso creatam. Exceptis Petro a Tar. et Richardo a Med., alii Commentores una quaestione comprehendunt utrumque problema, tractantes vel primum (ut S. Thom. et Richardus) vel secundum. Plerumque autem iidem tantum unum alterumve argumentum ponunt ex pluribus a nostro Doctore allatis.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 106. m. 4. in solut. obiector. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. 2. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1, a. 4. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4.

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English Translation

Article III.

On the equity of the divine judgment in the infusion and the punishment of the soul.

There is asked, consequently, concerning the third [point], namely concerning the equity of divine justice, according to which it infuses the soul into such flesh, from which it contracts the liability of eternal damnation. And concerning this two [questions] are asked.

First it is asked, whether God ought, out of justice, to impute to it that stain which the soul contracts.

Second it is asked, whether it befits divine justice to associate the soul with such flesh.

Question I.

Whether God ought to impute to the soul that stain which it contracts from the flesh.

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether God ought to impute to it¹ that stain which the soul contracts from the flesh. And that [He ought] not, it seems.

1. Augustine, in the book On the Two Souls against the Manichees²: « That anyone be held guilty because he does not do what he cannot do, is [a mark] of the highest iniquity and insanity ». If therefore the soul of a little child cannot at its origin have justice, it seems that the original stain ought in no way to be imputed to it.

2. Likewise, just as glory regards merit, so also punishment regards demerit; but merit properly consists in respect of an act, therefore also demerit: therefore nothing is to be imputed to anyone for a demerit which is not from his own act.

3. Likewise, in that which is in someone naturally, one is neither to be praised nor blamed³; but such a guilt is in the little child from the natural conjunction of soul and flesh: therefore for it the little child is neither to be praised nor blamed: therefore that stain which it contracts ought not to be imputed to it unto punishment.

4. Likewise, God is more inclined to mercy than is the human; but a human holds another excused on account of impossibility, nor does he punish him who is not capable of reason: if therefore such a condition is found in a little child, it seems that nothing which is in it ought to be imputed to it by the Lord.

On the contrary:

1. Actual sin renders a human unworthy, because there is therein a privation of some good which ought to be present; but original sin shares in this with actual [sin], because in it there is a privation of some good which ought to be present, namely of original justice: therefore original sin makes him in whom it is worthy of punishment. But everything such is to be imputed by a just judge: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the original [sin], as was proven before⁴, is an evil of guilt; but guilt disorders the universe, unless punishment follows, in which it may be ordered, according to what Augustine holds: therefore if divine justice ought not to leave anything disordered in the universe, it ought therefore to punish original sin in whomever it is found, whether in a little child or in an adult.

3. Likewise, it is just that God should exact from every soul the honor owed to Him: since therefore the beauty of the image in a rational creature pertains to the honor of God, God exacts that beauty from every rational creature. But he who justly exacts something from someone, if he lacks it, rightly imputes it to him unto punishment: if therefore whoever has original sin lacks that beauty which the soul ought to have; therefore to everyone such it ought to be imputed unto punishment by the highest justice⁵.

4. Likewise, just as the second Adam was an example of obeying, so the first Adam was an example of transgressing, as the Apostle⁶ intimates: therefore just as one having the image of the second Adam is worthy of glory, so one having the image of the first is worthy of punishment. But everyone who is regenerated in the baptism of Christ, by this very fact that he has the image of Christ, namely baptismal grace, is reputed by God worthy of eternal glory, although he has done nothing

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of good or evil: therefore by the opposite, everyone who is generated from Adam, since by this very fact he bears his image, ought to be reputed by divine justice unworthy of glory and liable to punishment.

Conclusion

Conclusion. It befits the divine wisdom, power, and justice to impute to the soul the guilt which it has contracted from the flesh.

I respond: It must be said that without doubt God imputes original sin to the little children themselves unto demerit, because unto the liability of punishment, at least the punishment of loss. And this the loftiness of the divine power and the beauty of the wisdom and the rectitude of the justice demand.

