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Dist. 18, Art. 2, Q. 3

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 18

Textus Latinus
p. 451

Articulus II. De productione animae Evae aliorumque hominum.

Quaestio III. Utrum anima rationalis sit ex traduce.

Tertio quaeritur, supposito, quod animae producantur successive, utrum anima rationalis sit ex traduce. Et quod sic, videtur.

*Ad oppositum.*

1. Genesis quadragesimo sexto1: Omnes animae, quae egressae sunt de femore Iacob, sunt septuaginta duo. Si tu dicas, quod anima non stat ibi pro substantia rationali, sed pro vita carnali sive homine exteriori; obiicitur de Genesis secundo2: in formatione mulieris nunquam dicitur, quod Deus inspiraverit in eam spiraculum vitae: ergo videtur, quod tota mulier de Adam producta fuerit quantum ad animam et quantum ad corpus.

2. Item, ad Ephesios secundo3: Nascimur omnes natura filii irae; sed non sumus filii irae ex parte carnis, sed ex parte animae, nec sumus filii irae, nisi quia sumus filii Adae: ergo anima nostra procedit ex anima Adae.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione. Actus generandi est entis completi — tunc enim unumquodque completum est, cum potest generare tale, quale ipsum est4 — sed anima humana inter omnes formas naturales est perfectissima: ergo si alia forma naturalis habet potentiam multiplicandi se in diversis materiis, sicut una flamma in diversis candelis, multo fortius hoc videtur esse in anima rationali.

4. Item, vis generativa principaliter residet penes animam: ergo si «homo generat hominem»5, cum generatio consistat in productione similis, principalius producit animam quam carnem: ergo si caro est ex carne, multo fortius anima est ex traduce.

5. Item, aeque magna vel maior congruentia est hominis ad hominem, quam sit bruti ad brutum; et perfectior est vis generativa in homine, quam sit in aliquo bruto animali. Si ergo brutum totaliter potest producere brutum, et quantum ad animam et quantum ad corpus, et non est necesse, animam brutorum creari: multo fortius videtur, quod anima rationalis possit traduci et per coitum seminari.

6. Item, hoc videtur per deductionem ad inconveniens: aut enim anima rationalis est per propagationem, aut per creationem. Si per propagationem, habeo propositum, scilicet quod sit ex p. 452 traduce. Si per creationem, cum Deus, cuius est creare, nihil possit vel debeat inordinate facere; videtur, quod sicut adultero non dat gratiam, quae immediate procedit ab ipso, sic etiam corpori per adulterium generato non debeat infundere animam. Quodsi infundat, videtur esse reprehensibilis et acceptare coitum adulterii6.

Contra:

*Fundamenta.*

1. Isaiae quinquagesimo septimo7: Omnem flatum ego feci; constat, quod de flatu corporali non intelligit, ergo de flatu spirituali, qui est anima rationalis: ergo sicut solus Deus insufflavit in faciem Adae spiraculum vitae, ita creat animam cuiuslibet hominis.

2. Item, Philosophus in decimo sexto de Animalibus8: «Solus intellectus intrat ab extrinseco»; sed si traduceretur, non intraret ab extrinseco: ergo anima rationalis non est ex traduce.

3. Item, ratione videtur. Omne quod est per naturam propagabile, est per naturam corruptibile; sed anima rationalis, secundum philosophos et secundum etiam omnes leges et sectas, est incorruptibilis9: ergo non est per naturam propagabilis: ergo non est ex traduce.

4. Item, si anima est ex traduce, aut ergo anima est ex carne, aut anima ex anima. Ex carne esse non potest, quoniam impossibile est, ex corpore fieri non-corpus: anima autem est non-corpus, sicut multipliciter probat Philosophus et Augustinus10. Si ex anima; aut ergo ex toto, aut ex parte. Ex parte non, quia anima est simplex; si ex toto: ergo cum aliquis generat aliquem, cum det ei totam animam suam, desinit habere animam, et sic desinit vivere. Quodsi hoc est manifeste falsum, patet etc.

5. Item, anima rationalis, cum sit substantia per se existens et incorruptibilis, habet materiam et formam, sicut probatum est supra11. Cum ergo producitur, aut producitur ex materia praeiacente, aut simul cum ipsa producitur sua materia. Si simul cum ipso producitur sua materia, ergo necesse est, quod producatur ex nihilo: ergo a solo Deo. Si producitur ex materia praeiacente: quaero de illa materia: aut est corporalis, aut spiritualis. Si corporalis, ex ea non potest fieri anima. Si spiritualis, aut habet formam, aut non. Si non, quomodo potest esse in rerum natura sine forma, cum «omne esse sit a forma»12? Si habet: ergo vel erit Angelus, vel anima. Non Angelus, constat: ergo anima; sed ex eodem non fit idem numero: ergo ex ea non potest fieri anima.

