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Dist. 41, Art. 2, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 41

Textus Latinus
p. 947

Articulus II. De comparatione actionis malae ad voluntatem.

Consequenter quaeritur circa secundum principale, scilicet de comparatione actionis malae ad voluntatem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. Primo quaeritur, utrum omne peccatum actuale, tam mortale quam veniale, sit voluntarium. Secundo quaeritur, utrum omne peccatum mortale sit circa voluntatem sicut circa subiectum. Tertio quaeritur, utrum puniri, sicut etiam peccare, sit ipsius voluntatis proprium.

Quaestio I. Utrum omne peccatum actuale sit voluntarium.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum omne peccatum actuale sit voluntarium; et cum certum sit de mortali, quod sic, quaeritur de veniali. Et quod omne peccatum veniale sit voluntarium, videtur.

1. Sicut dicit Augustinus, et habetur in littera1: « Usque adeo peccatum est voluntarium, ut nullo modo sit peccatum, nisi sit voluntarium »: ergo si peccatum veniale peccatum est, ergo necesse est, ipsum esse voluntarium. Si tu dicas, quod omne peccatum est voluntarium, aut voluntate propria, aut voluntate Adae, et veniale est peccatum, quia voluntarium voluntate Adae: obiicitur contra hoc: quia, si ad rationem peccati venialis sufficit, quod sit voluntarium voluntate Adae; cum illud peccatum, quod Adam transfudit, in nobis2 sit peccatum originale, veniale peccatum esset originale. Quodsi hoc est falsum, restat, quod et primum.

2. Item, motus inordinati et ad illicita, qui dicuntur esse in nobis peccata, non sunt peccata nec in parvulis nec in furiosis; hoc autem non est, nisi quia non moventur usu rationis et voluntatis3: ergo videtur, quod huiusmodi peccata sint in nobis voluntaria voluntate propria.

3. Item, quando stomachus exinanitus ante horam comestionis appetit comedere, nulla est ibi culpa, quamvis sit ille appetitus immoderatus et ad illud quod non licet tali tempore; hoc autem non est, nisi quia motus ille inest de necessitate: ergo videtur, quod ad hoc, quod aliquis motus ad illicitum sit veniale peccatum, necesse sit, ipsum esse voluntarium.

p. 948 4. Item, omne quod quis facit, aut facit naturaliter, aut facit voluntarie, aut violenter: si igitur venialia committimus, aut ergo per violentiam, aut per naturam, aut per voluntatem. Si per violentiam: ergo nulla est ibi culpa. Si per naturam: similiter, quia in iis quae naturaliter fiunt4 non est culpa: ergo si peccatum veniale culpa est, necesse est, quod sit a voluntate.

5. Item, demonstrato aliquo veniali, aut potest aliquis vitare hoc peccatum, aut non potest. Si non potest, et « nullus peccat in eo quod vitare non potest »: ergo committendo hoc peccatum, non peccat. Si potest vitare; et quod committimus, potentes vitare, committimus voluntarie: ergo etc.

Sed contra: 1. Proverbiorum vigesimo quarto5: Septies in die etc.: Glossa: « Singulis diebus per necessitatem vel fragilitatem carnis, vel volentes, vel inviti peccamus ». Si ergo peccamus venialiter, velimus nolimus; videtur, quod non omne peccatum veniale voluntarium sit.

2. Item, Augustinus in libro Retractationum6: « Sunt, inquit, quaedam necessitate facta improbanda, ut qui vult recte facere, et non potest. Unde est illud Apostoli: Non quod volo, hoc facio bonum, sed quod odi malum »; sed talia sunt peccata venialia: ergo aliqua venialia sunt de necessitate, non ergo a voluntate.

3. Item, Augustinus decimo nono de Civitate Dei7: « Nonnullum vitium est, cum caro concupiscit adversus spiritum »; sed caro concupiscit adversus spiritum frequenter, ipso nolente, sicut in littera habetur: ergo velit nolit, homo peccat venialiter: non ergo omne peccatum veniale est voluntarium. Minor probatur in littera: « Ille qui, concupiscente adversus spiritum carne, non ea quae vult, facit, concupiscit quidem nolens, et in eo facit quod non vult ».

4. Item, peccata venialia sunt in nobis ex repugnantia sensualitatis ad rationem, et etiam ex surreptione, sicut sunt primi motus; sed velimus nolimus, est in nobis repugnantia sensualitatis, et multi etiam motus inordinati ex surreptione surgunt. Si igitur voluntas non potest sensualitatem domare, et quod est ex surreptione praevenit voluntatem; videtur, quod peccata venialia, quae sunt primi motus, non sunt voluntaria8.

