Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 41, Art. 2, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 41

Textus Latinus

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Quaestio II. Utrum omne peccatum sit circa voluntatem sicut circa subiectum proprium.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum omne peccatum sit circa voluntatem sicut circa subiectum proprium. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Primo per Anselmum in libro de Originali Peccato¹: « Nusquam nisi in voluntate peccatum est ».

2. Item, hoc ipsum probatur tali ratione. « Membra et opera, et quidquid nos sumus, subiecit Deus voluntati; quidquid igitur faciunt, totum imputandum est voluntati² »: si ergo in eo est culpa, cui imputatur; et omnis culpa voluntati imputatur: ergo omnis culpa est in voluntate tanquam in subiecto proprio.

3. Item, in ea sola potentia est culpa, in qua nata est esse iustitia, « quia opposita nata sunt fieri circa idem³ »; sed iustitia est in voluntate tanquam in subiecto, quia, ut dicit Anselmus, « iustitia nihil aliud est quam voluntatis rectitudo »: ergo in eadem potentia, scilicet in voluntate, est culpa tanquam in subiecto proprio.

4. Item, in ea sola potentia est culpa, quae cogi non potest; nam nullus peccat nisi in eo, a quo libere potest abstinere⁴; sed sola potentia voluntatis est, quae cogi non potest: ergo etc.

5. Item, in ea sola potentia est culpa, quae aliquando denominatur bona, aliquando mala; sed nos non dicimur habere intelligentiam vel memoriam malam, sed solum voluntatem malam: si ergo accidens denominat subiectum⁵ et culpa denominat solam voluntatem, ergo culpa est in sola voluntate tanquam in subiecto proprio.

6. Item, in ea sola potentia est culpa tanquam in subiecto proprio, ad cuius actum comparatur sicut ad causam proximam et immediatam; sed nulla potentia animae est causa proxima et immediata culpae nisi sola potentia rationalis; nam « memorari malum vel intelligere malum non est culpa, sed velle malum culpa est⁶ »: ergo etc.

Sed contra: 1. Nunquam peccatur mortaliter nisi per consensum; sed consensus non tantummodo est voluntatis, sed etiam rationis: si ergo culpa est circa illam potentiam, per cuius actum perpetratur, ergo non tantum est circa voluntatem, sed etiam circa rationem.

2. Item, non tantum peccatur affectione, sed etiam peccatur oblivione, sicut dicitur Deuteronomii sexto⁷: Cave, ne obliviscaris Domini Dei tui, et frequenter in Scriptura reprehendit eos Dominus, qui eius sunt obliti: ergo si oblivio est in memoria, videtur, quod non tantum peccatum sit in voluntate, sed etiam in memoria.

3. Item, non solum peccatur delectatione, verum etiam cogitatione, secundum quod homo confitetur quotidie⁸; sed cogitatio est intellectus, non affectus: ergo non tantum in affectu, verum etiam in intellectu habet esse peccatum.

4. Item, non tantum peccatur deliberatione, verum etiam suggestione, secundum quod vult Gregorius⁹; sed suggestio est in parte sensibili: ergo peccatum non tantum est in parte rationali, sed etiam in parte sensibili.

5. Item, peccatum est deformitas, formaliter loquendo; sed constat, quod omni peccato imago deformatur — nam quodlibet peccatum, quantum est de se, gratiam expellit, quae est reformativa imaginis — ergo si imago non tantum respicit voluntatem, sed etiam alias potentias¹⁰; videtur, quod peccatum non solum in voluntate, sed etiam in aliis potentiis habeat esse.

6. Item, nullus amat, nisi quod iudicat esse amandum, ergo ante amorem inordinatum praecedit iudicium inordinatum. Si ergo primum iudicium inordinatum non potuit esse poena, quia poena non praecedit culpam; necesse est, quod fuerit culpa¹¹: ergo prius est peccatum in ratione quam in voluntate: potius igitur videtur, quod subiectum peccati debeat assignari ratio quam voluntas.

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Conclusio.