The loftiness of the divine power demands this, on account of which God ought always to seek His own glory and honor; and therefore, if the rational soul does not render honor to God, since it does not have in itself the comeliness of the divine image, through which God is to be honored; it is necessary that God recompense the disgrace of guilt in the comeliness of justice⁷. — The beauty also of the wisdom requires this, because it does not suffer anything base or disordered to be found within the universe. And since every sin, whether it be actual or contracted, is « a privation of mode, species, and order⁸ »; it is necessary that God recompense the disorder of nature through the order of punishment, so that thus the beauty of the universe may remain disfigured in no part. — The rectitude also of the divine justice requires this, because God exacts from the creature that which He gave it. Since therefore God had made human nature upright in the first human, He ought to exact the justice of the will not only from the first parent, but also from all the posterity in whom that nature is found. In whomever therefore there is a lack of that justice, it is deservedly imputed to him by divine justice. And this is what Anselm says in the book On the Virginal Conception, chapter twenty-eight⁹: « It must be said that God ought to act otherwise toward infants, and the human otherwise. For the human ought not to exact from nature what he did not give it and what is not owed to it; nor does a human justly reproach a human for being born with a guilt, without which he himself did not exist, and from which he is healed only through another. But God rightly exacts from nature what He Himself gave, and what is justly owed to Him ». Thus therefore it is plain that it befits God to impute to the soul the guilt which it contracted from the flesh. For this both power, and wisdom, and also justice demand. Therefore the reasons which show this are to be granted.

1. To that, then, which is objected first to the contrary concerning the words of Augustine in the book On the Two Souls¹⁰, it must be said that that reasoning is deficient in two ways. First indeed, because it proceeds from a bad understanding of the authority. For Augustine speaks of an impossibility which is in the human simply from nature, not of that into which the human has been thrust through will and guilt, as above, in the twenty-eighth distinction, the example was set forth of the servant going to the market. But this impossibility of preserving the rectitude of justice was not implanted in the human from the condition of nature, but rather was thrust in from the voluntary transgression of Adam. — Second, it is also deficient in the assumption [of the minor premise]¹¹, inasmuch as God does not impute to the little child original sin from this, that it does not do what it cannot do, but from this, that it does not have what it ought to have. And this is well imputed to the human, according to that [text] of Luke¹²: To everyone who has it shall be given, and he shall abound; but from him who has not etc. And the Apostle says that he who is ignorant shall be ignored. And the human was cast out¹³ from the wedding not only on account of the enormity of the actual transgression, but also on account of the lack of the wedding garment, which because the human lacks in the original conception, unless he be clothed in baptism, he is not permitted to enter the hall of the heavenly king, the dignity of that heavenly hall demanding this.

2. But to that which is objected, that demerit regards an act; it must be said that, just as little children having grace are worthy of eternal life, because they have that grace¹⁴ through the Sacraments of Christ, who merited eternal life for them by His grace and passion, so that the grace in the little children is other than [that] in Christ: so also in the [present] matter it must be understood that the soul contracts the stain of sin from its generation in the very propagation, and this from Adam himself, who by his own act befouled human nature. And therefore in Adam himself we are said to have sinned and demerited, and through his disobedience to have been constituted sinners¹⁵. Yet the guilt in us is other than it was in him; nevertheless this has the character of demerit from that [guilt] from which it proceeded. And this is what Anselm says On the Virginal

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Conception, chapter twenty-seven¹⁶: « Original sin I can understand to be nothing else in little children except that nakedness of the owed justice made through the disobedience of Adam, through which all are children of wrath, since the spontaneous desertion of justice which it made accuses also nature; nor does the impotence of recovering excuse persons, which the nakedness of beatitude accompanies, so that, just as they are without all rectitude of justice, so they are without all beatitude ».

