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Dist. 19, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 19

Textus Latinus
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Articulus I. De hominis immortalitate ex parte animae.

Quaestio I. Utrum anima humana per naturam sit immortalis.

Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod anima rationalis non sit naturaliter immortalis.

Ad oppositum:

1. Primo per auctoritatem Apostoli primae ad Timotheum ultimo1: Qui solus habet immortalitatem; loquitur de Deo: ergo immortalitas non convenit alicui creaturae. Si tu dicas, hoc esse dictum, quia soli Deo convenit per naturam, animae hominis vero non convenit per naturam, sed per gratiam; contra: gratia non repugnat naturae nec naturam variat, sed potius conservat. Si ergo mortalitas inest omni creaturae per naturam, immortalitas, quae est conditio opposita, nulli creaturae inest per gratiam, ergo nec animae.

2. Item, Damascenus2: «Omne quod a versione incipit, in versionem tendit»; sed anima rationalis a versione incipit, cum sit creata, ut ostensum fuit supra: ergo tendit in versionem: ergo non est immortalis. Si tu dicas, quod tendit, quantum est de se, sed tenetur et sustentatur manu Conditoris; contra hoc est illud Augustini, septimo de Civitate Dei3: «Sic res, quas condidit, administrat, ut eas agere proprios motus sinat»; loquitur de Deo. Si ergo de se ad corruptionem tendit, divinae manus potentia non obsistit.

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3. Item, per auctoritatem Philosophi4: «Intellectus corrumpitur, quodam interius corrupto»; sed non corrumpitur intellectus nisi a corruptione animae rationalis: ergo anima rationalis non est immortalis.

4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione. Anima patitur in corpore per naturam, sicut planum est; sed «passio magis et magis facta abiicit a substantia5»; a quacumque autem substantia fiat aliqua abiectio, fit etiam aliqua corruptio, per quam aliquid inde corrumpitur; et omnis talis substantia est corruptibilis: ergo anima rationalis est corruptibilis.

5. Item, anima rationalis condolet corpori patienti: ergo magis patienti magis condolet et maxime patienti maxime compatitur: ergo videtur, quod morienti commoriatur.

6. Item, si substantia est incorruptibilis, et operatio correspondens illi substantiae, quia nunquam substantia privatur propria operatione6: ergo si destruitur et laeditur operatio, destruitur et laeditur substantia. Sed ad laesionem corporis laeditur et impeditur actus substantiae rationalis, qui est intelligere: ergo videtur, quod laedatur et ipsa substantia: ergo substantia est corruptibilis et mortalis.

Fundamenta. Ad oppositum sunt innumerabiles auctoritates et philosophorum7 et Sanctorum, et ideo ostendamus hoc rationibus. Ut autem sufficienter animae ostendatur immortalitas, attendendum est, quod anima habet considerari in ordine, et habet considerari in se: in ordine respectu universae creaturae, vel respectu divinae iustitiae, vel respectu finis, qui competit propriae naturae; et in se quantum ad virtutem, quantum ad actum et quantum ad obiectum; et sic sex modis considerari habet. (Modi 6 considerandi.)

1, 2. Et prima consideratio est secundum ordinem, quem habet inter creaturas universi, et secundum hanc considerationem ostenditur eius immortalitas ex duplici ratione. Prima est haec. In ordine creaturarum universi reperimus primam materiam et ultimam formam, et aeque vel magis est de complemento universi ultima forma, sicut et prima materia. Si igitur prima materia est incorruptibilis8, ergo et ultima forma; sed haec est anima rationalis: ergo etc.

Item, alia ratio ad idem. Ad hoc quod universum sit completum, necesse est reperire differentias creaturarum secundum perfectam combinationem; sed contingit reperire in universo substantiam habentem magnitudinem, existentem incorruptibilem, ut corpus caeli; et contingit reperire substantiam incorruptibilem, quae nec est magnitudo nec coniuncta magnitudini9: ergo contingit reperire substantiam mediam incorruptibilem, quae non sit magnitudo, sed coniuncta magnitudini; sed haec est anima rationalis. — Ex perfectione igitur ordinis universitatis colligitur, animam esse immortalem.

3, 4. Ex secunda consideratione, scilicet ex ordine divinae iustitiae ostenditur sic. «Nullum bonum est irremuneratum, et nullum malum est impunitum10» apud eum, qui iuste iudicat; sed multa bona remanent irremunerata, et multa mala impunita secundum praesentem vitam: ergo est ponere vitam aliam quam hanc; sed hoc non esset, nisi anima remaneret post corpus: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod hoc non cogit, quia, sicut suscitatur corpus, ita posset anima suscitari; non est conveniens talis instantia. Cum enim anima ex nihilo sit creata, si corrumperetur, in nihilum tenderet: ergo non suscitaretur, sed alia anima de novo crearetur11.

Item, ad divinam iustitiam spectat, quod nihil bene et iuste factum debet vergere in malum exitum; sed secundum moralem philosophum et secundum legem divinam et secundum etiam omnes sectas potius homo debet pati mortem quam recedere a veritate vitae et a veritate iustitiae12. Sed si omnino perimeretur anima, perimeretur omnino iustitia, quae est in ipsa: ergo talis mortis perpessio, quae iusta est, et quam laudat omnis ratio recta, malum haberet simpliciter exitum; quod est

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contra divinam iustitiam. — Colligitur igitur ex ordine iustitiae13, animam immortalem esse.

5, 6. Ex tertia consideratione, scilicet ex ordine ipsius animae ad proprium finem, ostenditur sic. Remoto ultimo fine, qui principaliter movet, omnes alii fines cassi sunt et vani; sed finis ultimus omnis operationis rationalis est beatitudo perfecta: ergo si illa non est, omnia quaecumque facit anima, facit frustra. Si ergo hoc est inconveniens, necesse est illum finem ponere. Sed «beatitudo est status omnium bonorum congregatione perfectus14»; ubi autem hoc est, necesse est, esse immortalitatem: ergo anima per naturam est apta nata ad incorruptionem et immortalitatem.

