Dist. 31, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 31
ARTICULUS I.
Utrum originale peccatum traducatur mediante sensibili portione.
QUAESTIO I.
Utrum anima sensibilis in hominibus sit a generante.
Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum anima sensibilis in hominibus sit a generante. Et quod sit a generante, videtur:
1. Primo per verbum Philosophi in secundo de Anima1, ubi dicit, quod « sensitivi prima mutatio est a generante »; sed prima mutatio sensitivi est illa quae est ad esse: ergo videtur, quod pars sensitiva in nobis educatur in esse a generante.
2. Item, decimo sexto Animalium2: « Solus intellectus intrat ab extrinseco »: ergo solus intellectus intrat per creationem: ergo videtur, quod anima sensitiva in nobis educatur de principiis materiae et per generationem.
3. Item, sicut operatio animae sensitivae in brutis pendet a corpore, ita et in hominibus — unde sicut brutum impeditur ab operatione videndi, laeso organo, sic etiam homo — sed quod similiter se habet ad operationem, similiter se habet ad generationem: ergo si in brutis est anima sensibilis non per creationem, sed per generationem, sicut communiter tenetur, et supra ostensum est distinctione decima quinta3; videtur, quod in homine similiter sit per generationem.
4. Item, sicut in generatione brutorum « prius est animal quam equus », sic et in generatione hominis « prius est animal quam homo4 »: ergo prius habet operationem et perfectionem partis sensitivae, quam habeat perfectionem intellectivae. Et huius signum est, quia embryo prius nutritur et sentit, quam perficiatur anima rationali. Ergo videtur, quod ante productionem rationalis educatur in nobis sensibilis; sed hoc non est per creationem: ergo per generationem.
5. Item, anima sensitiva est in potentia materiae, alioquin nunquam ab agente naturali in his quae per putrefactionem generantur, posset produci in esse5. Si ergo aeque potens vel magis potens est vis generativa in homine, quam sit in bruto; et brutum potest per vim generativam animam sensitivam ad esse producere: multo fortius ergo hoc videtur in homine.
6. Item, si in nobis est sensitiva per creationem, in brutis per generationem: ergo non videtur, quod sit in nobis vel in ipsis univoce; et si hoc, animal dicetur aequivoce de asino et de homine. Quod si hoc est inconveniens6, restat, quodsi in brutis est per generationem, quod similiter in homine.
Sed contra:
1. Augustinus in libro de Spiritu et anima7: « Cum recedit anima a corpore, secum trahit sensum et imaginationem et rationem et intellectum »; sed nihil quod separatur a corpore, est per generationem; sensibilis autem in homine est huiusmodi: ergo etc.
2. Item, in libro de Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus8: « Animae animalium non sunt substantiae, sed cum carne ipsa carnis vivacitate nascuntur et cum carnis morte finiuntur », « anima vero humana non cum carne moritur, quia nec cum carne seminatur ».
3. Item, Philosophus in secundo de Anima9 dicit, quod « sensitivum est in intellectivo, sicut tetragonus in pentagono; et vegetativum in sensitivo, sicut trigonus in tetragono ». Si ergo ab eodem principio est tetragonus, a quo et pentagonus; ab eodem erit anima sensitiva et intellectiva; sed intellectiva non est a generante, ut monstratum fuit supra10: ergo nec sensitiva.
4. Item, quaecumque sunt idem in substantia ab eodem principio educuntur in esse; sed anima sensitiva et intellectiva in eodem homine sunt idem in substantia, quia unius perfectibilis una est perfectio11: ergo si rationalis non est per generationem, videtur, quod nec sensibilis.
5. Item, quae simul corrumpuntur simul etiam producuntur: ergo pari ratione, quae simul separantur simul et infunduntur. Sed recedente anima rationali, nullo modo remanet potentia sentiendi in corpore12: ergo sicut amittitur potentia sentiendi in recessu animae, ita infunditur in adventu; non est igitur a generatione, sed a creatione.