Peccatum, ut tenet rationem culpae, voluntatem respicit ut subiectum; ut vero tenet rationem vitii, causaliter loquendo, est in sola voluntate, ut principio et subiecto primo, materialiter loquendo, est etiam in actibus aliarum potentiarum.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod peccatum de sua ratione duo dicit¹². Dicit enim deordinationem sive privationem ordinis circa actum alicuius potentiae; dicit nihilominus illam deordinationem ut dignam vituperatione et punitione. Et quantum ad primum peccatum tenet rationem vitii aliquo modo corrumpentis; quantum ad secundum tenet rationem culpae et demeriti. Cum igitur comparamus peccatum ad subiectum proprium, aut loquimur de ipso, in quantum est culpa, aut loquimur de ipso, in quantum est vitium.

Si de ipso loquimur, in quantum est culpa et demeritum; sic proprie et praecise respicit liberum arbitrium. Quoniam enim libero arbitrio commissum est regimen totius hominis; si aliqua deordinatio fiat in regno totius animae, ipsi libero arbitrio imputatur. Unde si omnia membra, per quae consummata est¹³, et omnes potentiae, in quibus aliqua deordinatio facta est, traherentur in causam; omnia conquererentur de libero arbitrio, cui subiecta sunt, et ei Dominus totum imputaret, quidquid in eis mali gestum fuit. Unde si tollatur liberum arbitrium, iam nullo modo erit peccatum. Et quia libertas arbitrii principaliter residet penes voluntatem, sicut in praecedentibus ostensum fuit¹⁴; hinc est, quod culpa sub ratione culpae in voluntate tanquam in subiecto proprio dicitur esse.

Si autem loquamur de culpa, secundum quod est vitium, sic dupliciter adhuc¹⁵ contingit. Cum peccatum dicatur vitium, in quantum deordinat aliquem actum alicuius potentiae, secundum quod deordinatio illa dupliciter habet comparari; sic et peccatum, ut est vitium. Comparatur autem deordinatio illa ad actum alicuius potentiae tanquam ad materiale circa quod, et tanquam ad causale a quo. — Si igitur loquamur de illa deordinatione materialiter, sic dico, quod non solum circa actum voluntatis, sed etiam circa actus aliarum potentiarum animae consistit. Actus enim et memoriae et intelligentiae et aliarum potentiarum animae, subiacentium voluntati, deordinari habent per diversa peccata. — Si autem loquamur de illa deordinatione causaliter; sic omnis talis deordinatio est a voluntate.

Si autem quaeratur ratio huius, dicendum, quod huius ratio est triplex: prima, quia penes voluntatem consistit regiminis dominium; secunda, quia in ipsa reperitur rectitudinis principium; tertia vero, quia ad ipsam pertinet regiminis complementum. — In ipsa namque consistit regiminis dominium, pro eo quod ipsa aliis potentiis imperat et a nulla imperatur. — In ipsa etiam attenditur rectitudinis principium; amor enim principium est rectitudinis et obliquitatis, sicut ostendit Augustinus¹⁶; unde bonus amor est fundamentum civitatis Dei, et malus fundamentum civitatis diaboli. Et ratio huius est, quia amor est radix omnium affectionum et tantae adhaerentiae, ut transformet amantem in amatum. — Penes ipsam etiam consistit rectitudinis et regiminis complementum, quoniam ipsius obiectum est bonum; « bonum autem et finis est idem ». Et quia in directione ad finem consistit bonitatis completio, in obliquatione vero consistit bonitatis amissio; hinc est, quod ab ipsa voluntate oritur omne peccatum. Et propterea Augustinus in libro de Duabus Animabus definiens peccatum, dicit, quod « peccatum est voluntas assequendi, vel retinendi quod iustitia vetat, et a quo liberum est abstinere »; per hoc autem quod ait: voluntas assequendi etc., describit peccatum, secundum quod est vitium et deordinatio, quae a voluntate habet ortum. Per hoc autem quod dicit: a quo liberum est abstinere, notificat peccatum, secundum quod tenet rationem culpae; quia nemo culpatur in eo quod vitare non potest, sicut ipse dicit ibidem.

Sic igitur patet, quod peccatum, in quantum tenet rationem culpae, voluntatem respicit ut subiectum; in quantum etiam tenet rationem vitii, respicit voluntatem ut principium et ut subiectum primum, licet aliquo modo respiciat actus aliarum potentiarum. — Unde rationes, quae ad primam partem inducuntur, concedendae sunt.

