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Dist. 32, Art. 3, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 32

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio II.

Utrum deceat divinam iustitiam animam tali carni infundere.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum deceat divinam iustitiam animam tali carni infundere. Et quod non, videtur.

1. Non est vere innocens qui potest alium relevare a culpa, et non relevat: ergo multo fortius non est vere innocens qui potest alium praeservare a culpa, et non praeservat. Sed Creator posset animam, quam creat, a culpa praeservare, si eam tali corpori non infunderet: ergo videtur, quod eam infundendo tali corpori faciat minus iuste.

2. Item, idem est facere aliquid in se, et facere aliquid, quo facto necesse est illud fieri. Unde idem est hominem interficere, et facere, quo facto homo necessario moriatur; et qui aperit fenestram dicitur domum illuminare, pro eo quod facit aliquid, quo facto domus illuminatur. Sed anima infusa maculatae carni, necesse est, eam1 effici peccatricem: igitur idem est animam peccatricem facere, et animam tali carni infundere; sed nullo modo decet divinam iustitiam animam peccatricem facere: ergo nullo modo decet eam infundere.

3. Item, minus malum est affligi quantacumque poena temporali, quam maculari culpa mortali: sed nullo modo deceret divinam iustitiam, animam in suae creationis primordio, antequam uniretur corpori, in poenam demergere infernalem; immo diceretur ipsi animae facere iniuriam, quam innocentem humiliaret2 in poena: ergo multo fortius indecens est divinae iustitiae, et iniuria videtur fieri ipsi animae, si coniungitur carni maculatae, ex qua contrahit maculam originalis.

4. Item, etsi caro posterorum aliquo modo fuerit in Adam, animae tamen nunquam sunt ex anima Adae propagatae, sed immediate a Deo productae sunt3: ergo videtur, quod Adam nihil eis meruit nec demeruit: igitur sicut non decuisset divinam iustitiam animam Adae infundere corpori maculato in primaria rerum conditione, sic nec nunc videtur, quod debeat eam tali carni sociare.

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5. Item, non est vera iustitia, nisi ubi coniuncta est misericordia — nam universae viae Domini misericordia et veritas4 — sed cum Deus infundit animam carni maculatae, quam scit de corpore exire, antequam baptizetur vel possit converti ad Deum, tunc nullam facit misericordiam: ergo videtur, quod in tali operatione non commendetur divina iustitia, quae derelinquit misericordiam.

6. Item, si aliqua anima haberet usum voluntatis et recusaret tali corpori uniri, non esset iustum, quod Deus illam, ipsa recusante, in illo corpore incarceraret5: igitur si animae conditio non debet deteriorari, quia, cum creatur, caret usu libertatis arbitrii; videtur, quod nullo modo, salva rectitudine iustitiae, sociari deberet carni maculatae.

Sed contra:

1. Iustum est, ut Conditor naturae satisfaciat appetitui naturali, quem naturae inseruit; sed corpus ab Adam propagatum, perfecta organizatione organizatum appetit uniri animae rationali: ergo si nihil potest satisfacere illi appetitui6 nisi solus Deus, videtur, quod ad divinam iustitiam pertineat illi corpori animam infundere.

2. Item, iustum est, quod gubernator conservet res eo modo, quo natae sunt conservari; sed species humana nata est conservari, sicut et species aliorum animalium per propagationem hominis ab homine: igitur secundum quod corpora procreantur, iustum est, Deum animas illis infundere: ergo qualiacumque sint corpora ex Adam propagata, animae debent illis corporibus sociari7.

3. Item, iustum est, adiutorem omnium in eo quod praecipit alteri, auxilium suum impendere; sed Deus praecepit homini filios procreare8, et homo non potest sine divino adiutorio, perficiente et complente quod homo inchoat, dando formam completivam: ergo quotiescumque et quomodocumque homo generat, si non est defectus ex parte hominis praeparantis corpora, videtur, quod iustum et aequum sit, Deum auxiliari infundendo animas.

4. Item, iustum est, aequum retributorem pro enormi crimine totam posteritatem in servitutem redigere, sicut legibus humanis videmus pro crimine laesae maiestatis exheredari9 totam posteritatem. Si ergo Adam, pater omnium hominum, inexcusabiliter et contra excellentissimum Dominum peccavit; videtur, quod iustum sit, omnes posteros eius in miseriam et servitutem redigi; et si hoc, iustum est, animas eorum corporibus infectis et poenalibus copulari.

