Bonaventure

Quaestio II. Utrum animae omnium fuerint simul productae.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum animae omnium fuerint simul productae. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Iob quadragesimo¹: Ecce Behemoth, quem feci tecum: ergo Iob factus est simul cum lucifero; sed non est factum corpus: ergo est facta anima: ergo anima Iob facta est simul cum lucifero: ergo pari ratione et animae aliorum hominum productae sunt in primordio.

2. Item, Angeli simul producti sunt et corpora caelestia propter immortalitatem et incorruptibilitatem²: si ergo animae rationales sunt huiusmodi, videtur etc.

3. Item, animae omnes aequalis sunt durationis cum Angelis ex parte post: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod debeant esse aequalis durationis ex parte ante: ergo omnes simul cum Angelis fuerunt creatae.

4. Item, non est anima propter corpus, sed corpus propter animam³: ergo potius corpus deberet formari secundum exigentiam animae, quam anima produci secundum exigentiam corporis; sed illud, ad cuius exigentiam fit alterum, prius est: ergo videtur, quod omnes animae, antequam sua corpora sint, productae fuerint.

5. Item, reperimus spiritum, qui per naturam suam est omnino separatus, et spiritum, qui per naturam suam semper est coniunctus: ergo videtur, quod sit reperire spiritum, qui sit natus esse separatus et coniunctus⁴; talis autem non est nisi anima humana. Ergo si anima humana de sua natura est separata, ergo videtur, quod animae separatim a suis corporibus debuerint produci, et ita simul.

Ad oppositum arguitur sic.

Fundamenta.

1. In Psalmo⁵: Qui finxit singillatim corda eorum; Glossa exponit, id est animas: ergo animae factae sunt singillatim et successive, sicut et corpora.

2. Item, Augustinus in libro de Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus⁶: Tenendum est, quod animae non sunt simul creatae.

3. Item, hoc videtur ratione. Si animae essent creatae ante corpus, aut haberent usum rationis, aut non. Si non; quaero, quid impediret? et cum non sit dare, restat, quod si simul conditae fuerunt, statim habuerunt usum rationis; et si hoc, ergo meruerunt, vel demeruerunt, quorum utrumque est contra Apostolum ad Romanos nono⁷: Antequam aliquid boni vel mali egissent etc.

4. Item, si animae fuerunt simul creatae, aut volunt venire ad corpus, aut non. Si volunt, cum corpora illa sint infecta et poenalia: ergo sunt impiae et stultae, cum veniant voluntarie ad contrahendam culpam et poenam. Si nolunt, et mittuntur in corpora: ergo cum sint innocentes, fit eis iniuria, dum ante infligitur poena, quam commisissent culpam⁸.

5. Item, anima quamdiu est in corpore, mole corporis gravatur⁹: ergo melius est ei et perfectius est esse extra carnem quam in carne; sed non est ordo, sed perversio, procedere ad statum minus perfectum a statu magis perfecto. Si ergo Deus et natura ordinate facit quidquid facit, nec ordine naturae nec ordine divinae providentiae decet, animas simul creari et postmodum corporibus uniri. — Ad hoc etiam faciunt rationes, quae supra¹⁰ adductae sunt de anima Adae, ubi ostenditur, quod anima creata fuerit in corpore, et non ante.

### Conclusio. Animae humanae non fuerunt simul creatae.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc triplex est modus dicendi: unus secundum aestimationem aliquorum philosophorum, alter secundum inventionem quorundam haereticorum, tertius secundum instructionem sanctorum Doctorum.

Tres modi dicendi.

Primus. Primus modus dicendi est, quod animae simul fuerunt creatae in stellis comparibus, et post, formatis corporibus sibi idoneis, ad haec corpora vivificanda descendunt per lacteum caelum et alios orbes planetarum, et postmodum, corruptis corporibus, illuc revertuntur, et postmodum suo loco et tempore iterum descendunt; et cum descendunt, obliviscuntur prius cognitorum, et cum ascendunt, obliviscuntur malorum, quae in corpore habuerunt. Haec autem positio Platonis¹¹ fuit et suorum sequacium, et hanc multum nititur approbare Macrobius, exponens somnium Scipionis.