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Ad oppositorum solutionem: Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod non peccamus nisi consentiendo; dicendum, quod etsi consensus respiciat simul rationem et voluntatem, principalius tamen et completius voluntatem respicit, quia in ea consummatur. Quantumcumque enim ratio deliberet, nisi voluntas alterum praeoptet, nunquam eligit nec consentit; et quod est ibi culpae et iniustitiae, hoc est ratione voluntatis adiunctae.

Ad 2, 3, 4. Ad tria sequentia, quae subiungit, quod peccatur oblivione, cogitatione et suggestione; patet responsio ex his quae dicta sunt; nam talia non sunt peccata, nisi quia voluntaria. Unde nunquam circa actum memoriae culpa consistit nec etiam circa actum intelligentiae, nisi eis immisceat se voluntas vel antecedenter, vel concomitanter¹⁷, vel consequenter. Similiter nec suggestio, si est omnino ab extrinseco, est culpa, sed illa quae est ab intrinseco, quae quodam modo voluntaria est, sive quia a voluntate Adae habuit ortum, sive quia a voluntate peccantis non praecavetur.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod peccatum deformat totam imaginem; dicendum, quod etsi tota imago deformetur et vitietur, illa tamen sola deformatio, quae est in voluntate, est illa quae est ratio inculpandi; et ideo non sequitur, quod culpa respiciat alias potentias animae sub ratione culpae, quamvis circa actus earum consistat corruptio vitiosa.

Ad 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnem malam voluntatem praecedit malum iudicium; dicendum, quod verum est quantum ad actum voluntatis, qui quidem est consensus plenarius; illud autem nunquam in creatura rationali, secundum quod instituta fuit, iudicium erroneum interveniret, nisi voluntas se illi iudicio immisceret; nunquam enim Adam praesumsisset, vel de se praesumtuose iudicasset, nisi amore voluntatis nimium sibi adhaesisset. Unde amor mirabiliter pervertit iudicium. Licet igitur primus Angelus sive Adam, quando peccavit, prius praesumserit, quam amaverit; illius tamen praesumtionis perversitas a voluntate habuit ortum, et ambitionis scelus in voluntate fuit consummatum: et ita peccatum respicit voluntatem principaliter, tum quia in ipsa primo inchoatur, tum quia in ipsa consummatur. Ideo recte dicitur subiectum primum peccati, quia et primum est origine, primum etiam complemento sive consummatione.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether every sin is about the will as about its proper subject.

Secondly it is asked whether every sin is about the will as about its proper subject. And that it is so seems to be the case:

1. First, through Anselm in the book On Original Sin¹: « Nowhere save in the will is there sin ».

2. Likewise, this same thing is proved by such a reasoning. « The members and the works, and whatever we are, God has subjected to the will; whatever therefore they do, the whole is to be imputed to the will² »: if therefore the fault is in that to which it is imputed; and every fault is imputed to the will: therefore every fault is in the will as in its proper subject.

3. Likewise, fault is in that power alone in which justice is born to be, « because opposites are born to come to be about the same thing³ »; but justice is in the will as in its subject, because, as Anselm says, « justice is nothing other than rectitude of the will »: therefore in the same power, namely in the will, is fault as in its proper subject.

4. Likewise, fault is in that power alone which cannot be coerced; for no one sins except in that from which he is able freely to abstain⁴; but it is the power of the will alone that cannot be coerced: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, fault is in that power alone which is sometimes called good, sometimes evil; but we are not said to have an evil understanding or memory, but only an evil will: if therefore an accident denominates its subject⁵ and fault denominates the will alone, then fault is in the will alone as in its proper subject.

6. Likewise, fault is in that power alone as in its proper subject, to whose act it is compared as to its proximate and immediate cause; but no power of the soul is the proximate and immediate cause of fault except the rational power alone; for « to remember evil or to understand evil is not a fault, but to will evil is a fault⁶ »: therefore etc.

On the contrary: 1. Never is there mortal sin except through consent; but consent belongs not only to the will, but also to reason: if therefore fault is about that power by whose act it is perpetrated, then it is not only about the will, but also about reason.

2. Likewise, one sins not only by affection, but one sins also by forgetfulness, as is said in Deuteronomy six⁷: Take heed, lest thou forget the Lord thy God, and frequently in Scripture the Lord reproves those who have forgotten him: therefore if forgetfulness is in the memory, it seems that sin is not only in the will, but also in the memory.