Conclusio

Conclusio. Decet divinam iustitiam, prout dicit divinae bonitatis condecentiam, infundere animas corporibus propagatis ab Adam.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod iustitia dupliciter consuevit accipi. Uno modo dicitur iustitia ipsius divinae bonitatis condecentia. Alio modo dicitur iustitia, prout considerat meritorum exigentiam10. — Si dicatur iustitia divinae bonitatis condecentia, hoc modo decet divinam iustitiam animam rationalem infundere carni ex Adam propagatae: tum ex hoc, quod est rerum conditor; tum ex hoc, quod est conservator; tum ex hoc, quod est provisor sive administrator. — Conditorem decet appetitui naturae satisfacere; et ideo, cum natura in Adam vitiata corpus format habens appetitum ad animam rationalem, ad divinae bonitatis condecentiam spectat, illum appetitum supplere et perficere. — Conservatorem etiam decet rem sic conservare, secundum quod nata est conservari. Si ergo species humana, quae in Adam inchoata est, nata est conservari per propagationem hominis ex homine; cum habeat homo corpus animale, nec possit in solis corporibus conservari absque animabus; ad divinae bonitatis condecentiam spectat, in quantum Deus est naturae conservator, animas corporibus infundere, naturae lege11 propagatis. — Gubernatorem etiam decet sic rem administrare, secundum quod instituit et naturae suae indidit virtutem et potentiam ad movendum et operandum. Propter quod dicit Augustinus in septimo de Civitate Dei12: « Sic res, quas condidit, administrat, ut eas agere proprios motus sinat ». Quoniam igitur Deus sic instituit humanam naturam, ut Adam praepararet corpora, et ipse illis corporibus animas infunderet; et

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iterum, ipsum Adam instituit in statu mutabilitatis, in quo scilicet posset effici mortalis et immortalis: ex his duobus necessario colligitur, quod ad divinae bonitatis condecentiam spectat, in quantum est rerum administrator, quod animas talibus corporibus infundat. Si enim in primaria conditione sic instituit et sic decrevit, ut corporibus propagatis ab Adam animas rationales infunderet; et iterum, sic debet administrare res, « ut eas agere proprios motus sinat »: ut salva sit lex institutionis et lex administrationis, qualiacumque Adam corpora sibi propaget, dum tamen sint disposita ad animam rationalem, decet Deum animas his infundere. — Nec ex hoc culpatur Deus in aliquo. Et est exemplum satis manifestum. Si promisissem alicui, quotcumque13 dolia faceret de aliqua arbore, implere ea vino; et radix illius arboris sic inficeretur, ut omnia dolia, ex illa arbore facta, vinum inficerent, quod illis infunderetur: non esset culpa mei infundentis vinum in talia dolia, quia ego facio, quod debeo et promisi, sed eius culpa est, qui radicem arboris infecit et inepta dolia praeparavit. — Et sic patet, quod, secundum quod iustitia dicitur divinae bonitatis condecentia, hoc exigit, videlicet, ut animae talibus corporibus infundantur.