6. Item, cum intenditur operatio sensus, minuitur operatio intellectus, et e converso, sicut patet per experientiam13: ergo necesse est, sensum et intellectum vel esse unam potentiam, vel esse potentias eiusdem substantiae. Sed quodcumque eorum sit, eodem modo habent educi in esse: cum igitur rationalis non sit ex traduce, videtur, quod nec portio sensibilis in homine. Quodsi tu dicas14, quod una retrahit alteram propter ordinem et unionem in uno perfectibili, non in una substantia animae; obiicitur contra hoc: quia anima rationalis aut potest sentire, aut non. Si non potest: ergo videtur, quod non possit corpus vivificare. Quodsi potest sentire; restat, quod istae potentiae fundantur in eadem substantia. Si tu dicas ad hoc, quod duplex est in nobis sensitiva: una a generante, et haec corrumpitur; alia a creante, et haec cum anima separatur; obiicitur contra hoc: quia natura non facit per plura, quod potest facere per pauciora15. Si ergo sensitiva illa, quae est a generante, sufficit in brutis ad sentiendum, multo fortius illa, quae est a creante, sufficit homini: ergo non est aliam ponere sensitivam, quae sit a generante. Quodsi tu dicas, quod est illi non ad sentiendum, sed ad disponendum corpus ad susceptionem rationalis; hoc non videtur sufficere, quia, si talis anima est substantia aeque completa in homine, sicut in brutis, et in brutis non caret operatione sensitiva, videtur ergo, quod nec in homine. Aut igitur erit in nobis ponere duplicem actum sentiendi simul et semel16, aut est ponere, quod sensitiva sit in nobis a creatione. Sed primum manifeste est falsum: restat igitur, quod ultimum sit verum.
Conclusio.
Anima sensitiva in homine non habet esse per generationem, sed per creationem.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod circa hoc triplex est modus dicendi. Aliter enim hic senserunt quidam haeretici, aliter videntur sensisse philosophi, aliter sentiunt doctores catholici.
Quidam enim haeretici17 senserunt, esse in nobis animas diversas, ita quod una sit a Deo bono, et altera a Deo malo; et ex hoc, dixerunt, quod venit in nobis controversia et rebellio appetituum, ita quod caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem18, quia una illarum animarum, scilicet quae est a bono Deo, non potest facere malum, altera vero, scilicet illa quae est a Deo malo, non potest facere bonum. — Hunc modum dicendi tanquam haereticum reprobat Augustinus in libro de Duabus Animabus19, ostendens, quod ista positio implicat in se duo contradictoria, dum ponit, talem rebellionem esse in homine, et ponit simul cum hoc, hominem peccare et hominem poenitere posse. Hanc etiam positionem facile esset improbare secundum viam philosophiae: quoniam in uno perfectibili necesse est unam esse perfectionem; et cum homo sit unum quid per essentiam, impossibile est, ab omnino diversis principiis in esse produci: si ergo anima20 rationalis est a Deo bono, sensibilis nostra non potest esse a Deo malo.
Quidam autem dixerunt, quod rationalis et sensibilis sunt in nobis duae substantiae; non tamen sunt duae animae, pro eo quod anima nomen est officii, et illae duae substantiae ordinatae sunt ad unius corporis perfectionem, ita quod una disponit ad alteram. Una tamen illarum est per generationem, scilicet sensibilis; et huius signum est, quia dependet a corpore et est perfectio alicuius partis corporis: rationalis vero, quae nullius partis corporis est actus, est per creationem. — Sed hunc modum dicendi respuit Augustinus in libro de Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus21 dicens: « Non duas animas in homine uno esse dicimus — sicut Iacobus et alii Syrorum22 scribunt — unam animalem, qua animetur corpus et mixta sit sanguini, et alteram spiritualem, quae rationem administret ». Et si tu dicas, quod negat, duas esse animas, non negat, duas esse substantias; per litteram sequentem apparet, quod negat, duas substantias esse. Ait enim sic23: « Sed dicimus unam eandemque animam in homine, quae corpus sua societate vivificet et semetipsam sua ratione disponat ». Et expressius in libro de Spiritu et anima24 dicit, quod una et eadem anima dicitur sensus, dum sentit, et ratio, dum discernit. Et iterum dicit, quod anima cum recedit, trahit secum potentias sensitivas.
Doctores autem theologici dicunt, quod sensibilis et rationalis in homine eiusdem sunt substantiae et ab eodem principio habent educi in esse, videlicet a Creatore, pro eo quod in nobis non nominant diversas substantias, sed diversas potentias eiusdem substantiae, sicut Augustinus25, ubi de hac materia loquitur, insinuat expresse. Et hoc idem valde est rationabile, ponere in homine unam substantiam perficientem, quae det ei vitam et sensum et intellectum. Nec repugnat illud verbis Philosophi, si recte intelligantur.