3. Likewise, one sins not only by delight, but also by thought, according to what man confesses daily⁸; but thought belongs to the intellect, not to the affect: therefore sin has its being not only in the affect, but also in the intellect.

4. Likewise, one sins not only by deliberation, but also by suggestion, according to what Gregory holds⁹; but suggestion is in the sensitive part: therefore sin is not only in the rational part, but also in the sensitive part.

5. Likewise, sin is a deformity, formally speaking; but it is established that by every sin the image is deformed — for any sin whatever, so far as is of itself, expels grace, which is reformative of the image — therefore if the image regards not only the will, but also the other powers¹⁰; it seems that sin has its being not only in the will, but also in the other powers.

6. Likewise, no one loves except what he judges to be lovable, therefore before disordered love there precedes a disordered judgment. If therefore the first disordered judgment could not be a punishment, because punishment does not precede fault; it is necessary that it was a fault¹¹: therefore sin is prior in reason than in the will: rather, therefore, it seems that the subject of sin ought to be assigned to reason than to the will.

Conclusion.

Sin, as it holds the character of fault, regards the will as its subject; but as it holds the character of vice, speaking causally, it is in the will alone, as principle and first subject; speaking materially, it is also in the acts of the other powers.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that sin from its very nature says two things¹². For it says a disorder or privation of order about the act of some power; it says nonetheless that disorder as worthy of blame and punishment. And as to the first, sin holds the character of a vice in some way corrupting; as to the second, it holds the character of fault and demerit. When therefore we compare sin to its proper subject, either we speak of it insofar as it is fault, or we speak of it insofar as it is vice.

If we speak of it insofar as it is fault and demerit, thus it properly and precisely regards free choice. For since to free choice is committed the governance of the whole man, if any disorder arise in the kingdom of the whole soul, it is imputed to free choice itself. Hence if all the members through which it was consummated¹³, and all the powers in which any disorder has been done, were drawn into the cause, all would complain of free choice, to which they are subject, and the Lord would impute the whole to it, whatever of evil was done in them. Hence if free choice be taken away, there will now in no way be sin. And because the freedom of choice principally resides in the will, as was shown in what precedes¹⁴; hence it is that fault under the character of fault is said to be in the will as in its proper subject.

But if we speak of fault insofar as it is vice, thus it still happens in two ways¹⁵. Since sin is called a vice insofar as it disorders some act of some power, according as that disorder can be compared in two ways; so also sin, as it is vice. Now that disorder is compared to the act of some power as to the material about which, and as to the causal from which. — If therefore we speak of that disorder materially, thus I say that it consists not only about the act of the will, but also about the acts of the other powers of the soul. For the acts both of memory and of understanding and of the other powers of the soul, which are subject to the will, are liable to be disordered through diverse sins. — But if we speak of that disorder causally, thus all such disorder is from the will.

But if the reason for this be asked, it must be said that the reason for this is threefold: first, because in the will consists the lordship of governance; second, because in it is found the principle of rectitude; third, because to it pertains the completion of governance. — For in it consists the lordship of governance, inasmuch as it commands the other powers and is commanded by none. — In it also is observed the principle of rectitude; for love is the principle of rectitude and of obliquity, as Augustine shows¹⁶; whence good love is the foundation of the city of God, and evil love the foundation of the city of the devil. And the reason of this is that love is the root of all the affections and of so great an adherence that it transforms the lover into the beloved. — In it also consists the completion of rectitude and of governance, since its object is the good; « now the good and the end are the same ». And because in direction to the end consists the completion of goodness, but in obliquity consists the loss of goodness; hence it is that from the will itself arises all sin. And therefore Augustine, in the book On the Two Souls, defining sin, says that « sin is the will to attain or to retain what justice forbids, and from which one is free to abstain »; now by this that he says: the will to attain etc., he describes sin insofar as it is vice and disorder, which takes its origin from the will. But by this that he says: from which one is free to abstain, he marks out sin insofar as it holds the character of fault; for no one is faulted in that which he cannot avoid, as he himself says in the same place.

Thus therefore it is clear that sin, insofar as it holds the character of fault, regards the will as subject; insofar also as it holds the character of vice, it regards the will as principle and as first subject, although it in some way regards the acts of the other powers. — Whence the reasons which are brought forward for the first part are to be granted.