Item, omnis anima rationalis naturaliter appetit beatitudinem; sed nihil est otiosum in fundamento naturae: ergo omnis anima rationalis nata est ad beatitudinem pervenire. Ubi autem beatitudo, ibi perfecta securitas; ubi perfecta securitas, ibi immortalitas; ubi enim mors potest accidere, necesse est timere. — Colligitur igitur ex ordine ipsius animae ad suum finem, ipsam habere immortalitatem. Et haec triplex consideratio sumta est secundum triplicem ordinem ipsius animae, scilicet ad finem proprium, ad divinum iudicium, ad totum universum.

7, 8. Ex quarta consideratione, scilicet ipsius animae quantum ad propriam virtutem, arguitur sic. Nulla virtus materialis et corruptibilis nata est super se reflecti — haec per se manifesta est — anima rationalis secundum actum proprium nata est super se reflecti cognoscendo se et amando: ergo virtus animae rationalis non est materialis et corruptibilis15: ergo est immaterialis et incorruptibilis. Sed si virtus est incorruptibilis, et substantia: ergo etc.

Item, omnis virtus, quae per recessum et impermixtionem cum corpore corruptibili fortificatur et potentior efficitur, est incorruptibilis per naturam; anima rationalis est huiusmodi, sicut patet, quia tanto magis relevatur spiritus et homo interior, quanto magis mortificatur homo exterior16: virtus igitur animae rationalis est incorruptibilis. — Et sic ex sua virtute colligitur anima rationalis esse immortalis.

9, 10. Ex quinta consideratione, scilicet quantum ad operationem, arguitur sic. Cuiuslibet substantiae spiritualis, secundum esse et durationem pendentis ex corpore, operatio pendet ex corpore; sed anima rationalis propriam operationem habet, secundum quam non pendet ex corpore, scilicet intelligere, quia nullum organum sibi appropriat: ergo duratio animae non pendet ex corpore17. Sed ipsa de se corrumpi non habet, cum nullam contrarietatem habeat: ergo de se est immortalis et incorruptibilis.

Item, cuiuslibet substantiae corruptibilis operatio antiquatur et senescit in tempore; sed animae rationalis operatio nec antiquatur nec senescit in tempore, immo iuvenescit, quia in antiquis est sapientia, et in multo tempore prudentia18. — Ex propria ergo operatione colligere possumus, animam rationalem esse immortalem.

11, 12. Ex sexta consideratione, scilicet per comparationem ad obiectum, probatur anima rationalis immortalis esse sic. Necesse est, proportionem esse cognoscentis ad cognitum, sive potentiae ad obiectum; sed anima rationalis nata est cognoscere et intelligere veritatem; veritas autem est incorruptibilis, sicut probat Augustinus in Soliloquiis19, cum sit talis naturae, quod ipsa negatio veritatis veritatem ponat: ergo anima rationalis, cum sit veritati proportionabilis, est immortalis. Haec autem ratio non solum concludit, animam esse immortalem, per veritatem intelligentiae sive conscientiae, sed etiam per veritatem vitae sive iustitiae, de qua Sapientiae primo20 dicitur: Iustitia est perpetua et immortalis, ac per hoc anima, quae est iustitiae capax.

Item, omnis virtus corruptibilis laeditur ab obiecto improportionabiliter excellenti, et magis nata est delectari in medio quam in extremo. Sed anima rationalis, intelligens maiora et maxima, non propter hoc peius intelligit minora, et magis delectatur in cognitione summae lucis et perceptione sapientiae Dei quam in cognitione alicuius creati21. —

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Ex comparatione ergo ad obiectum colligitur anima rationalis esse immortalis. Si igitur substantia cognoscitur per virtutem, et virtus per operationem, et operatio per obiectum, cum secundum hanc triplicem considerationem ipsius animae ostensum sit, ipsam esse immortalem: omnis animae consideratio sive in se sive in ordine astruit animae immortalitatem.

### Conclusio. Animam rationalem esse immortalem, quadruplici ratione probatur.

Respondeo: Ad praedicta dicendum est, quod anima rationalis est immortalis, secundum quod dicit fides catholica, cui concordat philosophia et omnis ratio recta. Licet autem in cognitionem immortalitatis animae rationalis multiplici via possemus deduci et manuduci; potissimus tamen modus deveniendi in eius cognitionem est ex consideratione finis; et hunc modum praecipue approbat Augustinus in decimo tertio de Trinitate22 et in libro de Civitate Dei. Nec immerito, quia finis imponit necessitatem his quae sunt ad finem.

Ratio ex parte causae finalis. Hoc igitur primo supponendum est tanquam verum et certum, quod anima rationalis facta sit ad participandam summam beatitudinem. Hoc enim adeo certum est ex clamore omnis appetitus naturalis, quod nullus de eo dubitat, nisi cuius ratio est omnino subversa. Certissimum enim est nobis, quod omnes volumus esse beati. Si igitur beatus esse non potest qui bonum, quod habet, potest amittere, quia hoc ipso iam habet, unde timeat et unde etiam doleat, et ita unde miser existat; necesse est ergo, quodsi anima facta est capax beatitudinis, quod ipsa sit per naturam immortalis. Et sic colligitur eius immortalitas ex parte causae finalis.

Ex parte causae formalis. Colligitur etiam nihilominus consequenter ex parte causae formalis. Quia enim facta est ad participandam beatitudinem, quae consistit in solo summo bono, facta est capax Dei, et ita ad ipsius imaginem et similitudinem23. Sed si est imago Dei, expresse ei assimilatur; hoc autem non esset, «si mortis termino clauderetur24»: cum ergo de natura sua sit imago Dei, non potest mortis termino claudi.

