Dist. 31, Art. 1, Q. 3
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 31
Quaestio III. Utrum maior sit infectio generativae per originale peccatum quam alterius potentiae.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum maior sit infectio generativae per originale quam alterius potentiae. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Illa vis est in nobis magis corrupta per peccatum, in qua maior est rebellio et inobedientia; sed talis est potentia generativa, sicut patet, quia membra illa non subiacent imperio rationis: ergo videtur, quod illa vis est magis corrupta.
2. Item, illa vis est magis per peccatum infecta, in cuius actu est maior erubescentia; sed maior est erubescentia in actu potentiae generativae quam in actu alterius potentiae: ergo etc.
3. Item, illa vis magis est in nobis corrupta, cuius actui magis necessaria est medicina; sed talis est generativa, cuius actus non potest fieri absque peccato, « nisi excusetur per Sacramentum matrimonii »1; quod quidem non contingit in aliis animae potentiis: ergo etc.
4. Item, illa vis magis est in nobis corrupta, in cuius actu maior est incurvatio; sed talis est potentia generativa, nam in eius actu totaliter absorbetur ratio, et efficitur homo totus caro: ergo maior est in ea corruptio.
5. Item, illa vis magis est in nobis corrupta, in qua magis regnat concupiscentia; sed talis est vis generativa, sicut patet per pruritum, qui sentitur in membris genitalibus: ergo illa vis maxime inter ceteras corrupta videtur per originalis concupiscentiae vitium.
Sed contra: 1. Per quae quis peccat, per haec et torquetur, ut dicitur Sapientiae undecimo2: si ergo peccatum primorum parentum perpetratum fuit magis per nutritivam quam per generativam, immo minime per generativam; videtur, quod nutritiva magis debuerit esse corrupta.
2. Item, illa potentia est magis corrupta, quae minus potest refrenari; sed magis potest homo compescere appetitum potentiae generativae quam potentiae nutritivae: ergo videtur, quod vis nutritiva magis sit corrupta.
3. Item, si corruptio animae est ex carne3, videtur, quod illa vis potissime sit corrupta, quae primo in p. 746 carne et per carnem exercet suam operationem; sed talis est potentia nutritiva; longe enim ante nutritur homo quam generet, et prius appetit delectabilia gustus quam delectabilia tactus: ergo videtur idem quod prius.
4. Item, augmentativa tenet medium inter nutritivam et generativam — prius enim est nutriri, et postmodum augeri, et tertio generare — sed inter omnes vires animae augmentativa minime corrupta est: ergo si medium sapit naturam extremorum4, videtur similiter, quod et generativa minime deberet esse corrupta.
Iuxta hoc quaeritur, quare inter omnes sensus tactus illius5 habet de corruptione; et inter omnes potentias animae vegetativae generativa inter ceteras est in nobis magis corrupta.
Conclusio.
Per peccatum originale maxime corrupta est vis generativa.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod absque dubio inter omnes potentias sensibiles maxime corrupta est vis generativa. Unde, sicut communiter consuevit dici, aliae vires solummodo dicuntur corruptae; ipsa vero corrupta dicitur et infecta propter concupiscentiae pruritum et vehementiam, quae residet in ipsa.
Ratio autem, quare magis inficitur vis generativa quam alia potentia, sumitur ex hoc, quod ipsa est vis non solum deserviens personae, sed etiam deserviens naturae. Et ideo originalis corruptio sive vitium, quod inest naturae ex corruptione personae, per prius respicit illam potentiam quam aliam; deservit autem vis generativa naturae, in quantum per ipsam fit transfusio seminis in prolem. Et quoniam in illo semine est radix infectionis et corruptionis, hinc est, quod illa vis, quae11 est illius seminis6 administrativa12, plus habet in se de infectione et corruptione originalis. — Rursus, quia potentiae generativae in nobis iunctus est sensus, et potentia sensitiva respicit ipsum hominem in se, quodam modo habet vis ista deservire personae. Et quoniam inter omnes sensus tactus est maxime materialis et apprehendens cum maiori adhaerentia sensibilitatis ad sensibile7; et hic maxime viget in membris genitalibus ratione multitudinis nervorum: hinc est, quod modica corruptio ratione magnitudinis sensus plus inficit illam potentiam, quam inficeret aliam; et propterea maxime in ea regnat pruritus et concupiscentia. Et quia post sensum tactus sensus gustus maxime est materialis inter alios8, hinc est, quod inter alias vires magis sentitur inordinatio circa actum nutritivae sive gustativae. — Ex hac igitur duplici ratione una colligitur ratio sufficiens, quare anima per vitium originale plus inficitur in generativa quam in alia potentia. Et quia hoc probant rationes, quae ad primam partem inducuntur, ideo concedendae sunt.