Propter quod notandum, quod sensualitas tribus modis accipitur. Uno modo sensualitas dicit dispositionem ex parte carnis ad actum virtutis sensitivae; et hoc modo accipitur in libro de Spiritu et anima, decimo quarto capitulo, ubi dicitur: « Anima, quae vere spiritus est, et caro, quae vere corpus est, in suis extremitatibus facile iunguntur26 », id est in phantastico animae, quod corpus non est, sed simile corpori, et sensualitate carnis, quae fere spiritus est ». — Alio modo sensualitas dicit dispositionem ex parte carnis ad sentiendum cum virtute spirituali movente, nondum anima carnem perficiente; et talis sensualitas est in embryone ante ipsius completam animationem. Ibi enim non potest esse substantia animae perficiens, cum sit « perfectio corporis physici, organici27 »; nec possit actualiter existere, nisi corpore existente in debita complexione et organizatione. Potest tamen ibi esse virtus animae patris, quae quidem est in semine, sicut in subiecto deferente, sicut virtus motoris defertur simul cum lapide proiecto; et ideo haec cessat, quando operatio eius consummatur; quod fit, quando corpori organizato inducitur anima sensitiva perficiens, sive educatur de potentia materiae subito, sive cum rationali infundatur ab extrinseco28. — Tertia vero sensualitas est, quae non tantum dicit dispositionem cum virtute movente, sed etiam habilitatem, quae inest ex anima perficiente. — Primo et secundo modo accipiendo sensualitatem, sic est in nobis a generante29, quia cum semine deciduntur calores et spiritus, per quos caro disponitur ad sentiendum. Transfunditur etiam simul cum hoc aliqua virtus animae, quae movet et reget et operatur usque ad formae inductionem. Tertio modo sensualitas est in homine ab anima perficiente, quae quidem non habet esse per generationem, sed per creationem. — His visis, patet responsio ad quaestionem.
Concedendum est enim, quod anima sensibilis non est in nobis ex traduce, sicut ostendunt rationes ad secundam partem obiectae. Ad rationes vero, quae adducuntur in oppositum, facile est respondere.
1. Ad illud enim quod obiicitur, quod sensitivi prima mutatio est a generante; dicendum, quod loquitur de sensitivo, secundum quod nominat substantiam, non secundum quod nominat potentiam substantiae incorruptibilis. — Vel etiam hoc dicit ratione illius sensualitatis secundo modo dictae, quae quidem habet esse a generante.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod solus intellectus intrat ab extrinseco; dicendum, quod ibi vocatur intellectus substantia intellectiva; et quia eadem est substantia intellectiva et sensitiva hominis, ideo per hoc non excluditur sensitiva hominis, sed sensitiva brutalis.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod operatio sensitivae pendet ex corpore; dicendum, quod ex hoc non sequitur, quod substantia dependeat, quoniam in eadem substantia reperitur operatio, quae ei potest competere praeter corpus. Haec30 autem non convenit ipsi animae, nisi secundum quod animat, et ita secundum quod corpori iuncta est, et propterea pendet ex corpore, nec anima utitur illa potentia, postquam a corpore separatur; nec sequitur, quod sit otiosa, quia substantia illa aliam habet operationem. Hoc autem planius invenietur determinatum in quarto31, in quaestione de cognitione animae separatae.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod prius est animal quam homo; dicendum, quod hoc dicitur, quia prius reperitur in embryone operatio animalis quam operatio hominis; prius enim movetur et sentit, quam ratiocinetur. Sed hoc est a sensualitate secundo modo dicta, prout est a virtute movente, non prout est a virtute perficiente.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima sensibilis est in potentia materiae; dicendum, quod verum est, secundum quod anima sensibilis nominat substantiam generabilem et corruptibilem, sed non prout nominat potentiam substantiae incorruptibilis. Et quia anima sensitiva in brutis huiusmodi substantiam nominat; hinc est, quod bruta suam animam sensitivam educunt de materia, sicut et32 in his potissime, quae generantur per putrefactionem.
Sensibilis vero in homine dicit potentiam rationalis substantiae; et ideo ab eo solo producitur, a quo substantia rationalis. Et ideo, quod sensibilis non possit propagari in homine sicut in brutis, hoc non est imperfectionis ex parte virtutis generantis, sed ratione perfectionis, quae consistit in sensitiva hominis.
6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non est univoce in homine et in asino: dicendum, quod aliquid produci per generationem, et aliquid produci per creationem non tollit univocationem; sicut si Deus modo crearet unum hominem, eiusdem speciei esset cum aliis hominibus. Si igitur maior requiritur univocatio in specie quam in genere, planum est ex hoc, quod diversus modus producendi animam sensibilem in homine et asino non facit, hominem et asinum dici aequivoce. Et si tu obiicias, quod sensibilis in homine nominat potentiam, et in asino nominat substantiam, ergo aequivoce dicitur; dicendum, quod in asino et potest nominare substantiam, et potest nominare potentiam, principalius tamen nominat potentiam, quia nomen eius sumtum est ab actu sentiendi. In homine similiter nominare potest et substantiam et potentiam; sed prout nominat substantiam, non dicitur aliquid diversum a rationali; eadem enim est substantia, quae facit, hominem et sentire et ratiocinari, quamvis alia et alia sit potentia. Et sic patet, quod ex hoc non tollitur univocatio in genere animalis respectu rationalis et irrationalis.