Ex parte causae materialis. Ex hoc etiam habetur et colligitur ratio ex parte materiae. Quia enim ipsum quo est anima sive forma tantae dignitatis est, ut ipsam animam reddat Dei imagine insignitam, quae est conditio nobilissima: materia, quae huic formae unitur, tanto appetitu ei coniungitur, et ita eius appetitus in ipsa terminatur, quod nullatenus queat aliam formam appetere, cum optima colligantia iungantur ad invicem.

Ex parte causae efficientis. Et quoniam «quod bona ratione iunctum est, ei dissolvi velle non est Dei25», hinc est, quod Deus, qui fuit animae auctor, est continuus animae conservator. — Et sic patet ratio immortalitatis animae ex quadruplici genere causae, quamvis principaliter sumatur ex fine. Et istae sunt rationes ostendentes non solummodo, quia est immortalis, sed etiam propter quid est26. — Rationes vero superius inductae ostendunt, quod anima est immortalis, et verum concludunt, et ideo concedendae sunt.

Solutio oppositorum.

Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de Apostolo, dicendum, quod Apostolus dicit, solum Deum habere immortalitatem, quia solus est, qui potest summe se perpetuare sine alterius iuvamine. Anima autem, etsi sit secundum suam originem idonea ad immortalitatem, non tamen potest sufficienter se continuare in esse, nisi conservetur a summo Auctore; et illa conservatio est a gratuita Dei bonitate nec repugnat naturae ipsius animae quantum ad principia, ex quibus constituitur, sed potius conservat illorum principiorum appetitum.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Damasceno, quod tendit in versionem; dicendum, quod tendentia illa non est per aliquem appetitum virtutis, sed potius per defectum vanitatis, qua creatura est ex nihilo. Hunc autem defectum summa Veritas et Potestas sua praesentia et manutenentia excludit a creatura. Et quia sic praesens est animae rationali, quam fecit, ut eam nunquam deserat, quin sit in ea per potentiam, praesentiam et essentiam; ideo anima rationalis nunquam potest corrumpi. — Nec valet instantia, quam obiicit de verbo Augustini. Augustinus enim intelligit de motibus, qui sunt a natura, secundum quod natura dicit originale principium alicuius effectus, non secundum quod dicit defectum. Et sic intelligendum est etiam, quod gratia naturam perficit et ei non repugnat; et hoc melius explicatum est in libro primo, distinctione octava27.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Philosopho, quod intellectus corrumpitur etc.; dicendum, quod illud verbum pium debet habere intellectum. (Notandum.) Non enim

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credendum est, quod Philosophus voluerit dicere, intellectum esse corruptibilem, cum postea probet, ipsum impassibilem, incorruptibilem et immortalem esse, sicut in tertio de Anima28 expresse patet; sed vult dicere, quod operatio intellectus, quam habet in corpore, impeditur propter aliquam laesionem factam interius in organo imaginationis, vel alterius virtutis sensibilis. Et quantum ad hoc verum dixit, sicut patet et est manifestum sensui.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima patitur; responderi potest dupliciter. Primum quidem, quia passio eius non est per ipsius laesionem, sed per compassionem respectu corporis laesi: et hoc non ponit, aliquid de substantia eius abiici, sed de substantia, cui habet uniri. — (Alia solutio.) Aliter potest responderi, quod ipsa anima non solum in corpore, sed etiam extra corpus habet pati; nec tamen sequitur, quod habeat corrumpi: non enim est illa corruptio per partis ademptionem, sed per quietis et pacis continuam impeditionem. Hoc autem in quarto29 planius determinatum est, cum agitur de poenis animarum damnatarum.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima corpori condolet; dicendum, quod illa compassio non est, nisi salva coniunctione animae et corporis. Et quoniam mors separat illam coniunctionem, ideo non oportet compassionem mortis communicare, quia illa consequentia non tenet, nisi manente causa. Praeterea, illa consequentia non tenet, si anima maxime compatitur corpori maxime patienti, quod commoriatur morienti. Anima enim, cum sit capax laetitiae, est capax et doloris; sed cum sit capax vitae, nullo modo est susceptibilis mortis.

Ad 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod operatio animae laeditur vel impeditur: dicendum, quod hoc est per accidens solum. Quia enim anima magna inclinatione inclinatur ad corpus et corpori suas operationes communicat, et virtutes sensitivae ipsi virtuti intellectivae immediate subministrant30; inde est, quod laesis organis corporeis et impeditis viribus sensitivis, operatio intellectus, quamdiu est in corpore, habet impediri, ipso intellectu nullatenus in se laeso; quod ex hoc patet, quod statim cum a corpore separatur, habet suum usum completum. Et haec sufficiant quantum ad propositum.

Scholion.

I. Argumenta pro immortalitate animae humanae hoc loco allata et potissimum a S. Augustino accepta etiam in Summa de anima Ioannis a Rupella, p. I. c. 42. 43 (edita Prato 1882), aliis verbis proponuntur. — In solut. ad 3. Aristoteles absolvitur ab accusatione, quod immortalitatem animae non cognoverit; idem sentit S. Thom. cum communiore Scholasticorum sententia. Sed de hac re cum Henrico Gand. (cfr. supra schol. ad d. 18. a. 1. q. 1.) Scotus dubitat (IV. Sent. d. 43. q. 2. n. 16.) dicens: «Probabile est, quod Aristoteles in illa conclusione semper fuerit dubius»; Durandus autem (hic q. 1.), Aristoteli magis favens, primam opinionem reputat esse probabiliorem.

II. Scot., loc. cit., IV. Report. d. 43. q. 2. n. 10. seqq., et apud Hier. de Montefortino, t. II. p. I. q. 75. a. 6. — S. Thom., hic q. unica a. 1; S. I. q. 75. a. 6; S. c. Gent. II. c. 79. 80. — B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. p. II. tr. 12. q. 73. m. 2, et tr. 13. q. 77. m. 5.). — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. et dub. lat. 1. — Durand., loc. cit. — Dionys. Carth. de hoc aliqua habet II. Sent. d. 18. q. 1. — Biel, II. Sent. d. 16. q. unica.