5. Item, aut aliquod peccatum veniale est involuntarium, aut non. Si sic; habeo propositum; si non: igitur omne peccatum veniale est voluntarium. Sed omne voluntarium per voluntatem vitari potest: ergo per voluntatem potest quis vitare omne veniale peccatum: igitur potest quis cavere, ut nunquam peccet venialiter. Si igitur hoc est impossibile, quod aliquis diu vivat in hac carne, quin committat aliquod veniale; videtur, quod necessarium sit ponere, aliquod veniale peccatum non esse voluntarium.

Conclusio

Omne peccatum actuale est voluntarium vel simpliciter, vel secundum quid, ut aliqua venialia.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod voluntarium potest aliquid dici tripliciter: aut voluntate aliena, aut voluntate propria, aut partim voluntate aliena, partim voluntate propria. Et secundum hunc triplicem modum dicendi voluntarium, triplex est differentia peccati.

Peccatum namque originale voluntarium est, sed non voluntate eius in quo est, voluntaria scilicet Adae, a quo enim est, sed voluntate eius, scilicet Adae, qui in transgressione corrupit se et totam posteritatem9. — Voluntarium autem voluntate propria est peccatum actuale mortale; hoc quidem genere peccati nullus peccat nisi consentiens. — Voluntarium autem medio modo, scilicet partim voluntate propria, partim voluntate aliena, est veniale peccatum, illud maxime, quod consurgit ex repugnantia carnis ad spiritum, vel ex corruptione10 virium animae. Hoc inquam peccatum, quia partim est a voluntate aliena, partim a voluntate propria, ideo quodam modo secundum Augustinum tenet rationem poenae, quodam p. 949 modo rationem culpae. Propterea dicit Augustinus11: « Quia homo non voluit vitare peccatum, dum valuit, inflictum est, ut non possit, dum velit ». Voluntarium, inquam, dicitur per comparationem ad voluntatem Adae, quia Adam deliberative voluit; unde et corruptio subsecuta est, ex qua oriuntur in nobis motus inordinati, qui dicuntur esse peccata venialia. Voluntarium autem voluntate propria sive peccantis, non est omne peccatum veniale simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Illud enim est voluntarium simpliciter, quod est a voluntate praeambula et movente. Illud autem, quod oritur voluntate concomitante et non prohibente vel praecavente, dum possit prohibere vel praecavere, dicitur voluntarium quodam modo sive interpretative, pro eo quod talis deordinatio voluntati imputatur. Et hoc modo saltem omne peccatum veniale dicitur voluntarium, quia nemo peccat venialiter, nisi cum habet voluntatis usum; nemo etiam venialiter peccat in eo quod nullo modo potest prohibere nec etiam potuit praecavere. Venialia enim peccata etsi omnia non possint praecaveri nec prohiberi, nullum tamen est singulare peccatum, quod non possit prohiberi, vel quod saltem non potuerit praecaveri. Licet enim aliquis sit status, in quo necesse est, aliquem cadere in aliquod peccatum determinatum, illum tamen statum potuit quis praecavere; et ideo, si non praecavit, voluntati eius imputatur, quamvis tunc illud prohibere non possit12. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod omne peccatum actuale est voluntarium. Nam mortale est voluntarium simpliciter, veniale autem vel est voluntarium simpliciter, sicut illud quod fit ex deliberatione, ut mendacium iocosum; vel secundum quid sive quodam modo, sicut illud quod fit ex surreptione, sicut sunt primi motus.

