Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 32, Dubia

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 32

Textus Latinus

p. 774

Dubia circa litteram Magistri.

Dub. I. In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Manet igitur, ut ait Augustinus, in corpore mortis huius carnalis concupiscentia. Cum enim post baptismum non debeat remanere in nobis nisi poena promovens, et concupiscentia magis sit poena suffocans quam promovens; non debet remanere in corpore mortis huius¹. Quod autem sit poena suffocans, patet in lip. 775ttera sequenti, qua dicitur: Eius desideriis noxiis non obedire praecipimur. Si igitur desideria concupiscentiae sunt noxia, et prohibetur² obedire concupiscentiae: ergo videtur, quod sit poena suffocans. — Item, actus concupiscentiae ligat rationem, maxime in opere virtutis generativae; sed talis est poena suffocans: ergo etc.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod concupiscentia, quae remanet post baptismum, non est poena suffocans, quia non praecludit aditum vitae spiritualis; stat enim simul cum gratia. Praeterea, etsi incitet ad illicitum, non tamen praevalet, quia subter nos est appetitus noster, et nos dominari possumus illius³. Remanet autem haec concupiscentia in membris nostris ut poena promovens, maxime quantum ad exercitium pugnae, quae facit ad augmentum meriti et coronae. Quod bene significatum est in ingressu filiorum Israel in terram promissionis, in qua reliquit eis Dominus adversarios, cum quibus pugnare possent, et per quos Deus eos probaret, utrum ipsi Deum diligerent, an non, sicut patet in libro Iudicum⁴. Sunt et aliae plures utilitates, ad quas movetur homo occasione concupiscentiae in se relictae; sed hae inveniri possunt libro quarto, distinctione quarta⁵.

Per hoc patet responsio ad duo obiecta. Nam concupiscentia non suffocat, nisi ei obedire velimus; et licet in actu generandi usus rationis impediatur, non tamen est ibi suffocatio, quia talis actus potest esse meritorius.

Dub. II. Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Per gratiam baptismi concupiscentia mitigatur et minuitur. Contra hoc est: aut enim gratia baptismi habet oppositionem, aut non. Si sic: ergo una non potest stare cum altera: ergo, adveniente gratia, recedit concupiscentia, non⁶ minuitur. Si non opponitur ei: ergo videtur, quod ipsam non diminuat. — Item, si concupiscentia minuatur per gratiam: ergo cum sit finita, videtur, quod aliquando totaliter auferatur; quod est contra Augustinum in littera⁷, qui dicit, quod «hoc non praestatur nisi miraculo ineffabili, ut lex peccati prorsus exstinguatur».

Ideo est hic quaestio, utrum fomes in aliquo fuerit totaliter exstinctus.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est supra⁸, concupiscentia duo dicit — dicit enim appetitum immoderatum boni commutabilis — dico igitur, quod ista immoderantia circa appetitum potest esse dupliciter: aut ita, quod ratio captivetur, et anima pervertatur, ut necessitatem habeat praeponendi bonum commutabile bono incommutabili; et sic dicitur esse concupiscentia intensa, et hoc modo tenet rationem culpae, ratione videlicet illius immoderantiae. Alio modo concupiscentia dicit immoderantiam, non quia ratio succumbat sensualitati, sed quia sensualitas non perfecte obtemperet rationi; et hoc modo tenet rationem poenae. Primo modo, quia tenet rationem culpae, directe opponitur ipsi gratiae; et ideo gratia superveniens aufert illam immoderantiam, pro eo quod talis immoderantia ponebat debitae iustitiae carentiam. Aliam autem immoderantiam, quae, sicut dictum est, dicit rationem poenae, non tollit gratia in suo adventu, propter hoc quod non opponitur ei formaliter. Sed quoniam gratia et concupiscentia relicta respectu eius, ad quod inclinant, quandam habent oppositionem; hinc est, quod secundum quod homo plus exercitatur in gratia, magis et magis remitti dicitur⁹ concupiscentia. — Nunquam tamen omnino tollitur concupiscentia, quia semper remanet radix eius in homine, nisi auferatur per donum gratiae speciale, sicut in Virgine creditur fuisse post conceptionem Filii Dei. Sed hoc magis habet locum in tertio¹⁰, cum quaeritur de sanctificatione Virginis.

Per haec autem, quae dicta sunt, patent obiecta. Gratia enim et concupiscentia quodam modo opponuntur, et quodam modo non, sicut ostensum est. — Ad illud quod obiicitur secundo, quod concupiscentia est finita, ergo aliquando totaliter aufertur; dicendum, quod hoc verum esset, si concupiscentia diminueretur quantum ad causam¹¹; sed solum minuitur quantum ad exercitium sive per comparationem ad illud ad quod est; et ideo nunquam totaliter tollitur, sicut habilitas animae nunquam totaliter per peccatum adimitur; et hoc melius infra¹² videbitur.