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English Translation

Article I. On the immortality of man on the part of the soul.

Question I. Whether the human soul is by nature immortal.

Concerning the first [article] one proceeds thus, and it is shown that the rational soul is not naturally immortal.

On the contrary [side]:

1. First by the authority of the Apostle, 1 Timothy, last chapter1: Who alone has immortality; he is speaking of God: therefore immortality does not belong to any creature. If you say that this is said because it belongs to God alone by nature, but to the soul of man not by nature but by grace; against [this]: grace does not repugn nature nor change nature, but rather conserves it. If therefore mortality is in every creature by nature, immortality, which is the opposite condition, is in no creature by grace, therefore neither in the soul.

2. Likewise, Damascene2: «Everything that begins from change [versione] tends toward change»; but the rational soul begins from change, since it is created, as was shown above: therefore it tends toward change: therefore it is not immortal. If you say that it tends [thus] so far as itself is concerned, but is held and sustained by the hand of the Creator; against this is that [saying] of Augustine, On the City of God VII3: «He so administers the things which he founded, that he allows them to perform their proper motions»; he speaks of God. If therefore [the soul] of itself tends to corruption, the power of the divine hand does not stand in the way.

3. Likewise, by the authority of the Philosopher4: «The intellect is corrupted by some interior thing being corrupted»; but the intellect is not corrupted except by the corruption of the rational soul: therefore the rational soul is not immortal.

4. Likewise, this same [thing] seems [shown] by reason. The soul suffers in the body by nature, as is plain; but «passion made greater and greater casts away from the substance5»; and from whatever substance some casting-away takes place, there also takes place some corruption, by which something is thereby corrupted; and every such substance is corruptible: therefore the rational soul is corruptible.

5. Likewise, the rational soul condoles the suffering body: therefore [it condoles] the more-suffering [body] more, and the most-suffering [body] most: therefore it seems that it dies-with the dying [body].

6. Likewise, if a substance is incorruptible, also [its] operation corresponding to that substance, because a substance is never deprived of its proper operation6: therefore if the operation is destroyed and injured, the substance also is destroyed and injured. But upon the injury of the body the act of the rational substance, which is to understand, is injured and impeded: therefore it seems that the substance itself also is injured: therefore the substance is corruptible and mortal.

Foundations [for the contrary]. On the opposite side are innumerable authorities both of philosophers7 and of the Saints, and so let us demonstrate this by reasonings. Now in order that the immortality of the soul may be sufficiently shown, one must attend to this, that the soul can be considered in order and can be considered in itself: in order with respect to the whole of creation, or with respect to divine justice, or with respect to the end which befits its proper nature; and in itself as regards power, as regards act, and as regards object; and thus it can be considered in six modes. (Six modes of consideration.)

1, 2. And the first consideration is according to the order which it has among the creatures of the universe, and according to this consideration its immortality is shown from a twofold reasoning. The first is this. In the order of the creatures of the universe we find prime matter and ultimate form, and the ultimate form pertains as much or more to the completion of the universe as does prime matter. If therefore prime matter is incorruptible8, then also the ultimate form; but this is the rational soul: therefore etc.

Likewise, another reasoning to the same [conclusion]. For the universe to be complete, it is necessary to find differences of creatures according to a perfect combination; but it happens that there is found in the universe a substance having magnitude, existing as incorruptible, namely the body of the heavens; and it happens that there is found an incorruptible substance which is neither magnitude nor conjoined to magnitude9: therefore it happens that there is found a middle incorruptible substance, which is not magnitude but is conjoined to magnitude; but this is the rational soul. — From the perfection therefore of the order of the totality it is gathered that the soul is immortal.

3, 4. From the second consideration, namely from the order of divine justice, [the case] is shown thus. «No good is unrewarded, and no evil is unpunished10» with him who judges justly; but many goods remain unrewarded, and many evils unpunished according to the present life: therefore one must posit another life than this one; but this would not be unless the soul remained after the body: therefore etc. If you say that this does not compel [the conclusion], because, just as the body is raised, so the soul could be raised; such an instance is not fitting. For since the soul is created from nothing, if it were corrupted, it would tend toward nothing: therefore it would not be raised, but another soul would be created anew11.

Likewise, it pertains to divine justice that nothing well and justly done ought to incline toward an evil outcome; but according to the moral philosopher and according to the divine law and according also to all sects, man ought rather to suffer death than depart from the truth of life and from the truth of justice12. But if the soul were utterly destroyed, the justice which is in it would be utterly destroyed: therefore such a suffering of death, which is just and which all right reason praises, would have simply an evil outcome; which is against divine justice. — Therefore from the order of justice13 it is gathered that the soul is immortal.

5, 6. From the third consideration, namely from the order of the soul itself to its proper end, [the case] is shown thus. The ultimate end being removed, which principally moves, all other ends are empty and vain; but the ultimate end of every rational operation is perfect beatitude: therefore if that does not exist, whatever the soul does, it does in vain. If therefore this is unfitting, it is necessary to posit that end. But «beatitude is a state perfect by the gathering-together of all goods14»; and where this is, there must be immortality: therefore the soul by nature is born apt for incorruption and immortality.

Likewise, every rational soul naturally desires beatitude; but nothing is idle in the foundation of nature: therefore every rational soul is born to attain beatitude. But where beatitude is, there is perfect security; where perfect security is, there is immortality; for where death can come, one must fear. — Therefore from the order of the soul itself to its end it is gathered that it has immortality. And this threefold consideration has been taken according to a threefold order of the soul itself, namely to its proper end, to divine judgment, to the whole universe.

7, 8. From the fourth consideration, namely of the soul itself as regards its proper power, the argument runs thus. No material and corruptible power is born to reflect upon itself — this is manifest of itself — [but] the rational soul, according to its proper act, is born to reflect upon itself by knowing itself and loving itself: therefore the power of the rational soul is not material and corruptible15: therefore it is immaterial and incorruptible. But if the power is incorruptible, so also the substance: therefore etc.