6. Item, si anima rationalis esset ex traduce, necessario oporteret tunc discindi13, quando deciditur semen; sed multa semina sunt, quae nunquam perveniunt ad organizationem, immo plura effunduntur, quam ad formam producantur14: ergo vel essent animae rationales sine corporibus, vel periret tam nobilis forma; quorum utrumque absurdum est dicere et impium.

Conclusio.

Animae rationales non sunt ex traduce, sed per creationem.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc est triplex modus dicendi.

*Opinio 1. Quidam namque dixerunt, quod animarum productio est mediante Intelligentia, ut, sicut corpus caeleste ad productionem facit corporis humani, sic etiam Intelligentia ad productionem animae; et hoc plures senserunt philosophi, et sensisse videtur auctor in libro de Causis[^15]. — Ratio. Ratio autem, quae movit eos ad hoc ponendum, fuit et divina unitas, quae non patiebatur, ut Deus immediate produceret multa, et divina immutabilitas, quae non patiebatur, ut Deus produceret nova. — Reprobatur. Sed haec tanquam haeretica abiicienda sunt et ostensa sunt esse falsa, supra distinctione prima[^16]. Unde verbum illud de Causis tanquam haereticum est respuendum, nisi quis intelligat, quod anima dicitur creari ab Intelligentia in hoc, quod aliquam illuminationem <!-- page 453 --> suscipit mediante illa. Intelligentia enim, secundum Philosophum[^17], excedit animam in claritate cognitionis; et ideo dicit quidam philosophus, quod «anima rationalis creatur in umbra intelligentiae, et sensibilis in umbra rationalis*». Hoc autem dictum est, quia una deficit a perfectione alterius, non quia una producatur ab altera.

*Opinio 2. Est et alius modus dicendi, quod animarum productio est per traductionem, ut anima traducatur ex anima, sicut caro ex carne; et sicut ab una candela accenduntur multae, sic ab una anima per sui multiplicationem absque diminutione vivificentur multa corpora. Et de hoc aliquando dubitaverunt catholici tractatores, et Augustinus maxime, sicut patet in libro super Genesim ad litteram[^18], et in libro de Libero Arbitrio, et in libro Retractationum, ubi etiam dicit, quod non potuit pervenire ad certitudinem istius quaestionis. Ratio autem, quae potissime fecit eum dubitare, fuit transfusio originalis peccati. — Non probatur.* Verumtamen ipse Augustinus hanc positionem expresse reprehendit in libro de Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus, cuius auctoritatem Magister ponit in littera19, et ipse istum eundem modum improbat super Genesim ad litteram: quoniam, si propter originale peccatum anima transfunditur ex anima, aut anima Christi non esset de genere aliarum animarum, aut habuisset originale peccatum, quorum utrumque falsum est et impium.

*Opinio 3. Et ideo est tertius modus dicendi catholicus et verus, quod animae non seminantur, sed formatis corporibus a Deo creantur et creando infunduntur et infundendo producuntur. — Duplex ratio. Animarum enim creationem Deus sibi soli debuit reservare, tum propter earum dignitatem, tum propter earum immortalitatem. Propter animarum dignitatem, quia, cum anima sit imago Dei et nata immediate ferri in Deum et beatificari in ipso diligendo eum ex toto corde, totum suum esse immediate debuit ab ipso habere, ut ipsum ex toto corde teneretur diligere[^20]. — Decuit etiam hoc propter animarum immortalitatem. Cum enim solus Deus sit, qui habeat vitam in semetipso et vitam indeficientem[^21]; solus est, qui potest producere principium vitae perpetuum. Cum igitur res incorruptibilis substantificari non possit in materia transmutabili, et operatio creaturae sit super materiam transmutabilem; impossibile est, aliquam creaturam animam rationalem producere: et Conclusio.* ideo eius productionem Deus sibi soli debuit reservare.

