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Dist. 16, Art. 2, Q. 3

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 16

Textus Latinus
p. 357

Quaestio III. Utrum dolor fuerit intensior in parte rationali animae Christi, an in parte sensuali.

Tertio quaeritur, in qua parte animae Christi fuerit dolor intensior, utrum in parte rationali, an in parte sensualip357-7. Et quod in parte sensuali videtur.

1. Illud magis patitur ad praesentiam affligentis, quod magis est passibile; sed sensualitas in Christo erat magis passibilis quam ipsa ratio, erat enimp357-8 fragilior: ergo videtur, quod magis affligebatur anima Christi secundum sensualitatem, quam affligeretur secundum rationem.

2. Item, omne illud, quod magis in patiendo a consolatione elongatur, magis patitur et affligitur; sed sensualitas plus recedebat a gaudio in passione quam ipsa ratio, sicut manifestum estp357-9: ergo etc.

3. Item, ubi magis viget passio timoris, ibidem magis intenditur passio doloris; sed Christus plus timebat secundum sensualitatem quam secundum rationem — secundum enim rationem securus erat, licet sensualitas formidaretp357-10 — ergo pari ratione plus dolebat ex parte sensualitatis quam rationis.

4. Item, sicut gaudium est in coniunctione convenientis cum convenienti, ita dolor est in separatione: ergo ibi est maior dolor, ubi est separatio magis convenientis; sed anima plus convenit cum carne secundum sensualitatem quam secundum rationem, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro de Spiritu et animap357-11: ergo etc.

5. Item, quod magis alligatur alicui et plus indiget illo magis patitur et affligitur in illius corruptione et amissione; sed sensualitas magis alligatur carni et plus indiget carne ad suam operationem exercendam quam ratio: ergo carne patiente, plus affligebaturp357-12 anima in sensualitate quam in ratione.

Sed contra: 1. Sicut dicit Augustinus de Civitate Deip357-13: « Dolor est testimonium bonae naturae », ergo in meliori natura intensior est dolor; sed melior est natura animae secundum rationem quam secundum sensualitatem: ergo intensior est dolor ex parte rationis quam ex parte sensualitatis.

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2. Item, quod ex pluribus causis dolet intensius dolet, quam quod ex una tantum; sed dolor eratp358-1 in sensualitate tantum ex carne, ratio vero non tantum condolebat carni, sed etiam sensualitati et nobis: ergo videtur, quod intensior erat dolor in ratione quam in sensualitate.

3. Item, ubi est intensior amor, ibi est intensior dolorp358-2; sed Christus magis diligebat in nobis vitam gratiae, quam in se diligeret vitam naturae: ergo magis dolebat de hoc, quod nos amiseramus vitam gratiae, quam de hoc, quod ipse amittebat vitam naturae. Sed primus dolor erat in ratione, secundus in sensualitate: ergo magis doluit secundum rationem quam secundum sensualitatem.

4. Item, in ea parte intensior est dolor, quae habet maiorem rationem dolendi; sed sensualitas non habebat rationem dolendi nisi propter afflictionem carnis suae, ratio vero habebat rationem dolendi propter dehonorationem maiestatis divinae; sed magis dolendum est de Dei inhonoratione quam de carnis afflictione; et Christus dolebat, secundum quod debebat: ergo intensior dolor erat in Christo quantum ad partem rationalem quam quantum ad partem sensualem.

5. Item, Christus diligebat alios sicut se ipsum, quia perfectam habebat caritatemp358-3: ergo tantum dolebat de separatione aliorum a Deo, quantum si ipse separaretur ab ipso; sed constans est, quod omnis anima recta plus doleret de separatione a Deo quam de separatione a corpore proprio: ergo anima Christi plus compatiebatur aliis quam propriae carni. Si ergo compassio respectu aliorum erat in ratione, compassio respectu carnis erat in sensualitate; ergo intensior dolor erat secundum partem rationalem quam secundum sensualitatem.

### Conclusio. Quoad dolorem passionis Christus magis doluit in parte sensuali, quoad dolorem compassionis magis in parte rationali; ipse autem dolor compassionis fuit intensior quam dolor passionis.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod in Christo duplex dolor fuit, secundum quod dicunt Sanctip358-4, videlicet dolor passionis et dolor compassionis, et uterque dolor intensus fuit et acerbus. Multum enim in se doluit, et multum nobis condoluit; et uterque istorum dolorum et in sensualitate fuit et in ratione, sed ordine permutato. Nam dolor passionis et carnis primo attingebat animam secundum sensualitatem, et deinde secundum alias vires. Dolor vero compassionis primo erat in ratione, et ex ratione redundabat in sensualitatem. Sicut enim, ratione nostra dolente pro peccatis nostris, gemit sensualitas et lacrymatur; sic et Christus, quia multum pro peccatis nostris doluit, de peccatis nostris flevitp358-5.