3. But to that which is objected, that no one is to be praised or blamed for that which is in him naturally; it must be said that if it be understood of instituted nature, one is neither to be praised nor blamed, neither before God nor before humans, because God Himself instituted nature and ought not to blame what He made. But if it be understood of that which is in him naturally according to the state of fallen nature; thus I say that the human is not to be blamed before humans, as Anselm says, and as was held in the [above] response, because humans as regards such things are equal; nor ought a human to exact from a human what he did not give. But before God, who instituted nature otherwise, he is to be blamed, because he does not have in himself what God justly exacts from him¹⁷. Therefore that word of the Philosopher, who says that for natural things we are neither praised nor blamed, is either to be understood of natural things as regards the institution of nature, or, if it be understood of other [things], this is understood as regards human judgment, not as regards divine judgment.

4. To that which is objected last, that God is more inclined to mercy than the human; it must be said that it is true, inasmuch as He bestows full mercy on him whom it shall please Him to pity; nevertheless He judges most strictly, as is gathered from that word in the twelfth [chapter] of Matthew¹⁸: Of every idle word humans shall render an account in the day of judgment. Hence there are many sins which among humans are tolerated and not punished, such as are spiritual and interior, of which it will behoove us to render an account in the day of judgment. For mercy does not preclude the way of justice.

Scholion

I. The two questions of this article are intimately connected. In the 1st question original sin is considered under the character of guilt, which passes from the head or stock of the human race by a certain moral imputation into the souls of the posterity. But in the 2nd question there is treated this, that God unites with the infected flesh a soul created by Him. With the exception of Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, the other Commentators comprehend both problems in one question, treating either the first (as St. Thomas and Richard) or the second. But for the most part these same [authors] set down only one or the other argument out of the many adduced by our Doctor.

II. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 106, m. 4, in the solution of the objectors. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1, 2, 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 1, a. 4, q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2, a. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 4.