*Solutio oppositorum.* Concedendae sunt ergo rationes probantes, quod animae rationales non sint ex traduce, sed a creatione.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium de textu Genesis, dicendum, quod anima ibi accipitur pro homine, et homo dicitur egressus de corpore ratione partis corporalis. — Nec valet illud quod contra hoc obiicit, quod non dicitur in productione animae Evae: inspiravit in faciem eius etc., quia, cum idem modus producendi esset animam Evae et animam Adae, non oportuit iterari22.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnes nascimur natura filii irae; dicendum, quod hoc est, quia anima, cum unitur carni infectae, statim inficitur et contrahit culpam originalem; non quia ipsa traducatur, sed quia traducitur caro, cui unitur. Quomodo autem hoc fieri possit, infra23 determinabitur, cum agetur de peccato originali.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod actus generandi est entis completi; dicendum, quod non est cuiuslibet entis completi, sed eius rei, quae habet materiam transmutabilem, ex qua potest produci. Et quia anima non habet talem materiam, non potest aliam similem producere, quamvis sit forma completa.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod vis generativa principaliter residet penes animam; dicendum, quod etsi principaliter respiciat animam per modum moventis et agentis, principaliter tamen respicit corpus tanquam illud, ex quo producit. Et quoniam decisio potest fieri a corpore, non ab anima, hinc est, quod ordinatur ad productionem corporis humani, non ad productionem animae rationalis.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod brutum potest producere brutum; dicendum, quod non est p. 454 simile, quia anima bruti, cum sit forma tantum et forma corruptibilis, potest de potentia materiae educi; anima vero rationalis cum sit hoc aliquid et incorruptibilis nec educatur de materia praeiacente, necesse est, eam ex nihilo educi et ita creari. Quod autem non possit produci ex materia praeiacente, multipliciter ostendit Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram libro septimo24, quod illa materia praeexistens nec possit esse corporalis nec spiritualis.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de generato per adulterium, dicendum, quod in hoc ostenditur potius laus divinae bonitatis quam reprehensio; quia beneficium, quod disposuit servare sive continuare, propter peccata hominum non immutat vel interrumpit; unde, cum animam infundit, non considerat vitium, sed considerat naturam25. Nec est simile de gratia, quae non respicit naturam, secundum quod natura est, sed magis, secundum quod ad Deum conversa est. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. Patent etiam ea quae dicuntur in littera.

Scholion

I. De celebri circa hanc quaestionem controversia dicit Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 2. a. 2.): «Circa quaestionem hanc egregius Doctor Augustinus diu inter opiniones quatuor fluctuavit, ut ipse in fine libri de Libero Arbitrio ait: Harum quatuor de anima sententiarum, utrum de propagine veniant, an in singulis quibuscumque nascentibus novae fiant, an in corpora nascentium iam alicubi existentes impellantur, vel sponte illabantur, nullam temere affirmare oportebit. Ipse idem tamen postmodum unam ex iis, scil. eas in singulis corporibus nascentium novas creari, elegit et tenendam definivit, ut patet in littera». — Notandum autem, quod liber de Ecclesiast. Dogmatibus (inter opera S. August. ed. Maurina t. 8.), cuius testimonio tanquam auctoritate Augustini Magister innititur, est Gennadii, presbyteri Massiliensis. Sententia autem Traducianismi iam a Scholasticis communiter reprobata est.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 60. m. 3. a. 3. — Scot., de Rerum princip. q. 10. a. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; S. I. q. 118. a. 2; S. c. Gent. II. c. 86–89; de Potent. q. 3. a. 9; Quodlib. 12. a. 10. — B. Albert., hic a. 8; S. p. II. tr. 12. q. 72. m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Aegid. R., II. Sent. d. 19. q. 1. a. 3. et 2. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Biel, II. Sent. d. 17. q. 1.

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English Translation

Article II. On the production of the soul of Eve and of other human beings.

Question III. Whether the rational soul is by traduction.

Thirdly it is asked, supposing that souls are produced successively, whether the rational soul is by traduction. And that this is so, it seems thus.

*For the opposite side.*

1. Genesis forty-six1: All the souls that came out of the loins of Jacob were seventy-two. If you say that soul there does not stand for the rational substance but for the carnal life or the outer man; it is objected from Genesis chapter two2: in the formation of woman it is never said that God breathed into her the breath of life: therefore it seems that the whole woman was produced from Adam as to soul as well as to body.

2. Likewise, to the Ephesians chapter two3: We are all by nature children of wrath; but we are not children of wrath on the side of the flesh, but on the side of the soul, nor are we children of wrath save because we are children of Adam: therefore our soul proceeds from the soul of Adam.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems so by reason. The act of generating belongs to a complete being — for then is each thing complete, when it can generate such as it itself is4 — but the human soul among all natural forms is the most perfect: therefore if another natural form has the power of multiplying itself in diverse matters, as one flame in diverse candles, much more does this seem to be in the rational soul.

4. Likewise, the generative power principally resides in the soul: therefore if «man generates man»5, since generation consists in the production of like by like, it produces the soul more principally than the flesh: therefore if flesh is from flesh, much more is soul by traduction.