1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod nutritiva debet magis puniri, quia peccatum fuit primo perpetratum per eam; dicendum, quod illa ratio tenet, secundum quod peccatum Adae respiciebat personam, non secundum quod respiciebat naturam; et verum est, quod quantum ad illam vim acrius fuit punitus, quia fame et siti; et etiam eius posteri puniuntur per ieiuniorum abstinentiam, in quibus maior est poena, quam sit in carnis continentia.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nutritiva minus potest refrenari; dicendum, quod aliquam potentiam minus posse refrenari, hoc est dupliciter: vel ratione vehementiae appetitus et delectationis, vel ratione indigentiae naturalis. Et cum9 non potest de facili refrenari propter vehementiam appetitus et inclinationis, magis est vitiata et corrupta. Cum vero hoc habet ratione indigentiae naturalis, non sequitur ex hoc, quod magis corrupta sit. Cum ergo dicitur, quod nutritiva minus potest refrenari, hoc non est ratione maioris vehementiae appetitus, sed hoc est ratione indigentiae naturalis, quia non potest sustentari sine cibo. Non sic est de generativa, in qua non est improbitas appetitus propter necessitatem, sed propter corruptionis foeditatem. Et hinc est, quod primi motus generativae potius dicuntur peccata quam primi motus nutritivae.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nutritiva magis unitur carni et per prius habet actum suum in carne; dicendum, quod ex hoc non concluditur, quod corrumpatur intensius, sed quod eius corruptio sentiatur diuturnius. — Praeterea, unio non est tota causa, sicut praedictum est supra10.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de potentia augmentativa, dicendum, quod potentia augmentativa pure movet naturaliter nec habet sensum coniunctum, ratione cuius sentiatur delectatio. Et quoniam non subiacet voluntati, ideo per peccatum non habet deordinari. Rursus, quia sensum adiunctum non habet, hinc est, quod non est in ea delectatio concupiscentiae; p. 747 non sic autem est in nutritiva et generativa. Utraque enim harum subiacet voluntatis imperio, et utraque harum habet sensum adiunctum. Et quia plus est in potestate voluntatis abstinere a coitu quam a cibo; et sensus tactus, qui maxime materialis est, viget in organo generativae: hinc est, quod maior est in ea corruptio, non solum respectu potentiarum animae vegetabilis, sed etiam respectu potentiarum animae sensibilis. — Et per hoc patet illud quod ultimo quaerebatur.
I. Consentit S. Thom. conclusioni et probationi. Notandum autem, quod illa infectio, quae praeter corruptionem esse dicitur in generativa potentia vel in semine, quam Magister (hic c. 2.) vocat morbidum affectum, non debet intelligi, quasi sit positiva quaedam qualitas morbida, ut opinabantur nonnulli antiqui Scholastici, et postea Iansenius. Contra hanc opinionem merito arguit Scot. (II. Sent. d. 32. q. unica n. 5.); eaque omnino aliena est a sententia principalium Scholasticorum et S. Bonaventurae, ut tota hac distinctione manifestatur (cfr. S. Thom., de Malo, q. 4. a. 1. ad 9. et a. 3.).
II. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 106. m. 7. a. 3. § 3. — Scot., loc. cit. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2; S. 1. 11. q. 83. a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 3.
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Question III. Whether the infection of the generative power through original sin is greater than that of another power.
Thirdly it is asked whether the infection of the generative [power] through original [sin] is greater than that of another power. And that it is so, it seems.
1. That power is more corrupted in us through sin in which there is greater rebellion and disobedience; but such is the generative power, as is evident, because those members are not subject to the command of reason: therefore it seems that that power is more corrupted.