Reprobatur dupliciter. — Sed vere ista positio plus est somnium quam aliquod dictum authenticum. Primum quidem, quia talis creatio et descensus et ascensus nullam omnino potest habere certitudinem, cum nemo possit hoc convincere ratiocinando, nemo etiam sit, qui possit dicere, se talium recordari¹². Secundo vero, quia manifestam continet absurditatem: quia, dum ponit talem animarum circulationem, ponit, quod anima non sit vera corporis perfectio, cum «proprius actus in propria materia habeat fieri¹³». Ponit etiam, quod nulla possit esse beatitudo, cum illa non sit, nisi ubi est perpetuitas et certitudo, sicut ostendit Augustinus de Trinitate decimo quarto¹⁴.

Secundus. Secundus modus dicendi est, quod animae humanae simul fuerunt creatae in caelo cum Angelis, utpote quia sunt eiusdem naturae, et postmodum ad suggestionem dei tenebrarum peccaverunt, et merito illius peccati in corpora sunt detrusae tanquam in carceres, ut ibi purgentur, et cum purgatae fuerint, ad caelestem patriam revocentur. — Haec autem positio est haereticorum, qui dicuntur Manichaei¹⁵, Reprobatur sed etiam non solum est contra fidem catholicam, sed etiam contra philosophiam et contra sensibilem experientiam.

Contra fidem Catholicam est, cum ponat, animas ante peccasse, quam corporibus essent unitae, cum dicat Apostolus de Iacob et Esau ad Romanos nono¹⁶: Antequam aliquid boni et mali egissent; ponat etiam, nullam animam damnari finaliter, et ita timorem Dei auferat de corde. — Contra philosophiam est, dum ponit, animas circuire diversa corpora, cum «propria forma in propria materia habeat fieri¹⁷»; dum etiam ponit, quod corpus comparatur ad animam non sicut perfectibile, sed sicut carcer; quod si verum est, homo non est vera species, cum ex anima et corpore non fiat unum. — Contra rationem et sensibilem experientiam est, quia videmus, animam, quantumcumque bonam, nolle a corpore separari, secundum quod dicit Apostolus¹⁸: Nolumus exspoliari, sed supervestiri; quod mirum esset, si ad corpus naturalem aptitudinem et inclinationem non haberet sicut ad suum sodalem, non sicut ad carcerem. Videmus etiam, quod nihil novimus, nisi ea quae, postquam nati sumus, didicimus; quod non esset, si animae nostrae a primordio creatae fuissent et in caelo peccassent; multa enim alia scirent. Quodsi tu dicas, quod mole corporis oppressae obliviscuntur; quaero tunc: quare processu temporis non recordantur aliqua?

Tertius. Tertius modus dicendi est, quod animae non simul sunt creatae, sed successive producuntur in suis corporibus; et in hoc consenserunt omnes catholici tractatores; et adeo certum est, quod non licet alicui dubitare de animabus aliorum hominum

De anima Adae dubitat Augustinus. ab Adam. Nam de anima Adae dubitasse videtur Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram¹⁹, utrum fuerit ante corpus, vel in corpore creata. De istis autem non dubitat, immo improbat, quod ante corpus productae fuerint, duplici ratione movente circa animas aliorum hominum, quarum nulla reperitur in anima Adae. Prima est, quod animae, cum corporibus uniuntur, originalem culpam contrahunt et inficiuntur, ita quod nullam habent culpam actualem: ergo in eis nec meritum nec demeritum potuit praecedere nec liberi arbitrii usus nec deliberatio veniendi vel non veniendi ad corpus²⁰. — Alia vero ratio est, quia animae nostrae a sua prima origine sunt ignorantes nec noverunt ista quae per sensus addiscunt; non enim addiscere est reminisci, ut probant Sancti et philosophi²¹. — Et ideo animae nostrae hac duplici de causa non possunt dici ante corpora productae, tum propter ignorantiam, tum propter originalem culpam, quarum neutra fuit in anima Adae, quando in corpus fuit infusa: et ideo magis de illa dubitavit quam de istis. Probabilius tamen est de illa dicere, sicut supra²² ostensum fuit, quod fuerit creata in corpore.