Ad obiecta: Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod singulis diebus inviti peccamus; dicendum, quod in Glossa illa dicitur aliquis invitus peccare non per privationem voluntatis omnimodam, sed per privationem voluntatis plenae sive complacentiae. Et hoc quidem verum est, quod frequenter inviti peccamus, et nobis displicet, quod sic inordinate movemur; si tamen bene praecavissemus, in hunc actum vel illum non incidissemus, licet non sic possimus praecavere, quin in aliquod cadamus; sicut exemplum ponitur in nauta, qui potest praecavere et custodire, ne aqua per aliquod foramen determinatum ingrediatur; non tamen potest facere, quod per nullum habeat ingressum.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quaedam necessitate facta sunt improbanda; dicendum, quod Augustinus loquitur de necessitate venialium, non quantum ad hoc veniale vel illud determinate, sed generaliter quantum ad peccata venialia, vel etiam quantum ad aliquod genus venialis peccati; sicut videmus in iuvene et forti, quod nunquam potest omnino vitare motus carnis, licet possit hac hora vel illa, vel hunc motum vel illum vitare. Et quia nihil impedit, quod sit necessitas quaedam in universali, et voluntas quodam modo in particulari; ideo auctoritas illa non obviat his quae dicta sunt.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nonnullum vitium est, cum caro concupiscit adversus spiritum; dicendum, quod verum est. — Sed quod subiungit, quod necessarium est concupiscere: dicendum, quod verum est de concupiscentia, loquendo generaliter; de concupiscentia vero huius vel illius, hoc tempore vel illo, non est verum. Et quod dicit Augustinus, quod concupiscit nolens; et Apostolus13: Quod nolo malum, hoc ago; non privat omnimode voluntatem, sed hoc privat, quod voluntas non est ibi movens principale.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod primi motus sunt ex surreptione et ex rebellione; iam patet responsio per ea quae dicta sunt. Verum est enim, quod prohiberi, vel praecaveri non possunt generaliter, ita quod nullus insurgat; quilibet tamen per se praecaveri potest. Unde et huius signum14 est, quia nos non ponimus, peccatum esse circa primos motus nutritivae, sicut generativae; actus enim nutritivae necessarius est ad salutem nutriti, non autem actus generativae; licet et alia ratio possit assignari: quia nutritiva est corrupta tantum, generativa corrupta et infecta. Prima tamen ratio melius valet. Nam, sicut vult Augustinus in primo de Civitate Dei15, si aliqua mulier corrumpatur violenter, si omnino repugnat, absque omni culpa est; et tamen p. 950 a delectatione omnino immunis non est. Ait enim sic: « Si illa concupiscentialis inobedientia, quae adhuc in membris habitat, praeter voluntatis legem quasi lege sua movetur, et absque culpa est in corpore non consentientis ». Ex hoc patet, quod si venialia rationem culpae habent, hoc est, quia a voluntate in particulari et divisim vitari et praecaveri possunt.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si potest vitari hoc et illud, et sic de singulis, ergo omne; dicendum, quod haec est duplex: iste potest vitare omne peccatum veniale, sicut haec: iste potest vincere omnem hominem: aut quia potentia vitandi, vel vincendi comparatur ad obiectum coniunctim, vel divisim. Si divisim; sic vera est ista; iste potest vitare vel praecavere omne veniale peccatum, quia non est dare aliquod, quod non posset vitari. Si autem coniunctim; tunc est falsa; est enim sensus, quod possit facere, ut omnino sit absque veniali peccato; et in hoc sensu dicitur, quod non possumus omnia peccata venialia vitare. — Nec valet ratio illa: possum vitare hoc et illud et illud, ergo omnia simul; immo est ibi figura dictionis16, sive ex diversa suppositione huius quod dico veniale, sive potius, quia proceditur a pluribus determinatis suppositionibus huius verbi potest ad unam; sicut si argueretur: iste potest ferre hunc lapidem et illum et illum, et sic usque ad decem lapides: ergo potest ferre hos decem lapides; et sicut si diceretur: homo est Socrates, homo est Plato: ergo homo est Socrates et Plato. Praemissae sunt verae, et conclusio falsa, et proceditur a pluribus suppositionibus determinatis ad unam. Suppositio autem determinata dicitur, quando terminus non confunditur, sed debet reddere locutionem veram pro uno, sicut est, cum dicitur: homo currit. Sic et in proposito intelligendum est, quia hoc verbum potest, prout accipitur respectu omnis venialis coniunctim, respicit omne veniale tanquam obiectum unum, et dicit unam perfectam potentiam excedentem et vincentem omnem impulsum ad veniale peccatum; sicut si diceretur: iste potest vincere decem homines, vel ferre decem lapides. — Et sic patet, quod ille processus non tenet, quia non servatur ibi lex illationis rectae.