Likewise, every power which by withdrawal and unmingling with a corruptible body is fortified and rendered more powerful, is incorruptible by nature; the rational soul is of this kind, as is plain, because the spirit and the interior man are the more raised up the more the exterior man is mortified16: therefore the power of the rational soul is incorruptible. — And thus from its own power it is gathered that the rational soul is immortal.

9, 10. From the fifth consideration, namely as regards operation, [the case] is argued thus. The operation of every spiritual substance whose being and duration depend on the body, depends on the body; but the rational soul has its proper operation, according to which it does not depend on the body, namely to understand, because it appropriates no organ to itself: therefore the duration of the soul does not depend on the body17. But of itself it does not undergo corruption, since it has no contrariety: therefore of itself it is immortal and incorruptible.

Likewise, the operation of every corruptible substance grows old and decays in time; but the operation of the rational soul neither grows old nor decays in time, but rather grows young, because in the ancients is wisdom, and in much time prudence18. — Therefore from its proper operation we can gather that the rational soul is immortal.

11, 12. From the sixth consideration, namely by comparison to the object, the rational soul is proved to be immortal thus. There must be a proportion of the knower to the known, or of the power to the object; but the rational soul is born to know and understand truth; and truth is incorruptible, as Augustine proves in the Soliloquies19, since it is of such a nature that the very negation of truth posits truth: therefore the rational soul, since it is proportionable to truth, is immortal. Now this reasoning concludes not only that the soul is immortal through the truth of understanding or of conscience, but also through the truth of life or of justice, of which it is said in Wisdom 120: Justice is perpetual and immortal, and through this the soul which is capable of justice.

Likewise, every corruptible power is injured by an object of disproportionate excellence, and is born more to delight in a mean than in an extreme. But the rational soul, understanding greater and greatest [things], does not on that account understand lesser [things] worse, and more delights in the cognition of the highest light and in the perception of the wisdom of God than in the cognition of any created [thing]21. — Therefore from comparison to the object it is gathered that the rational soul is immortal. If, therefore, substance is known through power, and power through operation, and operation through object, since according to this threefold consideration of the soul itself it has been shown that the soul is immortal: every consideration of the soul, whether in itself or in [its] order, establishes the soul's immortality.

### Conclusion. That the rational soul is immortal is proved by a fourfold reason.

I respond: To the foregoing it must be said that the rational soul is immortal, as the catholic faith says, with which philosophy and every right reason concord. Now although we can be led and led-by-the-hand to the cognition of the immortality of the rational soul along many ways, yet the most powerful mode of coming to that cognition is from the consideration of the end; and this mode Augustine especially approves in book thirteen of On the Trinity22 and in his book On the City of God. And not without reason, because the end imposes necessity on those things which are toward the end.

Reason on the part of the final cause. This therefore must first be supposed as true and certain: that the rational soul has been made to participate in the highest beatitude. For this is so certain from the cry of every natural appetite that no one doubts it, except one whose reason is wholly subverted. For it is most certain to us that all of us will to be blessed. If therefore he cannot be blessed who can lose the good he has — because by this very fact he has whence to fear, and whence also to grieve, and so whence to be wretched — it is therefore necessary that, if the soul has been made capable of beatitude, it be by nature immortal. And thus its immortality is gathered on the part of the final cause.

On the part of the formal cause. Likewise nonetheless consequently is it gathered on the part of the formal cause. For because it has been made for participating in beatitude, which consists in the highest good alone, it has been made capable of God, and so [made] to his image and likeness23. But if it is the image of God, it is expressly assimilated to him; but this would not be, «if it were enclosed by the term of death24»: since therefore by its nature it is the image of God, it cannot be enclosed by the term of death.

On the part of the material cause. From this also is had and gathered a reason on the part of matter. For because the very that-by-which the soul is, namely its form, is of such great dignity that it renders the soul itself stamped with the image of God — which is the most noble condition — the matter which is united to this form is united to it with such great appetite, and so its appetite is so terminated in it, that it can in no way desire another form, since the best-fitting [partners] are joined to one another.

On the part of the efficient cause. And because «what is joined by good reason — for it to will to be dissolved is not [proper] of God25», hence it is that God, who was the soul's author, is the continuous conserver of the soul. — And thus appears the reason for the soul's immortality from the fourfold kind of cause, though principally it is taken from the end. And these are the reasons that show not only that it is immortal, but also on account of what it is26. — But the reasons adduced above show that the soul is immortal and conclude true, and therefore are to be conceded.

Solution of the contrary arguments.

To 1. To that which is first objected to the contrary from the Apostle, it must be said that the Apostle says God alone has immortality because he alone is the one who can perpetuate himself supremely without the help of another. The soul, however, even if it is according to its origin suited to immortality, nevertheless cannot sufficiently continue itself in esse unless it is conserved by the highest Author; and that conservation is from the gratuitous goodness of God, nor does it repugn the soul's nature as regards the principles from which it is constituted, but rather it conserves the appetite of those principles.

To 2. To that which is objected from Damascene, that it tends to versio; it must be said that that tendency is not through any appetite of power but rather through a defect of vanity by which the creature is from nothing. But this defect the highest Truth and Power, by his presence and sustaining, excludes from the creature. And because he is so present to the rational soul which he made, that he never forsakes it but is in it through potency, presence, and essence; therefore the rational soul can never be corrupted. — Nor does the instance avail which is objected from a saying of Augustine. For Augustine understands [it] of motions which are from nature, according as nature means the original principle of some effect, not according as it means a defect. And so also it must be understood that grace perfects nature and does not repugn it; and this has been better explained in book one, distinction eight27.

To 3. To that which is objected from the Philosopher, that the intellect is corrupted, etc.; it must be said that that saying must have a pious sense [intellectum]. (To be noted.) For one must not believe that the Philosopher meant to say that the intellect is corruptible, since afterward he proves it impassible, incorruptible, and immortal, as is expressly plain in book three On the Soul28; but he means that the operation of the intellect, which it has in the body, is impeded on account of some injury made interiorly in the organ of imagination, or of some other sensible power. And as regards this he spoke truly, as is plain and manifest to sense.