5. Likewise, an equally great or greater congruence is of man to man than is of brute to brute; and the generative power is more perfect in man than in any brute animal. If therefore a brute can produce a brute wholly, both as to soul and as to body, and it is not necessary that the soul of brutes be created: much more does it seem that the rational soul can be transmitted and sown by intercourse.

6. Likewise, this seems so by reduction to the absurd: for either the rational soul is by propagation, or by creation. If by propagation, I have what I propose, namely that it is by p. 452 traduction. If by creation, since God, whose office it is to create, can or ought to do nothing inordinately; it seems that just as he does not give to an adulterer the grace that proceeds immediately from himself, so neither ought he infuse the soul into a body generated through adultery. But if he do infuse it, he seems to be reprehensible and to accept the intercourse of adultery6.

On the contrary:

*Foundations.*

1. Isaiah fifty-seven7: Every breath have I made; it is settled that he does not understand it of bodily breath, therefore of spiritual breath, which is the rational soul: therefore just as God alone breathed into Adam's face the breath of life, so he creates the soul of every man.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher in the sixteenth book On Animals8: «The intellect alone enters from without»; but if it were transmitted, it would not enter from without: therefore the rational soul is not by traduction.

3. Likewise, by reason it seems so. Everything which is by nature propagable is by nature corruptible; but the rational soul, according to the philosophers and even according to all laws and sects, is incorruptible9: therefore it is not by nature propagable: therefore it is not by traduction.

4. Likewise, if the soul is by traduction, either then the soul is from the flesh, or the soul from the soul. From the flesh it cannot be, since it is impossible that from a body there come to be a non-body: but the soul is non-body, as the Philosopher and Augustine prove in many ways10. If from the soul; then either from the whole, or from a part. Not from a part, because the soul is simple; if from the whole: then when one generates another, since he gives him his whole soul, he ceases to have a soul, and so ceases to live. But since this is manifestly false, it is clear etc.

5. Likewise, the rational soul, since it is a substance existing through itself and incorruptible, has matter and form, as has been proved above11. When therefore it is produced, either it is produced from pre-existing matter, or its matter is produced together with it. If its matter is produced together with it, then it is necessary that it be produced from nothing: therefore by God alone. If it is produced from pre-existing matter: I ask of that matter: either it is bodily, or spiritual. If bodily, from it the soul cannot come to be. If spiritual, either it has a form, or not. If not, how can it be in the nature of things without a form, since «all being is from form»12? If it has: then it will be either an Angel, or a soul. Not an Angel, that is clear: therefore a soul; but from the same thing the same numerically does not come to be: therefore from it a soul cannot come to be.

6. Likewise, if the rational soul were by traduction, it would necessarily have to be cut off13 then, when the semen is shed; but there are many seeds which never attain to organization, indeed more are poured out than are brought forth to form14: therefore either there would be rational souls without bodies, or so noble a form would perish; both of which it is absurd and impious to say.

Conclusion.

Rational souls are not by traduction, but through creation.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it is to be noted that concerning this there is a threefold mode of speaking.

*Opinion 1. For certain ones said that the production of souls is mediated by an Intelligence, so that, just as the heavenly body contributes to the production of the human body, so also an Intelligence to the production of the soul; and many philosophers held this, and the author in the book de Causis[^15] seems to have held it. — Reason. The reason which moved them to posit this was both the divine unity, which did not allow that God should immediately produce many things, and the divine immutability, which did not allow that God should produce new things. — It is refuted. But these things are to be cast out as heretical and have been shown to be false above, in distinction one[^16]. Hence that saying of the de Causis is to be rejected as heretical, unless one understands that the soul is said to be created by an Intelligence in this, that it receives some illumination <!-- page 453 --> through it. For an Intelligence, according to the Philosopher[^17], exceeds the soul in clarity of cognition; and therefore a certain philosopher says, that «the rational soul is created in the shadow of an intelligence, and the sensitive in the shadow of the rational*». But this is said because the one falls short of the perfection of the other, not because the one is produced by the other.

*Opinion 2. There is also another mode of speaking, namely that the production of souls is by traduction, so that the soul is transmitted from a soul, as flesh from flesh; and as from one candle many are lit, so from one soul, by its multiplication without diminution, many bodies are vivified. And concerning this the Catholic discussants sometimes doubted, and Augustine especially, as is clear in the book On Genesis according to the letter[^18], and in the book On Free Choice, and in the book Retractations, where he also says that he could not arrive at certainty about this question. The reason which most strongly made him doubt was the transmission of original sin. — It is not proved. Nevertheless Augustine himself expressly reproves this position in the book On Ecclesiastical Dogmas, whose authority the Master sets down in the text[^19], and he himself reproves this same mode in On Genesis according to the letter:* because if on account of original sin the soul is transfused from a soul, then either the soul of Christ would not be of the kind of other souls, or it would have had original sin, both of which are false and impious.