Scholion

I. Extra controversiam est, quod peccatum, quatenus habet rationem culpae, non potest esse nisi circa ea quae in dominio voluntatis sunt. Hoc autem variis modis intelligi potest, unde S. Doctor (hic dub. 3.) distinguit novem gradus voluntarii. Quo sensu peccatum originale dici possit voluntarium, scilicet voluntate alterius personae, quae fuit caput generis humani, explicatum est supra d. 30. a. 1. 2. et d. 31. a. 1. 2. — De peccatis mortalibus et illis venialibus, quorum proxima et immediata causa et divisim et coniunctim est libera voluntas, nulla est difficultas, sed tantum de peccatis venialibus, quae quidem divisim et in particulari possunt praecaveri, non autem universaliter et coniunctim. Haec difficultas egregie hic explicatur, consentientibus aliis magistris (cfr. Conc. Trident. Sess. VI. c. 11.). Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 108. m. 1. a. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; S. I. II. q. 109. a. 8, q. 77. a. 1. seqq. — B. Albert., hic a. 9; S. p. II. tr. 18. q. 115. a. 2. partic. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

II. Quoad sequentem quaest. vide supra d. 39. dub. 1, ubi duplex ratio affertur, quare malitia (culpa) spectet ad actus voluntatis, non vero aliarum potentiarum. S. Doctor hic apte utitur distinctione inter peccatum ut culpam, et peccatum ut vitium, et quoad vitium iterum subdistinctione, ut patet in littera (cfr. supra d. 24. p. II. a. 3. q. 1. 2, d. 31. a. 2. q. 3. ad 2.). Hinc infert, peccatum in ratione culpae in sola esse voluntate ut subiecto (cfr. supra d. 32. dub. 1. 2, a. 2. q. 2, et d. 36. a. 1. q. 2.). — Aliis distinctionibus utitur S. Thom., scilicet quod aliquid possit inesse in aliqua potentia vel ut in causa, vel ut in subiecto, quod iterum possit esse vel primum (voluntas), vel proximum (potentia, quae elicit actum). Secundum hanc distinctionem concluditur: « Non solum voluntas potest esse subiectum peccati, sed omnes illae potentiae, quae possunt moveri ad suos actus, vel ab eis reprimi per voluntatem » (S. Thom., S. 1. II. q. 74. a. 2.). De hac (2.) quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 94. m. 5. a. 2, q. 108. m. 6. — Scot., in utroque Scripto, d. 42. q. 1-3. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2; S. I. II. q. 74. a. 1. 2. — B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 39. a. 1; S. p. II. tr. 22. q. 136. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Durand., II. Sent. d. 39. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., II. Sent. d. 39. q. 2.

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English Translation

Article II. On the comparison of the evil action to the will.

Next there is inquiry concerning the second principal point, namely concerning the comparison of the evil action to the will. And concerning this three things are asked. First it is asked whether every actual sin, both mortal and venial, is voluntary. Second it is asked whether every mortal sin is in the will as in a subject. Third it is asked whether to be punished, just as also to sin, is proper to the will itself.

Question I. Whether every actual sin is voluntary.

As to the first, the procedure is thus, and it is asked whether every actual sin is voluntary; and since it is certain concerning mortal sin that it is, the inquiry concerns venial sin. And that every venial sin is voluntary, it seems.

1. As Augustine says, and as is had in the text (littera)1: « So far is sin voluntary that in no way is it sin unless it is voluntary »: therefore if venial sin is a sin, then it is necessary that it be voluntary. If you should say that every sin is voluntary, either by one's own will or by the will of Adam, and a venial sin is a sin because it is voluntary by the will of Adam: against this it is objected: because, if it suffices for the character of venial sin that it be voluntary by the will of Adam; since that sin which Adam transmitted into us2 is original sin, a venial sin would be original sin. But if this is false, it remains that the first too is false.

2. Likewise, the inordinate movements toward illicit things, which are said to be sins in us, are sins neither in little children nor in the insane; but this is only because they are not moved by the use of reason and will3: therefore it seems that sins of this kind are in us voluntary by our own will.

3. Likewise, when the emptied stomach before the hour of eating craves to eat, there is no fault there, although that appetite is immoderate and toward that which is not licit at such a time; but this is only because that movement is present of necessity: therefore it seems that, for some movement toward the illicit to be a venial sin, it is necessary that it be voluntary.

4. Likewise, everything that one does, one does either naturally, or voluntarily, or by violence: if therefore we commit venial sins, then we do so either through violence, or through nature, or through the will. If through violence: then there is no fault there. If through nature: likewise, because in those things which are done naturally4 there is no fault: therefore if a venial sin is a fault, it is necessary that it be from the will.

5. Likewise, given some venial sin, either one can avoid this sin, or one cannot. If one cannot, and « no one sins in that which he cannot avoid »: then in committing this sin, he does not sin. If he can avoid it; and what we commit, being able to avoid it, we commit voluntarily: therefore, etc.