Dub. III. Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod manet vitium concupiscentiae in vetustate carnis tanquam superatum et peremptum, nisi illicito consensu reviviscat et in regnum proprium revocetur. Hoc enim videtur falsum esse, quia, si concupiscentia, prout p. 776regnabat, dicebatur esse originale peccatum ab Augustino¹³; videtur, quod si revocatur in regnum proprium post baptismum, quod originale peccatum revertatur. Quodsi hoc est falsum, restat etc. — Item, quae sunt diversorum generum, unum non auget alterum; sed illicitus consensus est culpa, concupiscentia relicta est poena: ergo non augetur per illicitum consensum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod concupiscentia augetur per consensum illicitum, sicut dicit Augustinus¹⁴, et hoc duplici ex causa. Primum, quia gratia expellitur, ex cuius praesentia ratio sensualitati praeerat, et per consequens remittebatur concupiscentia. Alia est ratio, quia potentia ex frequentia actus magis prompta efficitur ad exeundum in actum consimilem¹⁵; et quia actus illicitus dicit actum concupiscendi: hinc est, quod concupiscentia augetur ab actu illicito quasi a simili.

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod tunc redit originale peccatum; dicendum, quod hoc non sequitur duplici ex causa. Primum quidem, quia concupiscentia regnans non dicitur peccatum originale, nisi in quantum habet et regnum et dominium ab ipsa hominis origine. Cum autem illud habet per illicitum actum, non habet rationem peccati originalis, sed potius actualis. — Alia est etiam ratio, quia aliter diminuitur concupiscentia per baptismum, aliter augetur per illicitum consensum. Per baptismum enim sic diminuitur, ut auferatur illud quod formaliter erat peccatum originale, videlicet carentia debitae iustitiae. Ibi enim absolvitur quis a debito originalis iustitiae, ad quam omnes tenebantur ex ipsa obligatione Adae¹⁶; sed per illicitum consensum augeri dicitur, pro eo quod, dum homo peccat, magis efficitur pronus ad malum, saltem intensive et quantum ad aliquod peccati genus determinatum.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sunt diversorum generum concupiscentia, prout est culpa et prout est poena; dicendum, quod etsi sint diversorum generum¹⁷ in genere moris, non tamen in genere naturae; utriusque enim actus est concupiscere. Praeterea, etsi concupiscentia, prout est poena, non sit eiusdem generis cum concupiscentia, prout est culpa, formaliter loquendo, quia tamen est poena vitiosa, ad illam de se ordinat¹⁸, et propter hoc una augmentatur per alteram, sicut docet ipsa experientia¹⁹.

Dub. IV. Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Quomodo alia peccata praetereunt actu et remanent reatu, ita e converso fieri potest, quod concupiscentia praetereat reatu et remaneat actu. Sed contra: si concupiscentia remanet actu, ergo in originali non tantum consideratur reatus, verum etiam actus: ergo debet dici peccatum actuale. — Item, falsum videtur dicere, cum ait, quod alia peccata transeunt actu et remanent reatu. Cum enim dimittuntur peccata actualia in baptismo, transeunt et quantum ad poenam et quantum ad culpam. In²⁰ poenitentia etiam transeunt quantum ad reatum poenae aeternae. Et si tu dicas, quod remanet reatus ad poenam satisfactoriam et temporalem; obiicitur similiter de originali, post cuius deletionem in baptismate remanet obligatio ad mortem et ad alias poenas temporales.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Magister large vocat hic actum, non solum ipsum actualem motum, sed etiam pronitatem illam, secundum quam homo ordinatur ad actum. Et ideo dicit, originale peccatum remanere actu, quia, cum sit ibi privatio originalis iustitiae, per quam homo est reus carentiae visionis Dei, sit etiam pronitas, per quam homo ordinatus est ad actum concupiscendi²¹; aufertur illa privatio iustitiae originalis, et relinquitur illa inclinatio habitualis.

Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de transitu actuali, dicendum, quod Magister non loquitur de transitu, qui est per peccati deletionem, sed per peccati consummationem, per quem modum praesens in praeteritum dicitur transire. Ideo dicit, quod transit quantum ad actum et remanet quantum ad reatum, quia actus est in fieri, sed reatus est in quiete²².

Dub. V. Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Anima non est talis, qualem Deus eam fecit. Contra: in subita operatione simul est fieri et factum esse; sed istud argumentum est necessarium: Deus facit animam, ergo est; ergo²³ et istud: Deus facit talem animam, ergo talis est: ergo Magister implicat duo opposita in littera. — Item, quaero: aut Deus fecit animam p. 777iustam, aut iniustam. Si iustam: ergo Deus dedit ei iustitiam, et hoc est falsum; nunquam enim iustitia creata fuit cum ista anima. Si iniustam, et talis est: ergo talis est anima, qualem Deus eam fecit.