*Opinion 3. And therefore there is a third mode of speaking, catholic and true, namely that souls are not sown but, the bodies being formed, are created by God and by being created are infused and by being infused are produced. — Twofold reason. For the creation of souls God ought to have reserved to himself alone, both on account of their dignity and on account of their immortality. On account of the dignity of souls, because, since the soul is the image of God and born to be borne immediately to God and to be beatified in him by loving him with the whole heart, its whole being it ought to have immediately from him, so that it would be bound to love him with the whole heart[^20]. — It was fitting also on account of the immortality of souls. For since God alone is he who has life in himself and life that does not fail[^21]; he alone is who can produce a perpetual principle of life. Since therefore an incorruptible thing cannot be substantified in transmutable matter, and the operation of the creature is over transmutable matter; it is impossible that any creature produce a rational soul: and Conclusion.* therefore God ought to have reserved its production to himself alone.

*Solution of the opposing arguments.* The reasons proving that rational souls are not by traduction but by creation are therefore to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected to the contrary about the text of Genesis, it must be said that soul is there taken for man, and a man is said to have come out from the body by reason of the bodily part. — Nor is that valid which is objected against this, that it is not said in the production of the soul of Eve: he breathed into her face etc., because, since the mode of producing the soul of Eve and the soul of Adam was the same, it was not necessary to repeat it22.

2. To that which is objected, that all are born by nature children of wrath; it must be said that this is because the soul, when it is united to infected flesh, is immediately infected and contracts original guilt; not because it itself is transmitted, but because the flesh to which it is united is transmitted. But how this can come to be will be determined below23, when original sin is treated.

3. To that which is objected, that the act of generating belongs to a complete being; it must be said that it does not belong to just any complete being, but to that thing which has transmutable matter from which it can be produced. And since the soul does not have such matter, it cannot produce another like itself, although it is a complete form.

4. To that which is objected, that the generative power principally resides in the soul; it must be said that although it principally regards the soul by way of mover and agent, nevertheless it principally regards the body as that from which it produces. And since decision can be made from the body, not from the soul, hence it is that it is ordained to the production of the human body, not to the production of the rational soul.

5. To that which is objected, that a brute can produce a brute; it must be said that it is not p. 454 similar, because the soul of a brute, since it is a form only and a corruptible form, can be educed from the potency of matter; but the rational soul, since it is a this something and incorruptible and is not educed from pre-existing matter, must necessarily be educed from nothing and so created. That it cannot be produced from pre-existing matter, Augustine shows in many ways on Genesis according to the letter, book seven24, namely that that pre-existing matter can be neither bodily nor spiritual.

6. To that which is objected concerning what is generated by adultery, it must be said that in this is shown rather the praise of the divine goodness than reprehension; because the benefit which he has disposed to preserve or continue, on account of the sins of men he does not change or interrupt; hence, when he infuses the soul, he does not consider the vice but considers the nature25. Nor is it the same with grace, which does not regard nature insofar as it is nature, but rather insofar as it is converted to God. And through this is clear the response to the objections. Clear also are the things which are said in the text.

