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Dist. 16, Art. 2, Q. 1

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 16

Textus Latinus
p. 352

Articulus II. De passibilitate et dolore animae Christi specialiter.

Consequenter quaeritur de passibilitate et dolore ipsius animae Christi specialiterp352-2. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.

p. 353

Primo quaeritur, utrum Christus passus fuerit secundum rationem, an solum secundum sensualitatem. — Secundo, dato quod passus fuerit secundum rationem, quaeritur, utrum passus fuerit secundum partem inferiorem et superiorem. — Tertio, dato quodp353-1 secundum utramque, quaeritur, utrum poenalius passus fuerit secundum rationem quam secundum partem sensualem.

Quaestio I. Utrum Christus passus fuerit secundum rationem, an secundum sensualitatem.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum Christus passus fuerit secundum rationem, an tantum secundum sensualitatem. Et quod secundum rationem passus fuerit, videtur.

1. Anima passa est, patiente corpore, quia unitur corpori sicut perfectio; sed anima rationalis est perfectio corporis non tantum secundum sensualitatem, sed etiam secundum rationemp353-2: ergo utroque modo passa fuit, corpore patiente.

2. Item, maior est coniunctio virium animae ad invicem, quam sit animae ad corpus; sed patiente corpore, patitur anima: ergo patiente una potentia, patitur alia: ergo dolore existente in sensualitate, necesse est esse in ratione.

3. Item, maior est unio potentiarum animae in ipsa anima, quam sit membrorum corporis in ipso corpore; sed patiente uno membro, compatiuntur ceterap353-3: ergo si patitur potentia sensualis, necesse est, quod compatiatur et rationalis.

4. Item, quod inest animae secundum substantiam suam et essentiam per consequens redundat in omnes potentias; sed anima Christi patiebatur, patiente corpore, propter essentialem unionem ipsius ad corpus: ergo necesse fuit, eam pati secundum se totam: ergo secundum partem sensualem et rationalem.

5. Item, Christus sua passione non tantum nos liberavit a passione, qua patitur coniunctum, sed etiam a passione, qua patitur anima separata; sed anima separata non tantum patitur secundum sensualitatem, sed etiam patitur secundum se totam, praecipue secundum partem intellectualem, cuius habet usum et operationemp353-4. Si ergo Christus pro nostra liberatione in se suscepit huiusmodi passiones, videtur, quod non tantum passus fuerit secundum sensualitatem, verum etiam secundum rationem.

Sed contra: 1. Quod nullius partis corporis est actus non patitur, corpore patiente; « anima secundum partem rationis nullius partis corporis est actus », ut dicit Philosophusp353-5: ergo nunquam patitur, corpore patiente: ergo anima in Christo, si passa fuit, non fuit passa nisi solum secundum sensualitatem.

2. Item, quod non corrumpitur ad corruptionem alterius non patitur ad passionem alterius, quia passio est via ad corruptionemp353-6; sed anima Christi secundum rationem non potuit corrumpi ad corruptionem corporis: ergo nec pati, corpore patiente.

3. Item, quod nullo modo habet contrarium aliquid nec habet aliquid superius non potest pati ab aliquo agente vel laedip353-7; sed anima Christi secundum rationem nec habet aliquid contrarium nec habet aliquid creatum se ipsa superius: ergo nullo modo secundum rationem pati potuit vel affligi.

4. Item, nihil idem et secundum idem de eodem gaudet et tristatur de eodemp353-8; sed anima Christi secundum rationem gaudebat de doloribus et passionibus, quas corpus perferebat, alioquin non mereretur: ergo patiente corpore, non patiebatur nec affligebatur.

5. Item, cum passio attingit usque ad rationem, non tantum est propassio, immo est completa et perfecta passio, quae non potest cadere in sapientem, iuxta quod probat Senecap353-9 et Hieronymus dicit. Aut igitur Christus sapiens non fuit, aut si fuit, anima eius secundum rationem carni compassa non fuit.

