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Dist. 31, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 31

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio II. Ratione cuius partis primo insit animae peccatum originale.

Secundo quaeritur, ratione cuius partis primo insit animae peccatum originale. Et quod primo insit ratione potentiae vegetativae, videtur:

1. Quia originale inest animae ex coniunctione sui ad carnem corruptam1; sed anima maxime unitur carni secundum potentiam vegetativam, quae est prima potentia in ipsa: ergo videtur, quod primo insit ei ratione potentiae vegetabilis.

2. Item, hoc videtur alia ratione. Potentia generativa est ipsius animae vegetabilis; sed illa est, mediante qua originale transfunditur2, et quae maxime per originale peccatum inficitur, sicut patebit inferius3: ergo videtur, quod ratione vegetabilis primo et principaliter insit animae culpa originalis.

Quod autem ratione partis sensibilis, videtur.

3. Originale enim, sicut dicit Augustinus4, est concupiscentia; sed concupiscentia primo et principaliter in parte sensibili radicatur, quoniam concupiscentia dicit appetitum boni ut nunc, praevia cognitione, et hoc competit parti sensitivae: ergo videtur, quod originale peccatum primo habeat fieri in anima secundum illam partem.

4. Item, in actuali perpetratione peccati videmus, quod peccatum pervenit ad rationem mediante sensualitate, pro eo quod perversio hominis incipit ab inferiori et a conversione ad bonum commutabile5: ergo si peccatum originale incipit ab inferiori, videlicet a carnis infectione, et animam ab inferiori habet inficere; videtur, quod primo habeat animae inesse ratione potentiae sensitivae.

Quod autem primo insit ratione partis rationalis, videtur.

5. «Originale enim est carentia debitae iustitiae»; sed «iustitia habet esse in sola rationali voluntate primo et principaliter», sicut dicit Anselmus in libro de Conceptu virginali6: ergo originale peccatum primo et principaliter ratione partis rationalis habet animae inesse.

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6. Item, originale peccatum est peccatum mortale, ergo per ipsum anima est a Deo aversa; sed averti est ipsius portionis rationalis primo et principaliter: ergo videtur, quod originale peccatum primo habeat inesse animae ratione rationalis potentiae.

Sed quod primo insit ipsi animae ratione suae substantiae vel essentiae, videtur:

7. Quia originale contrahitur in anima ex unione ipsius ad carnem; sed per prius per naturam unitur substantia animae ipsi corpori quam potentiae organis; prius enim est vivere quam moveri7: ergo prius per naturam inficitur animae substantia, quam inficiantur potentiae. Et si hoc verum est, originale primo inest animae ex parte suae substantiae.

8. Item, originale cum sit unum, inficit omnes potentias animae8; sed nihil unum est commune omnibus potentiis animae nisi eius substantia: ergo originale primo est in anima ratione suae substantiae.

Est igitur quaestio, secundum quid originale primo insit animae: utrum scilicet ratione substantiae, aut potentiae; et si potentiae: utrum vegetativae, aut sensitivae, aut intellectivae.

Conclusio.

Originale peccatum, prout est vitium, inest animae primo ratione partis sensitivae, sed prout est culpa, est in sola parte rationali.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod aliqui dicere voluerunt, originale peccatum sic traduci et contrahi ab anima, ut primo insit animae ratione substantiae suae, quae primo carni coniungitur; et consequenter mediante substantia ab ipso9 potentiae inficiuntur, pro eo quod non uniuntur potentiae carni infectae nisi per unionem substantiae. Et sicut una est gratia, quae reformat animam et eius potentias, quae, inquam, dicitur una, quia primo respicit animae substantiam, ut dicunt; sic est unum originale, quod omnes potentias animae inficit et deordinat. — Sed si istud quis ita intelligeret, quod per originale peccatum primo haberet infici substantia quam potentiae, ita quod originale insit animae non ratione potentiae, sed ratione ipsius substantiae10 unitae; hoc non videtur intelligibile: tum quia originale est carentia debitae iustitiae, iustitia autem, cum sit rectitudo voluntatis, est primo in voluntate; tum etiam quia originale est concupiscentia, concupiscere autem non est actus substantiae nisi ratione potentiae; tum etiam quia in originali est deordinatio ipsius animae, deordinatio autem non est in anima nisi ratione potentiae, quia per ipsam potest ordinari et deordinari.