On the contrary: 1. Proverbs, chapter twenty-four5: Seven times in a day etc.: the Gloss: « Each day, through necessity or the frailty of the flesh, whether willing or unwilling, we sin ». If therefore we sin venially, whether we will or not; it seems that not every venial sin is voluntary.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the book of Retractations6: « There are, he says, certain things done of necessity which are to be disapproved, as when one wishes to do rightly and cannot. Whence is that saying of the Apostle: Not what I will, this good I do, but what I hate, the evil »; but such are venial sins: therefore some venial sins are of necessity, and so not from the will.

3. Likewise, Augustine in the nineteenth book of On the City of God7: « It is no small vice, when the flesh lusts against the spirit »; but the flesh lusts against the spirit frequently, the man himself being unwilling, as is had in the text: therefore, willing or not, a man sins venially: therefore not every venial sin is voluntary. The minor is proved in the text: « He who, when the flesh lusts against the spirit, does not do the things which he wills, indeed lusts unwillingly, and does in this what he does not will ».

4. Likewise, venial sins are in us from the resistance of sensuality to reason, and also from sudden onset (surreptio), as are the first movements; but, willing or not, there is in us the resistance of sensuality, and many inordinate movements also arise from sudden onset. If therefore the will cannot subdue sensuality, and what is from sudden onset forestalls the will; it seems that venial sins, which are first movements, are not voluntary8.

5. Likewise, either some venial sin is involuntary, or not. If so, I have my point; if not, then every venial sin is voluntary. But everything voluntary can be avoided through the will: therefore through the will one can avoid every venial sin: therefore one can take care never to sin venially. If therefore this is impossible, that anyone should live long in this flesh without committing some venial sin; it seems that it is necessary to hold that some venial sin is not voluntary.

Conclusion

Every actual sin is voluntary either simply, or in a certain respect, as are some venial sins.

I respond: It must be said that something can be called voluntary in three ways: either by another's will, or by one's own will, or partly by another's will and partly by one's own will. And according to this threefold mode of speaking of the voluntary, there is a threefold distinction of sin.

For original sin is voluntary, but not by the will of him in whom it is, namely the will of Adam from whom it is, but by the will of him, namely of Adam, who in the transgression corrupted himself and all his posterity9. — But voluntary by one's own will is actual mortal sin; in this kind of sin no one sins except by consenting. — But voluntary in the middle way, namely partly by one's own will and partly by another's will, is venial sin, especially that which arises from the resistance of the flesh to the spirit, or from the corruption10 of the powers of the soul. This sin, I say, because it is partly from another's will and partly from one's own will, therefore in a certain way, according to Augustine, holds the character of a penalty, and in a certain p. 949 way the character of a fault. Therefore Augustine says11: « Because man did not will to avoid sin while he was able, it has been inflicted that he cannot, when he wills ». Voluntary, I say, it is called by comparison to the will of Adam, because Adam willed deliberately; whence also corruption followed, from which arise in us inordinate movements, which are said to be venial sins. But voluntary by one's own will or by the will of the one sinning, not every venial sin is voluntary simply, but in a certain respect. For that is voluntary simply which is from a will going before and moving. But that which arises from a will accompanying and not prohibiting or forestalling, while it could prohibit or forestall, is called voluntary in a certain way or interpretatively, for this reason, that such disorder is imputed to the will. And in this way at least every venial sin is called voluntary, because no one sins venially except when he has the use of the will; nor does anyone sin venially in that which he can in no way prohibit, nor was even able to forestall. For although all venial sins cannot be forestalled nor prohibited, yet there is no single sin which cannot be prohibited, or which at least could not have been forestalled. For although there may be a state in which it is necessary that someone fall into some determinate sin, yet one could have forestalled that state; and therefore, if he did not forestall it, it is imputed to his will, although then he cannot prohibit it12. — Therefore the reasons showing that every actual sin is voluntary are to be granted. For mortal sin is voluntary simply, while venial sin is either voluntary simply, like that which comes about from deliberation, as a jesting lie; or in a certain respect or in a certain way, like that which comes about from sudden onset, as are the first movements.

To the objections: To 1. As to that which is first objected to the contrary, that each day we sin unwillingly; it must be said that in that Gloss someone is said to sin unwillingly not through a complete privation of will, but through the privation of full will or of complacency. And this indeed is true, that we frequently sin unwillingly, and it displeases us that we are thus moved inordinately; yet if we had taken good care beforehand, we would not have fallen into this act or that, although we cannot so take care that we do not fall into some; just as the example is given of the sailor, who can take care and watch lest water enter through some determinate opening; yet he cannot bring it about that it has entry through none.