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Conclusio.

Anima Christi passa est tum dolore, qui inest animae secundum se, tum eo qui ipsi inest ex carne, quatenus ratio consideratur ut natura.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod, sicut dicit Augustinus de Civitate Deip354-1, duplex est dolor in anima: unus, qui inest animae secundum se; alius, qui inest animae ex carne. Et utrumque dolorem constans est in anima Christi fuisse; et de illo quidem dolore, qui inest animae secundum se, non est dubium, quin Christus fuerit passus secundum rationem. Compassus enim fuit et doluit pro peccatis nostris; et iste dolor in voluntate rationali erat procedens ex consideratione rationis, videlicet ex recognitione peccatorum nostrorump354-2.

De alio autem dolore, qui inest animae ex carne, non est usquequaque evidens. Distinguunt tamen magistri nostri communiter, quod ratio dupliciter habet considerari, videlicet ut ratio et ut naturap354-3. Si consideretur ut ratio, sic passiones, quae ei attribuuntur, sunt consequentes ipsam deliberationem; et hoc modo anima Christi corpori patienti non compatiebatur, immo multum gaudebat et gratulabatur; vehementer enim placebat ei pati pro salute generis humani. — Si autem consideretur ratio ut natura; sic, cum habeat naturalem appetitum et inclinationem ad corpus, utpote perfectio ad perfectibile, patiebatur, corpore patiente. Anima enim rationalis non tantum est perfectio corporis humani secundum potentias sensibilesp354-4, cum corpus humanum sit ordinatum ad nobiliorem perfectionem, quam sit corpus brutale; sed secundum se totam, hoc est, secundum complementum suae essentiae et suarum potentiarum universitatem, est corporis perfectio et habet ad ipsum naturalem appetitum et inclinationem et coniunctionem, ac per hoc delectationemp354-5 et compassionem. — Concedendum est igitur, quod anima Christi fuerit compassa corpori secundum rationem, secundum quod consideratur ratio ut natura, cum passio corporis fuerit acerbissima, sicut ostensum fuit suprap354-6.

— Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quae sunt ad partem istam.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur primo in contrarium, quod anima secundum rationem nullius partis corporis est actus; dicendum, quod Philosophus in illo verbo non vult negare naturalem coniunctionem ipsius intellectus ad corpus, sed hoc vult dicere, quod intellectus non determinat sibi organum, in quantum egreditur in actum propriump354-7. Et ex hoc non potest inferri, quod corpori non compatiatur; compassio enim illa non habet ortum ex determinatione organi, sed potius ex coniunctione vel unione naturali.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil compatitur alii patienti, quod non corrumpatur cum illo; dicendum, quod Augustinus negat illud vigesimo primo de Civitate Deip354-8 tanquam falsum; instantiam enim habet in spiritu rationali. Unde illud verbum non habet veritatem nisi de illa passione, quae « magis facta abiicit a substantia » patiente, vel compatiente.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima Christi secundum rationem nec habet contrarium nec habet superius; dicendum, quod habere contrarium vel superius est dupliciter, videlicet per se, vel per accidens. Quamvis autem nihil adversetur et contrarietur animae Christi secundum se, adversatur tamen et contrariatur ratione uniti corporis; quod enim laedit perfectibile laedit et per consequens ipsam perfectionemp354-9.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima Christi secundum rationem gaudebat de passionibus corporis; dicendum, quod nihil impedit, quod ratio de aliquo gaudeat ut ratio, et contristeturp354-10 ut natura, pro eo quod aliquid potest repugnare voluntati secundum appetitum naturalem, et consonare voluntati secundum appetitum deliberativum. Frequenter enim voluntate liberi arbitrii refugimus quae natura appetit, et appetimus quae natura refugit; sic et in proposito habet intelligi.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod passio, quae attingit rationem, non cadit in sapientem; dicendum, quod rationem attingi per modum rationis

