Dist. 16, Art. 2, Q. 2
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 16
Quaestio II. Utrum anima Christi passa fuerit secundum superiorem portionem rationis.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum anima Christi passa fuerit secundum superiorem portionem rationis. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Christus «assumsit totum hominem, ut totum curaretp355-3»; sed totos nos curavit, et quantum ad superiorem portionem rationis et quantum ad inferiorem, et hoc quidem per passionem: ergo passus est quantum ad omnem partem rationis.
2. Item, ubi est culpa, ibi debet esse poena; sed culpa Adae fuit in superiori parte rationis propter completam aversionemp355-4: si ergo Christus poenam sustinuit pro culpa Adae, ergo poenam sensit in suprema parte rationis.
3. Item, plus iungitur ratio superior inferiori, quam iungatur inferior sensualitati; sed ratio inferior patitur, patiente sensualitate: ergo ratio superior patitur, patiente inferiori.
4. Item, ratio superiorp355-5 unionem habet ad deitatem et unionem habet ad carnem; sed propter unionem sui ad deitatem, in qua est promptuarium delectationis, necesse est, eam delectari: ergo pari ratione propter unionem sui ad carnem patientem necesse fuit, eam pati.
Sed contra: 1. Paulus in raptu suo propter plenam conversionem rationis ad Deum abstractus fuit omnino a passionibus et delectationibus carnis, sicut ipse dicitp355-6: Nescio, utrum in corpore, an extra corpus; sed superior portio rationis in Christo omnino fuit ad Deum conversa: ergo videtur, quod nihil de afflictione carnis sentiebat.
2. Item, «contraria non possunt esse in eodem et secundum idemp355-7»; sed gaudium et dolor sunt affectiones contrariae: ergo si Christus secundum portionem rationis superiorem continue gaudebat, ergo videtur, quod secundum illam dolorem non experiebatur nec sentiebat.
3. Item, «albius est quod est nigro impermixtiusp355-8»; ergo ubi est summum gaudium, ibi nullus
est dolor; sed in superiori portione rationis Christi summum gaudium erat, quia perfectissime Deum comprehendebat: ergo videtur, quod nihil de dolore secundum illam partem sentiebat.
4. Item, sicut culpa opponitur gratiae, ita beatitudo opponitur miseriae; sed culpa non potest stare in eodem et secundum idem simul cum gratia: ergo nec beatitudo et miseria secundum eandem animae portionem. Sed beatitudo erat in Christo secundum portionem animae superiorem: ergo impossibile fuit, secundum illam partem inesse Christo aliquem dolorem.
5. Item, potentia illa simplex erat, ergo ad quod se convertebat secundum eandem partem, totaliter ferebaturp356-1: si ergo quantum ad superiorem portionem semper erat conversus ad Deum, a quo hauriebat gaudium; videtur, quod secundum illam portionem nullum sentiebat cruciatum.
6. Item, superior portio rationis distinguitur ab inferiori in hoc, quod ipsa aspicit ad superiora, haec ad inferiora: si ergo Christus nullam materiam doloris habebat a superiori, sed solum ab infimo; videtur, quod superior portio rationis nullo modo pateretur in ipso.
Conclusio
Christus passus est etiam secundum portionem superiorem rationis, quatenus portio illa consideratur per modum naturae.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod secundum communem sententiam magistrorum passio Christi non solum stetit in sensualitate nec tantum pervenit ad rationem inferiorem, sed extendit se usque ad superiorem portionem.p356-2 Sicut enim anima nostra ex coniunctione sui ad corpus infectum tota corrumpitur et tota inficitur secundum omnem sui vim et secundum omnem partem, scilicet tam superiorem quam inferiorem; sic anima Christi ex coniunctione sui ad corpus patiens et afflictum tota patiebatur et affligebatur, ut per illam passionem et dolorem illum tota peccatrix anima curaretur. Et sic dolor fuit et passio in Christo secundum supremam rationis partem, quamvis in ea fuerit gaudium fruitionis. — Licet autem hoc teneatur tanquam verum, difficile tamen est ad intelligendum, qualiter in anima Christi secundum eandem potentiam et secundum eundem statum potentiae fuerit dolor et gaudium, nec dolor superveniens discontinuaverit gaudium; immo fueruntp356-3 simul; nec iterum, quod maius est, dolor intensus valde fecerat, gaudium esse minus perfectum.