Propter hoc est quaestio, qualem Deus fecerit animam²⁴; et non videtur, quod possit dari, quod fecerit eam iniustam, cum summa iustitia non possit facere aliquid iniustum. Non videtur similiter, quod fecerit eam iustam, quia, cum in primo instanti fuerit iniusta, simul fuisset iusta et iniusta, et haec sunt incompossibilia. Non enim videtur, quod possit dari medium circa haec, quia haec duo sunt immediate opposita circa animam.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur, qualem Deus fecerit animam quantum ad bonitatem et malitiam, quod hoc potest intelligi dupliciter: aut quantum ad bonitatem naturae, aut quantum ad bonitatem moris. Si quantum ad bonitatem naturae, sic concedendum est, quod fecit animam bonam, et adhuc bona est. Si quantum ad bonitatem moris, sic dicendum est, quod nec fecit eam bonam, nec malam. Bonam eam non fecit, quia bonitatem illam animae non dedit, obsistente infectione ex parte corporis, cui anima in eodem instanti unita fuit, in quo creata. Non fecit eam malam, quia, quamvis anima ab instanti suae creationis mala sit, hoc tamen non est a Deo creante, sed a carne inficiente. Et ideo dicit Magister²⁵, hanc non esse concedendam: anima est talis, qualem Deus eam fecit, sed potius e converso; non quia Deus dederit ei actualem iustitiam, sed quia dedit ei bonitatem naturae ad habendam iustitiam ordinatam, a qua iustitia privatur per carnem infectam.

Et sic patent obiecta. Per hunc etiam modum respondendum esset, si quaereretur de actione mala, quae ponitur esse a Deo, secundum quod actio. Non enim est a Deo, secundum quod iusta, quia non est iusta; nec secundum quod iniusta, quia iniustitia non est a Deo; sed est a Deo secundum bonitatem naturae, per quam est indifferens ad utrumque. Consimili modo intelligendum est²⁶ in creatione animae.

Dub. VI. Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicitur ultimo capitulo, quod ab ipsa creatione una anima est subtilior alia in essentia et ad intelligendum memorandumque habilior. Hoc enim videtur esse falsum, quia, sicut dicit Gregorius²⁷, «omnes homines natura pares genuit»: ergo similiter et ab ipsa creatione animae pares sunt.

Item quaeritur, utrum subtilitas ingenii et habilitas ad memorandum veniat ex parte corporis, an ex parte animae. Et quod ex parte animae, videtur Magister in littera²⁸ dicere. Sed contrarium huius videtur, quia videmus, quod ipsa anima, quae non variatur per tempora, modo dementior est, modo ad intelligendum acutior. Hoc autem non potest esse nisi ex parte corporis. — Item, videmus, quod cholerici naturaliter sunt melioris²⁹ ingenii quam phlegmatici: ergo si hoc dicit complexionem ex parte corporis, videtur etc.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Magister in littera³⁰, satis probabile est, quod in ipsa creatione sit praecellentia in animabus. Et quod dicuntur esse pares, hoc non intelligitur quantum ad privationem ordinis naturalium in praecellentia, sed quantum ad privationem ordinis in dominio et servitute.

Si autem quaeratur, unde veniat ista praecellentia naturalium, utrum ex parte animae, vel ex parte corporis; dicendum, quod cum anima non sit propter corpus, sed corpus propter animam, ista praecellentia ex parte animae venit³¹. In hac autem praecellit una anima alteram, non ratione principii ex quo, cum sit ex nihilo, sed ratione sapientiae Conditoris, qui producit omnia secundum debitum ordinem. — Non est tamen negandum, quin multum faciat corpus ad exercitium illarum habilitatum, quae animae a sua creatione insunt. Unde bona dispositio corporis multum expedit, sicut e contrario mala multum impedit; et propter hoc iudicantur cholerici boni ingenii, quia anima quantum ad usum illius habilitatis iuvatur per convenientem dispositionem ex parte corporis. Attamen non est illa ratio principalis boni ingenii, quia videmus, aliquando homines contrariae complexionis ingeniosos esse. Unde cum videamus homines ad diversa exercitia aptos, quosdam ad artes mechanicas, quosdam ad liberales, et iterum quosdam ad mathematica, quosdam ad metaphysica³², quosdam ad naturalia, quosdam ad rationalia: si quaeratur ratio huius, respondebit theologus, quod hoc est ex distributione donorum Dei, p. 778a quo non tantum procedunt dona gratuita, immo etiam dona naturalia; et omnia talia gratiae vocantur a Sanctis; et de huiusmodi intelligitur illud quod dicitur primae Petri quarto³³: Unusquisque, sicut accepit gratiam, in alterutrum illam administrantes etc. Naturalis autem respondebit, quod hoc venit ex diversa dispositione ex parte corporis, vel quantum ad complexionem, vel quantum ad organizationem. Uterque tamen bene, sed theologus melius, quia principaliorem assignat causam; unde et Philosophus in libro de Animalibus³⁴, cum assignat causas dispositionis membrorum, ubi non invenit causam principalem ex parte naturae, recurrit ad dispositionem conditricis Sapientiae.

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English Translation

Doubts concerning the text of the Master.