Unde sicut supra11 dictum fuit de gratia, quod ipsa respicit substantiam, non quia possit esse in animae substantia, circumscripta potentia, sed quia est in potentiis animae, secundum quod continuantur ad unam substantiam; sic etiam in proposito intelligendum est, ut originale peccatum dicatur substantiam animae respicere, quia inest potentiis animae, non ex actibus propriis, sed prout continuari habent in unam substantiam12 animae, prout est unita carni infectae, ita tamen, quod primo insit ipsa deordinatio potentiae quam substantiae. Non enim dicitur substantia ordinata vel deordinata nisi ratione potentiae.

Hoc igitur supposito, quod originale insit animae primo ratione potentiae, intelligendum est, quod dupliciter est loqui de originali peccato: aut prout est culpa reddens animam Deo odiosam; aut prout est vitium deordinans ipsam potentiam13. Primo modo accipiendo, proprie inest animae secundum liberum arbitrium, et maxime secundum voluntatem. Ipsum enim solum est, secundum quod anima culpatur, vel laudatur, cum est in actu, et secundum quod est culpabilis vel laudabilis a suo ortu. Secundo modo accipiendo, scilicet prout dicit vitium deordinans potentiam, sic, quia fomentum istius deordinationis ortum habet a carne, et rationalis motiva curvari habet per appetitum sive concupiscentiam sensitivae, quae ad illicitum impellit et movet; sic dicendum est, quod peccatum originale sive vitium, quod nascendo contrahimus, inest animae primo ratione partis sensitivae. — Et sic patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam; patet etiam in parte responsio ad obiecta. Concedo enim, quod originale, prout est vitium in nobis, primo inchoat14 a parte sensitiva, quia modus corrumpendi e contrario est in nobis, quam fuerit in Adam. Ibi enim persona corrupit naturam, et ratio partem sensibilem, et voluntas carnem; et sic, cum e contrario sit in nobis15, originalis corruptio ascendit ad partem rationalem mediante portione sensibili, secundum quod est vitiositas; licet, secundum quod est culpa, habeat esse in sola parte rationali, in qua est libertas arbitrii. Unde quatuor rationes mediae verum concludunt et concedendae sunt.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur de parte animae vegetativa, dicendum, quod unio ad corpus non est tota causa contrahendi originale, sed unio cum possibilitate ad deordinationem. Non enim corrumpitur per originale, secundum quod est vitium, nisi quod est ad iustitiam aliquo modo ordinabile. Et quoniam vegetativa plus tenet modum agendi naturalem quam voluntarium; hinc est, quod originale non sic respicit vegetativam, sicut respicit sensitivam, in qua potest esse appetitus et delectatio coniuncta.

2. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de vi generativa, iam patet responsio, quia in ea viget corruptio, non solum quia sit potentia animae vegetabilis, sed etiam quia ratione sensus adiuncti potest delectatione et concupiscentia deordinari.

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7. Ad illud vero quod ultimo obiicitur, quod primo sit originale peccatum in animae substantia, et per unionem; dicendum, quod, sicut tactum est, unio non est tota causa, sed requiritur ibi cum hoc possibilitas ad deordinationem peccati; talis autem non est in substantia, sed in potentia, ut praedictum est supra.

8. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de unitate originalis, dicendum, quod hoc non concludit, quod originale primo sit in substantia, sed quod sit in potentiis, secundum quod continuantur ad unam substantiam, sicut prius explanatum est de gratia. Hoc autem melius explanabitur infra, cum agetur de unitate originalis peccati.