Si autem iustitia dicatur proprie secundum quod respicit meritorum exigentiam, sic nulla est quaestio, utrum Deus animam tali corpori infundat iuste, vel iniuste. Iustitia enim haec14 non respicit rerum conditionem, sed respicit retributionum distributionem. Aliud autem est, animam creare et infundere, aliud, pro meritis sibi retribuere. Cum enim eam creat, non considerat, quid anima meruerit, sed quod anima appetitu naturali uniri appetit. — Posset tamen dici, quod etsi non sit assignare iustitiam isto modo, secundum quod habetur respectus ad ipsam animam in se, contingit tamen reperire in comparatione ad demeritum Adae. Et hoc est quod dicit Anselmus in libro de Conceptu virginali, capitulo vigesimo octavo15: « Si quis vir et uxor ad magnam quandam dignitatem et possessionem nullo suo merito, sed sola gratia provecti sunt, si crimen grave inexcusabiliter committant et pro eo iuste deiiciuntur et in servitutem rediguntur; quis dicet, filios, quos post damnationem genuerunt, eidem non subiacere servituti, sed potius ad bona, quae parentes amiserunt iuste, gratis debere restitui? Tales sunt primi parentes et eorum filii, quos iuste pro culpa sua de beatitudine in miseriam deiecti, in eodem generant exilio, de quibus tanto districtius debet esse iudicium, quanto delictum eorum potest probari improbabilius ». — Sic igitur patet, quomodo decet divinam iustitiam infundere animas corporibus propagatis ab Adam. Et concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod non est vere innocens qui potest alium relevare a culpa etc.; dicendum, quod istud verum est de eo innocente, qui nescit vel non potest bona ex malis elicere16, vel cuius etiam non est universaliter naturam regere; et ideo locum in proposito non habet. Nam Deus mala permittit non solummodo originalia, verum etiam actualia: tum quia « sic res, quas condidit, administrat, ut eas agere proprios motus sinat »; tum etiam quia novit de malis bona elicere.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod qui facit, quo facto necesse est alterum fieri, dicitur illud facere; dicendum, quod hoc veritatem habet, quando effectus consequens directe consequitur ad illud factum intermedium, et secundum ordinationem operis et secundum intentionem agentis, sicut est in eo qui aperit fenestram, ut illuminetur domus. Non sic autem est in proposito: tum quia Deus non intendit infundere animam carni ad hoc, ut contrahat culpam; tum etiam quia infusio animae in carnem non directe ordinatur ad animae maculationem nisi solum per accidens, videlicet ratione foeditatis introductae in carnem ex culpa Adae; et ideo talis effectus extraneus est operationi divinae. Et ideo ratio illa peccat secundum accidens17.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si Deus poneret animam in inferno, non faceret iuste; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia, cum dico, animam poni in inferno, hoc non attenditur secundum ordinem naturae, cum talis locus non sit debitus animae per naturam. Si ergo ibi ordinate ponatur, necesse est, quod ponatur secundum iustitiam, quae respicit meritorum exigentiam. Sed anima, antequam corpori infundatur, nulla habet merita18; et ideo, si in inferno collocaretur, nulla esset ibi iustitia. Non sic autem est ex parte ista, quia anima naturalem habet appetitum ad carnem, et caro ad spiritum; et ideo secundum ordinem naturae anima in tali corpore col-

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locatur, nec debet infringi appetitus naturalis propter aliquod accidens praeternaturale, utpote foeditatis vel poenalitatis.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima non propagatur ex anima, ergo nihil meretur una alteri; dicendum, quod etsi potentia virtutis generativae non se extendat plus quam ad carnis propagationem per modum efficientis, intentio tamen naturae se extendit ad totum compositum. Homo enim non intendit generare carnem, sed intendit generare hominem similem sibi in specie; et ideo omnes dicuntur filii Adae. Et propterea, licet Adam non potuerit demereri animae ut separatae, potuit tamen ei demereri ut carni unitae; et ideo ratio illa non valet.

— Posset tamen et aliter dici, sicut tactum est, quod illa animae infusio non respicit merita praecedentia.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de anima separata, quae haberet usum liberae voluntatis; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia, si talis anima usum liberae voluntatis haberet et corpus tale respueret, infusio illa non posset esse absque poena; et ita culpa praecederet eius infusionem, aut sibi fieret iniustitia. Non sic autem est in proposito, quia cum anima corpori uniri appetat, illa unio est naturalis, licet accidentaliter ex hoc contrahat culpam et poenam.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod iustitia semper debet esse iuncta misericordiae; dicendum, quod verum est; nam iustitia, secundum quod dicitur divinae bonitatis condecentia, iuncta est misericordiae, quae quidem dicitur divinae bonitatis affluentia19, et utraque in proposito habet reperiri. In hoc enim ipso, quod Deus animas talibus corporibus infundit, manifestatur affluentia divinae bonitatis, qua solem suum super bonos et malos oriri facit20; nec propter transgressionem Adae subtraxit manum a conservatione humanae naturae. Secundum autem quod iustitia respicit meritorum exigentiam, sic etiam habet misericordiam coniunctam; sed neutro modo, proprie loquendo, habet locum in proposito, nisi comparemus ad peccatum Adae. Nam per comparationem ad peccatum Adae est ibi iustitia, quia Deus pro sua transgressione totam posteritatem Adae punivit; est etiam misericordia, quia eam non omnino delevit, quamvis Adam hoc ex sua transgressione mereretur; immo multis ipsorum posterorum restituit gratiam. Aliis vero, qui moriuntur ante baptisma, etsi non praestet beneficium gratiae, beneficium tamen aliquod impendit misericordiae in hoc, quod conservat eis esse naturae. Melius est enim sic esse quam omnino non esse. Paratus etiam esset eis impendere beneficium gratiae, si perducerentur ad baptismatis Sacramentum. Quod autem non perducuntur, hoc venit ex defectu naturae21.