Doubt I. In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about that which he says: There remains therefore, as Augustine says, in the body of this death the carnal concupiscence. For since after baptism nothing ought to remain in us except a promoting punishment, and concupiscence is rather a suffocating punishment than a promoting one; it ought not to remain in the body of this death¹. But that it is a suffocating punishment is plain from the following text, in which it is said: We are bidden not to obey its noxious desires. If therefore the desires of concupiscence are noxious, and we are forbidden² to obey concupiscence: then it seems to be a suffocating punishment. — Likewise, the act of concupiscence binds the reason, especially in the work of the generative power; but such is a suffocating punishment: therefore etc.

I respond: It must be said that the concupiscence which remains after baptism is not a suffocating punishment, because it does not bar the entrance to the spiritual life; for it stands together with grace. Moreover, although it incites to the unlawful, yet it does not prevail, because our appetite is beneath us, and we can have dominion over it³. But this concupiscence remains in our members as a promoting punishment, especially with regard to the exercise of the fight, which conduces to the increase of merit and of the crown. This was well signified in the entrance of the children of Israel into the land of promise, in which the Lord left them adversaries, with whom they might fight, and through whom God might test them, whether they loved God or not, as is plain in the book of Judges⁴. And there are also several other utilities, to which a man is moved on the occasion of the concupiscence left in him; but these can be found in the fourth book, distinction four⁵.

By this the answer to the two objections becomes plain. For concupiscence does not suffocate, unless we are willing to obey it; and although in the act of generating the use of reason is impeded, yet there is not there a suffocation, because such an act can be meritorious.

Doubt II. Likewise it is asked about that which he says: Through the grace of baptism concupiscence is mitigated and diminished. Against this it stands: for either the grace of baptism has an opposition [to concupiscence], or not. If yes: then the one cannot stand with the other: therefore, when grace comes, concupiscence withdraws, it is not⁶ diminished. If it is not opposed to it: then it seems that it does not diminish it. — Likewise, if concupiscence is diminished through grace: then since it is finite, it seems that at some time it would be totally taken away; which is against Augustine in the text⁷, who says that «this is not granted except by an ineffable miracle, that the law of sin be utterly extinguished».

Therefore there is here a question, whether the tinder [of sin] has in anyone been totally extinguished.

I respond: It must be said that, as was said above⁸, concupiscence says two things — for it says an immoderate appetite for the changeable good — I say therefore that this immoderateness about the appetite can be in two ways: either so that the reason is taken captive, and the soul is perverted, so that it has a necessity of preferring the changeable good to the unchangeable good; and thus it is called intense concupiscence, and in this manner it holds the formal character of fault, namely by reason of that immoderateness. In another way concupiscence says an immoderateness, not because the reason succumbs to the sensuality, but because the sensuality does not perfectly comply with the reason; and in this manner it holds the formal character of punishment. In the first manner, since it holds the formal character of fault, it is directly opposed to grace itself; and therefore supervening grace takes away that immoderateness, on account of the fact that such immoderateness posited a lack of due justice. But the other immoderateness, which, as was said, says the formal character of punishment, grace does not take away at its coming, on account of the fact that it is not formally opposed to it. But since grace and the concupiscence left [in us], with respect to that to which they incline, have a certain opposition; hence it is, that according as a man is more exercised in grace, concupiscence is said to be more and more remitted⁹. — Yet concupiscence is never altogether taken away, because the root of it always remains in man, unless it be taken away by a special gift of grace, as is believed to have been the case in the Virgin after the conception of the Son of God. But this has its place rather in the third book¹⁰, when it is asked about the sanctification of the Virgin.

But by these things which have been said, the objections become plain. For grace and concupiscence are in a certain manner opposed, and in a certain manner not, as has been shown. — To that which is objected in the second place, that concupiscence is finite, therefore at some time it is totally taken away; it must be said that this would be true, if concupiscence were diminished with regard to its cause¹¹; but it is only diminished with regard to its exercise or by comparison to that to which it is [directed]; and therefore it is never totally taken away, just as the aptitude of the soul is never totally removed by sin; and this will be seen better below¹².

Doubt III. Likewise it is asked about that which he says, that the vice of concupiscence remains in the oldness of the flesh as something overcome and slain, unless by an unlawful consent it revive and be recalled into its own kingdom. For this seems to be false, because, if concupiscence, insofar as p. 776it reigned, was called original sin by Augustine¹³; it seems that if it is recalled into its own kingdom after baptism, original sin would return. But if this is false, it remains etc. — Likewise, things which are of diverse genera, the one does not increase the other; but the unlawful consent is a fault, the concupiscence left [in us] is a punishment: therefore it is not increased by an unlawful consent.

I respond: It must be said that concupiscence is increased by an unlawful consent, as Augustine says¹⁴, and this for a twofold cause. First, because grace is expelled, by whose presence the reason was set over the sensuality, and consequently concupiscence was remitted. The other reason is, that a power by the frequency of acts becomes more prompt to go out into a like act¹⁵; and because the unlawful act says an act of desiring: hence it is, that concupiscence is increased by the unlawful act as by something like it.