Scholion

I. Concerning the celebrated controversy around this question Petr. a Tar. says (here q. 2. a. 2.): «Around this question the Doctor of distinction Augustine for a long time fluctuated among four opinions, as he himself says at the end of the book On Free Choice: Of these four opinions about the soul — whether they come by propagation, or are newly made in each one being born, or, already existing somewhere, are driven into the bodies of those being born, or slip in spontaneously — it will not behoove one rashly to affirm any. Yet he himself afterwards chose and defined as to be held one of them, namely that they are newly created in each body of those being born, as is clear in the text». — But it is to be noted that the book On Ecclesiastical Dogmas (among the works of S. Augustine, Maurist ed., t. 8), on whose testimony as on the authority of Augustine the Master relies, is by Gennadius, presbyter of Marseilles. The opinion of Traducianism, however, has by now been commonly reproved by the Scholastics.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 60. m. 3. a. 3. — Scot., de Rerum princip. q. 10. a. 1. — S. Thom., here q. 2. a. 1; S. I. q. 118. a. 2; S. c. Gent. II. c. 86–89; de Potent. q. 3. a. 9; Quodlib. 12. a. 10. — B. Albert., here a. 8; S. p. II. tr. 12. q. 72. m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. — Richard. a Med., here a. 2. q. 2. — Aegid. R., II. Sent. d. 19. q. 1. a. 3. et 2. — Durand., here q. 3. — Biel, II. Sent. d. 17. q. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 26. seq., ubi Vulgata: Cunctae animae, quae ingressae sunt cum Iacob in Aegyptum, et egressae sunt de femore illius, absque uxoribus filiorum eius, sexaginta sex. Filii autem Ioseph, qui nati sunt ei in terra Aegypti, animae duae. Omnes animae domus Iacob, quae ingressae sunt in Aegyptum, fuere septuaginta. — Codd. cum primis edd., contra Vat., quae ponit sexaginta sex, exhibent lectionem in textu receptam, de qua cfr. Hieronym., Qq. hebraic. in Gen., et August., 1. Qq. in Gen. q. 152, ubi ait: «Quod legitur, sexaginta sex animas intrasse cum Iacob in Aegyptum, exceptis videlicet filiis Ioseph, et deinde illis annumeratis, infertur: septuaginta quinque animae erant, cum quibus Iacob intravit in Aegyptum, sic accipiendum est, qui erant in domo Iacob, quando intravit in Aegyptum. Nam utique quos ibi invenit, non cum eis intravit» etc. Idem dicit XVI. de Civ. Dei, c. 40.
    Verse 26 and following, where the Vulgate reads: All the souls that came in with Jacob into Egypt and came out of his loins, apart from the wives of his sons, were sixty-six. But the sons of Joseph, who were born to him in the land of Egypt, were two souls. All the souls of the house of Jacob that came into Egypt were seventy. — The codices, with the first editions, against the Vatican edition (which puts sixty-six), exhibit the reading received in the text; concerning which cf. Jerome, Hebrew Questions on Genesis, and Augustine, Questions on Genesis, bk. 1, q. 152, where he says: «That it is read, sixty-six souls entered with Jacob into Egypt, the sons of Joseph being excepted; and then, those being added, it is inferred: there were seventy-five souls with whom Jacob entered into Egypt — this must be taken thus, those who were in the house of Jacob when he entered into Egypt. For surely those whom he found there did not enter with them,» etc. He says the same in City of God XVI, c. 40.
  2. Vers. 22.
    Verse 22.
  3. Vers. 3: Eramus natura filii irae.
    Verse 3: We were by nature children of wrath.
  4. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 34. (c. 4.): «Naturalissimum enim operum, quae in viventibus, quaecunque perfecta et non mutilata sunt, aut generationem spontaneam habent, est facere aliud, quale ipsum.» Idem dicit IV. Meteor. text. 19. (c. 3.).
    Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 34 (c. 4): «For the most natural of works in living things, whichever are perfect and not mutilated, or have spontaneous generation, is to make another such as itself.» He says the same in Meteor. IV, text 19 (c. 3).
  5. Aristot., II. Phys. text. 26. (c. 2.) et VII. Metaph. text. 22. (VI. c. 7.), ubi etiam seq. prop. insinuatur.
    Aristotle, Physics II, text 26 (c. 2), and Metaphysics VII, text 22 (VI, c. 7), where also the following proposition is intimated.
  6. Cfr. August., Epist. 166. (alias 28.) ad Hieronym. c. 3. n. 15, ubi dicitur, quod, teste Hieronymo (III. contra Rufinum, n. 28.), quidam hoc arg. usi sint ad inferendam praeexistentiam animarum. Verba Hieronymi sunt: «Et si dixero illud Ecclesiasticum: Quotidie Deus operatur animas et in corpore eas mittit nascentium, illico magistri tendiculas proferas: et ubi est iustitia Dei, ut de adulterio incestuque nascentibus animas largiatur? Ergo cooperator est malorum hominum et adulteris seminantibus corpora ipse fabricatur animas»? Vide etiam Greg. Nyssen., de Anima.