To 4. To that which is objected, that the soul suffers; one can respond in two ways. First indeed, because its passion is not through its own injury, but through compassion with respect to the injured body: and this does not posit that anything is cast away from its substance, but [from] the substance to which it has [to be] united. — (Another solution.) Otherwise it can be answered that the soul itself has [to] suffer not only in the body but even outside the body; nor however does it follow that it has [to] be corrupted: for that corruption is not through removal of a part but through continual impedition of rest and peace. But this has been more clearly determined in [book] four29, where the punishments of the souls of the damned are treated.

To 5. To that which is objected, that the soul condoles the body; it must be said that that compassion is not [present] except when the conjunction of soul and body is preserved. And since death separates that conjunction, therefore one need not extend compassion to death, because that consequence does not hold except while the cause remains. Moreover, that consequence does not hold, namely that, if the soul most compassionates the most-suffering body, it dies-with the dying [body]. For the soul, since it is capable of joy, is also capable of sorrow; but since it is capable of life, it is in no way susceptible of death.

To 6. To that which is objected, that the operation of the soul is injured or impeded: it must be said that this is by accident only. For because the soul with great inclination is inclined toward the body and communicates its operations to the body, and the sensitive powers immediately subminister to the intellective power itself30; hence it is that, when the bodily organs are injured and the sensitive powers are impeded, the operation of the intellect, while it is in the body, is impeded, the intellect itself being in no way injured in itself; which appears from this, that as soon as it is separated from the body it has its complete use. And let these suffice as regards the matter proposed.

Scholion.

I. The arguments for the immortality of the human soul brought forward in this place and taken chiefly from St. Augustine are also proposed, in other words, in the Summa de anima of John of La Rochelle, p. I. c. 42, 43 (edited at Prato 1882). — In the solution to [argument] 3 Aristotle is absolved from the accusation that he did not know the immortality of the soul; the same is the opinion of St. Thomas with the more common opinion of the Scholastics. But on this matter, with Henry of Ghent (cf. above, scholion at d. 18 a. 1 q. 1), Scotus doubts (IV. Sent. d. 43, q. 2, n. 16), saying: «It is probable that Aristotle in that conclusion was always doubtful»; but Durandus (here q. 1), more favorable to Aristotle, considers the first opinion to be the more probable.