To 2. As to that which is objected, that certain things done of necessity are to be disapproved; it must be said that Augustine speaks of the necessity of venial sins, not as to this venial sin or that determinately, but generally as to venial sins, or even as to some kind of venial sin; just as we see in a young and strong man, that he can never altogether avoid the movements of the flesh, although he can avoid this hour or that, or this movement or that. And because nothing prevents there being a certain necessity in the universal, and the will being in a certain way in the particular; therefore that authority does not stand against the things which have been said.

To 3. As to that which is objected, that it is no small vice when the flesh lusts against the spirit; it must be said that it is true. — But as to what is subjoined, that it is necessary to lust: it must be said that it is true of concupiscence, speaking generally; but of the concupiscence of this thing or that, at this time or that, it is not true. And as to what Augustine says, that one lusts unwillingly; and the Apostle13: The evil that I will not, this I do; it does not deprive the will in every way, but it deprives it of this, that the will is not there the principal mover.

To 4. As to that which is objected, that the first movements are from sudden onset and from rebellion; the response is already clear from the things which have been said. For it is true that they cannot be prohibited or forestalled generally, so that none should arise; yet each one taken by itself can be forestalled. Whence also a sign of this14 is that we do not hold there to be sin concerning the first movements of the nutritive power, as of the generative; for the act of the nutritive power is necessary for the health of the one nourished, but not the act of the generative; although another reason too can be assigned: because the nutritive power is only corrupted, while the generative is corrupted and infected. Yet the first reason holds better. For, as Augustine holds in the first book of On the City of God15, if some woman is violated by force, if she altogether resists, she is without any fault; and yet p. 950 she is not altogether immune from delight. For he says thus: « If that concupiscential disobedience, which still dwells in the members, is moved beyond the law of the will as if by its own law, it is also without fault in the body of one not consenting ». From this it is clear that, if venial sins have the character of fault, this is because they can be avoided and forestalled by the will in particular and divisively (divisim).

To 5. As to that which is objected, that if this and that can be avoided, and so of the individual ones, then all; it must be said that this is twofold: "this man can avoid every venial sin," like this: "this man can conquer every man": either because the power of avoiding or of conquering is compared to its object conjointly, or divisively. If divisively; thus this is true; this man can avoid or forestall every venial sin, because there is none to be given which could not be avoided. But if conjointly; then it is false; for the sense is that he could bring it about that he be altogether without venial sin; and in this sense it is said that we cannot avoid all venial sins. — Nor is that reasoning valid: "I can avoid this and that and that, therefore all together"; rather there is there a figure of speech (figura dictionis), either from the diverse supposition of this term which I call "venial," or rather because the argument proceeds from several determinate suppositions of this verb "can" to one; just as if it were argued: "this man can carry this stone and that and that, and so on up to ten stones: therefore he can carry these ten stones"; and just as if it were said: "man is Socrates, man is Plato: therefore man is Socrates and Plato." The premises are true, and the conclusion false, and the argument proceeds from several determinate suppositions to one16. But supposition is called determinate when the term is not confused, but ought to render the statement true for one, as it is when it is said: "man runs." So too in the present case it must be understood, because this verb "can," insofar as it is taken with respect to every venial sin conjointly, regards every venial sin as one object, and asserts one perfect power exceeding and conquering every impulse toward venial sin; just as if it were said: "this man can conquer ten men, or carry ten stones." — And thus it is clear that that process does not hold, because the law of right inference is not preserved in it.

Scholion

I. It is beyond controversy that sin, insofar as it has the character of fault, cannot be except concerning those things which are in the dominion of the will. But this can be understood in various ways, whence the holy Doctor (here, dub. 3) distinguishes nine grades of the voluntary. In what sense original sin can be called voluntary, namely by the will of another person, who was the head of the human race, has been explained above, d. 30, a. 1, 2 and d. 31, a. 1, 2. — Concerning mortal sins and those venial sins whose proximate and immediate cause, both divisively and conjointly, is the free will, there is no difficulty, but only concerning those venial sins which indeed can be forestalled divisively and in particular, but not universally and conjointly. This difficulty is admirably explained here, the other masters agreeing (cf. Council of Trent, Session VI, c. 11). Alex. of Hales, S. p. II, q. 108, m. 1, a. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 1; S. I-II, q. 109, a. 8, q. 77, a. 1 sqq. — B. Albert, here a. 9; S. p. II, tr. 18, q. 115, a. 2, partic. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here q. 2, a. 1. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2.