I. Solutio huius quaest. dependet ab alia, scilicet utrum praeter animam rationalem sit alia anima in homine tanquam principium vitae sensibilis. Unicam autem eamque rationalem sive intellectualem animam esse in homine, pluries definitum est ab Ecclesia, scilicet contra Apollinaristas in Concilio oecumenico V. (adversus Origenem) can. 9; contra Manichaeos in Concilio oecumenico VIII, can. 11; contra Averroistas in Conciliis Viennensi et Lateranensi V. — Quoad plura hic dicta cfr. supra d. 18. a. 1. q. 1, d. 17. a. 1. q. 2. 3, d. 18. a. 1. 3, d. 19. a. 1. q. 1. 2.
II. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 62. m. 2. — Scot., de Rerum principio, q. 10. a. 1. (cfr. ibid. a. 3), et in utroque Scripto, II. Sent. d. 18. q. unica. — S. Thom., II. Sent. d. 18. q. 2. a. 1. 3; S. 1. q. 76. a. 4, q. 90. a. 2, q. 118. a. 1. 2; S. c. Gent. II. c. 86-89. — B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 18. a. 8; S. p. II. tr. 12. q. 70. m. 3, q. 72. m. 3, q. 73. m. 1. — Richard. a Med., II. Sent. d. 18. a. 2. q. 1. 2. — Aegid. R., II. Sent. d. 19. a. 3. 4. — Durand., II. Sent. d. 18. q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., II. Sent. d. 17. q. 1, d. 18. q. 3. — Biel, II. Sent. d. 17. q. 1.
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ARTICLE I.
Whether original sin is transmitted by means of the sensible portion.
QUESTION I.
Whether the sensible soul in humans is from the begetter.
Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and it is asked, whether the sensible soul in humans is from the begetter. And that it is from the begetter, it seems:
1. First, by the word of the Philosopher in the second [book] of On the Soul1, where he says that « the first change of the sensitive [soul] is from the begetter »; but the first change of the sensitive [soul] is that which is toward being: therefore it seems that the sensitive part in us is brought into being by the begetter.
2. Likewise, in the sixteenth [book] of On Animals2: « The intellect alone enters from without »: therefore the intellect alone enters by creation: therefore it seems that the sensitive soul in us is educed from the principles of matter and by generation.
3. Likewise, just as the operation of the sensitive soul in brutes depends on the body, so also in humans — whence just as a brute is hindered from the operation of seeing when the organ is injured, so also is a human — but what is similarly disposed toward operation, is similarly disposed toward generation: therefore if in brutes the sensible soul is not by creation, but by generation, as is commonly held, and as was shown above in the fifteenth distinction3; it seems that in a human it is likewise by generation.
4. Likewise, just as in the generation of brutes « the animal is prior to the horse », so also in the generation of a human « the animal is prior to the human4 »: therefore it has the operation and perfection of the sensitive part prior to having the perfection of the intellective. And a sign of this is that the embryo is first nourished and senses before it is perfected by the rational soul. Therefore it seems that before the production of the rational [soul] the sensible [soul] is educed in us; but this is not by creation: therefore by generation.
5. Likewise, the sensitive soul is in the potency of matter, otherwise it could never be produced into being by a natural agent in those things which are generated by putrefaction5. If therefore the generative power in a human is equally potent or more potent than it is in a brute; and a brute can by its generative power produce a sensitive soul into being: much more, therefore, does this seem [to hold] in a human.
6. Likewise, if in us the sensitive [soul] is by creation, in brutes by generation: therefore it does not seem that it is in us or in them univocally; and if so, "animal" will be said equivocally of an ass and of a human. But if this is unfitting6, it remains that, if in brutes it is by generation, it is likewise in a human.
On the contrary:
1. Augustine in the book On the Spirit and the Soul7: « When the soul departs from the body, it draws with itself sense and imagination and reason and intellect »; but nothing which is separated from the body is by generation; but the sensible [soul] in a human is of this kind: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, in the book On Ecclesiastical Dogmas8: « The souls of animals are not substances, but are born together with the flesh by the very vivacity of the flesh and are ended with the death of the flesh », « but the human soul does not die with the flesh, because neither is it sown with the flesh ».
3. Likewise, the Philosopher in the second [book] of On the Soul9 says that « the sensitive is in the intellective, as the tetragon in the pentagon; and the vegetative in the sensitive, as the trigon in the tetragon ». If therefore the tetragon is from the same principle from which the pentagon also is; the sensitive and intellective soul will be from the same [principle]; but the intellective is not from the begetter, as was shown above10: therefore neither is the sensitive.