To that therefore which is objected, that then original sin returns; it must be said that this does not follow, for a twofold cause. First indeed, because reigning concupiscence is not called original sin, except insofar as it has both kingdom and dominion from the very origin of man. But when it has this through an unlawful act, it does not have the character of original sin, but rather of actual. — There is also another reason, that concupiscence is diminished by baptism in one way, and increased by unlawful consent in another. For by baptism it is so diminished, that there is taken away that which formally was original sin, namely the lack of due justice. For there one is absolved from the debt of original justice, to which all were bound by the very obligation of Adam¹⁶; but by unlawful consent it is said to be increased, on account of the fact that, while a man sins, he becomes more prone to evil, at least intensively and with regard to some determinate genus of sin.

To that which is objected, that concupiscence, insofar as it is a fault and insofar as it is a punishment, is of diverse genera; it must be said that although they are of diverse genera¹⁷ in the genus of morals, yet not in the genus of nature; for the act of each is to desire. Moreover, although concupiscence, insofar as it is a punishment, is not of the same genus with concupiscence, insofar as it is a fault, formally speaking, yet since it is a vicious punishment, it of itself orders to that [fault]¹⁸, and on account of this the one is increased by the other, as experience itself teaches¹⁹.

Doubt IV. Likewise it is asked about that which he says: As other sins pass away in act and remain in guilt, so conversely it can come about that concupiscence pass away in guilt and remain in act. But on the contrary: if concupiscence remains in act, then in original [sin] not only is guilt considered, but also act: therefore it ought to be called actual sin. — Likewise, he seems to say what is false, when he says that other sins pass away in act and remain in guilt. For when actual sins are forgiven in baptism, they pass away both with regard to punishment and with regard to fault. In²⁰ penance also they pass away with regard to the guilt of eternal punishment. And if you say that there remains a guilt unto satisfactory and temporal punishment; it is objected likewise concerning original [sin], after whose deletion in baptism there remains an obligation unto death and unto other temporal punishments.

I respond: It must be said that the Master here broadly calls act not only the actual motion itself, but also that proneness according to which a man is ordered to act. And therefore he says that original sin remains in act, because, since there is there a privation of original justice, by which a man is guilty of the lack of the vision of God, there is also a proneness, by which a man is ordered to the act of desiring²¹; that privation of original justice is taken away, and that habitual inclination is left.

But to that which is objected concerning the actual passing-away, it must be said that the Master does not speak of a passing-away which is by the deletion of sin, but by the consummation of sin, by which manner the present is said to pass into the past. Therefore he says that it passes away with regard to act and remains with regard to guilt, because the act is in becoming, but the guilt is in rest²².

Doubt V. Likewise it is asked about that which he says: The soul is not such as God made it. On the contrary: in a sudden operation the becoming and the having-become are simultaneous; but this argument is necessary: God makes the soul, therefore it is; therefore²³ also this: God makes such a soul, therefore it is such: therefore the Master implies two opposites in the text. — Likewise, I ask: either God made the soul p. 777just, or unjust. If just: then God gave it justice, and this is false; for justice was never created together with this soul. If unjust, and it is such: then the soul is such as God made it.

On account of this there is a question, of what sort God made the soul²⁴; and it does not seem that it can be granted that he made it unjust, since the highest justice cannot make anything unjust. Likewise it does not seem that he made it just, because, since in the first instant it was unjust, it would have been at once just and unjust, and these are incompossible. For it does not seem that a middle can be granted concerning these, because these two are immediately opposed concerning the soul.

I respond: It must be said that when it is asked of what sort God made the soul with regard to goodness and malice, this can be understood in two ways: either with regard to the goodness of nature, or with regard to the goodness of morals. If with regard to the goodness of nature, thus it must be conceded that he made the soul good, and it is still good. If with regard to the goodness of morals, thus it must be said that he neither made it good nor evil. He did not make it good, because he did not give that goodness to the soul, the infection from the side of the body resisting, to which the soul was united in the same instant in which it was created. He did not make it evil, because, although the soul from the instant of its creation is evil, yet this is not from God creating, but from the flesh infecting. And therefore the Master says²⁵ that this is not to be conceded: the soul is such as God made it, but rather the converse; not because God gave it actual justice, but because he gave it the goodness of nature for having ordered justice, of which justice it is deprived through the infected flesh.

And thus the objections become plain. By this manner also it would have to be answered, if it were asked concerning an evil action, which is posited to be from God, insofar as it is action. For it is not from God insofar as it is just, because it is not just; nor insofar as it is unjust, because injustice is not from God; but it is from God with regard to the goodness of nature, by which it is indifferent to either. In a like manner it is to be understood²⁶ in the creation of the soul.

Doubt VI. Likewise it is asked about that which is said in the last chapter, that from the very creation one soul is subtler than another in essence and more apt for understanding and remembering. For this seems to be false, because, as Gregory says²⁷, «he begat all men equal by nature»: therefore likewise also from the very creation the souls are equal.