Et si tu quaeras, cum Deus hoc praesciret, quare animam corpori illi infunderet; vel cum etiam praesciret Adam lapsurum et corpora humana corrupturum, quare sic et non aliter propagationem hominis instituit, cum taliter posset instituere, ut nullo modo proli fieret praeiudicium a parente; dicendum, quod in rerum conditione plus pensatur ordo divinae sapientiae, quam pensetur ordo iustitiae vel misericordiae. Ordo autem divinae sapientiae hoc exigebat, ut rationales spiritus immediate exirent a Deo, ad cuius sunt imaginem; et omnes homines propagarentur ex uno homine, multis de causis, sicut supra distinctione decima octava22 assignatum est; et quamvis Deus videret, aliquod malum inde provenire, non tamen debuit ordinem, quem requirebat divina sapientia, immutare. Eliciendo enim bona ex malis subsequentibus, totum reducit ad ordinem sapientiae competentem; et dum ex magnis malis maiora elicit bona, commendabilior redditur et potentia et sapientia et bonitas. Propter quod exclamat Gregorius23 et dicit: « O felix culpa, quae talem meruit habere Redemptorem ». Et ideo si quis velit attendere, quantum sit commendabilis Deus in operibus suis, non debet aspicere solum ad illud quod praesentialiter videt, verum etiam ad antecedentia et futura; quia, sicut pulcritudo metri non percipitur una syllaba24, sed in versus integritate, sic pulcritudinem divinorum operum et laudabilitatem respicere non potest qui respicit ea in parte.

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English Translation

Question II.

Whether it befits divine justice to infuse the soul into such flesh.

Second it is asked, whether it befits divine justice to infuse the soul into such flesh. And that [it does] not, it seems.

1. He is not truly innocent who can relieve another from guilt, and does not relieve him: therefore much more is he not truly innocent who can preserve another from guilt, and does not preserve him. But the Creator could preserve from guilt the soul which He creates, if He did not infuse it into such a body: therefore it seems that, by infusing it into such a body, He acts less justly.

2. Likewise, it is the same thing to make something in itself, and to make something which being done it is necessary that the other come about. Hence it is the same thing to kill a human, and to do that which being done the human necessarily dies; and he who opens a window is said to illuminate the house, because he does something which being done the house is illuminated. But the soul infused into infected flesh, it is necessary that it1 be made a sinner: therefore it is the same thing to make the soul a sinner, and to infuse the soul into such flesh; but in no way does it befit divine justice to make the soul a sinner: therefore in no way does it befit it to infuse it.

3. Likewise, it is a lesser evil to be afflicted with any temporal punishment whatever, than to be stained with mortal guilt: but in no way would it befit divine justice to plunge the soul, in the first beginning of its creation, before it were united to the body, into infernal punishment; nay, it would be said to do an injury to the soul itself, which it would humble2 innocent in punishment: therefore much more is it unbecoming to divine justice, and an injury seems to be done to the soul itself, if it is joined to infected flesh, from which it contracts the stain of the original [sin].

4. Likewise, although the flesh of the posterity was in some way in Adam, yet the souls are never propagated from the soul of Adam, but are produced immediately by God3: therefore it seems that Adam neither merited nor demerited anything for them: therefore just as it would not have befitted divine justice to infuse the soul of Adam into an infected body in the first condition of things, so neither now does it seem that it ought to associate it with such flesh.

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5. Likewise, there is no true justice except where mercy is joined to it — for all the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth4 — but when God infuses the soul into infected flesh, which He knows will go forth from the body before it is baptized or can be converted to God, then He does no mercy: therefore it seems that in such an operation divine justice, which abandons mercy, is not commended.

6. Likewise, if some soul had the use of will and refused to be united to such a body, it would not be just that God should imprison5 it, against its refusal, in that body: therefore if the condition of the soul ought not to be worsened, because, when it is created, it lacks the use of freedom of choice; it seems that in no way, with the rectitude of justice preserved, ought it to be associated with infected flesh.

On the contrary:

1. It is just that the Author of nature should satisfy the natural appetite which He implanted in nature; but a body propagated from Adam, organized by a perfect organization, desires to be united to a rational soul: therefore if nothing can satisfy that appetite6 except God alone, it seems that it pertains to divine justice to infuse a soul into that body.

2. Likewise, it is just that a governor should conserve things in the mode in which they are born to be conserved; but the human species is born to be conserved, like the species also of other animals, through the propagation of human from human: therefore according as bodies are procreated, it is just that God infuse souls into them: therefore whatever the bodies propagated from Adam may be, the souls ought to be associated with those bodies7.