Ad haec autem intelligenda tria oportet supponere, quae sunt vera et probabilia, videlicet quod gaudium fruitionis et dolor passionis non sunt affectiones contrariae, quia non sunt respectu eiusdem nec omnino eodem modo insunt eidem, sed unum inest per se, alterum per accidens: quia gaudium inest propter coniunctionem gratuitam ipsius cum Deitate, sed dolor propter naturalem coniunctionem ipsius cum carne; et quia non sunt affectiones contrariae, possunt in anima esse secundum eandem partem.
Altera suppositio est, quod non tantum huiusmodi dolor et gaudium non sunt contraria, sed unum est materiale respectu alterius; et ideo simul eidem inesse poterant, sicut in virop356-4 poenitente videmus, quod simul dolet et de dolore gaudet. Sic et anima Christi secundum naturam corpori patienti compatiebatur, tamen de illa passione et compassione laetabatur.
Tertia suppositio est, quod Christus simul erat viator et comprehensor, ita quod viatoris cognitio non impediebat comprehensoris cognitionem, nec affectio affectionemp356-5; et illud fuit in Christo singulare propter officium mediatoris, quo debebat experiri et divina et humana. Unde sicut simul et semel poterat perfecte converti ad Deum et converti ad nos, ita quod una illarum conversionum alteram non impediebat nec retardabat; sic potuit secundum eandem partem animae simul et semel gaudere in Deo et compati corpori suo, ita quod nec dolor a gaudio, nec gaudium a dolore pateretur aliquam diminutionem sive remissionem. — Concedendum est igitur, Christum secundum superiorem portionem doluisse in passione, in quantum tamen ratio illa consideratur per modum naturaep356-6. Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hanc partem inductae. Ad rationes vero ad oppositum facile est per ea quae dicta sunt, respondere.
1. Ad illud enim quod primo obiicitur de raptu Pauli, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia Paulus non sic potuit habere usum viatoris et comprehensoris, secundum quod Christus, qui erat homo et Deus.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod contraria non possunt inesse eidem; dicendum, sicut dictum est, quod dolor et gaudium in Christo non habebant contrarietatem, immo unum erat materiale respectu alterius, quia ex hoc ipso Christus gaudebat in Dominop356-7, quo sentiebat, se pati et dolere pro Domino.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod gaudium dolori impermixtum est magis intensum; dicendum,
quod illud verum est de dolore opposito gaudio; sed de dolore, qui dat occasionem gaudendip357-1, non oportet illud habere veritatem; et ideo in proposito non concludit illa ratio.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod beatitudo opponitur miseriae, secundum quodp357-2 gratia culpae; dicendum, quod verum est, quod beatitudo miseriae opponitur secundum legem communem, et non reperitur in aliquo simul gloria cum miseria. Et ratio huius est, quia unusquisque est in uno statu, non in duplici; sed quoniam Christus in duplici statu erat, vel quasi rationem tenebat duplicis personae; sicut in Christo status est compossibilis statui sine repugnantia, sic beatitudo cum miseria. Nec est simile omnino de gratia et culpa, quia non respiciunt diversos status, sed directe habent oppositionem et incompossibilitatem; nisi forte quis intelligat de culpa veniali, quae in eodem simul potest reperiri cum gratia, quae non habet oppositionem directam; expelleretur autem omnino venialis culpa, cum perficereturp357-3 gratia; sic et a Christo ablata fuit passionis miseria, quando consummata fuit eius gloria.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potentia illa simplex est; dicendum, quod quamvis per naturam potentia simplex non possit ad diversa converti, tamen per deiformitatem gloriae possibile est adeo ampliari, ut simul possit et ad diversa converti et circa diversa affici; et sic in patria erit aliquando, et intelligendum etiam est fuisse in Christop357-4.