Likewise it is asked, whether subtlety of intellect and aptitude for remembering come from the side of the body, or from the side of the soul. And that they come from the side of the soul, the Master seems to say in the text²⁸. But the contrary of this seems [true], because we see that the soul itself, which is not varied through times, is now more dull, now keener for understanding. But this cannot be except from the side of the body. — Likewise, we see that the choleric are naturally of better²⁹ intellect than the phlegmatic: therefore if this bespeaks complexion from the side of the body, it seems etc.

I respond: It must be said that, as the Master says in the text³⁰, it is sufficiently probable that in the very creation there is a pre-eminence in souls. And that they are said to be equal, this is not understood with regard to the privation of the order of natural things in pre-eminence, but with regard to the privation of the order in dominion and servitude.

But if it be asked whence comes this pre-eminence of natural things, whether from the side of the soul, or from the side of the body; it must be said that, since the soul is not for the sake of the body, but the body for the sake of the soul, this pre-eminence comes from the side of the soul³¹. But in this one soul excels another, not by reason of the principle from which [it is], since it is from nothing, but by reason of the wisdom of the Creator, who produces all things according to due order. — Yet it is not to be denied that the body does much toward the exercise of those aptitudes which are in the soul from its creation. Hence a good disposition of the body much avails, just as on the contrary a bad one much hinders; and on account of this the choleric are judged to be of good intellect, because the soul, with regard to the use of that aptitude, is aided by the suitable disposition from the side of the body. Nevertheless that is not the principal reason of good intellect, because we see that sometimes men of contrary complexion are ingenious. Hence since we see men apt for diverse exercises, some for the mechanical arts, some for the liberal [arts], and again some for mathematics, some for metaphysics³², some for natural [sciences], some for rational [sciences]: if the reason of this be asked, the theologian will answer that this is from the distribution of the gifts of God, p. 778from whom proceed not only gratuitous gifts, but indeed also natural gifts; and all such things are called graces by the Saints; and of these is understood that which is said in the fourth chapter of First Peter³³: Each one, as he has received grace, administering it to one another etc. But the natural philosopher will answer that this comes from the diverse disposition from the side of the body, whether with regard to complexion, or with regard to organization. Yet both answer well, but the theologian better, because he assigns the more principal cause; whence also the Philosopher in the book On Animals³⁴, when he assigns the causes of the disposition of the members, where he does not find the principal cause from the side of nature, has recourse to the disposition of the Wisdom that fashions [them].