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repugnat perfectioni sapientiae, non autemp355-1 attingi per modum naturae. Hoc enim est, quod facit hominem cadere a statu et perfectione sapientiae, videlicet quod eius ratio cedat et succumbat passionibus, non autem quod sentiat passiones; et ita pati per modum naturae non aufert rationem propassionis. Aliud enim est passionem experiri, aliud a passionibus perturbari. Perturbari enim est subiici, experiri autem potest aliquis passiones et eis superferri. Et sic fuit in anima Christi, quae secundum rationem ut naturam passiones corporis experiebatur dolore acutissimo, secundum rationem ut deliberativam passionibus corporis superferebatur gaudio virtuosop355-2.

Scholion

I. Etiam posteriores Scholastici approbant distinctionem inter rationem ut ratio et rationem ut natura (ut S. Thom., III. Sent. d. 15. q. 2. a. 3. quaestiunc. 2.), et quod anima Christi, quia tota secundum essentiam erat unita corpori ut forma eius, tota secundum omnes potentias patiebatur.

Alex. Hal., S. p. III. de hac et seq. q. q. 18. m. 2. a. 1. § 2. — Scot., de hac et seqq. qq. in utroque Scripto III. Sent. d. 15. q. unica. — S. Thom., III. Sent. d. 15. q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2.; S. III. q. 15. a. 4, q. 46. a. 7. — B. Albert., III. Sent. d. 15. a. 3. 4. — Petr. a Tar., III. Sent. d. 15. q. 2. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., III. Sent. d. 15. a. 2. q. 1. 3. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. III. Sent. d. 15. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. III. Sent. d. 15. q. 2. 3.

II. Solutio affirmativa ad seq. (2.) quaestionem communiter approbatur contra opinionem Henrici Gand. (Quodl. 8. q. 7, cui favere videtur Caietanus) asserentis: « Gaudium non est in anima ut in portione, nisi ut est superior; similiter neque tristitia, nisi ut est portio inferior ». — Notandum autem est, S. Bonaventuram cum aliis propositionem, quod etiam secundum portionem superiorem anima Christi passa sit, intelligere in hoc sensu, quod ipsa « consideratur per modum naturae » (in fine corp., cfr. solut. ad 6.), non ut ratio, minime autem, quatenus ordinatur ad suum obiectum primarium, scilicet Deum. Sed Scotus in Oxon. (loc. cit. n. 21.) praeter hoc asserere videtur, tristitiam etiam secundum actum, qui importat nolle, conditionatum, in superiore portione fuisse. — Notabilia sunt hic tria supposita ad explicandum mysterium, quod in eadem superiore portione gaudium fruitionis potuerit simul esse cum tristitia.

De hac (2.) quaestione: S. Thom. in Comment. loc. cit. a. 3. quaestiunc. 2. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit. a. 4. q. 2.

III. In solutione 3. quaestionis consentit S. Thom., S. III. q. 46. a. 6. ad 3. De eadem explicite tractat Richard. a Med., III. Sent. hic a. 4. q. 4; alii plerumque rem tangunt in praecedentibus quaest., praecipue ubi inquirunt, utrum Christus habuerit dolorem compassionis.

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English Translation
p. 352

Article II. On the passibility and pain of Christ's soul in particular.

Next there is inquiry concerning the passibility and pain of Christ's soul itself in particularp352-2. And concerning this three things are asked.

p. 353

First it is asked whether Christ suffered according to the reason, or only according to the sensuality. — Second, granted that he suffered according to the reason, it is asked whether he suffered according to the inferior part and the superior. — Third, granted thatp353-1 [he suffered] according to both, it is asked whether he suffered more penally according to the reason than according to the sensual part.

Question I. Whether Christ suffered according to the reason, or according to the sensuality.

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether Christ suffered according to the reason, or only according to the sensuality. And that he suffered according to the reason, it seems.

1. The soul suffered while the body was suffering, because it is united to the body as a perfection; but the rational soul is the perfection of the body not only according to the sensuality, but also according to the reasonp353-2: therefore it suffered in both ways while the body was suffering.