2. Likewise, that power is more infected through sin in whose act there is greater shame; but there is greater shame in the act of the generative power than in the act of another power: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, that power is more corrupted in us whose act has more need of medicine; but such is the generative [power], whose act cannot take place without sin, « unless it be excused through the Sacrament of matrimony »1; which indeed does not happen in the other powers of the soul: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, that power is more corrupted in us in whose act there is greater bending-down; but such is the generative power, for in its act reason is wholly absorbed, and man is made wholly flesh: therefore the corruption is greater in it.
5. Likewise, that power is more corrupted in us in which concupiscence reigns more; but such is the generative power, as is evident from the itch which is felt in the genital members: therefore that power seems most of all among the rest to be corrupted through the vice of original concupiscence.
On the contrary: 1. By the things through which one sins, by these also is one tormented, as is said in Wisdom eleven2: if therefore the sin of the first parents was perpetrated more through the nutritive than through the generative [power] — indeed least of all through the generative — it seems that the nutritive ought to have been more corrupted.
2. Likewise, that power is more corrupted which can less be restrained; but a man can more compress the appetite of the generative power than of the nutritive power: therefore it seems that the nutritive power is more corrupted.
3. Likewise, if the corruption of the soul is from the flesh3, it seems that that power is most of all corrupted which first operates in the flesh and through the flesh; but such is the nutritive power; for man is nourished long before he generates, and desires the delectable things of taste before the delectable things of touch: therefore it seems the same as before.
4. Likewise, the augmentative [power] holds the middle between the nutritive and the generative — for first is being nourished, and afterward being increased, and thirdly generating — but among all the powers of the soul the augmentative is least corrupted: therefore if the middle savors the nature of the extremes4, it seems likewise that the generative also ought to be least corrupted.
Along with this it is asked why among all the senses touch has [the most] of corruption5; and why among all the powers of the vegetative soul the generative is, among the rest, the more corrupted in us.
Conclusion.
Through original sin the generative power is most corrupted.
I respond: It must be said that without doubt among all the sensible powers the generative power is most corrupted. Hence, as it is commonly wont to be said, the other powers are called only corrupted; but it [the generative] is called corrupted and infected on account of the itch and vehemence of concupiscence which resides in it.
But the reason why the generative power is more infected than another power is taken from this, that it is a power not only serving the person, but also serving the nature. And therefore the original corruption or vice, which is in the nature from the corruption of the person, regards that power before another; and the generative power serves the nature inasmuch as through it the seed is transmitted into the offspring. And since in that seed is the root of infection and corruption, hence it is that that power, which11 is the administrator of that seed612, has in itself more of original infection and corruption. — Again, because sense is joined to the generative power in us, and the sensitive power regards man himself in himself, this power has in a certain manner to serve the person. And since among all the senses touch is the most material and apprehends with the greatest adherence of sensibility to the sensible7; and this flourishes most in the genital members by reason of the multitude of nerves: hence it is that a slight corruption, by reason of the magnitude of the sense, infects that power more than it would infect another; and on this account the itch and concupiscence reign most of all in it. And because after the sense of touch the sense of taste is the most material among the others8, hence it is that among the other powers disorder is felt more in the act of the nutritive or gustative [power]. — From this twofold reason, therefore, one sufficient reason is gathered why the soul, through the original vice, is more infected in the generative than in another power. And because the reasons that are adduced for the first part prove this, therefore they are to be conceded.
1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that the nutritive ought to be more punished because the sin was first perpetrated through it; it must be said that that reason holds according as the sin of Adam regarded the person, not according as it regarded the nature; and it is true that with respect to that power [Adam] was more sharply punished, namely by hunger and thirst; and his posterity also are punished by the abstinence of fasts, in which there is greater penalty than there is in continence of the flesh.
2. To that which is objected, that the nutritive can less be restrained; it must be said that for some power to be able to be less restrained is so in two ways: either by reason of the vehemence of appetite and delight, or by reason of natural need. And when9 it cannot easily be restrained on account of the vehemence of appetite and inclination, it is the more vitiated and corrupted. But when it has this by reason of natural need, it does not follow from this that it is more corrupted. When therefore it is said that the nutritive can less be restrained, this is not by reason of the greater vehemence of appetite, but it is by reason of natural need, because it cannot be sustained without food. It is not so with the generative, in which there is not depravity of appetite on account of necessity, but on account of the foulness of corruption. And hence it is that the first motions of the generative are rather called sins than the first motions of the nutritive.