3. Likewise, it is just that a helper of all should expend his aid in that which he commands to another; but God commanded the human to procreate children8, and the human cannot, without divine assistance perfecting and completing what the human begins, by giving the completive form: therefore as often and in whatever manner the human generates, if there is no defect on the part of the human preparing the bodies, it seems that it is just and equitable that God should assist by infusing souls.

4. Likewise, it is just that an equitable requiter should reduce a whole posterity into servitude for an enormous crime, just as by human laws we see a whole posterity disinherited9 for the crime of treason. If therefore Adam, the father of all humans, sinned inexcusably and against a most excellent Lord; it seems that it is just that all his posterity be reduced into misery and servitude; and if this, it is just that their souls be coupled with infected and penal bodies.

Conclusion

Conclusion. It befits divine justice, insofar as it bespeaks the becomingness of the divine goodness, to infuse souls into bodies propagated from Adam.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that justice is wont to be taken in two ways. In one way it is called the justice [which is] the becomingness of the divine goodness itself. In another way it is called justice, insofar as it considers the exigency of merits10. — If justice be called the becomingness of the divine goodness, in this way it befits divine justice to infuse a rational soul into flesh propagated from Adam: both from this, that it is the Author of things; both from this, that it is the Conservator; both from this, that it is the Provider or administrator. — It befits the Author to satisfy the appetite of nature; and therefore, since nature, vitiated in Adam, forms a body having an appetite for a rational soul, it pertains to the becomingness of the divine goodness to supply and perfect that appetite. — It befits the Conservator also so to conserve a thing, according as it is born to be conserved. If therefore the human species, which was begun in Adam, is born to be conserved through the propagation of human from human; since the human has an animate body, nor can be conserved in bodies alone without souls; it pertains to the becomingness of the divine goodness, inasmuch as God is the conservator of nature, to infuse souls into bodies propagated by the law of nature11. — It befits the Governor also so to administer a thing, according as He instituted and bestowed on its nature the power and potency for moving and operating. On account of which Augustine says in the seventh [book] of the City of God12: « He so administers the things which He founded, that He lets them carry out their own motions ». Since therefore God so instituted human nature, that Adam should prepare the bodies, and He Himself should infuse souls into those bodies; and

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again, He instituted Adam himself in a state of mutability, in which namely he could be made mortal and immortal: from these two it is necessarily gathered that it pertains to the becomingness of the divine goodness, inasmuch as it is the administrator of things, that He should infuse souls into such bodies. For if in the first condition He so instituted and so decreed, that He would infuse rational souls into bodies propagated from Adam; and again, He so ought to administer things, « that He lets them carry out their own motions »: so that the law of institution and the law of administration be preserved, whatever bodies Adam may propagate for himself, provided that they be disposed for a rational soul, it befits God to infuse souls into them. — Nor by this is God blamed in anything. And there is a sufficiently manifest example. If I had promised someone, that however many13 casks he should make from a certain tree, I would fill them with wine; and the root of that tree were so infected that all the casks, made from that tree, would infect the wine which was poured into them: it would not be the fault of me who pour the wine into such casks, because I do what I owe and promised, but it is the fault of him who infected the root of the tree and prepared unfit casks. — And thus it is plain that, according as justice is called the becomingness of the divine goodness, it demands this, namely, that souls be infused into such bodies.

But if justice be called properly according as it regards the exigency of merits, thus there is no question whether God infuses the soul into such a body justly or unjustly. For this justice14 does not regard the condition of things, but regards the distribution of retributions. But it is one thing to create and infuse the soul, another to requite it according to its merits. For when He creates it, He does not consider what the soul has merited, but that the soul by natural appetite desires to be united. — Yet it could be said that, although justice be not assigned in this way, according as a respect is had to the soul in itself, nevertheless it happens to be found in comparison to the demerit of Adam. And this is what Anselm says in the book On the Virginal Conception, chapter twenty-eight15: « If a man and wife have been advanced to a certain great dignity and possession by no merit of their own, but by grace alone, [and] if they inexcusably commit a grave crime and for it are justly cast down and reduced into servitude; who will say that the sons whom they begot after the condemnation are not subject to the same servitude, but rather ought freely to be restored to the goods which the parents justly lost? Such are the first parents and their sons, who, justly cast down for their guilt from beatitude into misery, generate in the same exile, concerning whom the judgment ought to be so much the stricter, the more inexcusably their offense can be proven ». — Thus therefore it is plain how it befits divine justice to infuse souls into bodies propagated from Adam. And the reasons which show this are to be granted.