2. Likewise, the conjunction of the powers of the soul to one another is greater than is that of the soul to the body; but when the body suffers, the soul suffers: therefore when one power suffers, another suffers: therefore, pain existing in the sensuality, it must be also in the reason.

3. Likewise, the union of the powers of the soul within the soul itself is greater than is that of the members of the body within the body itself; but when one member suffers, the rest suffer along with itp353-3: therefore if the sensual power suffers, it is necessary that the rational also suffer along with it.

4. Likewise, what is in the soul according to its substance and essence consequently redounds into all the powers; but Christ's soul was suffering while the body was suffering, on account of the essential union of it to the body: therefore it was necessary that it suffer according to its whole self: therefore according to the sensual part and the rational.

5. Likewise, Christ by his passion freed us not only from the passion by which the conjoined [soul] suffers, but also from the passion by which the separated soul suffers; but the separated soul suffers not only according to the sensuality, but also suffers according to its whole self, especially according to the intellectual part, of which it has use and operationp353-4. If therefore Christ for our liberation took upon himself such passions, it seems that he suffered not only according to the sensuality, but also according to the reason.

On the contrary: 1. That which is the act of no part of the body does not suffer while the body suffers; « the soul according to the part of reason is the act of no part of the body », as the Philosopher saysp353-5: therefore it never suffers while the body suffers: therefore the soul in Christ, if it suffered, did not suffer except only according to the sensuality.

2. Likewise, that which is not corrupted unto the corruption of another does not suffer unto the passion of another, because passion is the way to corruptionp353-6; but Christ's soul according to the reason could not be corrupted unto the corruption of the body: therefore neither could it suffer while the body suffered.

3. Likewise, that which in no way has anything contrary nor has anything superior cannot suffer from any agent nor be harmedp353-7; but Christ's soul according to the reason has neither anything contrary nor anything created superior to itself: therefore in no way according to the reason could it suffer or be afflicted.

4. Likewise, nothing one and the same and according to the same rejoices and grieves over the same thingp353-8; but Christ's soul according to the reason rejoiced over the pains and passions which the body bore, otherwise it would not merit: therefore while the body suffered, it did not suffer nor was it afflicted.

5. Likewise, when passion reaches all the way to the reason, it is not only a pre-passion, but rather it is a complete and perfect passion, which cannot fall upon a wise man, according to what Seneca provesp353-9 and Jerome says. Either therefore Christ was not wise, or, if he was, his soul according to the reason did not suffer along with the flesh.

p. 354

Conclusion.

Christ's soul suffered both with the pain which is in the soul according to itself, and with that which is in it from the flesh, insofar as the reason is considered as a nature.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that, as Augustine says On the City of Godp354-1, there is a twofold pain in the soul: one which is in the soul according to itself; another which is in the soul from the flesh. And it is settled that both pains were in Christ's soul; and concerning that pain indeed which is in the soul according to itself, there is no doubt that Christ suffered according to the reason. For he suffered along with and grieved for our sins; and that pain in the rational will was proceeding from the consideration of reason, namely from the recognition of our sinsp354-2.

But concerning the other pain, which is in the soul from the flesh, it is not altogether evident. Yet our masters commonly distinguish that the reason can be considered in two ways, namely as reason and as naturep354-3. If it be considered as reason, then the passions which are attributed to it are consequent upon deliberation itself; and in this way Christ's soul did not suffer along with the suffering body, but rather rejoiced and was glad exceedingly; for it pleased him vehemently to suffer for the salvation of the human race. — But if the reason be considered as nature; then, since it has a natural appetite and inclination toward the body, as a perfection toward the perfectible, it was suffering while the body was suffering. For the rational soul is the perfection of the human body not only according to the sensible powersp354-4, since the human body is ordered to a nobler perfection than is the brute body; but according to its whole self, that is, according to the completeness of its essence and the totality of its powers, it is the perfection of the body and has toward it a natural appetite and inclination and conjunction, and through this delightp354-5 and compassion. — It must therefore be granted that Christ's soul suffered along with the body according to the reason, insofar as the reason is considered as nature, since the passion of the body was most bitter, as was shown abovep354-6.