3. To that which is objected, that the nutritive is more united to the flesh and has its act in the flesh before [the generative]; it must be said that from this it is not concluded that it is corrupted more intensely, but that its corruption is felt more lastingly. — Moreover, the union is not the whole cause, as was said above10.
4. To that which is objected concerning the augmentative power, it must be said that the augmentative power moves purely naturally and does not have a conjoined sense, by reason of which delight might be felt. And since it is not subject to the will, therefore through sin it has no disorder. Again, because it does not have an adjoined sense, hence it is that there is in it no delight of concupiscence; it is not so, however, in the nutritive and the generative. For each of these is subject to the command of the will, and each of these has an adjoined sense. And because it is more in the power of the will to abstain from coition than from food; and the sense of touch, which is most material, flourishes in the organ of the generative [power]: hence it is that the corruption is greater in it, not only in respect of the powers of the vegetable soul, but also in respect of the powers of the sensible soul. — And by this is made evident that which was lastly asked.
I. St. Thomas agrees with the conclusion and the proof. But it must be noted that the infection which, beyond corruption, is said to be in the generative power or in the seed — which the Master (here c. 2) calls a morbid affection — must not be understood as if it were a certain positive morbid quality, as some ancient Scholastics, and afterward Jansenius, supposed. Against this opinion Scotus rightly argues (II Sent. d. 32, q. unica, n. 5); and it is altogether foreign to the opinion of the principal Scholastics and of St. Bonaventure, as is manifested throughout this whole distinction (cf. St. Thomas, de Malo, q. 4, a. 1, ad 9, and a. 3).
II. Alexander of Hales, S. p. II, q. 106, m. 7, a. 3, § 3. — Scotus, loc. cit. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 2; S. 1.2, q. 83, a. 4. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 3. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 3.
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- Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 delectatio.The Vatican edition, with editions 3 and 4, reads delectatio (delight).
- Dist. 33. a. 2. q. 2. — De unitate gratiae vide supra d. 26. q. 5. — Paulo superius post continuantur codd. B P T et alii interserunt ad unam potentiam. Pro unam cod. ee substituit primam.Distinction 33, a. 2, q. 2. — On the unity of grace see above d. 26, q. 5. — A little earlier, after continuantur, codices B P T and others insert ad unam potentiam (to one power). For unam codex ee substitutes primam (the first).
- Plures codd., ut T aa cc ee, cum ed. 1 sit.Several codices, such as T aa cc ee, with edition 1, read sit.
- Verba sunt Magistri, hic c. 4.These are the words of the Master, here c. 4.
- Vers. 17.[Wisdom 11,] verse 17.
- Vide hic a. 2. q. 1.See here a. 2, q. 1.
- Aristot., IV. Polit. c. 9. (c. 7.): In eo [medio] enim utrumque extremorum apparet.Aristotle, Politics IV, c. 9 (c. 7): for in it [the middle] each of the extremes appears.
- Codd. D H Q omittunt seminis; codd. B E F K T V bb ee et alii nec non edd. 2, 3 pro seminis habent vis.Codices D H Q omit seminis (of the seed); codices B E F K T V bb ee and others, as well as editions 2 and 3, read vis (power) in place of seminis.
- Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 106. seqq. (c. 11.) et III. text. 66. seqq. (c. 13.); II. de Part. animal. c. 1. et 8. — Immediate ante pro sensibilitatis plures codd., ut A T aa bb ee, sentientis, ed. 1 sensitivae. Mox pro et hic, quod habent codd. F K T Y et alii, Vat. et haec, codd. A ee cum ed. 1 et hoc.Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 106 ff. (c. 11) and III, text 66 ff. (c. 13); On the Parts of Animals II, c. 1 and 8. — Immediately before, in place of sensibilitatis several codices, such as A T aa bb ee, read sentientis, edition 1 sensitivae. Shortly after, in place of et hic, which codices F K T Y and others have, the Vatican edition reads et haec, and codices A ee with edition 1 et hoc.
- Vide Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 101. seqq. (c. 10.).See Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 101 ff. (c. 10).
- Cod. cc et ed. 1 quae, scil. potentia.Codex cc and edition 1 read quae (which), i.e. potentia (power).
- Quaest. praeced.The preceding question.