Conclusio. De istis autem non solum debemus opinari probabiliter, sed etiam cogimur credere fideliter, quod ante corpora creatae non fuerint; et hoc omnes catholici sentiunt tractatores. Et sic, quando invenitur eorum auctoritas, quae videatur aliud sonare, pie intelligenda est; quia vel loquuntur secundum aliorum opinionem, vel si secundum propriam loquuntur, intelligunt, quod anima, priusquam corpori uniatur, creata est, non ordine temporis, sed naturae. Et sic intelligenda sunt verba Gregorii Nazianzeni et verba Damasceni²³ et verba etiam Augustini in libro de Anima et spiritu, qui dicit, quod concupiscibilitas et irascibilitas prius insunt animae, quam ipsa uniatur corpori. In omnibus enim istis magis notatur ordo naturae quam temporis. — Concedendae sunt ergo rationes ostendentes, quod animae non fuerunt simul creatae.

Solutio obiectorum.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur primo de Iob, dicendum, quod tecum non dicit ibi associationem quantum ad simultatem durationis, sed dicit conformitatem in participatione rationis, quasi diceret: Feci tecum, id est tibi similem.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Angeli sunt simul creati, quia incorruptibiles; dicendum, quod ista non est ratio tota; sed quia sunt incorruptibiles, ita quod non habent inclinationem ad alicuius alterius rei perfectionem. Anima vero, cum sit perfectio corporis, naturalem habet inclinationem ad corpus; et ideo, quamvis sit incorruptibilis et a corpore separabilis, debet tamen tunc produci, quando facta est formatio corporis, secundum exigentiam inclinationis ad corpus, quam non est ponere in Angelis. Qui autem hanc inclinationem negat esse in animabus, indiget sensu.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnis animae duratio a parte post est aequalis durationi Angeli, ergo et a parte ante; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia duratio aeviterni a parte post est infinita, et infinitum infinito non est maius; et ideo nulla substantia spiritualis incorruptibilis potest aliam excedere quantum ad durationem ex parte post. Quantum autem ad durationem ex parte ante est finitas, et ex illa parte potest esse excessus, et excedit duratio Angeli durationem animae propter naturam animae, per quam habet uniri proprio corpori ut perfectibili. Et quia corpora non decuit simul esse, sed successive produci; spiritus similiter humanos oportuit non simul produci, sed successive.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod corpus est propter animam; dicendum, quod verum est, sed tamen non oportet propter hoc, quod anima praecedat secundum rem, sed solum secundum inten-

tionem artificis; finis enim, etsi praecedat in intentione, tamen habet sequi in executione²⁴.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod deberet esse spiritus, qui modo sit separatus, modo coniunctus; dicendum, quod illa combinatio non est congrua, nec debet esse per naturam. Spiritus enim, qui naturaliter coniungitur corpori, nunquam natus est a corpore separari nisi propter poenam peccati. Cum enim sit incorruptibilis secundum naturalem institutionem, debet ei aptari corpus incorruptibile, cum non possit ab eo separari absque dolore²⁵; et ideo illa tertia differentia spiritus non debet naturaliter reperiri. — Posset tamen dici, quod competentius est, animam manere post corpus quam ante, quia incorruptibile necessario excedit corruptibile duratione ex parte post; sed commetiri se potest duratione ex parte ante. Et hoc quidem decebat esse in anima et corpore, cum proportio debeat esse perfectionis ad perfectibile, quanta potest esse.

Question II. Whether the souls of all human beings were produced simultaneously.

Secondly it is asked whether the souls of all were produced simultaneously. And that it is so, it seems:

1. Job, chapter forty¹: Behold Behemoth, whom I made with thee: therefore Job was made simultaneously with Lucifer; but [his] body was not made [then]: therefore the soul was made: therefore Job's soul was made simultaneously with Lucifer: therefore by parity of reasoning the souls of other human beings also were produced in the beginning.

2. Likewise, the Angels were produced simultaneously, and the celestial bodies, on account of their immortality and incorruptibility²: if therefore rational souls are of this kind, it seems etc.

3. Likewise, all souls are of equal duration with the Angels on the side of the future: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems that they ought to be of equal duration on the side of the past: therefore all were created simultaneously with the Angels.

4. Likewise, the soul is not for the sake of the body, but the body for the sake of the soul³: therefore the body ought rather to be formed according to the requirement of the soul, than the soul produced according to the requirement of the body; but that for whose requirement another thing comes to be is prior: therefore it seems that all souls were produced before their bodies existed.

5. Likewise, we find a spirit that by its nature is wholly separate, and a spirit that by its nature is always conjoined: therefore it seems that there must be found a spirit that is by nature suited to be [both] separate and conjoined⁴; but such a one is none other than the human soul. Therefore if the human soul is by its nature separate, it seems that the souls ought to have been produced separately from their bodies, and so simultaneously.