— Hence the reasons which are for this part are to be granted.

1. To that, indeed, which is objected first to the contrary, that the soul according to the reason is the act of no part of the body; it must be said that the Philosopher in that statement does not wish to deny the natural conjunction of the intellect itself to the body, but he wishes to say this, that the intellect does not determine an organ for itself, insofar as it goes forth into its proper actp354-7. And from this it cannot be inferred that it does not suffer along with the body; for that compassion does not take its origin from the determination of an organ, but rather from the natural conjunction or union.

2. To that which is objected, that nothing suffers along with another suffering thing which is not corrupted together with it; it must be said that Augustine denies that in the twenty-first [book] On the City of Godp354-8 as false; for he has an instance in the rational spirit. Hence that statement does not hold true except concerning that passion which « more, once made, casts [the thing] away from the substance » that suffers, or suffers along [with it].

3. To that which is objected, that Christ's soul according to the reason has neither anything contrary nor anything superior; it must be said that to have something contrary or superior is twofold, namely in itself, or by accident. But although nothing is opposed and contrary to Christ's soul according to itself, yet it is opposed and contrary by reason of the body united [to it]; for what harms the perfectible harms also, and consequently, the perfection itselfp354-9.

4. To that which is objected, that Christ's soul according to the reason rejoiced over the passions of the body; it must be said that nothing hinders the reason from rejoicing over something as reason, and grievingp354-10 as nature, for the reason that something can be repugnant to the will according to the natural appetite, and consonant with the will according to the deliberative appetite. For frequently by the will of free choice we flee what nature seeks, and we seek what nature flees; so too it must be understood in the matter proposed.

5. To that which is objected, that the passion which reaches the reason does not fall upon a wise man; it must be said that the reason's being reached by the mode of reason

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is repugnant to the perfection of wisdom, but notp355-1 its being reached by the mode of nature. For this is what makes a man fall from the state and perfection of wisdom, namely that his reason yield and succumb to the passions, but not that he feel the passions; and thus to suffer by the mode of nature does not take away the character of a pre-passion. For it is one thing to experience a passion, another to be disturbed by the passions. For to be disturbed is to be subjected, but one can experience passions and be borne above them. And so it was in Christ's soul, which according to the reason as nature experienced the passions of the body with most acute pain, [and] according to the reason as deliberative was borne above the passions of the body with virtuous joyp355-2.

Scholion

I. Even the later Scholastics approve the distinction between reason as reason and reason as nature (as St. Thomas, III. Sent. d. 15. q. 2. a. 3. subquestion 2.), and that Christ's soul, because it was wholly united according to essence to the body as its form, was wholly suffering according to all its powers.

Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III, on this and the following q., q. 18. m. 2. a. 1. § 2. — Scotus, on this and the following qq. in both Writings on III. Sent. d. 15. q. unica. — St. Thomas, III. Sent. d. 15. q. 2. a. 1. subquestion 2.; Summa III. q. 15. a. 4, q. 46. a. 7. — Bl. Albert, III. Sent. d. 15. a. 3. 4. — Peter of Tarentaise, III. Sent. d. 15. q. 2. a. 2. subquestion 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, III. Sent. d. 15. a. 2. q. 1. 3. — Durandus, on this and the following q., III. Sent. d. 15. q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following qq., III. Sent. d. 15. q. 2. 3.