Cum ergo comparamus dolorem sensualitatis ad dolorem rationis, hoc potest esse in duplici genere; et si quidem intelligatur de dolore passionis, cum ille primo sensualitatem attingeret; concedendum est, animam Christi secundum partem sensualem magis doluisse, sicut ostendunt rationes ad primam partemp358-6. — Si vero intelligatur de dolore compassionis, quo interius afficiebatur propter scelera nostra; cum ille ortum et originem habeat a ratione, concedendum est, ipsum magis secundum rationem doluisse, sicut ostendunt rationes ad partem sequentem inductae. — Et sic patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam, patet etiam responsio ad obiecta. Membra enim huius quaestionis habent se sicut excedentia et excessa, et obiecta verum concludunt secundum diversas vias.

Si quis autem ulterius quaerat, cum ratio et sensualitas secundum duo genera dolorisp358-7 mutuo se excedant, quis eorum fuerit intensior in Christo, utrum videlicet dolor passionis, vel compassionis; responderi potest, quod dolor compassionis fuit intensior. — Et ratio huius est: quia, quamvis magna causa esset dolendi in sensualitate propter separationem ipsius a carne, magna etiam esset dispositio ad dolendum propter optimam complexionemp358-8; in dolore tamen compassionis amplior erat ratio dolendi propter inhonorationem Dei et separationem nostram a Deo, maior etiam erat dispositio ad dolendum propter dilectionis nimietatem. Secundum enim quod dilectio maior est, secundum hoc sunt plagae compassionis maiores. Unde multo plus compassio Christi excessit aliorum compassiones quam passio passiones, sicut fuit in eo maior

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excellentia dilectionis quam passionis respectu aliorum, licet in utroque multum excederet. — Et quod ille dolor intensior fuerit, colligitur ex duplici signo. Unum est, quod maluit animam suam a corpore separari, quam quod nos essemus a Deo separati. Aliud vero signum est, quod flevit pro peccatis nostris, sed non flevit pro poenis corporis sui, sicut Bernardusp359-1 dicit; planctus autem signum est amaritudinis et doloris. Et ideo hoc eleganter exprimit cancellarius Philippusp359-2 in quadam prosula valde notabili et devota. Ait enim sic:

Homo vide, quid pro te patior! Ad te clamo, qui pro te morior. Vide poenas, quibus afficior, Vide clavos, quibus confodior! Cum sit tantus dolor exterior, Interior tamen planctus est gravior, Tam ingratum dum te experiorp359-3.

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English Translation
p. 357

Question III. Whether the pain was more intense in the rational part of Christ's soul or in the sensual part.

Thirdly it is asked, in which part of Christ's soul the pain was more intense, whether in the rational part or in the sensual partp357-7. And that it was in the sensual part is shown.

1. That suffers more at the presence of the afflicting thing which is more passible; but the sensuality in Christ was more passible than the reason itself, for it wasp357-8 more fragile: therefore it seems that Christ's soul was more afflicted according to sensuality than it would be afflicted according to reason.

2. Likewise, everything that in suffering is removed further from consolation suffers and is afflicted more; but sensuality withdrew further from joy in the passion than the reason itself, as is manifestp357-9: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, where the passion of fear is more vigorous, there the passion of pain is more intensified; but Christ feared more according to sensuality than according to reason — for according to reason he was secure, although sensuality dreadedp357-10 — therefore by parity of reasoning he grieved more on the part of sensuality than of reason.

4. Likewise, just as joy is in the conjunction of the fitting with the fitting, so pain is in separation: therefore there is greater pain where there is separation of what is more fitting; but the soul agrees more with the flesh according to sensuality than according to reason, as Augustine says in the book On the Spirit and the Soulp357-11: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, that which is more bound to something and has more need of it suffers and is afflicted more in its corruption and loss; but sensuality is more bound to the flesh and has more need of the flesh for exercising its operation than reason does: therefore, the flesh suffering, the soul was afflictedp357-12 more in sensuality than in reason.

On the contrary: 1. As Augustine says On the City of Godp357-13: « Pain is the testimony of a good nature », therefore in a better nature pain is more intense; but the nature of the soul is better according to reason than according to sensuality: therefore pain is more intense on the part of reason than on the part of sensuality.

p. 358

2. Likewise, that which grieves from several causes grieves more intensely than that which grieves from one only; but the pain wasp358-1 in sensuality only from the flesh, whereas reason not only suffered-with the flesh, but also with sensuality and with us: therefore it seems that the pain was more intense in reason than in sensuality.

3. Likewise, where love is more intense, there pain is more intensep358-2; but Christ loved in us the life of grace more than he would love in himself the life of nature: therefore he grieved more over this, that we had lost the life of grace, than over this, that he himself was losing the life of nature. But the first pain was in reason, the second in sensuality: therefore he grieved more according to reason than according to sensuality.