4. Likewise, whatever things are the same in substance are educed into being from the same principle; but the sensitive and intellective soul in the same human are the same in substance, because of one perfectible thing there is one perfection11: therefore if the rational [soul] is not by generation, it seems that neither is the sensible.
5. Likewise, those things which are corrupted together are also produced together: therefore by parity of reason, those things which are separated together are also infused together. But when the rational soul withdraws, the power of sensing in no way remains in the body12: therefore just as the power of sensing is lost at the departure of the soul, so it is infused at its arrival; it is not, therefore, from generation, but from creation.
6. Likewise, when the operation of sense is intensified, the operation of the intellect is diminished, and conversely, as is clear from experience13: therefore it is necessary that sense and intellect are either one power, or powers of the same substance. But whichever of these it is, they must be educed into being in the same manner: since therefore the rational [soul] is not from transmission, it seems that neither is the sensible portion in a human. But if you say14 that one draws back the other on account of the order and union in one perfectible thing, not in one substance of the soul; it is objected against this: that the rational soul either can sense, or cannot. If it cannot: then it seems that it cannot vivify the body. But if it can sense; it remains that these powers are founded in the same substance. If you say to this, that there is a twofold sensitive [soul] in us: one from the begetter, and this is corrupted; another from the Creator, and this is separated together with the soul; it is objected against this: that nature does not do through many what it can do through fewer15. If therefore that sensitive [soul] which is from the begetter suffices in brutes for sensing, much more does that which is from the Creator suffice for a human: therefore one must not posit another sensitive [soul] which is from the begetter. But if you say that it is in it not for sensing, but for disposing the body for the reception of the rational [soul]; this does not seem to suffice, because, if such a soul is a substance equally complete in a human as in brutes, and in brutes it does not lack sensitive operation, it seems therefore that neither [does it lack it] in a human. Either, therefore, we must posit in us a twofold act of sensing at one and the same time16, or we must posit that the sensitive [soul] is in us from creation. But the first is manifestly false: it remains, therefore, that the latter is true.
Conclusion.
The sensitive soul in a human does not have being by generation, but by creation.
I respond: It must be said that concerning this there is a threefold mode of speaking. For certain heretics thought one way here, the philosophers seem to have thought another way, the Catholic doctors think another way.
For certain heretics17 thought that there are diverse souls in us, such that one is from the good God, and the other from an evil God; and from this, they said, there comes about in us the conflict and rebellion of appetites, such that the flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh18, because one of those souls, namely that which is from the good God, cannot do evil, but the other, namely that which is from the evil God, cannot do good. — Augustine, in the book On the Two Souls19, reproves this mode of speaking as heretical, showing that this position implies in itself two contradictories, since it posits that there is such a rebellion in a human, and posits together with this that a human can sin and a human can repent. This position would also be easy to disprove by the way of philosophy: because in one perfectible thing there must be one perfection; and since a human is one something by essence, it is impossible to be produced into being from altogether diverse principles: if therefore the rational soul20 is from the good God, our sensible [soul] cannot be from the evil God.
But certain ones said that the rational and the sensible are in us two substances; yet they are not two souls, for the reason that "soul" is a name of office, and those two substances are ordered to the perfection of one body, such that one disposes toward the other. Yet one of them is by generation, namely the sensible; and a sign of this is that it depends on the body and is the perfection of some part of the body: but the rational, which is the act of no part of the body, is by creation. — But Augustine rejects this mode of speaking in the book On Ecclesiastical Dogmas21, saying: « We do not say that there are two souls in one human — as James and others of the Syrians22 write — one animal [soul], by which the body is animated and which is mixed with the blood, and another spiritual [soul], which administers reason ». And if you say that he denies there to be two souls, [but] does not deny there to be two substances; by the following text it appears that he denies two substances to be. For he says thus23: « But we say that there is one and the same soul in a human, which vivifies the body by its association and disposes itself by its reason ». And more expressly in the book On the Spirit and the Soul24 he says that one and the same soul is called sense, while it senses, and reason, while it discerns. And again he says that the soul, when it withdraws, draws the sensitive powers with itself.
But the theological doctors say that the sensible and the rational in a human are of the same substance and are to be educed into being from the same principle, namely from the Creator, for the reason that in us they do not name diverse substances, but diverse powers of the same substance, as Augustine25, where he speaks about this matter, expressly intimates. And this same [view] is very reasonable, to posit in a human one perfecting substance, which gives it life and sense and intellect. Nor does that conflict with the words of the Philosopher, if they are rightly understood.