Scholion

I. Primam sententiam, hic relatam et a S. Bonav. non probatam, tenet S. Thom. Haec autem differentia opinionum nascitur ex diversis principiis, quae quoad subiectum primarium gratiae sanctificantis et quoad iustitiam originalem Angelicus et Seraphicus (cui adhaeret Scot.) profitentur. Ut prima illa sententia intelligatur, notanda sunt verba S. Thomae, S. 1. II. q. 83. a. 2. ad 2: «Potentiae magis videntur pertinere ad personam, in quantum sunt principia personalium actuum; unde sunt propria subiecta peccatorum actualium, quae sunt peccata personalia». Idem distinguit (ibid. a. 3. ad 2.) duplicem huius peccati progressum: «unum quidem a carne ad animam, alium vero ab essentia animae ad potentiam»; ac quoad ordinem, secundum quem ipsae potentiae corrumpuntur, ipse docet, quod considerando inclinationem ad actum, peccatum originale in genere per prius respiciat voluntatem. Sed S. Bonaventura, constans suis principiis de originali iustitia et peccato, hic distinctionem adhibet inter peccatum originale, prout est culpa, et prout est vitium deordinans potentiam, sicut in textu clare exponitur.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 62. m. 2. — Scot., de Rerum principio, q. 10. a. 1. (cfr. ibid. a. 3), et in utroque Scripto, II. Sent. d. 18. q. unica. — S. Thom., II. Sent. d. 18. q. 2. a. 1; S. 1. q. 76. a. 4, q. 90. a. 2, q. 118. a. 1. 2; S. c. Gent. II. c. 86-89. — B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 18. a. 8; S. p. II. tr. 12. q. 70. m. 3, q. 72. m. 3, q. 73. m. 1. — Richard. a Med., II. Sent. d. 18. a. 2. q. 1. 2. — Ægid. R., II. Sent. d. 19. a. 3. 4. — Durand., II. Sent. d. 18. q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., II. Sent. d. 17. q. 1, d. 18. q. 3. — Biel, II. Sent. d. 17. q. 1. — Scot., hic q. 2. et infra d. 42. q. 4. n. 1. seqq. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; S. art. citt.; de Malo, q. 4. a. 4. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Ægid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1. 2. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

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English Translation

Question II. By reason of which part original sin first inheres in the soul.

Secondly it is asked, by reason of which part original sin first inheres in the soul. And that it first inheres by reason of the vegetative power seems so:

1. Because original sin is in the soul from its conjunction to the corrupt flesh1; but the soul is most of all united to the flesh according to the vegetative power, which is the first power in it: therefore it seems that it first inheres in it by reason of the vegetable power.

2. Likewise, this seems so by another argument. The generative power belongs to the vegetable soul itself; but that is the power by means of which original sin is transmitted2, and which is most of all infected by original sin, as will be made clear below3: therefore it seems that by reason of the vegetable power the original fault first and principally inheres in the soul.

But that it inheres by reason of the sensible part seems so.

3. For original sin, as Augustine says4, is concupiscence; but concupiscence is rooted first and principally in the sensible part, since concupiscence denotes an appetite for a good as here-and-now, with cognition going before, and this belongs to the sensitive part: therefore it seems that original sin must first come to be in the soul according to that part.

4. Likewise, in the actual perpetration of sin we see that sin reaches reason by means of sensuality, for the reason that the perversion of man begins from the lower and from a turning to a changeable good5: therefore if original sin begins from the lower, namely from the infection of the flesh, and has to infect the soul from the lower; it seems that it must first inhere in the soul by reason of the sensitive power.

But that it first inheres by reason of the rational part seems so.

5. «For original sin is the lack of due justice»; but «justice has its being first and principally in the rational will alone», as Anselm says in the book On the Virginal Conception6: therefore original sin must inhere in the soul first and principally by reason of the rational part.

6. Likewise, original sin is a mortal sin, therefore through it the soul is turned away from God; but to be turned away belongs to the rational portion first and principally: therefore it seems that original sin must first inhere in the soul by reason of the rational power.

But that it first inheres in the soul itself by reason of its substance or essence seems so:

7. Because original sin is contracted in the soul from its union to the flesh; but by priority of nature the substance of the soul is united to the body itself rather than the powers to the bodily organs; for to live is prior to to be moved7: therefore by priority of nature the substance of the soul is infected, rather than that the powers are infected. And if this is true, original sin is first in the soul on the part of its substance.

8. Likewise, original sin, since it is one, infects all the powers of the soul8; but nothing one is common to all the powers of the soul except its substance: therefore original sin is first in the soul by reason of its substance.

The question therefore is, by reason of what original sin first inheres in the soul: namely whether by reason of substance, or of power; and if of power: whether of the vegetative, or of the sensitive, or of the intellective.

Conclusion.

Original sin, insofar as it is a vice, inheres in the soul first by reason of the sensitive part, but insofar as it is fault, it is in the rational part alone.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that some have wished to say that original sin is so transmitted and contracted by the soul that it first inheres in the soul by reason of its substance, which is first conjoined to the flesh; and consequently the powers are infected by it9 by means of the substance, for the reason that the powers are not united to the infected flesh except through the union of the substance. And just as grace is one, which reforms the soul and its powers — which grace, I say, is called one because it first regards the substance of the soul, as they say — so original sin is one, which infects and disorders all the powers of the soul. — But if anyone were to understand this in such a way that through original sin the substance would be infected before the powers, so that original sin inheres in the soul not by reason of power, but by reason of the substance10 itself as united; this does not seem intelligible: both because original sin is the lack of due justice, while justice, since it is the rectitude of the will, is first in the will; and also because original sin is concupiscence, but to be concupiscent is not an act of the substance except by reason of power; and also because in original sin there is a disordering of the soul itself, but disordering is not in the soul except by reason of power, since through it the soul can be ordered and disordered.