II. The affirmative solution to the following (2nd) question is commonly approved against the opinion of Henry of Ghent (Quodl. 8. q. 7, whom Cajetan seems to favor), who asserts: « Joy is not in the soul as in a portion, except as it is superior; likewise neither is sadness, except as it is the inferior portion ». — But it must be noted that St. Bonaventure, with others, understands the proposition that Christ's soul suffered even according to the superior portion in this sense, that it « is considered by the mode of nature » (at the end of the body [of the article], cf. the solution to the 6th), not as reason, and least of all insofar as it is ordered to its primary object, namely God. But Scotus in the Oxford [commentary] (loc. cit. n. 21.) seems besides this to assert that sadness was also in the superior portion according to an act which implies not willing, [taken] conditionally. — Three suppositions are notable here for explaining the mystery, that in the same superior portion the joy of fruition could be at once together with sadness.

On this (2nd) question: St. Thomas in the Commentary, loc. cit. a. 3. subquestion 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit. q. 1. a. 1. subquestion 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, loc. cit. a. 4. q. 2.

III. In the solution of the 3rd question St. Thomas agrees, Summa III. q. 46. a. 6. ad 3. Concerning the same Richard of Mediavilla treats explicitly, III. Sent. here a. 4. q. 4; others mostly touch the matter in the preceding questions, especially where they inquire whether Christ had the pain of compassion.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Libr. II. Cur Deus homo, c. 17: Quapropter cum dicimus, quod homo ille [Christus]... non potuit non mori, aut velle non mori... non significatur in illo ulla impotentia servandi aut volendi servare vitam suam immortalem, sed immutabilitas voluntatis eius, qua se sponte fecit hominem ad hoc, ut in eadem voluntate perseverans moreretur, et quia nulla res potuit illam voluntatem mutare... Et si... cum aliquis sponte se proposuit facturum bonum aliquod, et eadem voluntate postea perficit quod proposuit; quamvis cogi possit, si nolit promissum solvere, non tamen dicendus est necessitate facere quod fecit, sed ea qua proposuit libera voluntate; non enim necessitate aut impotentia fieri vel non fieri dici debet aliquid, ubi neque necessitas neque impotentia quidquam operantur, sed voluntas; si, inquam, ita est in homine, multo magis necessitas aut impotentia nequaquam nominandae sunt in Deo etc. — In initio solut. edd. lectionem codd. sic mutarunt: obiicitur, quod illud necessario inest alicui, quod inest ei etc.
    Bk. II of Why God Became Man (Cur Deus homo), c. 17: Wherefore when we say that that man [Christ]... could not not die, or [could not] will not to die... there is signified in him no inability to preserve or to will to preserve his immortal life, but the immutability of his will, by which he of his own accord made himself man for this end, that, persevering in the same will, he might die, and because no thing could change that will... And if... when someone of his own accord has proposed to do some good, and by the same will afterward accomplishes what he proposed; although he can be compelled, if he be unwilling to pay what was promised, yet he is not to be said to do by necessity what he did, but by that free will by which he proposed it; for nothing ought to be said to be done or not done by necessity or inability, where neither necessity nor inability effects anything, but the will; if, I say, it is thus in man, much more are necessity and inability by no means to be named in God etc. — At the beginning of the solution the editions altered the reading of the codices thus: it is objected, that what necessarily inheres in something inheres in it etc.
  2. Codd. D M O hic repetunt passus fuerit. Deinde pro partem sensualem [cod. Z sensibilem] edd. sensualitatem.
    Codices D M O here repeat passus fuerit ("he suffered"). Then for partem sensualem ("the sensual part") [cod. Z sensibilem] the editions read sensualitatem ("the sensuality").