To the solution of the opposing arguments: To 1. As to that, then, which is first objected, that we do not sin except by consenting; it must be said that although consent regards at once reason and the will, nevertheless it more principally and more completely regards the will, because in it it is consummated. For however much reason may deliberate, unless the will prefer the one alternative, it never chooses nor consents; and whatever there is there of fault and of injustice, this is by reason of the will joined to it.

To 2, 3, 4. To the three following, which it adds, that one sins by forgetfulness, by thought, and by suggestion; the response is clear from what has been said; for such things are not sins, except inasmuch as they are voluntary. Hence never does fault consist about the act of memory nor even about the act of understanding, unless the will mingle itself with them either antecedently, or concomitantly¹⁷, or consequently. Likewise neither is suggestion, if it is wholly from without, a fault, but that which is from within, which is in a certain way voluntary, whether because it took its origin from the will of Adam, or because it is not guarded against by the will of the one sinning.

To 5. As to that which is objected, that sin deforms the whole image; it must be said that although the whole image is deformed and vitiated, nevertheless that deformation alone which is in the will is the one which is the ground of inculpating; and therefore it does not follow that fault regards the other powers of the soul under the character of fault, although about their acts there consists a vicious corruption.

To 6. As to that which is objected, that every evil will is preceded by an evil judgment; it must be said that this is true as regards the act of the will, which indeed is full consent; but that judgment never, in a rational creature, according as it was instituted, would an erroneous judgment intervene, unless the will mingled itself with that judgment; for never would Adam have presumed, or judged of himself presumptuously, unless by the love of his will he had clung too much to himself. Hence love marvelously perverts judgment. Although therefore the first Angel or Adam, when he sinned, presumed before he loved; nevertheless the perversity of that presumption took its origin from the will, and the crime of ambition was consummated in the will: and thus sin regards the will principally, both because in it it is first begun, and because in it it is consummated. Therefore it is rightly called the first subject of sin, because it is both first in origin and first also in completion or consummation.