II. As to the following question, see above d. 39, dub. 1, where a twofold reason is brought forward why malice (fault) pertains to the acts of the will, but not of the other powers. The holy Doctor here aptly uses the distinction between sin as fault (culpa) and sin as vice (vitium), and, with regard to vice, again a subdistinction, as is clear in the text (cf. above d. 24, p. II, a. 3, q. 1, 2; d. 31, a. 2, q. 3, ad 2). Hence he infers that sin in the character of fault is in the will alone as in a subject (cf. above d. 32, dub. 1, 2, a. 2, q. 2; and d. 36, a. 1, q. 2). — St. Thomas uses other distinctions, namely that something can be in some power either as in a cause or as in a subject, which again can be either primary (the will), or proximate (the power which elicits the act). According to this distinction it is concluded: « Not only the will can be the subject of sin, but all those powers which can be moved to their acts, or be restrained from them, by the will » (St. Thomas, S. I-II, q. 74, a. 2). On this (second) question: Alex. of Hales, S. p. II, q. 94, m. 5, a. 2, q. 108, m. 6. — Scotus, in both Scripts, d. 42, q. 1-3. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 2; S. I-II, q. 74, a. 1, 2. — B. Albert, II Sent., d. 39, a. 1; S. p. II, tr. 22, q. 136. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here q. 2, a. 2. — Durandus, II Sent., d. 39, q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, II Sent., d. 39, q. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Hic c. 3. — In codd. T W et nonnullis aliis deest conclusio: ergo si peccatum veniale... esse voluntarium.
    Here, c. 3. — In codices T W and certain others the conclusion is lacking: therefore if venial sin... that it is voluntary.
  2. In Vat. et edd. 3, 4, ubi cum interpunctione etiam sententia mutata est, legitur sic: quod Adam transfudit in nos, sit etc. Pro transfudit codd. F H T et alii plures transfundit.
    In the Vatican edition and edd. 3, 4, where along with the punctuation the sense too is changed, it reads thus: which Adam transmitted into us, is etc. For transmitted codices F H T and several others read transmits.
  3. Cfr. supra pag. 525, nota 6. — De motibus inordinatis cfr. supra d. 21. a. 2. q. 3. schol. et ibid. dub. 4.
    Cf. above, p. 525, note 6. — On the inordinate movements cf. above, d. 21, a. 2, q. 3, schol., and ibid., dub. 4.
  4. Cod. T solet. — De minori eiusque probatione, quae delibata est ex August., I. Retract. c. 13. n. 5, vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.
    Codex T reads is wont. — On the minor premise and its proof, which is drawn from Augustine, Retractations I, c. 13, n. 5, see here the text of the Master (lit. Magistri), c. 3.
  5. Vers. 16. Vulgata omittit in die. — Glossa deprompta est ex Beda super hunc loc. et habetur apud Strabum et Lyranum. — Mox pro velimus nolimus, quod habent plurimi codd. et ed. 1, in Vat. aliisque edd. et codd. vel velimus, vel nolimus.
    Verse 16. The Vulgate omits in a day. — The Gloss is drawn from Bede on this passage and is found in Strabo and Lyranus. — Presently, for whether we will or not, which very many codices and ed. 1 have, the Vatican edition and other editions and codices read either we will, or we will not.
  6. August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 18. n. 50. Cfr. supra d. XXVIII. lit. Magistri, c. 3. et ibid. dub. 3.
    Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will III, c. 18, n. 50. Cf. above, d. XXVIII, text of the Master, c. 3, and ibid., dub. 3.
  7. Libr. 1. c. 9. n. 5, et III. de Lib. Arb. c. 18. n. 51. Cfr. supra d. XXXVI, lit. Magistri, c. 5, et ibid. dub. 4. — Verba Apostoli habentur Rom. 7, 19.
    Book I, c. 9, n. 5, and On Free Choice of the Will III, c. 18, n. 51. Cf. above, d. XXXVI, text of the Master, c. 5, and ibid., dub. 4. — The words of the Apostle are had in Rom. 7:19.
  8. Cap. 1. n. 3, ubi ostendens, ipsam virtutem in hac vita propter conflictum cum vitiis imperfectam esse, ait: Neque enim nullum est vitium, cum sicut dicit Apostolus (Gal. 5, n.): Caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, cui vitio contraria virtus est, cum, sicut idem dicit: Spiritus concupiscit adversus carnem etc.
    Chapter 1, n. 3, where, showing that virtue itself in this life is imperfect on account of the conflict with the vices, he says: For neither is there no vice, since, as the Apostle says (Gal. 5): The flesh lusts against the spirit, to which vice the contrary virtue is, when, as the same says: The spirit lusts against the flesh etc.
  9. Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XXIV. c. 9. et 12. atque ibid. Comment. p. II. a. 3. q. 1.