6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ratio superior non dicitur, nisi in quantum convertitur ad superiora; dicendum, quod hoc non est verum, pro eo quod ad superiorem portionem rationis spectat regere inferiorem, et penes ipsam residet regimen et imperium respectu omnium potentiarum animae, quae sunt aliquo modo rationi obaudibilesp357-5; et ita per modum naturae colligatur potentiis aliis et ipsi corpori humano tanquam perfectibili; et ideo pati habet, corpore patiente. Quod autem dicitur, quod ratio superior attenditur secundum aspectum ad superiora; hoc dicitur quantum ad eius principalem actum, non quod excludatur conversio et colligantia ipsius ad inferiorap357-6.
---
Question II. Whether the soul of Christ suffered according to the superior portion of reason.
Secondly it is asked, whether the soul of Christ suffered according to the superior portion of reason. And that it did, it seems thus.
1. Christ "assumed the whole man, that he might heal the wholep355-3"; but he healed all of us, both as to the superior portion of reason and as to the inferior, and this indeed through his passion: therefore he suffered as to every part of reason.
2. Likewise, where there is fault, there ought to be punishment; but the fault of Adam was in the superior part of reason on account of a complete aversionp355-4: if therefore Christ sustained punishment for the fault of Adam, then he felt punishment in the supreme part of reason.
3. Likewise, the superior reason is more joined to the inferior than the inferior is joined to sensuality; but the inferior reason suffers when sensuality suffers: therefore the superior reason suffers when the inferior suffers.
4. Likewise, the superior reasonp355-5 has a union with the deity and has a union with the flesh; but on account of its union with the deity, in which there is the storehouse of delight, it is necessary that it be delighted: therefore by parity of reasoning, on account of its union with the suffering flesh it was necessary that it suffer.
On the contrary: 1. Paul in his rapture, on account of the full conversion of his reason to God, was withdrawn entirely from the passions and delights of the flesh, as he himself saysp355-6: I know not, whether in the body or out of the body; but the superior portion of reason in Christ was entirely turned to God: therefore it seems that he felt nothing of the affliction of the flesh.
2. Likewise, "contraries cannot be in the same thing and according to the samep355-7"; but joy and sorrow are contrary affections: therefore if Christ continually rejoiced according to the superior portion of reason, then it seems that according to it he did not experience nor feel sorrow.
3. Likewise, "that is whiter which is more unmixed with blackp355-8"; therefore where there is the highest joy, there is no
sorrow; but in the superior portion of Christ's reason there was the highest joy, because he comprehended God most perfectly: therefore it seems that he felt nothing of sorrow according to that part.
4. Likewise, just as fault is opposed to grace, so beatitude is opposed to misery; but fault cannot stand in the same thing and according to the same together with grace: therefore neither beatitude and misery according to the same portion of the soul. But beatitude was in Christ according to the superior portion of the soul: therefore it was impossible that according to that part any sorrow be in Christ.
5. Likewise, that power was simple, therefore to whatever it turned itself according to the same part, it was wholly bornep356-1: if therefore as to the superior portion he was always turned to God, from whom he drew joy; it seems that according to that portion he felt no torment.
6. Likewise, the superior portion of reason is distinguished from the inferior in this, that the superior looks to higher things, the latter to lower: if therefore Christ had no matter of sorrow from the superior, but only from the lowest; it seems that the superior portion of reason in no way suffered in him.
Conclusion
Christ suffered also according to the superior portion of reason, insofar as that portion is considered after the manner of nature.
I respond: It must be said that, according to the common opinion of the masters, the passion of Christ did not stand only in sensuality, nor only reach the inferior reason, but extended itself even to the superior portion.p356-2 For just as our soul, from its conjunction to an infected body, is wholly corrupted and wholly infected according to all its power and according to every part, namely both superior and inferior; so the soul of Christ, from its conjunction to the suffering and afflicted body, wholly suffered and was afflicted, that through that passion and that sorrow the whole sinful soul might be healed. And thus sorrow and passion were in Christ according to the supreme part of reason, although in it there was the joy of fruition. — But although this is held as true, it is nonetheless difficult to understand how in the soul of Christ, according to the same power and according to the same state of the power, there could be sorrow and joy, and the supervening sorrow not interrupt the joy; rather they werep356-3 simultaneous; nor again, what is greater, the very intense sorrow had made the joy be less perfect.