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Apparatus Criticus

Cap. 4. — Codd. T bb et alii nec non Vat. et edd. 3, 4 possit.
Chapter 4. — Codices T, bb and others, as also the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4, read possit.
Cap. 3. seq., secundum sententiam — Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3, ubi praecise eadem sententia Augustini habetur. — Anselm., de Conceptu virgin. et orig. peccat. c. 4: Denique, si de actionibus voluntariis, quae iniuste fiunt, arguentur membra et sensus, quibus fiunt, respondere possunt: Deus nos et potestatem, quae in nobis est, subiecit voluntati... Dominae, quam Deus nobis dedit, nec possumus nec debemus non obedire... Ergo quid peccant membra vel sensus vel opera, quae Deus sic subiecit voluntati, si servant quod Deus illis ordinavit? Quidquid igitur faciunt, totum imputandum est voluntati. — Mox pro si ergo in eo Vat. et edd. 3, 4 si ergo in ea potentia.
Chapter 3 and following, according to the sense — Cf. here the Master's text, c. 3, where precisely the same opinion of Augustine is found. — Anselm, On the Conception of the Virgin and on Original Sin c. 4: Finally, if for the voluntary actions which are done unjustly the members and senses by which they are done were to be arraigned, they can answer: God has subjected us and the power which is in us to the will... To the Lady whom God has given us we neither can nor ought not to obey... Therefore in what do the members or senses or works sin, which God has thus subjected to the will, if they keep what God ordained for them? Whatever therefore they do, the whole is to be imputed to the will. — Presently, for si ergo in eo (if therefore in that) the Vatican and editions 3, 4 read si ergo in ea potentia (if therefore in that power).
Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis, et II. Topic. c. 3. (c. 7.). Dictum Anselmi habetur in eius Dialogo de veritate, c. 12, et de Conceptu virgin. et orig. peccat. c. 3, ubi et de maiori huius arg. videas. Cfr. etiam supra pag. 722, nota 3. — Pro nata sunt fieri cod. T sunt nata esse.
Aristotle, Categories in the chapter on Opposites, and Topics II c. 3 (c. 7). The saying of Anselm is found in his Dialogue on Truth c. 12, and in On the Conception of the Virgin and on Original Sin c. 3, where you may also see about the major of this argument. Cf. also above p. 722, note 3. — For nata sunt fieri codex T reads sunt nata esse.
Vide definitionem peccati, ab Augustino positam, quae habetur infra in corp. quaest. — De minori cfr. supra d. 28. p. II. q. 4. ad 5.
See the definition of sin, set down by Augustine, which is found below in the body of the question. — On the minor cf. above d. 28, p. II, q. 4, ad 5.
Cfr. supra pag. 920, nota 1. in fine et August., I. contra Iulian. Pelagian. c. 8. n. 37: Nam si quaeratur, qualis sit Angelus vel homo malae voluntatis, rectissime respondetur: malus; magis accipiens qualitatis nomen ex voluntate mala quam ex natura bona. — De minori vide supra d. 39. dub. 1. — Plurimi codd. et ed. 1 omittunt in fine arg. proprio. Edd. 2. 3, omisso principio seq. arg., verba ad cuius actum etc. immediate adnectunt ad verbum finale arg. praeced., scilicet ad proprio, sicque ex duobus argg. faciunt unum.
Cf. above p. 920, note 1 at the end, and Augustine, Against Julian the Pelagian I, c. 8, n. 37: For if it be asked what sort of being is an Angel or a man of evil will, the most correct answer is: evil; taking the name of quality rather from the evil will than from the good nature. — On the minor see above d. 39, dub. 1. — Very many codices and edition 1 omit at the end of the argument proprio (proper). Editions 2, 3, having omitted the beginning of the following argument, annex the words ad cuius actum etc. immediately to the final word of the preceding argument, namely to proprio, and thus from two arguments make one.
Ut legitur supra in lit. Magistri, d. XXXIX. c. 2. — In minori post potentia rationalis simul audi: affectiva (motiva).
As is read above in the Master's text, d. XXXIX, c. 2. — In the minor, after rational power understand also: affective (motive).
Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XXIV. c. 9. seqq. et ibid. Comment. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. in corp. — De minori vide supra pag. 893, nota 2. — Vers. 13: Cave diligenter, ne obliviscaris Domini, qui eduxit te etc. — De propos. seq. cfr. Isai. 17, 10; 51, 13; 37, 11; Ierem. 2, 32; 13, 25. — De memoria et oblivione vide supra d. 7. p. II. a. I. q. 2. in corp.
Cf. above the Master's text, d. XXIV, c. 9ff., and there the Commentary, p. II, a. 2, q. 2, in the body. — On the minor see above p. 893, note 2. — Verse 13: Take diligent heed, lest thou forget the Lord, who brought thee out etc. — On the following proposition cf. Isa. 17:10; 51:13; 37:11; Jer. 2:32; 13:25. — On memory and forgetfulness see above d. 7, p. II, a. I, q. 2, in the body.
In recitanda illa pervulgata formula confessionis generalis, quae incipit: Confiteor Deo omnipotenti etc. — August., X. Confess. c. 11. n. 18. ait: Cogo et cogito sic est, ut ago et agito, facio et factito. Verumtamen sibi animus hoc verbum proprie vindicavit, ut non quod alibi, sed quod in animo colligitur i. e. cogitur, cogitari proprie iam dicatur. — Pro cogitatione plurimi codd. cum edd. 1, 2 in cogitatione.