Hence, just as it was said above11 concerning grace, that it regards the substance — not because it could be in the substance of the soul with power set aside, but because it is in the powers of the soul, insofar as they are continued into one substance — so too in the matter at hand it must be understood that original sin is said to regard the substance of the soul, because it is in the powers of the soul, not from their proper acts, but insofar as they are to be continued into one substance12 of the soul, insofar as it is united to the infected flesh; yet in such a way that the disordering itself inheres first in the power than in the substance. For the substance is not said to be ordered or disordered except by reason of power.

This therefore being supposed, that original sin inheres in the soul first by reason of power, it must be understood that there are two ways of speaking of original sin: either insofar as it is fault rendering the soul hateful to God; or insofar as it is a vice disordering the power itself13. Taking it the first way, it properly inheres in the soul according to free choice, and most of all according to the will. For it is this alone according to which the soul is blamed or praised when it is in act, and according to which it is blameworthy or praiseworthy from its origin. Taking it the second way, namely insofar as it denotes a vice disordering the power, thus, because the kindling of this disordering has its rise from the flesh, and the rational movers have to be bent by the appetite or concupiscence of the sensitive part, which impels and moves to the illicit; thus it must be said that the original sin or vice which we contract in being born inheres in the soul first by reason of the sensitive part. — And thus the answer to the question proposed is clear; the answer to the objections is also in part clear. For I concede that original sin, insofar as it is a vice in us, first begins14 from the sensitive part, because the manner of corrupting is the reverse in us from what it was in Adam. For there the person corrupted the nature, and reason the sensible part, and the will the flesh; and so, since it is the reverse in us15, the original corruption ascends to the rational part by means of the sensible portion, insofar as it is viciousness; although, insofar as it is fault, it has its being in the rational part alone, in which there is freedom of choice. Hence the four middle arguments conclude truly and are to be conceded.

1. To that which is first objected concerning the vegetative part of the soul, it must be said that the union to the body is not the whole cause of contracting original sin, but the union together with a possibility for disordering. For nothing is corrupted by original sin, insofar as it is a vice, except what is in some way orderable to justice. And since the vegetative power holds more to the natural manner of acting than to the voluntary; hence it is that original sin does not regard the vegetative as it regards the sensitive, in which there can be conjoined appetite and delight.

2. To that which is objected concerning the generative power, the answer is now clear, because in it corruption flourishes, not only because it is a power of the vegetable soul, but also because by reason of the adjoined sense it can be disordered by delight and concupiscence.

7. To that which is objected last, that original sin is first in the substance of the soul, and through the union; it must be said that, as has been touched on, the union is not the whole cause, but there is required together with this a possibility for disordering by sin; but such a possibility is not in the substance, but in the power, as was said above.

8. To that which is objected concerning the unity of original sin, it must be said that this does not conclude that original sin is first in the substance, but that it is in the powers, insofar as they are continued into one substance, as was previously explained concerning grace. But this will be better explained below, when the unity of original sin is treated.

Scholion

I. The first opinion, related here and not approved by St. Bonaventure, is held by St. Thomas. Now this difference of opinions arises from the diverse principles which the Angelic and the Seraphic (to whom Scotus adheres) profess concerning the primary subject of sanctifying grace and concerning original justice. That the first opinion may be understood, the words of St. Thomas are to be noted, Summa I-II, q. 83, a. 2, ad 2: «The powers seem rather to pertain to the person, inasmuch as they are the principles of personal acts; whence they are the proper subjects of actual sins, which are personal sins». He distinguishes the same (ibid. a. 3, ad 2.) a twofold progress of this sin: «one indeed from the flesh to the soul, the other from the essence of the soul to the power»; and as to the order according to which the powers themselves are corrupted, he teaches that, considering the inclination to act, original sin in general regards the will by priority. But St. Bonaventure, consistent with his principles concerning original justice and sin, here applies the distinction between original sin insofar as it is fault, and insofar as it is a vice disordering the power, as is clearly set forth in the text.

II. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 62, m. 2. — Scotus, On the Principle of Things, q. 10, a. 1 (cf. ibid. a. 3), and in both Commentaries, II Sent. d. 18, q. unica. — St. Thomas, II Sent. d. 18, q. 2, a. 1; Summa I, q. 76, a. 4, q. 90, a. 2, q. 118, a. 1, 2; Summa contra Gentiles II, c. 86-89. — Bl. Albert, II Sent. d. 18, a. 8; Summa p. II, tr. 12, q. 70, m. 3, q. 72, m. 3, q. 73, m. 1. — Richard of Middleton, II Sent. d. 18, a. 2, q. 1, 2. — Giles of Rome, II Sent. d. 19, a. 3, 4. — Durandus, II Sent. d. 18, q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, II Sent. d. 17, q. 1, d. 18, q. 3. — Biel, II Sent. d. 17, q. 1. — Scotus, here q. 2, and below d. 42, q. 4, n. 1 seqq. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 1; the articles cited; de Malo, q. 4, a. 4, 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here q. 2, a. 1, 2. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Codd. H X Z et alii cum ed. 2 colligitur.
    Codices H X Z and others, with ed. 2, read colligitur (is gathered).
  2. Ut ostenditur infra a. 2. q. 1. — De minori, quae sequitur, cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 31. (c. 3.). In fine arg. pro vegetabilis edd., excepta 2, vegetativae. — Vat., in initio huius arg. pro Et substituto Sed, hoc ipsum arg. cum seq. reiecit post arg. sextum, haec duo argg. nec non septimum et octavum coniungens ut argg. ad oppositum. Sed hoc loco S. Bonav. specialem ordinem observat, incipiens ab inferiore potentia.
    As is shown below, a. 2, q. 1. — On the minor [premise] which follows, cf. Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 31 (c. 3). At the end of the argument, for vegetabilis the editions, except 2, [read] vegetativae. — The Vatican edition, at the beginning of this argument substituting Sed for Et, rejected this very argument together with the following one after the sixth argument, joining these two arguments as well as the seventh and eighth as arguments to the contrary. But in this place St. Bonaventure observes a special order, beginning from the lower power.
  3. Quaest. seq. De maiori cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 34. seqq. (c. 4.).
    The following question. On the major [premise] cf. Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 34 seqq. (c. 4).
  4. Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XXX. c. 8. seqq. — De propos. seq. (minori) cfr. infra d. 32. a. 2. q. 1. — Vvo praevia non pauci codd., inter quos B C D E R S, cum edd. 1, 2 prima; subinde pro cognitione memorati codd. cognatione.
    See above, the text of the Master, d. XXX, c. 8 seqq. — On the following proposition (the minor) cf. below, d. 32, a. 2, q. 1. — For praevia not a few codices, among them B C D E R S, with edd. 1, 2, [read] prima; thereupon for cognitione the said codices [read] cognatione.
  5. Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XXIV. c. 6. seqq.
    Cf. above, the text of the Master, d. XXIV, c. 6 seqq.
  6. Cap. 3. Verba habentur supra pag. 722, nota 3.
    Chapter 3. The words are found above, page 722, note 3.
  7. Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 36. seq. (c. 4.).
    Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 36 seq. (c. 4).
  8. Ut ostenditur infra d. 33. a. 2. q. 2.
    As is shown below, d. 33, a. 2, q. 2.
  9. Cod. X supplet scilicet originali.
    Codex X supplies scilicet originali (namely, by original sin).
  10. Cod. aa adiicit carnis.
    Codex aa adds carnis (of the flesh).
  11. Dist. 26. q. 5.
    Distinction 26, q. 5.
  12. Vat. in una substantia.
    The Vatican edition [reads] in una substantia (in one substance).
  13. Haec distinctio recurrit etiam infra d. 41. a. 2. q. 2 et supponitur passim, praesertim d. 31. a. 1. q. 1. 2.
    This distinction recurs also below, d. 41, a. 2, q. 2, and is presupposed throughout, especially d. 31, a. 1, q. 1, 2.
  14. Codd. aa bb inchoatur.
    Codices aa bb [read] inchoatur (is begun).
  15. Pro et sic Vat. sed; cod. aa verba et sic et seqq. sic auxit: in nobis autem caro corrumpit voluntatem et sensibilis rationem et natura personam; et sic originalis etc.
    For et sic the Vatican edition [reads] sed; codex aa expanded the words et sic and the following thus: but in us the flesh corrupts the will, and the sensible [part] corrupts reason, and the nature corrupts the person; and thus the original etc. ---
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