    Cf. Augustine, Epistle 166 (otherwise 28) to Jerome, c. 3, n. 15, where it is said that, according to Jerome's witness (Against Rufinus III, n. 28), certain ones used this argument to infer the pre-existence of souls. Jerome's words are: «And if I say that ecclesiastical saying: Daily God works on souls and sends them into the bodies of those being born, you straightway bring forth the master's snares: where is the justice of God, that he should bestow souls on those being born from adultery and incest? Therefore he is a cooperator of evil men, and for adulterers sowing bodies he himself fashions souls?» See also Gregory of Nyssa, On the Soul.
  7. Vers. 16; iuxta translationem Septuaginta, cfr. supra in lit. Magistri, d. XVII. c. 2. — Text. seq. est Gen. 2, 7.
    Verse 16; according to the Septuagint translation, cf. above in the Master's text, d. XVII, c. 2. — The following text is Gen. 2, 7.
  8. Sive II. de Generat. animal. c. 3.
    Or II On the Generation of Animals, c. 3.
  9. Vide infra d. 19. a. 1. q. 1.
    See below d. 19, a. 1, q. 1.
  10. Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 46–90. (c. 3. seqq.) ostendit, quod anima non sit magnitudo neque corpus mixtum (harmonia) neque subtilissimum corpus. Idem probat August., de Immort. animae, c. 10. n. 17. seqq.; de Quant. animae, c. 18. n. 32. seqq.; 1. de Anima et eius origine, c. 3. n. 3. et IV. c. 12. n. 18. seqq.; VII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 12. n. 18. seqq. et X. c. 24. n. 40. seqq., ubi impugnat Tertullianum, qui putabat, Deum et animam esse corpus. — Paulo superius post fieri retinuimus cum Vat. non-corpus pro nisi corpus, quod in plurimis codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3 perperam habetur; vel lege: fieri aliquid aliud, nisi corpus. Mox plures codd. bis ex tota pro ex toto.
    Aristotle, On the Soul I, text 46–90 (c. 3 and following) shows that the soul is neither magnitude nor a mixed body (harmony) nor a most subtle body. Augustine proves the same in On the Immortality of the Soul, c. 10, n. 17 ff.; On the Quantity of the Soul, c. 18, n. 32 ff.; On the Soul and its Origin book 1, c. 3, n. 3, and book IV, c. 12, n. 18 ff.; On Genesis according to the letter VII, c. 12, n. 18 ff., and X, c. 24, n. 40 ff., where he attacks Tertullian, who thought that God and the soul are body. — A little above, after fieri, we have retained with the Vatican edition non-corpus in place of nisi corpus, which in many codices and editions 1, 2, 3 is wrongly held; or read: fieri aliquid aliud, nisi corpus. Shortly after, several codices have twice ex tota in place of ex toto.
  11. Dist. 17. a. 1. q. 2.
    Distinction 17, a. 1, q. 2.
  12. Ut dicit Boeth., de Unitate et uno. Cfr. supra pag. 445. nota 5. — Simili arg. usus est August., VII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 7. n. 10. seq., in solutione quaestionis: utrum in prima creatione praecesserit animam aliqua materia, ex qua facta sit. — In plurimis codd. et edd. 1, 2 desiderantur verba Non Angelus usque numero.
    As Boethius says, On Unity and the One. Cf. above p. 445, note 5. — Augustine uses a similar argument in On Genesis according to the letter VII, c. 7, n. 10 and following, in the solution of the question: whether in the first creation any matter preceded the soul, from which it was made. — In most codices and editions 1, 2 the words Non Angelus through numero are lacking.
  13. Codd. scribunt descindi.
    The codices write descindi.
  14. Ed. 1. cum paucis codd. producuntur. Magis placeret perducuntur.
    Edition 1 with a few codices reads producuntur. More fitting would be perducuntur.
  15. Prop. 5. 9. et 19. Cfr. supra pag. 29, nota 3.
    Propositions 5, 9, and 19. Cf. above p. 29, note 3.
  16. Part. I. a. 1. q. 2. ad 6. et a. 2. q. 2.
    Part I, a. 1, q. 2, ad 6, and a. 2, q. 2.
  17. Cfr. XII. Metaph. text. 39. seqq. (XI. c. 7. seq.), ubi agit de intellectu divino et dein de aliis Intelligentiis. Vide etiam librum de Causis, prop. 10, 18, 23. — Verba, quae mox sequuntur, sumta sunt, ut iam cod. F notavit, ex Isaac, de Definitionibus, et continent summam eorum quae ibi dicuntur de speciebus animarum. Nam secundum cod. lat. 8001 bibl. Regiae Monacensis ibi legitur: Restat scire, quod animarum sunt ordines tres, anima rationalis, bestialis, vegetalis. Omnibus autem excellentior est ratio, eo quod ipsa creata est ex intelligentia et de natura eius, et ob hoc factus est homo rationalis perceptibilis disciplinae, discernens inter bonum et malum et inter ea, per quae sit salvandus, vel damnandus. Inferior autem ea claritate et ordine est anima bestialis, quoniam [eo quod?] ex anima rationali creata est, et ideo elongata est a splendore, integre manens in tenebris, expers discretionis... Anima vero vegetalis, quae est desiderativa, est inferior omnibus animabus dignitate et ordine, eo quod creata est ex umbra animae bestialis, et propter hoc obtenebratur, procul remota a splendore intelligentiae propter multitudinem suarum tenebrarum privata sensu et motu... Ipsum [caelum] enim in horizonte animae vegetalis generatum est etc.