1. To that, then, which is objected first to the contrary, that he is not truly innocent who can relieve another from guilt, etc.; it must be said that that is true of the innocent one who does not know or cannot elicit goods from evils16, or whose office it is also not universally to govern nature; and therefore it has no place in the [present] matter. For God permits evils not only original, but also actual: both because « He so administers the things which He founded, that He lets them carry out their own motions »; both also because He knows how to elicit goods from evils.

2. To that which is objected, that he who makes [something] by which being done it is necessary that the other come about, is said to make it; it must be said that this holds true, when the consequent effect follows directly upon that intermediate thing done, and according to the ordination of the work and according to the intention of the agent, as it is in him who opens a window, that the house may be illuminated. But it is not so in the [present] matter: both because God does not intend to infuse the soul into the flesh for this, that it may contract guilt; both also because the infusion of the soul into the flesh is not directly ordered to the staining of the soul except only per accidens, namely by reason of the foulness introduced into the flesh from the guilt of Adam; and therefore such an effect is extraneous to the divine operation. And therefore that reasoning errs per accidens17.

3. To that which is objected, that if God were to place the soul in hell, He would not act justly; it must be said that it is not similar, because, when I say the soul is placed in hell, this is not regarded according to the order of nature, since such a place is not owed to the soul by nature. If therefore it is placed there in an ordered way, it is necessary that it be placed according to justice, which regards the exigency of merits. But the soul, before it is infused into the body, has no merits18; and therefore, if it were placed in hell, there would be no justice there. But it is not so on this side, because the soul has a natural appetite for the flesh, and the flesh for the spirit; and therefore according to the order of nature the soul is placed

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in such a body, nor ought the natural appetite to be infringed on account of some preternatural accident, such as of foulness or penality.

4. To that which is objected, that the soul is not propagated from a soul, therefore one merits nothing for another; it must be said that although the power of the generative virtue does not extend further than to the propagation of the flesh by way of an efficient [cause], yet the intention of nature extends to the whole composite. For the human does not intend to generate flesh, but intends to generate a human like himself in species; and therefore all are called sons of Adam. And on that account, although Adam could not demerit for the soul as separated, he could nevertheless demerit for it as united to the flesh; and therefore that reasoning is not valid.

— Yet it could also be said otherwise, as has been touched on, that that infusion of the soul does not regard preceding merits.

6. To that which is objected concerning a separated soul, which would have the use of free will; it must be said that it is not similar, because, if such a soul had the use of free will and rejected such a body, that infusion could not be without punishment; and thus guilt would precede its infusion, or an injustice would be done to it. But it is not so in the [present] matter, because since the soul desires to be united to the body, that union is natural, although accidentally from this it contracts guilt and punishment.

5. To that which is objected, that justice ought always to be joined to mercy; it must be said that it is true; for justice, according as it is called the becomingness of the divine goodness, is joined to mercy, which indeed is called the affluence of the divine goodness19, and both are to be found in the [present] matter. For in this very [fact], that God infuses souls into such bodies, is manifested the affluence of the divine goodness, by which He makes His sun to rise over the good and the evil20; nor on account of the transgression of Adam did He withdraw His hand from the conservation of human nature. But according as justice regards the exigency of merits, thus also it has mercy conjoined; but in neither mode, properly speaking, does it have place in the [present] matter, unless we compare to the sin of Adam. For by comparison to the sin of Adam there is justice there, because God punished the whole posterity of Adam for his transgression; there is also mercy, because He did not utterly destroy it, although Adam merited this by his transgression; nay, to many of those same posterity He restored grace. But to others, who die before baptism, although He does not bestow the benefit of grace, He nevertheless expends some benefit of mercy in this, that He conserves for them the being of nature. For it is better so to be than not to be at all. He would even be ready to bestow on them the benefit of grace, if they were brought to the Sacrament of baptism. But that they are not brought, this comes from a defect of nature21.