  3. De coniunctione animae cum corpore et de coniunctione potentiarum animae inter se cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 3. et d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 3.
    On the conjunction of the soul with the body and on the conjunction of the powers of the soul among themselves cf. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 3. and d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 3.
  4. Epist. I. Cor. 12, 26: Et si quid patitur unum membrum, compatiuntur omnia membra.
    Epistle 1 Cor. 12:26: And if one member suffers anything, all the members suffer along with it.
  5. Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 44. p. II. a. 3. q. 2, d. 45. a. 1. q. 1. seq. et d. 50. p. II. a. 2. q. 1.
    Cf. IV. Sent. d. 44. p. II. a. 3. q. 2, d. 45. a. 1. q. 1 and following, and d. 50. p. II. a. 2. q. 1.
  6. Libr. II. de Anima, text. 11. (c. 1.) et III. text. 6. (c. 4.). — Mox pro si passa fuit cod. K si passa fuerit.
    Bk. II of On the Soul (de Anima), text 11 (c. 1) and Bk. III, text 6 (c. 4). — Soon, for si passa fuit cod. K reads si passa fuerit.
  7. Cfr. Aristot., de Longitud. et brevitate vitae, c. 2, ubi haec corruptio vocatur corruptio secundum accidens i. e. quae consequitur corruptionem alterius. — Quod passio sit via ad corruptionem, insinuat Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 6.), de quo vide tom. II. pag. 458, nota 1, et I. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 50. seqq. (c. 7.).
    Cf. Aristotle, On Length and Shortness of Life, c. 2, where this corruption is called corruption by accident, i.e. that which follows upon the corruption of another. — That passion is the way to corruption Aristotle intimates, VI. Topics c. 3 (c. 6), on which see vol. II, p. 458, note 1, and I. On Generation and Corruption text 50 ff. (c. 7).
  8. Aristot., de Longitud. et brevitate vitae, c. 2: Cui non est contrarium, et ubi non est, impossibile utique corrumpi. Cfr. I. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 50. seqq. (c. 7.) et supra pag. 346, nota 5. — De minori vide supra pag. 266, nota 5. — Paulo inferius pro se ipsa superius cod. Z super se, sed ipsa superius est. In fine arg. pro vel affligi cod. W nec affligi.
    Aristotle, On Length and Shortness of Life, c. 2: That for which there is nothing contrary, and where it [the contrary] is not, [it is] impossible at all to be corrupted. Cf. I. On Generation and Corruption text 50 ff. (c. 7) and above, p. 346, note 5. — On the minor [premise] see above, p. 266, note 5. — A little below, for se ipsa superius cod. Z reads super se, but [reads] ipsa superius est. At the end of the argument, for vel affligi cod. W reads nec affligi.
  9. Cfr. supra pag. 205, nota 5.
    Cf. above, p. 205, note 5.
  10. Vide supra pag. 338, nota 7. Hieron. in Comment. in Eccle. ad 7, 8. annotat: Calumnia conturbat sapientem etc. Nunc sapientem in profectu positum accipe... Sapiens quippe perfectus... nulla calumnia conturbatur. Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XV. c. 2, ubi propassio et passio verbis Hieronymi describuntur.
    See above, p. 338, note 7. Jerome in the Commentary on Ecclesiastes, on 7:8, annotates: Calumny disturbs the wise man etc. Now take "the wise man" as one placed in progress... For the perfect wise man... is disturbed by no calumny. Cf. above, the text of the Master, d. XV. c. 2, where pre-passion and passion are described in the words of Jerome.
  11. Libr. XIV. c. 15. n. 2: Dolor carnis tantummodo offensio est animae ex carne et quaedam ab eius passione dissensio; sicut animae dolor, quae tristitia nuncupatur, dissensio est ab his rebus, quae nobis nolentibus acciderunt.
    Bk. XIV. c. 15. n. 2: The pain of the flesh is only an offense of the soul from the flesh and a certain dissension from its passion; just as the pain of the soul, which is called sadness, is a dissension from those things which befell us against our will.
  12. Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XV. c. 1. — Pro recognitione cod. T cognitione, codd. H I K L aa bb recogitatione.
    See above, the text of the Master, d. XV. c. 1. — For recognitione cod. T reads cognitione, codices H I K L aa bb recogitatione.