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Apparatus Criticus

Respicitur illud Rom. 7, 24: Quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? — Illa poena dicitur suffocans, ut exponit B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 17. q. 107. m. 4. a. 2. partic. 3. ad 2., quae praefocat vitalem spiritum gratiae, ita scil., quod homo compellatur ad illicitum; promovens dicitur, quae est ad exercitium virtutis.
This refers to Romans 7:24: Who will deliver me from the body of this death? — That punishment is called suffocating, as B. Albert expounds, Summa, p. II, tr. 17, q. 107, m. 4, a. 2, partic. 3, ad 2, which suffocates the vital spirit of grace, namely so that a man is compelled to the unlawful; it is called promoting, which is for the exercise of virtue.
Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 nec non aliqui codd. prohibemur.
The Vatican edition with editions 3, 4, and likewise some codices, read prohibemur.
Gen. 4, 7: Sub te erit appetitus eius [peccati], et tu dominaberis illius. — Paulo superius pro cum gratia. Praeterea, etsi Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 cum gratia prima; etsi.
Genesis 4:7: Its [sin's] appetite will be under you, and you will have dominion over it. — A little above, for cum gratia. Praeterea, etsi the Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 read cum gratia prima; etsi.
Cap. 18. seqq.
Chapter 18 and following.
Part. 1. a. 1. q. 2. Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 2. — Hoc dubium solvunt etiam B. Albert., hic a. 3; Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.
Part. 1, a. 1, q. 2. Cf. above, a. 1, q. 2. — This doubt is also resolved by B. Albert, here, a. 3; Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text.
Cod. bb non tantum.
Codex bb reads non tantum.
Hic c. 1. — Paulo ante pro cum sit finita codd. F I T et alii cum non sit infinita.
Here, c. 1. — Shortly before, for cum sit finita codices F, I, T and others read cum non sit infinita.
Art. 1. q. 1. in corp.; a. 2. q. 2; d. 30. a. 2. q. 1 et alibi passim.
Art. 1, q. 1, in the body; a. 2, q. 2; d. 30, a. 2, q. 1, and elsewhere throughout.
Edd., excepta 1, remittitur.
The editions, except the first, read remittitur.
Dist. 3. p. I. a. 2. q. 2.
Dist. 3, p. I, a. 2, q. 2.
Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 2.
Cf. above, a. 1, q. 2.
Dist. 35. a. 2. q. 3. — De hoc dubio cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 106. m. 7. a. 7. § 1. seqq.; B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 17. q. III. m. I. seqq.; Petr. a Tar., hic q. I. a. 3; Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 2.
Dist. 35, a. 2, q. 3. — On this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. II, q. 106, m. 7, a. 7, § 1 ff.; B. Albert, Summa, p. II, tr. 17, q. III, m. I ff.; Peter of Tarentaise, here, q. I, a. 3; Giles of Rome, here, q. 1, a. 2.
Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. et supra d. XXX. c. 8. seqq.
See here the text of the Master, c. 1, and above, d. XXX, c. 8 ff.
Libr. II. de Peccat. merit. et remiss. etc. c. 28. n. 45, unde et textus huius dubii sumtus est.
On the Merits and Remission of Sins etc., Bk. II, c. 28, n. 45, whence also the text of this doubt is taken.
Cfr. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 1. seqq.
Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. II, c. 1 ff.
Vide hic n. 1. q. 1, et d. 30. a. 2. — Cod. V addit prout est culpa et.
See here n. 1, q. 1, and d. 30, a. 2. — Codex V adds prout est culpa et.
Vel supple se, vel lege ordinatur.
Either supply se, or read ordinatur.
Huius dubii solutionem exhibent S. Thom., hic circa lit., et Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 1.
The solution of this doubt is given by St. Thomas, here on the text, and Giles of Rome, here, doubt on the text, 1.
Vat. ideo. — Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 adiicit ideo. In seq. propos. omnes edd., excepta 1, pro transitu actualis [scil. peccati] substituunt transitu actuali, et dein post peccati consummationem sic prosequuntur: et per quem modum praesens et praeteritum etc.
The Vatican edition reads ideo. — The Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 adds ideo. In the following proposition all the editions, except the first, for transitu actualis [namely of sin] substitute transitu actuali, and then after peccati consummationem they continue thus: et per quem modum praesens et praeteritum etc.
Vat. ideo. — Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 adiicit ideo.
The Vatican edition reads ideo. — The Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 adds ideo.
In seq. propos. omnes edd., excepta 1, pro transitu actualis [scil. peccati] substituunt transitu actuali, et dein post peccati consummationem sic prosequuntur: et per quem modum praesens et praeteritum etc.
In the following proposition all the editions, except the first, for transitu actualis [namely of sin] substitute transitu actuali, and then after peccati consummationem they continue thus: et per quem modum praesens et praeteritum etc.
Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 106. m. 6. ad 1: Dicendum est, quod non simili modo dicitur actus in actuali peccato et in originali peccato. Ibi enim actus praecedit [reatum], hic vero actus sequitur. Nec dicitur in originali peccato actus peccati, quo fit vel quo est, sed quo remanet ad exercitium. Cfr. B. Albert., hic a. 1. quaestiunc. 1; S. p. II. tr. 17. q. 107. m. 4. a. 2. partic. 3; S. Thom., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 2. 3.
Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. II, q. 106, m. 6, ad 1: It must be said that act is not spoken of in the same manner in actual sin and in original sin. For there the act precedes [the guilt], but here the act follows. Nor is act of sin spoken of in original sin, by which it comes to be or by which it is, but by which it remains unto exercise. Cf. B. Albert, here, a. 1, little question 1; Summa, p. II, tr. 17, q. 107, m. 4, a. 2, partic. 3; St. Thomas, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here, doubt on the text, 2, 3.
In edd., excepta 1, desideratur ergo, et paulo inferius pro nunquam habetur non.
In the editions, except the first, ergo is lacking, and a little below, for nunquam there is non.
Edd., excepta 1, voci animam praeponunt illam.
The editions, except the first, place illam before the word animam.
Hic c. 7. Cfr. supra a. 3. q. 1. seq. — Mox multi codd. cum ed. 1 sive pro sed.