And if you ask, since God foreknew this, why He would infuse the soul into that body; or since He also foreknew that Adam would fall and would corrupt human bodies, why He instituted the propagation of the human thus and not otherwise, since He could institute [it] in such a way that in no way would prejudice be done to the offspring by the parent; it must be said that in the condition of things the order of the divine wisdom is weighed more than the order of justice or of mercy is weighed. But the order of the divine wisdom demanded this, that rational spirits should go forth immediately from God, to whose image they are; and that all humans should be propagated from one human, for many causes, as was assigned above in the eighteenth distinction22; and although God saw that some evil would come thence, He nevertheless ought not to alter the order which the divine wisdom required. For by eliciting goods from the evils that follow, He reduces the whole to the order befitting wisdom; and while He elicits greater goods from great evils, both power and wisdom and goodness are rendered more commendable. On account of which Gregory23 exclaims and says: « O happy fault, which merited to have such a Redeemer ». And therefore if anyone wishes to attend to how commendable God is in His works, he ought not to look only to that which he sees in the present, but also to the antecedents and the things to come; because, just as the beauty of a verse is not perceived in one syllable24, but in the integrity of the verse, so he cannot regard the beauty and praiseworthiness of the divine works who regards them in part.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Paulo ante plurimi codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 4 animam infusam pro anima infusa, tamen incongrue retinent eam, exceptis cod. cc et ed. 1, recte in sua lectione omittentibus eam.
    Shortly before, very many codices and editions 1, 2, 3, 4 [read] animam infusam (the soul infused, accusative) for anima infusa (the soul [having been] infused, ablative), yet they incongruously retain eam (it), with the exception of codex cc and edition 1, which rightly omit eam in their reading.
  2. Vat. cum ed. 3 vexaret. Codd. A I quod, cod. F quia pro quam.
    The Vatican [edition] with edition 3 [reads] vexaret (would vex). Codices A I [read] quod, codex F quia for quam (which).
  3. Ut probatum est supra d. 18. a. 2. q. 3.
    As was proven above, d. 18, a. 2, q. 3.
  4. Psalm. 24, 10. — Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 hoc quintum argumentum reiecit in locum sextum, eo, ut in oculos incurrit, consilio, ut ordo obiectionum plane respondeat ordini solutionum postea adductarum.
    Psalm 24:10. — The Vatican [edition] with editions 3, 4 cast this fifth argument into the sixth place, with this design, as is evident, that the order of the objections might plainly correspond to the order of the solutions adduced afterward.
  5. Cod. cc et ed. 1 incarnaret.
    Codex cc and edition 1 [read] incarnaret (would incarnate).
  6. Cod. V addit naturali.
    Codex V adds naturali (natural).
  7. Cfr. supra d. XXXII. lit. Magistri, c. 6.
    Cf. above, d. 32, the text of the Master, c. 6.
  8. Gen. 1, 28; 8, 17. — Paulo inferius Vat., omissa voce homo ante inchoat, post inchoat subiungit perficere et complere. Pro voce homo codd. P V X cc ee et alii cum edd. 1, 2 non.
    Genesis 1:28; 8:17. — A little below, the Vatican [edition], with the word homo (the human) omitted before inchoat (begins), after inchoat subjoins perficere et complere (to perfect and complete). For the word homo codices P V X cc ee and others, with editions 1, 2, [read] non (not).
  9. Non pauci codd., inter quos F Y aa bb ee, exhereditari. — Cfr. Anselm., de Conceptu virgin. et orig. pecc. c. 28, ex quo testimonium illud, quod ad rem tractatam spectat, affertur infra in corp. quaest.
    Not a few codices, among them F Y aa bb ee, [read] exhereditari (to be disinherited). — Cf. Anselm, On the Virginal Conception and Original Sin, c. 28, from which that testimony, which pertains to the matter treated, is adduced below in the body of the question.
  10. Anselm., Proslog. c. 10: Cum enim punis malos, iustum est, quia illorum meritis convenit; cum vero parcis malis, iustum est, non quia illorum meritis, sed quia bonitati tuae condecens est.
    Anselm, Proslogion c. 10: « For when You punish the evil, it is just, because it befits their merits; but when You spare the evil, it is just, not because [it befits] their merits, but because it is becoming to Your goodness ».
  11. Edd., excepta 1, cum pluribus codd. legis.
    The editions, except 1, with several codices [read] legis (of the law).
  12. Cap. 30: Sic itaque administrat omnia quae creavit, ut etiam ipsa proprios exercere et agere motus sinat.
    Chapter 30: « And so He thus administers all the things which He created, that He lets them also exercise and carry out their own motions ».