On the contrary it is argued thus.

Foundations.

1. In the Psalm⁵: Who hath fashioned the hearts of them one by one; the Gloss expounds, that is, the souls: therefore the souls were made one by one and successively, just as the bodies also.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the book On Ecclesiastical Dogmas⁶: It must be held that the souls were not simultaneously created.

3. Likewise, this is seen by reason. If the souls were created before the body, either they would have the use of reason, or not. If not; I ask, what would have hindered? and since none can be assigned, it remains that if they were created simultaneously, they immediately had the use of reason; and if so, then they merited or demerited, both of which are against the Apostle to the Romans nine⁷: Before they had done anything good or evil etc.

4. Likewise, if the souls were created simultaneously, either they wish to come to a body, or not. If they wish, since those bodies are infected and penal: therefore they are impious and foolish, since they come voluntarily to contracting guilt and punishment. If they do not wish, and are sent into bodies: therefore since they are innocent, an injury is done to them, when punishment is inflicted before they had committed guilt⁸.

5. Likewise, the soul as long as it is in the body is weighed down by the mass of the body⁹: therefore it is better and more perfect for it to be outside the flesh than in the flesh; but it is not order, but perversion, to proceed to a less perfect state from a more perfect state. Therefore if God and nature do whatever they do in an orderly way, neither by the order of nature nor by the order of divine providence is it fitting that souls be created simultaneously and afterwards united to bodies. — To this also tend the reasons which were adduced above¹⁰ concerning the soul of Adam, where it is shown that the soul was created in the body, and not before.

### Conclusion. Human souls were not created simultaneously.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that concerning this there is a threefold mode of speaking: one according to the opinion of certain philosophers, another according to the invention of certain heretics, the third according to the instruction of the holy Doctors.

Three modes of speaking.

First. The first mode of speaking is that the souls were created simultaneously in their corresponding stars, and afterwards, when bodies suitable for them have been formed, they descend through the milky heaven and the other orbs of the planets to vivify these bodies, and afterwards, when the bodies are corrupted, they return thither, and afterwards in their own place and time they descend again; and when they descend, they forget what was previously known, and when they ascend, they forget the evils which they had in the body. This indeed was the position of Plato¹¹ and of his followers, and Macrobius greatly strives to approve it, expounding the Dream of Scipio.

It is refuted in two ways. — But truly this position is more a dream than any authentic statement. First indeed, because such a creation and descent and ascent can have absolutely no certitude, since no one can convict this by reasoning, nor is there anyone who could say that he remembers such things¹². Secondly, because it contains a manifest absurdity: because, while it posits such a circulation of souls, it posits that the soul is not the true perfection of the body, since «the proper act has its coming-to-be in proper matter¹³». It also posits that there can be no beatitude, since that does not exist except where there is perpetuity and certitude, as Augustine shows in On the Trinity book fourteen¹⁴.

Second. The second mode of speaking is that human souls were created simultaneously in heaven with the Angels, since they are of the same nature, and afterwards at the suggestion of the prince of darkness they sinned, and by the merit of that sin they were thrust into bodies as into prisons, that they might be purged there, and when they have been purged, that they might be called back to the heavenly fatherland. — This indeed is the position of the heretics who are called Manichees¹⁵, It is refuted, and it is not only against the Catholic faith, but also against philosophy and against sensible experience.

It is against the Catholic faith, since it posits that the souls sinned before they were united to bodies, although the Apostle says of Jacob and Esau, to the Romans nine¹⁶: Before they had done anything good or evil; it also posits that no soul is finally damned, and so takes away the fear of God from the heart. — It is against philosophy, while it posits that the souls go round through diverse bodies, since «the proper form has its coming-to-be in proper matter¹⁷»; while it also posits that the body is compared to the soul not as a perfectible, but as a prison; and if this is true, man is not a true species, since one [thing] does not come to be from soul and body. — It is against reason and sensible experience, because we see that the soul, however good, is unwilling to be separated from the body, according to what the Apostle says¹⁸: We do not wish to be despoiled, but to be clothed over; which would be amazing if it had no natural aptitude and inclination to the body as to its companion, not as to a prison. We see also that we know nothing except what, after we are born, we have learned; which would not be the case if our souls had been created from the beginning and had sinned in heaven; for they would know many other things. But if you say that they are forgetful, oppressed by the mass of the body; I then ask: why in the course of time do they not recall anything?