II. Scotus, loc. cit., IV. Report. d. 43, q. 2, nn. 10 sqq., and apud Hier. de Montefortino, t. II. p. I. q. 75, a. 6. — St. Thomas, here q. unica a. 1; S.T. I, q. 75, a. 6; SCG II, c. 79, 80. — B. Albert, here a. 1; Summa p. II, tr. 12, q. 73, m. 2, and tr. 13, q. 77, m. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1, a. 1, and dub. lat. 1. — Durandus, loc. cit. — Dionysius the Carthusian has something on this, II. Sent. d. 18, q. 1. — Biel, II. Sent. d. 16, q. unica.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 16. — Scil. I. Timoth. 6, 16: Qui solus habet immortalitatem.
    Verse 16. — Namely 1 Timothy 6:16: Who alone has immortality.
  2. Libr. I. de Fide orthod. c. 3. et II. c. 27. — Quod anima creata sit, vide supra d. 17. a. 1. q. 1. et d. 18. a. 2. q. 3.
    Book I On the Orthodox Faith, c. 3, and Book II, c. 27. — That the soul is created, see above d. 17, a. 1, q. 1, and d. 18, a. 2, q. 3.
  3. Cap. 30. — Paulo inferius post Si ergo de se supple cum cod. 0 anima rationalis.
    Chapter 30. — A little below, after Si ergo de se, supply with codex 0 anima rationalis.
  4. Libr. I. de Anima, text. 66. (c. 4.). — In cod. I post corrupto subiungitur ut patet in phreneticis.
    Book I On the Soul, text 66 (c. 4). — In codex I after corrupto is added ut patet in phreneticis.
  5. In cod. 1 additur ut dicit Philosophus, VI. Topic., in quo c. 3. (c. 6.): Nam omnis affectus (πάθος), cum magis fit, detrahit a substantia. — De maiori cfr. August., XXI. de Civ. Dei, c. 3. — Paulo inferius codd. L O substituunt aliquando pro aliquid inde.
    In codex 1 is added as the Philosopher says, VI. Topics, where c. 3 (c. 6): For every affection (πάθος) when it grows greater detracts from the substance. — On the major [premise] cf. Augustine, City of God XXI, c. 3. — A little below, codices L O substitute aliquando for aliquid inde.
  6. Cfr. supra pag. 197, nota 5.
    Cf. above p. 197, note 5.
  7. Sufficiat allegare Platonem, qui in Phaedone (ed. Serrani, tom. I. pag. 69. seqq.) immortalitatem animae variis argg. probat et contrarias opiniones refutat; Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 65. seq. text. 82. et 92. (c. 4. seq.); II, text. 11. 21. et 150. seqq. (c. 1. seq. et III. c. 3.); III. text. 4. seqq. 15. 20. (c. 4. seq.); II. de Generat. animal. c. 3; XII. Metaph. text. 17. (XI. c. 3.). In omnibus his locis profitetur Aristoteles, intellectum non dependere a corpore, posse ab ipso separari et esse incorruptibilem. Cfr. etiam Aristotelis fragmenta (ed. Firmin-Didot, tom. IV. pag. 48. seqq.), ubi testimonio variorum auctorum constat, Aristotelem scripsisse quendam dialogum, qui Eudemus intitulabatur, in quo immortalitas animae diversis argg. propugnabatur. Avicenna, V. de Anima sive sexti Naturalium, c. 2. et 4, decem signa affert, ex quibus colligi potest, animam rationalem esse incorruptibilem.
    Let it suffice to allege Plato, who in the Phaedo (ed. Serranus, tom. I, pp. 69 sqq.) proves the soul's immortality by various arguments and refutes the contrary opinions; Aristotle, I On the Soul, text 65 sq., text 82 and 92 (c. 4 sq.); II, texts 11, 21, and 150 sqq. (c. 1 sq. and III, c. 3); III, text 4 sqq., 15, 20 (c. 4 sq.); II On the Generation of Animals, c. 3; XII Metaphysics, text 17 (XI, c. 3). In all these places Aristotle professes that the intellect does not depend on the body, that it can be separated from it, and that it is incorruptible. Cf. also the Fragments of Aristotle (ed. Firmin-Didot, tom. IV, pp. 48 sqq.), where from the testimony of various authors it is established that Aristotle wrote a certain dialogue entitled Eudemus, in which the immortality of the soul was defended by various arguments. Avicenna, V On the Soul or of the sixth book of the Naturalia, c. 2 and 4, adduces ten signs from which it can be gathered that the rational soul is incorruptible.
  8. Ut docet Aristot., I. Phys. text. 82. (c. 9.).
    As Aristotle teaches, I Physics, text 82 (c. 9).
  9. Huiusmodi sunt tam primum movens sive Deus, ut probat Aristot., VIII. Phys. text. 86. (c. 10.) et XII. Metaph. text. 41. (XI. c. 7.), quam aliae substantiae separatae sive Intelligentiae, ut docet ibidem, text. 43. (c. 8.). — Cod. A post substantiam incorruptibilem subiungit ut angelica natura. — De maiori cfr. supra pag. 210, nota 11. — Simile arg. proponit Gregor., IV. Dialog. c. 3.
    Of this kind is both the first mover or God, as Aristotle proves, VIII Physics, text 86 (c. 10) and XII Metaphysics, text 41 (XI, c. 7), and also the other separate substances or Intelligences, as he teaches there, text 43 (c. 8). — Codex A after substantiam incorruptibilem adds as the angelic nature. — On the major [premise] cf. above p. 210, note 11. — A similar argument is proposed by Gregory, IV Dialogues, c. 3.
  10. Secundum Boeth., IV. de Consol. prosa 1. et 4. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 713, nota 2. Cfr. de hoc arg. Plato, Phaedo (ed. Serrani, tom. I. pag. 107.). Quod sequitur est Ier. 11, 20.
    According to Boethius, IV On Consolation, prose 1 and 4. Cf. tom. I, p. 713, note 2. Cf. on this argument Plato, Phaedo (ed. Serranus, tom. I, p. 107). What follows is Jeremiah 11:20.
  11. Aristot., II. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 70. (c. 11.) dicit: Quorumcumque autem non [incorruptibilis est substantia], sed corruptibilis, necesse est specie, numero autem non, reverti. Cfr. supra d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. scholion II. n. 2, ubi aliquid simile effectus asseritur ex S. Bonav. de actione creaturae respectu sui ipsius.
    Aristotle, II On Generation and Corruption, text 70 (c. 11), says: Of whatever things, however, the substance is not [incorruptible] but corruptible, they must return in species, but not in number. Cf. above d. 7, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, scholion II, n. 2, where something similar is asserted on the effect from St. Bonaventure on the action of the creature with respect to itself.
  12. Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 1: Quaedam autem fortasse sunt, ad quae perpetranda nemo cogi compellive potest [Ἔνια δ' ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκασθῆναι], sed potius extrema quaeque pati ac mori convenit.
    Aristotle, III Ethics, c. 1: But there are perhaps certain things to the perpetrating of which no one can be coerced or compelled [Ἔνια δ' ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκασθῆναι], but it is rather fitting to suffer extremes whatsoever and to die.
  13. Codd. Y ad divinae iustitiae.
    Codices Y read ad divinae iustitiae.
  14. Boeth., III. de Consol. prosa 2. — Principia huius et seq. arg. insinuantur ab Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 1. seq. et ab August., XIII. de Trin. c. 7. n. 10. seq.
    Boethius, III On Consolation, prose 2. — The principles of this and the following argument are intimated by Aristotle, I Ethics, c. 1 sq., and by Augustine, XIII On the Trinity, c. 7, n. 10 sq.