  13. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 1. m. 1: « Est enim cognitio naturae, scilicet rationis, ut est natura quaedam; et est cognitio rationis, ut est ratio, cogitando et pertractando ». Ibid. p. III. q. 18. m. 2. a. 1. § 2: Dicendum sine praeiudicio, quod est considerare rationem dupliciter... vel ut [est] ratio, vel ut natura. Secundum quod consideratur ut natura, appetit unionem cum suo corpore et refugit separationem. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 3, ubi eodem duplici modo voluntas consideratur. — Paulo superius pro tamen, quod non pauci codd. omittunt, cod. W autem, edd. enim.
    Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II. q. 1. m. 1: « For there is a cognition of nature, namely of the reason, as it is a certain nature; and there is a cognition of the reason, as it is reason, by thinking and discoursing ». Ibid. p. III. q. 18. m. 2. a. 1. § 2: It must be said without prejudice that the reason can be considered in two ways... either as [it is] reason, or as nature. According as it is considered as nature, it seeks union with its body and shuns separation. Cf. II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 3, where the will is considered in the same twofold manner. — A little above, for tamen, which not a few codices omit, cod. W reads autem, the editions enim.
  14. Multi codd. sensuales.
    Many codices read sensuales ("sensual").
  15. In compluribus codd. exstare videtur dilectionem. Deinde in conclus. edd. et multi codd. omittunt corpori, quod ex codd. A F H (K et secunda manu) P Q Z restauravimus.
    In several codices dilectionem ("love") seems to stand. Then in the conclusion the editions and many codices omit corpori ("to the body"), which we have restored from codices A F H (K also by a second hand) P Q Z.
  16. Hic a. 1. q. 2. — Subinde post Unde codd. A I L T V Z aa subnectunt et.
    Here a. 1. q. 2. — Thereupon, after Unde ("Hence") codices A I L T V Z aa append et ("and").
  17. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 3. ad 3. — Paulo superius Vat. omittit naturalem; paulo inferius pro compatiatur codd. A X exhibent compatiebatur.
    Cf. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 3. ad 3. — A little above the Vatican [edition] omits naturalem ("natural"); a little below, for compatiatur codices A X present compatiebatur.
  18. Cap. 3. n. 2. Codd. et edd. allegant 19. de Civ. Dei. — Verba magis facta abiicit a substantia sumta sunt ex Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 6.). Cfr. II. Sent. d. 19. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4, et IV. Sent. d. 44. p. II. a. 3. q. 1. ad 2. et q. 2. ad 6, ubi eadem obiectio solvitur.
    Ch. 3. n. 2. Codices and editions cite 19. On the City of God. — The words more, once made, casts away from the substance are taken from Aristotle, VI. Topics c. 3 (c. 6). Cf. II. Sent. d. 19. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4, and IV. Sent. d. 44. p. II. a. 3. q. 1. ad 2. and q. 2. ad 6, where the same objection is resolved.
  19. Cfr. Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 62. seqq. (c. 4.).
    Cf. Aristotle, I. On the Soul (de Anima), text 62 ff. (c. 4).
  20. Cod. N, omisso et, subiicit autem.
    Cod. N, omitting et, subjoins autem.
  21. Cod. Z addit sic. Proxime post pro attingi multi codd. habent attingit, quorum complures etiam subinde omittunt per.
    Cod. Z adds sic. Immediately after, for attingi many codices have attingit, of which several also thereupon omit per.
  22. Cfr. supra d. 15. a. 2. q. 2. — Paulo superius pro ut naturam cod. C ut natura est, edd. 1, 2 sensitivam; in Vat. legitur non tantum, et deinde sed secundum rationem deliberativam etc.; in edd. 1, 2 et cod. X secundum rationem vero deliberativam etc.
    Cf. above, d. 15. a. 2. q. 2. — A little above, for ut naturam cod. C reads ut natura est, the editions 1, 2 sensitivam; in the Vatican [edition] is read non tantum, and then sed secundum rationem deliberativam etc.; in editions 1, 2 and cod. X secundum rationem vero deliberativam etc.
← Dist. 16, Art. 1, Q. 3Dist. 16, Art. 2, Q. 2→