Third. The third mode of speaking is that the souls are not simultaneously created, but are successively produced in their bodies; and in this all Catholic theologians have agreed; and it is so certain that it is not lawful for anyone to doubt concerning the souls of other human beings besides Adam.

Augustine doubts concerning Adam's soul. For Augustine seems to have doubted concerning the soul of Adam, on Genesis to the letter¹⁹, whether it was created before the body, or in the body. But concerning these [other souls] he does not doubt; on the contrary, he disapproves [the view] that they were produced before the body, for a twofold reason that moves him with regard to the souls of other human beings, of which neither is found in the soul of Adam. The first is that the souls, when they are united to bodies, contract original sin and are infected, so that they have no actual sin: therefore in them neither merit nor demerit could have preceded, nor any use of free will, nor any deliberation of coming or not coming to the body²⁰. — The other reason is that our souls from their first origin are ignorant, nor have they known the things that they learn through the senses; for to learn is not to recall, as Saints and philosophers prove²¹. — And therefore our souls, for this twofold cause, cannot be said to have been produced before the bodies, both on account of ignorance and on account of original sin, neither of which was in the soul of Adam when it was infused into the body: and therefore he doubted more concerning that one than concerning these. Yet it is more probable to say concerning it, as was shown above²², that it was created in the body.

Conclusion. Concerning these [souls of other men], however, we are not only to opine probably, but are even compelled to believe faithfully, that they were not created before the bodies; and this all Catholic theologians hold. And so, when their authority is found that seems to sound otherwise, it is to be piously understood; because either they are speaking according to the opinion of others, or if they are speaking according to their own [view], they understand that the soul, before it is united to the body, is created not by the order of time, but of nature. And thus are to be understood the words of Gregory Nazianzen and the words of Damascene²³ and also the words of Augustine in the book On the Soul and the Spirit, who says that concupiscibility and irascibility are in the soul before it is united to the body. For in all these [statements] is noted rather the order of nature than of time. — Therefore the reasons that show that the souls were not simultaneously created are to be granted.

Solution of the objections.

1. To that which is objected first concerning Job, it must be said that with thee does not there express association in respect to simultaneity of duration, but it expresses conformity in participation of reason, as if he were saying: I made thee with [me], that is, similar to thee.

2. To that which is objected, that the Angels are simultaneously created because they are incorruptible; it must be said that this is not the whole reason; but because they are incorruptible, in such a way that they have no inclination to the perfection of any other thing. The soul, however, since it is the perfection of the body, has a natural inclination to the body; and therefore, although it is incorruptible and separable from the body, nevertheless it must be produced when the formation of the body has taken place, according to the requirement of its inclination to the body, which is not to be posited in the Angels. But whoever denies that this inclination is in souls is in need of sense.

3. To that which is objected, that the duration of every soul on the side of the future is equal to the duration of the Angel, therefore also on the side of the past; it must be said that the case is not similar, because the duration of the everlasting on the side of the future is infinite, and an infinite is not greater than an infinite; and therefore no incorruptible spiritual substance can exceed another in respect to duration on the side of the future. As to duration on the side of the past, however, there is finitude, and on that side there can be excess, and the duration of the Angel exceeds the duration of the soul on account of the nature of the soul, by which it must be united to a proper body as to a perfectible. And because it was not fitting that the bodies be simultaneously, but successively produced; the human spirits likewise had to be not simultaneously produced, but successively.

4. To that which is objected, that the body is for the sake of the soul; it must be said that this is true, yet on that account it is not necessary that the soul precede according to the thing, but only according to the intention of the maker; for the end, although it precede in intention, yet must follow in execution²⁴.

5. To that which is objected, that there ought to be a spirit which is now separated, now conjoined; it must be said that that combination is not congruous, nor ought it to be by nature. For a spirit which is naturally conjoined to a body is never apt to be separated from the body except on account of the punishment of sin. For since it is incorruptible according to its natural institution, an incorruptible body must be fitted to it, since it cannot be separated from it without sorrow²⁵; and therefore that third difference of spirit ought not naturally to be found. — Yet it could be said that it is more fitting that the soul remain after the body than before, because the incorruptible necessarily exceeds the corruptible in duration on the side of the future; but it can be measured along with it in duration on the side of the past. And this indeed was fitting in soul and body, since the proportion ought to be of the perfection to the perfectible, [in the degree] which it can be.