Here, c. 7. Cf. above, a. 3, q. 1 ff. — Soon after, many codices with edition 1 read sive for sed.
Non pauci codd., ut H K P Q T aa etc., cum ed. 1 hic subiiciunt H, cod. W etiam. — Cfr. infra d. 37. a. 1. q. 1. et a. 2. q. 1. — Solutio huius dubii habetur etiam apud Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.
Not a few codices, such as H, K, P, Q, T, aa etc., with edition 1 here subjoin H; codex W likewise. — Cf. below, d. 37, a. 1, q. 1, and a. 2, q. 1. — The solution of this doubt is found also in Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text.
Libr. XXI. Moral. c. 15. n. 22, ubi textus originalis pro pares exhibet aequales. — Paulo inferius pro Item quaeritur Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 Hic quaeri potest.
Morals, Bk. XXI, c. 15, n. 22, where the original text for pares reads aequales. — A little below, for Item quaeritur the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 read Hic quaeri potest.
Hic c. 8, ubi pro sua sententia ex simili arguit, scil. in angelis, qui, ut supra d. III. c. 2. monstratum est, non sunt aequales. — Paulo post pro quia videmus, quae verba, in codd. F T ee et aliis oppressa, ex cod. cc et ed. 1 restauravimus, Vat. cum aliis codd. quia videtur.
Here, c. 8, where he argues for his opinion from a likeness, namely in the angels, who, as was shown above, d. III, c. 2, are not equal. — A little after, for quia videmus, which words, suppressed in codices F, T, ee and others, we have restored from codex cc and edition 1, the Vatican edition with other codices reads quia videtur.
Edd., excepta 1, maioris, cod. T boni. — Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 94. (c. 9.).
The editions, except the first, read maioris; codex T boni. — Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. II, text 94 (c. 9).
Hic c. 8.
Here, c. 8.
Aristot., I. de Partib. animal. c. 5: Corpus etiam totum animae gratia conditum est. — Post ex parte animae cod. cc et ed. 1 addunt non ex parte corporis. Mox pro In hac Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 In hoc.
Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals, Bk. I, c. 5: The whole body too has been constituted for the sake of the soul. — After ex parte animae codex cc and edition 1 add non ex parte corporis. Soon after, for In hac the Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 read In hoc.
Multi codd., ut C F L O U S T X Y Z ee, metaphysicalia, Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 metaphysicam et immediate ante mathematicam.
Many codices, such as C, F, L, O, U, S, T, X, Y, Z, ee, read metaphysicalia; the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 metaphysicam, and immediately before, mathematicam.
Vers. 10. Cfr. supra d. 28. a. 2. q. 3. in corp. — Paulo superius pro et omnia cod. A et ideo omnia.
Verse 10. Cf. above, d. 28, a. 2, q. 3, in the body. — A little above, for et omnia codex A reads et ideo omnia.
Libr. I. de Partib. animal. c. 3. tanquam principium perscrutationis rerum naturalium statuitur, quod nulla res sit in natura, quae non habeat aliquid admirandi signumque sit sapientiae divinae. «Aggredi enim, ait Philosophus, quaeque sine ullo pudore debemus, cum in omnibus naturae numen et honestum pulcrumque insit ingenium; quippe cum naturae operibus iunctum illud praecipue sit, ubi nihil temere viceque fortuita committatur, sed alicuius gratia omnia agantur.» Et in libro de Animalium incessu, c. 2. ait: «Perscrutationis autem principium est, supponentibus illa nobis, quibus uti saepenumero in physico negotio soliti sumus, accipere scil. ea quae in omnibus naturae operibus eodem se habent modo. Illorum autem unum est: naturam nihil frustra facere, sed semper ex iis quae cuique animalium generis essentiae contingunt, id quod optimum est; quam ob rem si melius hoc modo, ita natura se habet.» Ad hoc principium Aristoteles saepe saepius recurrit in explicando officio, usu etc. membrorum animalium, v. gr. de Animal. incessu, c. 8. et 10. (c. 8. et 12.); II. de Partib. animal. c. 13. seq. et IV. c. 11. — Hoc dubium speciali quaestione solvunt B. Albert., hic a. 6; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 3; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 4; Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 1; Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 3; Durand., hic q. 3; Dionys. Carth., hic q. 5. — De hac quaestione dissentire Scholasticos, iam dictum est I. Sent. d. 17. p. II. q. 1, schol. n. II. Hic tantum addimus, sententiae Magistri cum S. Bonaventura favere B. Albertum, Petrum a Tar., Richardum a Med. et etiam Aegid. R.
On the Parts of Animals, Bk. I, c. 3, where as a principle of the investigation of natural things it is laid down that there is no thing in nature which does not have something worthy of wonder and which is not a sign of the divine wisdom. «For we ought, says the Philosopher, to approach each thing without any shame, since in all the works of nature there is present a divine power and an honorable and beautiful character; since indeed that is especially joined to the works of nature, where nothing is committed rashly or by chance, but all things are done for the sake of something.» And in the book On the Gait of Animals, c. 2, he says: «The principle of the investigation is, when we presuppose those things which we are wont to use very often in physical inquiry, to take, namely, those things which in all the works of nature hold themselves in the same way. And one of these is: that nature does nothing in vain, but always [does], out of those things which befall the essence of each genus of animals, that which is best; wherefore if [it is] better in this way, thus nature holds itself.» To this principle Aristotle very often has recourse in explaining the office, use, etc. of the members of animals, e.g. On the Gait of Animals, c. 8 and 10 (cc. 8 and 12); On the Parts of Animals, Bk. II, c. 13 ff., and Bk. IV, c. 11. — This doubt is resolved by a special question by B. Albert, here, a. 6; St. Thomas, here, q. 2, a. 3; Peter of Tarentaise, here, q. 2, a. 4; Richard of Mediavilla, here, a. 4, q. 1; Giles of Rome, here, q. 2, a. 3; Durandus, here, q. 3; Dionysius the Carthusian, here, q. 5. — That the Scholastics dissent concerning this question was already said in I Sent., d. 17, p. II, q. 1, scholion, n. II. Here we only add that B. Albert, Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Mediavilla, and also Giles of Rome favor the opinion of the Master with St. Bonaventure.

← Dist. 32, Art. 3, Q. 2