  15. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 15. (c. 4.): Et ipse [intellectus] etiam intelligibilis est, sicut ipsa intelligibilia. In his enim, quae sunt sine materia, idem est quod intelligit et quod intelligitur. Cfr. ibid. II. text. 136. seqq. (III. c. 2.), ubi ex materialitate sensuum ostendit, impossibile esse, quod eodem sensu, quo sentimus, etiam nos sentire percipiamus, adeoque alium sensum, scil. communem, esse admittendum. Idem dicit I. Magn. Moral. c. 17. (c. 18.) et Auctor libri de Causis, prop. 15. Avicenna, V. de Anima sive sexti Naturalium, c. 2. hoc arg. latius exponit.
    Aristotle, III On the Soul, text 15 (c. 4): And it itself [the intellect] is also intelligible, just as the intelligibles themselves. For in those things which are without matter, that which understands and that which is understood are the same. Cf. ibid. II, text 136 sqq. (III, c. 2), where from the materiality of the senses he shows that it is impossible that we should perceive ourselves sensing by the same sense by which we sense, and therefore another sense, namely the common [sense], must be admitted. The same he says in I Magna Moralia, c. 17 (c. 18), and the author of the book De Causis, prop. 15. Avicenna, V On the Soul or of the sixth book of the Naturalia, c. 2, expounds this argument more amply.
  16. Alluditur ad illud II. Cor. 4, 16: Sed licet is qui foris est noster homo corrumpatur, tamen is qui intus est renovatur de die in diem.
    Allusion is made to 2 Cor 4:16: But though our outward man is corrupted, yet the inward [man] is renewed from day to day.
  17. Vide Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 12. seq. (c. 1.) et III. text. 4. seqq. (c. 4.). — Ratio seq. prop. continetur in eo, quod anima cognoscere possit omnia (Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 37. c. 8.); si enim haberet contrarium, anima recipere non posset similitudinem sive speciem illius, ideoque nec illud cognoscere. Cfr. Plato, X. de Republ. (tom. II. pag. 608. seqq.), ubi ostendit, animae contraria esse vitia et ignorantiam, quae tamen nequeunt ipsam dissolvere. Idem respectu falsitatis asserit August., de Immortal. animae, c. 11. n. 18. seq.
    See Aristotle, I On the Soul, text 12 sq. (c. 1) and III, text 4 sqq. (c. 4). — The reason of the following proposition is contained in this, that the soul can know all things (Aristotle, III On the Soul, text 37, c. 8); for if it had a contrary, the soul could not receive the likeness or species of that [contrary], and so could not know it. Cf. Plato, X Republic (tom. II, pp. 608 sqq.), where he shows that the soul's contraries are vices and ignorance, which nevertheless cannot dissolve it. The same with respect to falsity Augustine asserts, On the Immortality of the Soul, c. 11, n. 18 sq.
  18. Iob 12, 12. — De hoc arg. cfr. Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 63. seq. (c. 4.); Problem. sect. 30. n. 4. (5.) et Avicenna, loc. cit.
    Job 12:12. — On this argument cf. Aristotle, I On the Soul, text 63 sq. (c. 4); Problems, sect. 30, n. 4 (5); and Avicenna, loc. cit.
  19. Libr. II. c. 2. — August. hoc arg. proponit ibid. c. 13. n. 24; de Immortal. animae, c. 1. n. 1; c. 4. n. 5; c. 6. n. 10; Epist. 3. (alias 151.) ad Nebrid. n. 4.
    Book II, c. 2. — Augustine proposes this argument ibid. c. 13, n. 24; On the Immortality of the Soul, c. 1, n. 1; c. 4, n. 5; c. 6, n. 10; Letter 3 (alias 151) to Nebridius, n. 4.
  20. Vers. 15. — Supra cod. aa bene scientiae pro conscientiae. Deinde Vat. veritatem misericordiae pro veritatem vitae.
    Verse 15. — Above, codex aa rightly has scientiae for conscientiae. Then the Vatican [edition] [reads] veritatem misericordiae for veritatem vitae.
  21. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 123. 143. (c. 12. et III. c. 2.) et III. text. 7. (c. 4.) docet, sensum laedi ex obiecto excellente, non vero intellectum.
    Aristotle, II On the Soul, text 123, 143 (c. 12, and III, c. 2), and III, text 7 (c. 4), teaches that the sense is injured by an excelling object, but not the intellect.
  22. Cap. 7. n. 10. seqq. — De Civ. Dei, VIII. c. 8; XIV. c. 25; XIX. c. 1. seqq. — Paulo inferius plures codd. percipiendam pro participandam.
    Chapter 7, n. 10 sqq. — City of God VIII, c. 8; XIV, c. 25; XIX, c. 1 sqq. — A little below, several codices [read] percipiendam for participandam.
  23. Secundum August., XIV. de Trin. c. 8. n. 11.
    According to Augustine, XIV On the Trinity, c. 8, n. 11.
  24. Cassiodor., de Anima, c. 8. et Auctor libri de Spiritu et anima, c. 18. Cfr. supra pag. 411, nota 3.
    Cassiodorus, On the Soul, c. 8, and the author of the book On the Spirit and the Soul, c. 18. Cf. above p. 411, note 3.
  25. Plato, in Timaeo (Chalcidio interprete, ed. Wrobel, pag. 43.). — Paulo superius post ad invicem Vat. addit Denique ex parte causae efficientis colligitur, et hic subiungit efficientis.
    Plato, in the Timaeus (Chalcidius's translation, ed. Wrobel, p. 43). — A little above, after ad invicem, the Vatican [edition] adds Lastly it is gathered on the part of the efficient cause, and here subjoins efficientis.
  26. Supple: immortalis, quod in uno alteroque cod., in Vat. et aliis edd., excepta 1, etiam additur.
    Supply: immortalis, which is also added in one and another codex, in the Vatican and other editions, except 1.
  27. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 86. m. 2. a. 2. § 1, ubi appetitum intrinsecum principiorum rerum explicat, de anima ait: Ergo cum anima sit substantia simplex et semper in actu, in ea fortis et potens actus et vigens est appetitus. Huius vigoris modum exprimens, maximus poetarum Virgilius (Aeneid. 6, 729) dixit: «Igneus est ollis vigor et caelestis origo, Seminibus» etc. Igneus vigor, quia subtilis et acutus; et caelestis origo, quia vis est indita divinitus.
    Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 86, m. 2, a. 2, § 1, where, explaining the intrinsic appetite of the principles of things, he says of the soul: Therefore since the soul is a simple substance and ever in act, in it there is a strong and powerful act and a vigorous appetite. Expressing the manner of this vigor, the greatest of poets, Virgil (Aeneid 6:729), said: «Fiery is the vigor in them and a heavenly origin, in their seeds» etc. Fiery vigor, because subtle and acute; and heavenly origin, because the force is divinely instilled.
  28. Part. I. a. 2. q. 2. Cfr. etiam ibid. d. 37. p. 1. a. 1. q. 1. seq. et in hoc libro d. 37. a. 1. q. 2.
    Part I, a. 2, q. 2. Cf. also ibid. d. 37, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1 sq., and in this book d. 37, a. 1, q. 2.
  29. Text. 4. seqq. 15. 20. (c. 4. seq.).
    Text 4 sqq., 15, 20 (c. 4 sq.).
  30. Dist. 44. p. II. a. 3. q. 2. et d. 50. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. seqq. — Paulo superius cod. O illa passio pro illa corruptio.
    Distinction 44, p. II, a. 3, q. 2, and d. 50, p. II, a. 2, q. 1 sqq. — A little above, codex O [reads] illa passio for illa corruptio.
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