4. Likewise, pain is more intense in that part which has the greater ground for grieving; but sensuality had no ground for grieving except on account of the affliction of its own flesh, whereas reason had a ground for grieving on account of the dishonoring of the divine majesty; but one ought to grieve more over the dishonoring of God than over the affliction of the flesh; and Christ grieved according as he ought: therefore the pain was more intense in Christ as regards the rational part than as regards the sensual part.

5. Likewise, Christ loved others as himself, because he had perfect charityp358-3: therefore he grieved over the separation of others from God as much as if he himself were separated from him; but it is certain that every right soul would grieve more over separation from God than over separation from its own body: therefore Christ's soul had more compassion for others than for its own flesh. If therefore compassion with respect to others was in reason, compassion with respect to the flesh was in sensuality; therefore the pain was more intense according to the rational part than according to sensuality.

### Conclusion. As regards the pain of passion, Christ grieved more in the sensual part; as regards the pain of compassion, more in the rational part; but the pain of compassion itself was more intense than the pain of passion.

I respond: For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that in Christ there was a twofold pain, according to what the Saints sayp358-4, namely the pain of passion and the pain of compassion, and each pain was intense and bitter. For he grieved much in himself, and grieved-with us much; and each of these pains was both in sensuality and in reason, but with the order interchanged. For the pain of passion and of the flesh first reached the soul according to sensuality, and then according to the other powers. But the pain of compassion was first in reason, and from reason redounded into sensuality. For just as, when our reason grieves for our sins, the sensuality groans and weeps; so also Christ, because he grieved much for our sins, wept over our sinsp358-5.

When, therefore, we compare the pain of sensuality to the pain of reason, this can be in a twofold kind; and if indeed it be understood of the pain of passion, since that first reached the sensuality, it must be granted that Christ's soul grieved more according to the sensual part, as the arguments for the first part showp358-6. — But if it be understood of the pain of compassion, by which he was inwardly affected on account of our crimes, since that takes its rise and origin from reason, it must be granted that he grieved more according to reason, as the arguments adduced for the following part show. — And thus the response to the question proposed is clear, and the response to the objections is also clear. For the members of this question stand to one another as exceeding and exceeded, and the objections conclude truly according to diverse ways.

But if anyone further asks, since reason and sensuality mutually exceed one another according to the two kinds of painp358-7, which of them was more intense in Christ — namely whether the pain of passion or of compassion — it can be answered that the pain of compassion was more intense. — And the reason of this is: that, although there was a great cause for grieving in sensuality on account of its separation from the flesh, and there was also a great disposition for grieving on account of the excellent complexionp358-8; nevertheless in the pain of compassion there was a fuller ground for grieving on account of the dishonoring of God and our separation from God, and there was also a greater disposition for grieving on account of the excess of love. For according as love is greater, accordingly the wounds of compassion are greater. Hence by much more did the compassion of Christ exceed the compassions of others than his passion exceeded their passions, just as there was in him a greater

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excellence of love than of passion with respect to others, although in each he greatly exceeded. — And that that pain was more intense is gathered from a twofold sign. One is, that he preferred his soul to be separated from the body rather than that we should be separated from God. But the other sign is, that he wept for our sins, but did not weep for the punishments of his own body, as Bernardp359-1 says; and lamentation is a sign of bitterness and pain. And therefore Chancellor Philipp359-2 elegantly expresses this in a certain very notable and devout sequence. For he speaks thus:

O man, behold what I suffer for you! To you I cry, I who die for you. Behold the pains by which I am afflicted, Behold the nails by which I am pierced! Though the outward pain be so great, The inward lamentation is yet heavier, While I find you so ungratefulp359-3.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Edd. et nonnulli codd. hic et mox sensibili. Subinde pro ad praesentiam affligentis Vat. ad potentiam affligentis.
    The editions and several codices here and just below read sensibili ("sensible"). Subsequently, for ad praesentiam affligentis ("at the presence of the afflicting thing") the Vatican reads ad potentiam affligentis ("at the power of the afflicting thing").
  2. Ita cod. A; in aliis et edd. male ergo erat.
    So codex A; in the others and in the editions, wrongly, ergo erat ("therefore it was").
  3. Cfr. quaest. praeced. in corp. et ad. 3. — In maiori pro patiendo cod. K compatiendo.
    Cf. the preceding question in the body and the reply to the 3rd. — In maiori (the major edition) for patiendo ("in suffering") codex K reads compatiendo ("in suffering-with").
  4. Vide supra d. XV. lit. Magistri, c. 1. in fine, et ibid. Comment. a. 2. q. 2. — In maiori pro passio timoris cod. K ratio timoris.
    See above, dist. XV, the Master's text, ch. 1 at the end, and there the Commentary, art. 2, q. 2. — In maiori for passio timoris ("the passion of fear") codex K reads ratio timoris ("the ground of fear").
  5. Cap. 14. — De maiori cfr. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 29. (c. 7.), et tom. I. pag. 38, nota 4.
    Ch. 14. — On maiori cf. Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 29 (ch. 7), and vol. I, p. 38, note 4.
  6. Edd. contra codd. A F G H U V affligitur.
    The editions, against codices A F G H U V, read affligitur ("is afflicted," present tense).
  7. Libr. XIX. c. 13, n. 2: Et ipse dolor testimonium est boni adempti et boni relicti. Nisi enim bonum relictum esset, bonum amissum dolere non posset... Sicut ergo laetitia deserti boni in peccato testis est voluntatis malae, ita dolor amissi boni in supplicio testis est naturae bonae.
    Book XIX, ch. 13, n. 2: "And pain itself is the testimony of a good taken away and of a good left behind. For unless the good were left behind, one could not grieve over the good lost... As, therefore, the gladness over a good forsaken in sin is the witness of an evil will, so the pain over a good lost in punishment is the witness of a good nature."
  8. Edd. cum nonnullis codd. incongrue est.
    The editions, with some codices, incongruously read est ("is").
  9. Cfr. supra pag. 338, nota 3.
    Cf. above, p. 338, note 3.
  10. Matth. 22, 39; Ioan. 15, 12. — Paulo inferius pro plus doleret cod. N plus dolet.
    Matthew 22:39; John 15:12. — A little further down, for plus doleret ("would grieve more") codex N reads plus dolet ("grieves more").
  11. Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XV. c. 1, et Bernard. Serm. 3. in Nativ. Domini, n. 3. seq. Vide etiam infra d. 17. a. 1. q. 3, ubi Hugonis sententia affertur, de qua consule I. Sent. d. 48. a. 2. q. 2.
    Cf. above, the Master's text, dist. XV, ch. 1, and Bernard, Sermon 3 on the Lord's Nativity, n. 3 and following. See also below, dist. 17, art. 1, q. 3, where Hugh's opinion is brought forward, on which consult Book I of the Sentences, dist. 48, art. 2, q. 2.
  12. Cfr. Luc. 19, 41. seqq. Codd. L aa verbis de peccatis praefigunt et.
    Cf. Luke 19:41 and following. Codices L aa prefix et ("and") to the words de peccatis ("for our sins").
  13. Edd. supplent adductae, et deinde pro afficiebatur cum nonnullis codd. substituunt affligebatur et pro habeat a ratione legunt haberet in ratione.
    The editions supply adductae ("adduced"), and then for afficiebatur ("was affected") with some codices they substitute affligebatur ("was afflicted"), and for habeat a ratione ("takes from reason") they read haberet in ratione ("it would have in reason").
  14. Cod. A dolorum.
    Codex A reads dolorum ("of pains").
  15. Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 2. — Inferius pro nimietatem codd. K bb immensitatem.
    Cf. above, art. 1, q. 2. — Further below, for nimietatem ("excess") codices K bb read immensitatem ("immensity").
  16. Serm. 4. de Adventu Domini, n. 7. et Serm. 3. in Nativ. Domini n. 3. seq. — De seq. propos. idem dicit Serm. in Cantic. serm. 19. n. 7: Alia suspiria testantur tristitiam animorum. August., Serm. 351. (alias Homil. 50.) c. 1. n. 1: Lacrymae sunt testes doloris.
    Sermon 4 on the Lord's Advent, n. 7, and Sermon 3 on the Lord's Nativity, n. 3 and following. — On what is set forth below, the same says in the Sermon on the Canticle, serm. 19, n. 7: "Other sighs bear witness to the sadness of souls." Augustine, Sermon 351 (alias Homily 50), ch. 1, n. 1: "Tears are the witnesses of pain."
  17. Cod. N addit Parisiensis. Boulaeus, Hist. univers. Paris. tom. 3. pag. 154, loquitur de quodam cancellario Philippo, mortuo an. 1237, qui igitur probabiliter est auctor huius carminis. — Fr. Mone, Hymn. lat. etc. tom. 1. pag. 172, inter hymnos Bernardo tributos affert etiam fragmentum cuiusdam carminis, quod prorsus convenit cum versibus hic allatis.
    Codex N adds Parisiensis ("of Paris"). Du Boulay, History of the University of Paris, vol. 3, p. 154, speaks of a certain chancellor Philip, who died in the year 1237, who therefore is probably the author of this poem. — Fr. Mone, Latin Hymns etc., vol. 1, p. 172, among the hymns attributed to Bernard, also brings forward a fragment of a certain poem, which agrees entirely with the verses here cited.
  18. Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest.
    See the scholion on the 1st question of this article.
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