    Cf. Metaphysics XII, text 39 and following (XI, c. 7 ff.), where he treats of the divine intellect and then of the other Intelligences. See also the book de Causis, propositions 10, 18, 23. — The words which follow next are taken, as already codex F noted, from Isaac, On Definitions, and contain the sum of what is there said about the species of souls. For according to the Latin codex 8001 of the Royal Library of Munich it is there read: It remains to know that there are three orders of souls: the rational soul, the bestial, the vegetative. More excellent than all is reason, because it itself was created out of the intelligence and from its nature; and on this account man was made rational, capable of receiving instruction, discerning between good and evil and between those things through which he is to be saved or condemned. Lower in clarity and order than this is the bestial soul, because [in that?] it has been created from the rational soul, and therefore has been removed from the splendor, abiding entirely in shadows, devoid of discrimination... But the vegetative soul, which is appetitive, is lower than all souls in dignity and order, because it has been created from the shadow of the bestial soul, and on this account it is darkened, far removed from the splendor of the intelligence on account of the multitude of its shadows, deprived of sense and motion... For it [heaven] itself was generated on the horizon of the vegetative soul, etc.
  18. Libr. X. c. 6. n. 9. seqq. — Libr. III. de Lib. Arb. c. 21. n. 59. et 62; — Libr. I. Retract. c. 1. n. 3. — Cfr. etiam Epist. 166. (alias 28.) et 190. (alias 157.); III. de Peccatorum meritis et remiss. c. 10. n. 18.
    Book X, c. 6, n. 9 and following. — Book III On Free Choice, c. 21, nn. 59 and 62; — Book I Retractations, c. 1, n. 3. — Cf. also Epistles 166 (otherwise 28) and 190 (otherwise 157); III On the Merits and Remission of Sins, c. 10, n. 18.
  19. Hic c. 7. — August., X. de Gen. ad lit. c. 18. n. 32. seqq. — Liber de Ecclesiast. Dogm. est Gennadii.
    Here c. 7. — Augustine, X On Genesis according to the letter, c. 18, n. 32 and following. — The book On Ecclesiastical Dogmas is by Gennadius.
  20. Alluditur ad Deut. 6, 5; Matth. 22, 37. — Hoc arg. utitur August., de Quantit. animae, c. 34. n. 77. seq. Cfr. supra d. 16. a. 1. q. 1.
    Alluded to are Deut. 6:5; Matt. 22:37. — Augustine uses this argument in On the Quantity of the Soul, c. 34, n. 77 and following. Cf. above d. 16, a. 1, q. 1.
  21. Ioan. 5, 26: Sicut enim Pater habet vitam in semetipso, sic dedit et Filio etc. — Paulo inferius aliqui codd. sustentari, plures sustentificari pro substantificari. In fine articuli Vat. cum aliis edd., exc. 1, Creatore pro creatione.
    John 5:26: For as the Father has life in himself, so has he given to the Son etc. — A little below some codices have sustentari, several have sustentificari in place of substantificari. At the end of the article the Vatican edition with the other editions, except 1, has Creatore in place of creatione.
  22. Cfr. August., X. de Gen. ad lit. c. 1. n. 2.
    Cf. Augustine, On Genesis according to the letter X, c. 1, n. 2.
  23. Dist. 31. a. 2. q. 1.
    Distinction 31, a. 2, q. 1.
  24. Cap. 6. n. 9. seqq. — Codd. et edd. allegant librum X, in quo tamen, c. 1. n. 7. seq., pauca tantum de hac re habentur. — Cfr. infra d. 31. a. 1. q. 1. — Paulo superius aliqui codd. ut aa ee ex nihilo produci pro ex nihilo educi, et dein cod. V educi ex materia pro produci ex materia.
    Chapter 6, n. 9 and following. — The codices and editions allege book X, in which however, c. 1, n. 7 and following, only a few things on this matter are had. — Cf. below d. 31, a. 1, q. 1. — A little above some codices, such as aa ee, have ex nihilo produci in place of ex nihilo educi, and then codex V educi ex materia in place of produci ex materia.
  25. Cfr. August., X. de Gen. ad lit. c. 13. n. 23; Epist. 166. (alias 28.) c. 5. n. 15; Epist. 180. (alias 261.) n. 2.
    Cf. Augustine, On Genesis according to the letter X, c. 13, n. 23; Epistle 166 (otherwise 28), c. 5, n. 15; Epistle 180 (otherwise 261), n. 2. ---
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