    Cf. above, the text of the Master, d. XXIV, c. 9 and 12, and there the Commentary, p. II, a. 3, q. 1.
  10. Quamvis plerique codd. primaeque edd. exhibeant vel corruptionis, tamen lectio Vat. nobis facilior visa est eamque relinquimus.
    Although most codices and the first editions exhibit or of the corruption, yet the reading of the Vatican edition seemed to us easier, and we retain it.
  11. Libr. III. de Lib. Arb. c. 18. n. 52: Illa est enim peccati poena iustissima, ut omittat quisque quo bene uti noluit, cum sine ulla posset difficultate, si vellet. Id est autem, ut qui sciens recte non facit, amittat scire, quid rectum sit; et qui recte facere, cum posset, noluit, amittat posse, cum velit. — Pro Quia homo codd. H V Y ee et nonnulli alii quod homo, et subinde pro non voluit codd. F V atque ed. 1 noluit.
    Book III, On Free Choice of the Will, c. 18, n. 52: For this is the most just penalty of sin, that each one should lose that which he was unwilling to use well, when he could without any difficulty, if he wished. And that is, that he who knowingly does not act rightly should lose the knowledge of what is right; and he who, when he was able, was unwilling to act rightly, should lose the ability, when he wishes. — For Because man codices H V Y ee and certain others read that man, and thereupon for did not will codices F V and ed. 1 read was unwilling.
  12. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. — Paulo ante pro imputatur cod. T imputabitur. Paulo inferius pro ostendentes, quod verbum quod multi codd. nec non primae edd. omittunt, cod. V quae ostendunt.
    Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3. — A little before, for is imputed codex T reads will be imputed. A little below, for showing that, the word that many codices as well as the first editions omit; codex V reads which show.
  13. Rom. 7, 19. — Dictum Augustini vide supra in ipsa 3. obiectione, ad quam hic respondetur. — In principio huius solut. ante nonnullum vitium Vat. cum pluribus codd. perperam inserit non.
    Rom. 7:19. — For the saying of Augustine see above in the third objection itself, to which reply is here made. — At the beginning of this solution, before no small vice, the Vatican edition with several codices wrongly inserts not.
  14. Complures codd., inter quos L O R W, ratio. In Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 legitur: Et ratio huius est, in codd. C H 3 T ee: Unde et huius est (omissa voce signum). Paulo superius post insurgat cod. K supplet motus. — Vide supra d. 31. a. 1. q. 3.
    Very many codices, among them L O R W, read reason. In the Vatican edition and edd. 2, 3, 4 it reads: And the reason of this is, in codices C H 3 T ee: Whence also of this there is (the word sign being omitted). A little above, after should arise, codex K supplies movement. — See above, d. 31, a. 1, q. 3.
  15. Cap. 23: Quodsi illa concupiscentialis inobedientia, quae adhuc in membris moribundis habitat, praeter nostrae voluntatis legem quasi lege sua movetur, quanto magis absque culpa est in corpore non consentientis, si absque culpa est in corpore dormientis? — Codd. F X bb in testimonio Augustini ante ultima verba non consentientis interserunt dormientis, quanto magis est absque culpa in corpore. Vat. hoc testimonium sic reddit: Si illa... inobedientia, quod adhuc... voluntatis legem, quia lege sua movetur, ab omni culpa immunis est in etc.
    Chapter 23: But if that concupiscential disobedience, which still dwells in the dying members, is moved beyond the law of our will as if by its own law, how much more is it without fault in the body of one not consenting, if it is without fault in the body of one sleeping? — Codices F X bb in the testimony of Augustine, before the last words not consenting, insert sleeping, how much more is it without fault in the body. The Vatican edition renders this testimony thus: If that... disobedience, which still... the law of the will, because it is moved by its own law, is immune from all fault in etc.
  16. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. — Paulo ante pro non posset codd. O S ne unquam. Dein pro venialiter codd. V X Z voluntarie. — Aliquanto superius pro modum dicendi Vat. modum distinguendi, et paulo inferius eadem Vat. verbis hoc quidem genere praefigit et.
    Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3. — A little before, for could not codices O S read never. Then for venially codices V X Z read voluntarily. — Somewhat above, for mode of speaking the Vatican edition reads mode of distinguishing, and a little below the same Vatican edition prefixes and to the words this indeed in kind. ---
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