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Apparatus Criticus

Intellige: animae.
Understand: to the soul.
Cap. 12. n. 17: Peccati reum tenere quemquam, quia non fecit quod facere non potuit, summae iniquitatis est et insaniae.
Chapter 12, n. 17: « That anyone be held guilty of sin because he did not do what he could not do, is [a mark] of the highest iniquity and insanity ».
Cfr. supra pag. 113, nota 8.
Cf. above p. 113, note 8.
Dist. 30. a. 1. q. 1. seq. — Sententia Augustini, quae mox memoratur, habetur III. de Lib. Arb. c. 9. n. 26. et c. 13. n. 41. nec non de Natura boni, c. 7. seqq. — Cfr. I. Sent. d. 46. q. 6. — Circa finem arg. cod. cc et ed. 1 omittunt igitur.
Dist. 30, a. 1, q. 1 and following. — The opinion of Augustine, which is recalled shortly after, is found in On Free Choice III, c. 9, n. 26, and c. 13, n. 41, and also in On the Nature of the Good, c. 7 and following. — Cf. I Sent., d. 46, q. 6. — Toward the end of the argument codex cc and edition 1 omit igitur (therefore).
Cfr. Anselm., I. Cur Deus homo, c. 13. seqq.
Cf. Anselm, Why God [Became] Man, bk. I, c. 13 and following.
Rom. 5, 14. et 19.
Romans 5:14 and 19.
Hic S. Doctori illa verba August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 15. n. 44. ante oculos versata esse videntur: Nullo autem temporis intervallo ista [peccatum et poena peccati] dividuntur... ne vel puncto temporis universalis pulcritudo turpetur, ut sit in ea peccati dedecus sine decore vindictae.
Here those words of Augustine, On Free Choice III, c. 15, n. 44, seem to have been before the eyes of the holy Doctor: « But by no interval of time are these [the sin and the punishment of the sin] divided... lest the universal beauty be marred even for a point of time, so that there be in it the disgrace of sin without the comeliness of vengeance ».
Secundum August., de Natura boni, c. 4. Cfr. infra d. 33. a. 2.
According to Augustine, On the Nature of the Good, c. 4. Cf. below, d. 33, a. 2.
In testimonio ex Anselmo allato textus originalis pro debeat agere exhibet exigit quid debeant agere, deinde pro sibi non dedit lectionem ipse non dedit, tum nascitur pro exstitit et circa finem post ipse dedit adiungit ei.
In the testimony adduced from Anselm the original text exhibits, for debeat agere (ought to act), exigit quid debeant agere (exacts what they ought to do), then for sibi non dedit (did not give it) the reading ipse non dedit (he himself did not give), then nascitur (is born) for exstitit (existed), and toward the end after ipse dedit (He Himself gave) it adds ei (to it).
Dub. 3. Augustinus obiectionem hic factam ipse solvit I. Retract. c. 15. n. 6, ubi ait: Cur ergo parvuli tenentur rei? Respondetur, quia ex eius origine tenentur, qui non fecit quod facere potuit, divinum scilicet servare mandatum. Cfr. etiam supra d. XXVIII. lit. Magistri, c. 3.
Dub. 3. Augustine himself solves the objection here made in Retractations I, c. 15, n. 6, where he says: « Why then are little children held guilty? It is answered, because they are held [guilty] from his origin who did not do what he could do, namely to keep the divine command ». Cf. also above, d. 28, the text of the Master, c. 3.
Sive in minori, quae habetur in I. arg., scilicet: Si igitur anima parvuli etc.
Or in the minor [premise], which is found in the 1st argument, namely: « If therefore the soul of a little child » etc.
Cap. 19, 26, ubi Vulgata pro non habenti vero legit ab eo autem qui non habet. — Seq. textus est I. Cor. 14, 38: Si autem ignorat, ignorabitur.
Chapter 19:26, where the Vulgate, for non habenti vero (but from him who has not), reads ab eo autem qui non habet (but from him who has not). — The following text is 1 Cor. 14:38: « But if he is ignorant, he shall be ignored ».
Edd. adiiciunt Matthaei 7. (perperam pro 22. 12. seqq.); edd. 3, 4 interserunt Matthaei 7. Glossa; Vat. inter verba Et eiectus interiicit Glossa in Matthaeo.
The editions add Matthew 7 (wrongly, for 22:12 and following); editions 3 and 4 insert Matthew 7, the Gloss; the Vatican [edition] interjects between the words Et eiectus (And [he] cast out) the Gloss on Matthew.
Cum codd. F O (T a secunda manu) adiecimus habent, quod in Vat. desideratur. In cod. aa secunda, sed antiqua manus textum sic transformavit: gratiam per sacramenta Christus eis etc.
With codices F O (T by a second hand) we have added habent (they have), which is wanting in the Vatican [edition]. In codex aa a second, but ancient hand transformed the text thus: the grace through the sacraments Christ to them etc.
Rom. 5, 12. 19.
Romans 5:12, 19.
Textus originalis sic sonat: Hoc peccatum, quod originale dico, aliud intelligere nequeo in eisdem infantibus, nisi ipsam, quam supra posui, factam... quam fecit in Adam iustitiae desertio. Nec personas excusat, ut dictum est, recuperandi impotentia, quam comitatur beatitudinis quoque nuditas, ut, sicut sunt sine omni iustitia, ita sint etc.
The original text runs thus: « This sin, which I call original, I can understand to be nothing else in those same infants, except that very [nakedness], which I set down above, made... which the desertion of justice made in Adam. Nor does the impotence of recovering excuse persons, as has been said, which the nakedness also of beatitude accompanies, so that, just as they are without all justice, so they are » etc.
Cfr. August., I. Retract. c. 15. n. 6. seq. — Dictum Philosophi iam supra notavimus pag. 113, nota 8.
Cf. Augustine, Retractations I, c. 15, n. 6 and following. — We have already noted the saying of the Philosopher above, p. 113, note 8.
Vers. 36: Dico autem vobis, quoniam omne verbum otiosum, quod locuti fuerint homines, reddent rationem de eo in die iudicii.
Verse 36: « But I say to you, that for every idle word that men shall speak, they shall render an account for it in the day of judgment. » ---

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