  13. Codd. K T Y et alii quaecumque, Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 quotquot.
    Codices K T Y and others [read] quaecumque, the Vatican [edition] with editions 3, 4 quotquot (however many).
  14. Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 et plures codd. hic. Aliquanto inferius pro appetitu naturali memoratae edd. appetitui naturali.
    The Vatican [edition] with editions 2, 3, 4 and several codices [read] hic (this). Somewhat below, for appetitu naturali (by natural appetite) the said editions [read] appetitui naturali (to the natural appetite).
  15. Textus originalis sic: Si quis enim vir et uxor eius... provecti, simul crimen... post damnationem generant, eidem non debere subiacere... quae parentes iuste perdiderunt, gratis oportere restitui... in miseriam damnati, in eodem generant exilio. De similibus itaque simile debet esse iudicium; sed de illis tanto districtius, quanto delictum eorum probari potest improbabilius. — Pro improbabilius Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 exhibet improbius, cod. N inexcusabilius. Sed teste Forcellini, Lexicon totius latinitatis adiectivum improbabilis etiam de factis et moribus a ratione reprobandis usurpatur.
    The original text runs thus: « For if a man and his wife... advanced, [and they] together [commit] a crime... after the condemnation they generate, [and the sons] ought not to be subject to the same [servitude]... [the goods] which the parents justly lost ought freely to be restored... condemned into misery, they generate in the same exile. And so concerning the like the judgment ought to be alike; but concerning those so much the stricter, the more inexcusably their offense can be proven ». — For improbabilius (more inexcusably) the Vatican [edition] with editions 3, 4 exhibits improbius, codex N inexcusabilius. But on the testimony of Forcellini, the Lexicon of the whole Latin language, the adjective improbabilis is used also of deeds and morals to be reproved by reason.
  16. Bene multi codd. cum edd., excepta 1, hanc sententiam verterunt in contrariam, legentes: vel non potest mala ex bonis elicere, quae lectio evidenter falsa reprobatur a codd. F I L O etc. et ed. 1. Pro nostra lectione militant etiam quae supra habentur d. 23. a. 1. q. 2. ad 2. Paulo inferius pro solummodo originalia [i. e. numero, non specie diversa], verum etiam actualia cod. cc et ed. 1 solummodo originale... actuale.
    Quite many codices with the editions, except 1, turned this sentence into the contrary, reading: vel non potest mala ex bonis elicere (or he cannot elicit evils from goods), which reading, evidently false, is reproved by codices F I L O etc. and edition 1. For our reading there militate also the things had above in d. 23, a. 1, q. 2, ad 2. A little below, for solummodo originalia (only original [evils], i.e. diverse in number, not in species), verum etiam actualia (but also actual), codex cc and edition 1 [read] solummodo originale... actuale (only original... actual).
  17. De hac fallacia vide tom. 1. pag. 58, nota 5.
    Concerning this fallacy see vol. 1, p. 58, note 5.
  18. Cfr. supra d. 18. a. 2. q. 2, et August., l. de Anima et eius orig. c. 6. n. 6.
    Cf. above, d. 18, a. 2, q. 2, and Augustine, the book On the Soul and Its Origin, c. 6, n. 6.
  19. Anselm., Proslog. c. 9: Vere in altissimo et secretissimo bonitatis tuae latet fons, unde manat fluvius misericordiae tuae.
    Anselm, Proslogion c. 9: « Truly in the highest and most secret [part] of Your goodness lies hidden the fount, whence flows the river of Your mercy ».
  20. Matth. 5, 45. — Paulo ante pro qua codd. F aa quae, Vat. quia.
    Matthew 5:45. — Shortly before, for qua (by which) codices F aa [read] quae, the Vatican [edition] quia.
  21. Cfr. August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 20. n. 53. seqq. — Mox pro corpori illi cod. O tali corpori.
    Cf. Augustine, On Free Choice III, c. 20, n. 53 and following. — Soon, for corpori illi (into that body) codex O [reads] tali corpori (into such a body).
  22. Art. 1. q. 1. et dub. circa lit.
    Article 1, q. 1, and the dubium concerning the text.
  23. In praeconio paschali Exultet, quod cantatur Sabbato sancto. — Mox pro quantum sit commendabilis Deus in operibus cod. L quid sit commendabilius in operibus.
    In the paschal proclamation Exultet, which is sung on Holy Saturday. — Soon, for quantum sit commendabilis Deus in operibus (how commendable God is in [His] works) codex L [reads] quid sit commendabilius in operibus (what is more commendable in [His] works).
  24. Cfr. August., VI. Music. c. 11. n. 30; de Vera Relig. c. 22. n. 42. — Paulo superius cod. H verbis una syllaba praefigit in.
    Cfr. Augustine, On Music VI, c. 11, n. 30; On True Religion c. 22, n. 42. — A little above, codex H prefixes in to the words una syllaba (one syllable). ---
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