But for these things to be understood, three things must be supposed, which are true and probable, namely that the joy of fruition and the sorrow of passion are not contrary affections, because they are not in respect of the same thing nor are altogether present in the same way in the same subject, but the one is present per se, the other per accidens: because joy is present on account of the gratuitous conjunction of [the soul] with the Deity, but sorrow on account of the natural conjunction of it with the flesh; and because they are not contrary affections, they can be in the soul according to the same part.
The second supposition is that not only are sorrow and joy of this kind not contrary, but the one is material in respect of the other; and therefore they could be present in the same thing at once, as we see in a penitent manp356-4, who at once grieves and rejoices over his grief. So too the soul of Christ, according to its nature, suffered-with the suffering body, yet rejoiced over that passion and compassion.
The third supposition is that Christ was at once wayfarer and comprehensor, in such a way that the cognition of the wayfarer did not impede the cognition of the comprehensor, nor affection [impede] affectionp356-5; and this was singular in Christ on account of the office of mediator, by which he had to experience both things divine and human. Hence just as he could at once and at the same time be turned perfectly to God and be turned to us, in such a way that one of those conversions did not impede nor retard the other; so he could, according to the same part of the soul, at once and at the same time rejoice in God and suffer-with his body, in such a way that neither did sorrow suffer any diminution or remission from joy, nor joy from sorrow. — It must therefore be granted that Christ grieved according to the superior portion in the passion, insofar however as that reason is considered after the manner of naturep356-6. And the reasons adduced for this side are to be granted. But to the reasons for the opposite it is easy to reply through the things that have been said.
1. For to that which is first objected concerning the rapture of Paul, it must be said that it is not similar, because Paul could not have the use of wayfarer and comprehensor in the way that Christ could, who was man and God.
2. To that which is objected, that contraries cannot be present in the same subject; it must be said, as has been said, that sorrow and joy in Christ did not have contrariety, but rather the one was material in respect of the other, because by this very fact Christ rejoiced in the Lordp356-7, by which he perceived that he was suffering and grieving for the Lord.
3. To that which is objected, that joy unmixed with sorrow is more intense; it must be said
that this is true of sorrow opposed to joy; but of sorrow which gives occasion for rejoicingp357-1, it is not necessary that this hold true; and therefore in the present case that argument does not conclude.
4. To that which is objected, that beatitude is opposed to misery, in the way thatp357-2 grace [is opposed] to fault; it must be said that it is true that beatitude is opposed to misery according to the common law, and glory together with misery is not found in anyone at once. And the reason for this is that each one is in one state, not in two; but since Christ was in a twofold state, or held as it were the standing of a twofold person; just as in Christ a state is compossible with a state without repugnance, so beatitude with misery. Nor is it altogether similar in the case of grace and fault, because they do not regard different states, but directly have opposition and incompossibility; unless perhaps one understands it of venial fault, which can be found in the same thing at once with grace, since it does not have direct opposition; but venial fault would be entirely expelled when grace is perfectedp357-3; so too from Christ the misery of the passion was taken away, when his glory was consummated.
5. To that which is objected, that that power is simple; it must be said that, although by nature a simple power cannot be turned to diverse things, nevertheless through the deiformity of glory it is possible for it to be so enlarged that it can at once both be turned to diverse things and be affected about diverse things; and thus it will be sometime in the fatherland, and it is to be understood that it was so also in Christp357-4.
6. To that which is objected, that the superior reason is not so called except insofar as it is turned to higher things; it must be said that this is not true, because to the superior portion of reason belongs the governing of the inferior, and within it resides the rule and command over all the powers of the soul, which are in some way obedient to reasonp357-5; and thus after the manner of nature it is bound together with the other powers and with the human body itself as with something perfectible; and therefore it has to suffer when the body suffers. But as to what is said, that the superior reason is attended to according to its regard for higher things; this is said as to its principal act, not that there be excluded its conversion and conjunction to lower thingsp357-6.