In the reciting of that widely known formula of the general confession, which begins: I confess to almighty God etc. — Augustine, Confessions X, c. 11, n. 18, says: « I drive together » and « I think » stand as « I act » and « I am active », « I do » and « I do repeatedly ». Nevertheless the mind has claimed this word properly for itself, so that not what is gathered elsewhere, but what is gathered i. e. driven together (cogitur) in the mind is now properly said to be thought (cogitari). — For cogitatione very many codices with editions 1, 2 read in cogitatione.
Libr. IV. Moral. c. 27. n. 49, ubi peccatum quatuor modis in corde, ac totidem in opere perpetrari docet his verbis: In corde namque suggestione, delectatione, consensu et defensionis audacia perpetratur. Fit enim suggestio per adversarium, delectatio per carnem, consensus per spiritum, defensionis audacia per elationem. — De minori cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XXIV. c. 9. — Pro deliberatione in cod. U habetur delectatione, et in fine arg. pro sensibili cod. K et ed. 1 substituunt sensuali.
Morals book IV, c. 27, n. 49, where he teaches that sin is perpetrated in four ways in the heart, and as many in the deed, in these words: For in the heart it is perpetrated by suggestion, delight, consent, and the boldness of defence. For suggestion comes about through the adversary, delight through the flesh, consent through the spirit, the boldness of defence through pride. — On the minor cf. above the Master's text, d. XXIV, c. 9. — For deliberatione codex U has delectatione (by delight), and at the end of the argument for sensibili codex K and edition 1 substitute sensuali.
Cfr. supra d. 16. a. 2. q. 3.
Cf. above d. 16, a. 2, q. 3.
Cfr. August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 24. n. 72. seqq. — Pro primum iudicium Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 praevium iudicium. Circa finem arg. pro assignari cod. T esse.
Cf. Augustine, On Free Choice III, c. 24, n. 72ff. — For primum iudicium (the first judgment) the Vatican with editions 3, 4 reads praevium iudicium (the previous judgment). Toward the end of the argument, for assignari codex T reads esse.
Cod. T dicit.
Codex T reads dicit (says).
Cod. A supplet culpa. In cod. V legitur sic: Unde si omnia membra, secundum quae consummata est culpa, et omnes etc. Pro omnes potentiae, in quibus cod. T omnis potentia, in qua, qui cod. et paulo superius pro Si de ipso loquimur exhibet Si de ipso loquamur. Aliquanto inferius pro imputaret codd. H W imputat, et subinde pro gestum fuit codd. H V gestum est.
Codex A supplies culpa (fault). In codex V it is read thus: Hence if all the members, according to which fault was consummated, and all etc. For omnes potentiae, in quibus (all the powers, in which) codex T reads omnis potentia, in qua (every power, in which), which codex also, a little above, for Si de ipso loquimur exhibits Si de ipso loquamur. Somewhat below, for imputaret codices H W read imputat, and thereupon for gestum fuit codices H V read gestum est.
Dist. 25. p. 1. q. 6. Post pauca pro proprio cod. T proprie. — Edd., excepta 1, ex praeced. supplent loqui. Subinde post cum cod. Q (W a secunda manu) subiicit enim. — Vat. et edd. 3, 4 adiiciunt ei.
Distinction 25, p. 1, q. 6. A little after, for proprio codex T reads proprie. — The editions, except the first, supply from the preceding loqui. Thereupon after cum codex Q (W by a second hand) adds enim. — The Vatican and editions 3, 4 add ei.
Vide supra pag. 150, nota 1. Cfr. etiam August., Enarrat. in Ps. 9. n. 15. et in Ps. 122. n. 1. — Quod amor sit radix omnium affectionum, docet August., XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 7. n. 2, et quod amor amantem transformet in amatum, dicunt Dionys. et Hugo de S. Vict., ut videre est supra pag. 121, nota 4.
See above p. 150, note 1. Cf. also Augustine, Commentary on the Psalms on Ps. 9, n. 15, and on Ps. 122, n. 1. — That love is the root of all the affections, Augustine teaches, City of God XIV, c. 7, n. 2; and that love transforms the lover into the beloved, Dionysius and Hugh of St. Victor say, as may be seen above p. 121, note 4.
Secundum Aristot., de quo vide supra pag. 808, nota 3. — Loc. cit. (de Duabus Animabus): Quodsi nemo vituperatione vel damnatione dignus est, aut non contra vetitum iustitiae faciens, aut quod non potest non faciens, omne autem peccatum vel vituperandum est, vel damnandum; quis dubitet, tunc esse peccatum, cum et velle iniustum est, et liberum nolle etc. Cfr. supra d. XXVIII. lit. Magistri, c. 3. et ibid. Comment. dub. 3.
According to Aristotle, on whom see above p. 808, note 3. — In the place cited (On the Two Souls): But if no one is worthy of blame or condemnation, either when not acting against what justice forbids, or when doing what he cannot not do, while however every sin is either to be blamed or to be condemned; who would doubt that there is sin then, when both to will is unjust, and it is free to be unwilling etc. Cf. above d. XXVIII, the Master's text, c. 3, and there the Commentary, dub. 3.
Cfr. supra d. 7. p. II. a. 1. q. 2.; de suggestione, supra eodem loco et lit. Magistri huius dist. — Subinde pro concomitanter nonnulli codd. comitanter.
Cf. above d. 7, p. II, a. 1, q. 2; on suggestion, above in the same place and the Master's text of this distinction. — Thereupon for concomitanter (concomitantly) several codices read comitanter.

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