On account of which it is to be noted that "sensuality" is taken in three modes. In one mode sensuality names the disposition on the part of the flesh toward the act of the sensitive power; and in this mode it is taken in the book On the Spirit and the Soul, in the fourteenth chapter, where it is said: « The soul, which is truly spirit, and the flesh, which is truly body, are easily joined at their extremities26 », that is in the phantastic [faculty] of the soul, which is not body, but like body, and by the sensuality of the flesh, which is almost spirit ». — In another mode sensuality names the disposition on the part of the flesh toward sensing with a moving spiritual power, the soul not yet perfecting the flesh; and such sensuality is in the embryo before its complete animation. For there the perfecting substance of the soul cannot be present, since it is « the perfection of a physical, organic body27 »; nor could it actually exist, except with the body existing in due complexion and organization. Yet there can be present the power of the father's soul, which indeed is in the seed, as in a subject conveying [it], just as the power of a mover is conveyed together with a thrown stone; and therefore this ceases when its operation is consummated; which happens when the perfecting sensitive soul is introduced into the organized body, whether it is educed from the potency of matter suddenly, or is infused from without together with the rational [soul]28. — But the third sensuality is that which names not only the disposition with the moving power, but also the aptitude which is present from the perfecting soul. — Taking sensuality in the first and second mode, thus it is in us from the begetter29, because together with the seed there fall down heats and spirits, by which the flesh is disposed for sensing. There is also transfused together with this a certain power of the soul, which moves and rules and operates until the introduction of the form. In the third mode sensuality is in a human from the perfecting soul, which indeed does not have being by generation, but by creation. — These things having been seen, the response to the question is clear.
For it must be granted that the sensible soul is not in us from transmission, as the reasons objected to the second part show. But to the reasons which are adduced to the opposite, it is easy to respond.
1. For to that which is objected, that the first change of the sensitive [soul] is from the begetter; it must be said that he speaks of the sensitive insofar as it names a substance, not insofar as it names a power of an incorruptible substance. — Or also he says this by reason of that sensuality said in the second mode, which indeed has being from the begetter.
2. To that which is objected, that the intellect alone enters from without; it must be said that there the intellect is called the intellective substance; and because the intellective and sensitive substance of a human is the same, therefore by this the sensitive [substance] of a human is not excluded, but the brute sensitive [substance].
3. To that which is objected, that the operation of the sensitive [soul] depends on the body; it must be said that from this it does not follow that the substance depends [on it], since in the same substance there is found an operation which can belong to it apart from the body. This30, however, does not belong to the soul itself, except insofar as it animates, and thus insofar as it is joined to the body, and therefore it depends on the body, nor does the soul use that power after it is separated from the body; nor does it follow that it is idle, because that substance has another operation. But this will be found more plainly determined in the fourth [book]31, in the question on the cognition of the separated soul.
4. To that which is objected, that the animal is prior to the human; it must be said that this is said because in the embryo the animal operation is found prior to the operation of the human; for it is first moved and senses before it reasons. But this is from the sensuality said in the second mode, insofar as it is from the moving power, not insofar as it is from the perfecting power.
5. To that which is objected, that the sensible soul is in the potency of matter; it must be said that it is true insofar as the sensible soul names a generable and corruptible substance, but not insofar as it names a power of an incorruptible substance. And because the sensitive soul in brutes names a substance of this kind; hence it is that brutes educe their sensitive soul from matter, as also32 in those things especially which are generated by putrefaction.
But the sensible [soul] in a human names a power of the rational substance; and therefore it is produced by that alone by which the rational substance [is produced]. And therefore, that the sensible [soul] cannot be propagated in a human as in brutes, this is not from imperfection on the part of the generating power, but by reason of the perfection which consists in the sensitive [soul] of a human.
6. To that which is objected, that it is not univocal in a human and in an ass: it must be said that for something to be produced by generation, and something to be produced by creation, does not take away univocation; just as if God were now to create one human, it would be of the same species as other humans. If therefore a greater univocation is required in species than in genus, it is plain from this that the diverse mode of producing the sensible soul in a human and an ass does not cause "human" and "ass" to be said equivocally. And if you object that the sensible [soul] in a human names a power, and in an ass names a substance, therefore it is said equivocally; it must be said that in an ass it can both name a substance and can name a power, yet it principally names a power, because its name is taken from the act of sensing. In a human likewise it can name both a substance and a power; but insofar as it names a substance, it is not said to be something diverse from the rational; for it is the same substance which makes the human both sense and reason, although the power is one and another. And thus it is clear that from this the univocation in the genus of animal with respect to the rational and the irrational is not taken away.