---
- Damasc., III. de Fide orthod. c. 6. et 18. Cfr. supra lit. Magistri d. II. c. 1.Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith III, c. 6 and 18. Cf. above, the text of the Master, d. II, c. 1.
- Vide II. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XXII. c. 3. seq., nec non Comment. ibid. a. 1. q. 2. seq. Cfr. etiam lit. Magistri, II. Sent. d. XXIV. c. 4-13, et Comment. ibid. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. ac p. II. per totam. — In fine arg. pro suprema edd. superiori.See II Sent., the text of the Master, d. XXII, c. 3 ff., and also the Commentary there, a. 1, q. 2 ff. Cf. also the text of the Master, II Sent., d. XXIV, c. 4–13, and the Commentary there, p. I, a. 2, q. 2 and throughout p. II. — At the end of the argument, for suprema the editions read superiori.
- Cod. F perperam inferior.Codex F wrongly reads inferior.
- Epist. II. Cor. 12, 2.2 Corinthians 12:2.
- Secundum Aristot., de quo vide supra pag. 85, nota 10. — Pro non possunt esse edd. non possunt simul esse.According to Aristotle, concerning which see above, p. 85, note 10. — For non possunt esse (cannot be) the editions read non possunt simul esse (cannot be at once).
- Aristot., III. Topic. c. 4. (c. 5.).Aristotle, Topics III, c. 4 (c. 5).
- Cfr. supra pag. 311, nota 1. et pag. 299, nota 3. — Mox pro superiorem portionem edd. superiorem partem rationis.Cf. above, p. 311, note 1, and p. 299, note 3. — Presently, for superiorem portionem (the superior portion) the editions read superiorem partem rationis (the superior part of reason).
- Vide II. Sent. d. 31. a. 1. q. 2.See II Sent., d. 31, a. 1, q. 2.
- Ita codd. E I L N T U V Z aa, cod. K fuerint, edd. fuerit.Thus codices E I L N T U V Z aa; codex K reads fuerint, the editions fuerit.
- Edd. vero. Paulo ante pro poterant cod. A poterat, codd. E K N V poterunt, edd. potuerunt.The editions read vero. A little earlier, for poterant (they could) codex A reads poterat, codices E K N V poterunt, the editions potuerunt.
- Cfr. supra d. 14. a. 3. q. 1. seq. — Cod. K sic prosequitur: et illud fuit in Christo propter singulare officium mediatoris.Cf. above, d. 14, a. 3, q. 1 ff. — Codex K continues thus: and this was in Christ on account of the singular office of the mediator.
- Vide quaest. praeced. in corp.See the preceding question in the body.
- Respicitur illud Phil. 4, 4: Gaudete in Domino etc. — Paulo superius ante sicut dictum est codd. A H I L Z aa bb et edd. 1, 2 interiiciunt quod.This refers to Philippians 4:4: Rejoice in the Lord, etc. — A little above, before sicut dictum est, codices A H I L Z aa bb and editions 1, 2 insert quod.
- Codd. A K L aa bb gaudii.Codices A K L aa bb read gaudii.
- Pro secundum quod cod. O sicut. Aliquanto inferius pro in uno statu cod. U in suo statu uno, et post pauca pro est compossibilis idem cod. U erat compossibilis.For secundum quod codex O reads sicut. Somewhat below, for in uno statu codex U reads in suo statu uno, and a little after, for est compossibilis the same codex U reads erat compossibilis.
- Edd. cum nonnullis codd. perficitur; codd. K bb perficietur, qui et paulo ante pro expelleretur cum aliquot aliis codd. habent expelletur. Cod. A quin non pro quae non.The editions, with some codices, read perficitur; codices K bb read perficietur, which also a little before, for expelleretur, together with some other codices have expelletur. Codex A reads quin non for quae non.
- Cfr. supra d. 14. a. 3. q. 2. in fine corp.Cf. above, d. 14, a. 3, q. 2, at the end of the body.
- Cod. M. obedibiles.Codex M reads obedibiles.
- Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.See the scholion on the preceding question.