I. The solution of this question depends on another, namely whether besides the rational soul there is another soul in a human as the principle of sensible life. But that there is one soul in a human, and that a rational or intellectual one, has been defined many times by the Church, namely against the Apollinarists in the Fifth Ecumenical Council (against Origen) can. 9; against the Manichaeans in the Eighth Ecumenical Council, can. 11; against the Averroists in the Councils of Vienne and the Fifth Lateran. — As to the many things said here cfr. above d. 18. a. 1. q. 1, d. 17. a. 1. q. 2. 3, d. 18. a. 1. 3, d. 19. a. 1. q. 1. 2.
II. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II. q. 62. m. 2. — Scotus, On the Principle of Things, q. 10. a. 1. (cfr. ibid. a. 3), and in each Scriptum, II. Sent. d. 18. q. unica. — St. Thomas, II. Sent. d. 18. q. 2. a. 1. 3; Summa I. q. 76. a. 4, q. 90. a. 2, q. 118. a. 1. 2; Summa contra Gentiles II. c. 86-89. — B. Albert, II. Sent. d. 18. a. 8; Summa p. II. tr. 12. q. 70. m. 3, q. 72. m. 3, q. 73. m. 1. — Richard of Middleton, II. Sent. d. 18. a. 2. q. 1. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, II. Sent. d. 19. a. 3. 4. — Durandus, II. Sent. d. 18. q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, II. Sent. d. 17. q. 1, d. 18. q. 3. — Biel, II. Sent. d. 17. q. 1.
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- Text. 59. (c. 5.). — In hoc arg. Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 bis sensitivae pro sensitivi (αἰσθητικοῦ).Text 59 (c. 5). — In this argument the Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 [reads] twice sensitivae for sensitivi (αἰσθητικοῦ).
- Sive II. de Generat. animal. c. 3. Vide supra pag. 622, nota 9.Or II. On the Generation of Animals c. 3. See above p. 622, note 9.
- Art. 1. q. 1. — Ed. 4 adiicit et etiam d. 47; Vat. et etiam praefigit verbo videtur, prius posito commate, sed ad marginem habet etiam; dist. 15. et 17. Paulo superius pro sensibilis codd. X Z substituunt sensitiva.Art. 1. q. 1. — Ed. 4 adds and also d. 47; the Vatican [edition] prefixes et etiam to the word videtur, a comma having first been placed, but in the margin has etiam; dist. 15. et 17. A little above, for sensibilis codices X Z substitute sensitiva.
- Aristot., II. de Generat. animal. c. 3. — Aliquantulum inferius ante perfectionem intellectivae Vat. repetit operationem et, ac post pauca cum edd. 3, 4 sentit commutat in sentitur.Aristotle, II. On the Generation of Animals c. 3. — A little below, before perfectionem intellectivae the Vatican [edition] repeats operationem et, and after a few [words], with edd. 3, 4, changes sentit to sentitur.
- Deinde post productionem cod. cc et ed. I interserunt animae et mox pro sed hoc legunt sed haec.Then after productionem cod. cc and ed. I insert animae, and presently for sed hoc read sed haec.
- Cfr. supra d. 13. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4.Cfr. above d. 13. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4.
- Vide Cap. 15. supra pag. 608, nota 9.See Cap. 15, above p. 608, note 9.
- Cap. 17, ubi textus originalis pro substantiae habet substantivae et post finiuntur plura addit.Cap. 17, where the original text for substantiae has substantivae and after finiuntur adds more.
- Text. 31. (c. 3.), ubi explicite tantum ultima pars prop. ponitur.Text 31 (c. 3), where only the last part of the proposition is explicitly stated.
- Dist. 18. a. 2. q. 3.Dist. 18. a. 2. q. 3.
- Cfr. supra pag. 223, nota 6.Cfr. above p. 223, note 6.
- Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 90. (c. 5.): Egrediente enim [anima], exspirat et putrescit [corpus].Aristotle, I. On the Soul, text 90 (c. 5): For when [the soul] departs, [the body] expires and putrefies.
- Cfr. supra pag. 260, nota 1, et Aristot., VIII. Phys. text. 51. (c. 6.).Cfr. above p. 260, note 1, and Aristotle, VIII. Physics text 51 (c. 6).
- In obiectionibus, quae hic ponuntur, fundamenta afferuntur, quibus secunda opinio, postea in corp. quaest. proposita, innititur.In the objections which are here set down, the grounds are brought forward upon which the second opinion, later proposed in the body of the question, rests.
- Vide Aristot., IV. de Partib. animal. c. 6, et supra pag. 44, nota 8.See Aristotle, IV. On the Parts of Animals c. 6, and above p. 44, note 8.
- Simili modo Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 42. (c. 9.) arguit Platonem, qui tres in homine animas esse tenet dicens: Si autem tria sit anima, in unoquoque erit appetitus.In a similar way Aristotle, III. On the Soul, text 42 (c. 9), argues against Plato, who holds that there are three souls in a human, saying: But if the soul be three, in each one there will be appetite.
- Scil. Manichaei. — Paulo ante pro sentiunt nonnulli codd. cum ed. 1 senserunt, quam verbi formam ceterae quoque edd. exhibent, simul praefigentes etiam hic.Namely the Manichaeans. — A little before, for sentiunt some codices with ed. 1 [read] senserunt, which form of the verb the other editions also exhibit, prefixing at the same time etiam hic.
- Gal. 3, 17.Galatians 5, 17 [Vulg. Gal. 3, 17].
- Cap. 12. n. 16. et c. 14. n. 22.Cap. 12. n. 16. and c. 14. n. 22.
- Plures codd., ut A H T W aa bb, cum edd. 2, 3 nostra, cod. V nostra anima.Several codices, such as A H T W aa bb, with edd. 2, 3 [read] nostra, cod. V nostra anima.
- Cap. 13.Cap. 13.
- Scil. sectatores Apollinaris, Episc. Laodiceae in Syria.Namely the followers of Apollinaris, Bishop of Laodicea in Syria.
- Loc. cit.Loc. cit.
- Cap. 4. et 13, ubi animam in substantia unam esse docetur, propter varia autem officia variis nominibus nuncupari; quae nomina exponuntur ibid. c. 11. — Ibid. c. 13. habetur et seq. sententia. — Paulo inferius pro theologici codd. K T W bb ee et alii cum ed. 2 theologi, Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 theologiae.Cap. 4. and 13, where the soul is taught to be one in substance, but to be called by various names on account of its various offices; which names are explained ibid. c. 11. — Ibid. c. 13. the following sentence is also found. — A little below, for theologici codd. K T W bb ee and others with ed. 2 [read] theologi, the Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 theologiae.
- De duabus Animabus, c. 13. n. 19; de Quant. animae, c. 33. n. 70. seqq.; de Fide et symb. c. 10. n. 23. Cfr. etiam supra lit. Magistri, d. XXIV. c. 4, et de Spiritu et anima, c. 13. — Mox post rationabile cod. F interserit scilicet, cod. aa videlicet.On the Two Souls, c. 13. n. 19; On the Quantity of the Soul, c. 33. n. 70. seqq.; On Faith and the Creed c. 10. n. 23. Cfr. also above, the Master's text, d. XXIV. c. 4, and On the Spirit and the Soul, c. 13. — Presently after rationabile cod. F inserts scilicet, cod. aa videlicet.
- Textus originalis sic: facile et convenienter uniuntur. — Mox pro phantastico cod. C phantastica, et subinde pro quod multi codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 quae.The original text thus: facile et convenienter uniuntur [easily and fittingly are united]. — Presently for phantastico cod. C [reads] phantastica, and thereupon for quod many codices with edd. 1, 2, 3 [read] quae.
- Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 6. (c. 1.).Aristotle, II. On the Soul, text 6 (c. 1).
- Cfr. Aristot., II. de Generat. animal. c. 3. — Paulo inferius pro ex anima codd. I X Z et alii ab anima.Cfr. Aristotle, II. On the Generation of Animals c. 3. — A little below, for ex anima codd. I X Z and others [read] ab anima.
- Cod. X hic addit: Quod primo modo, patet, et terminata hac propos. verbo sentiendum, sic prosequitur: Similiter de secundo, quod sit in nobis a generante, quia transfunditur etc. Pro deciduntur codd. F H K T et alii descinduntur, codd. V W Y discinduntur.Cod. X here adds: Quod primo modo, patet [that in the first mode, is clear], and having ended this proposition with the word sentiendum, continues thus: Similiter de secundo, quod sit in nobis a generante, quia transfunditur etc. For deciduntur codd. F H K T and others [read] descinduntur, codd. V W Y discinduntur.
- Scil. operatio sensitiva. — Paulo ante Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 bis anima pro substantia.Namely the sensitive operation. — A little before, the Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 [reads] twice anima for substantia.
- Dist. 30. p. II. a. 1. q. 1.Dist. 30. p. II. a. 1. q. 1.
- Codd. F V aa ee et alii est, refragantibus edd. et multis codd. Fortasse legendum est et. Immediate post plures codd. cum Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 verba male sic transposuerunt: in his quae potissime generantur. Paulo inferius post a quo cod. aa repetit producitur.Codd. F V aa ee and others [read] est, the editions and many codices opposing. Perhaps it should be read est et. Immediately after, several codices with the Vatican [edition] and edd. 2, 3, 4 wrongly transposed the words thus: in his quae potissime generantur. A little below, after a quo cod. aa repeats producitur.