Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 19, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 19

Textus Latinus

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Quaestio II. Utrum quaevis anima, etiam brutalis, ex prima conditione fuerit immortalis.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum omnis anima, utpote brutalis, non solum rationalis, ex prima conditione fuerit immortalis. Et quod sic, videtur:

Ad oppositum.

1. Ecclesiastis tertio¹: Unus est interitus hominis et iumentorum; sed homines, etsi intereant quantum ad corpora, non tamen intereunt quantum ad animas: ergo pari ratione nec bruta animalia.

2. Item, Sapientiae primo²: Deus mortem non fecit nec delectatur in perditione vivorum; igitur mors non est introducta nisi propter peccatum: ergo si homo non peccasset, nec moreretur ipse, nec moreretur brutum animal. Sed hoc non esset, nisi animae brutorum essent immortales: ergo etc.

3. Item, hoc videtur ratione. Probato, quod anima Petri sit immortalis, probatur, quod omnis anima sit immortalis per hypothesim³, quia non est maior ratio de una quam de alia, loquendo de animabus rationalibus; ergo pari ratione, loquendo de animalibus sensibilibus, si una anima sensibilis est immortalis, ergo et omnes. Sed anima sensibilis humana est immortalis, quia nunquam est rationalis sine sensibili: ergo cum in hac communicet homo cum brutis, anima sensibilis brutorum animalium per naturam est immortalis.

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4. Item, omnis anima, quantumcumque parum habeat de nobilitate, excellit omne corpus, sicut vult Augustinus, ergo magis accedit ad Dei similitudinem; sed aliqua corpora per naturam sunt immortalia, sicut corpora caelestia: ergo multo fortius animae brutorum animalium.

5. Item, substantia, cuius virtus et operatio non senescit in tempore, non corrumpitur in tempore: sed anima sensibilis est huiusmodi, quia, sicut dicit Philosophus, « si senex acciperet oculum iuvenis, ita videret, sicut iuvenis »: ergo etc.

6. Item, quia homo servit Deo, est dignus remuneratione; et ideo necesse est ponere animam eius immortalem, ut remuneretur post mortem: ergo pari ratione, cum bruta animalia serviant homini, et per hoc Deo in homine, videtur similiter, quod ipsa debeant remunerari.

Contra:

Fundamenta.

1. Nulla forma est separabilis a corpore, nisi quae habet operationem propriam praeter corpus; sed nullus spiritus brutalis est huiusmodi: ergo etc. Maior manifesta est, tum quia Philosophus⁴ dicit, tum etiam, quia nulla est substantia, quae omni careat operatione, cum nulla sit otiosa. Secunda manifesta est ad sensum.

2. Item, omnia bruta animalia facta sunt propter usum hominis⁵; sed usus hominis est in vescendo eis, et vescitur eis, dum ea occidit: ergo facta sunt ad hoc, ut non tantum serviant homini per vitam, sed etiam per mortem; sed hoc non esset, si animae eorum essent immortales: ergo etc.

3. Item, animae immortali debetur corpus immortale, quantum est ex institutione prima⁶: ergo si animae brutorum erant immortales, habebant corpora immortalia. Sed constat, quod bruta non peccaverunt: ergo deberent adhuc esse immortalia. Quodsi⁷ hoc constat esse falsum, patet etiam, quod et primum.

4. Item, si animae brutorum essent immortales, ergo deberent omnia corpora brutorum redire⁸, sicut et corpora hominum; sed si hoc, esset impossibile, quod omnia essent in terra, cum innumerabilis bestiarum multitudo et animalium continue sibi succedat: ergo inconveniens est dicere, brutorum animas esse immortales.

### Conclusio. Irrationales animae ex sua prima conditione sunt mortales.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod aliqui dicere voluerunt, brutorum animas esse immortales, pro eo quod eaedem animae sunt, quae vivificant corpora brutorum et corpora hominum, cum merito peccatorum suorum de corpore ad corpus circumeundo pertranseant. — Opinio 1. — Reprobatur. Et haec positio quorundam philosophorum et haereticorum fuit, sicut dictum est supra⁹, et iam improbata est supra tanquam haeretica; et prorsus abiicienda est ista positio tanquam vilis et derogans dignitati creaturae rationalis, dum ponit, homines et bestias esse pares. In hoc enim indicat, quod sui inventores et defensores sunt homines bestiales, dum animas suas credunt vel bestiarum fuisse, vel futuras esse¹⁰. — Notandum.

Opinio 2. Fuerunt et alii, qui dicere voluerunt, quod animae brutorum nec sunt adeo immortales, sicut animae rationales, ut possint post corpora vivere, nec sunt adeo corruptibiles, sicut aliae formae, quae habent contrarietatem; sed quantum est de sui natura, natae sunt continue durare, nisi impedimentum suae durationis habeant ex corpore, sine quo non possunt subsistere. Huiusmodi autem impedimentum durationis introductum esse dicunt in corpora brutorum propter peccatum hominum¹¹. Si enim Adam non peccasset, nullum animal brutum decederet. Unde sicut merito peccati humani quae ad eius obsequium facta sunt deteriorata fuerunt, sic et bruta animalia facta sunt morti obnoxia. — Sed improbatur tripliciter. Sed istud prima fronte obviat ei quod dicit Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram libro tertio¹², quod si homo non peccasset, nihilominus essent animalia viventia de rapina, quae ad suam vitam servandam alia interficerent animalia. — Repugnat etiam rationi, cum nulla ratio dicat, congruum esse, ovem interfici propter hoc, quod homo peccavit, cum nullo modo ei in peccato communicaverit, nec peccatum suum in ovem transfuderit. — Repugnat etiam imaginationi sensibili. Ubi enim essent tot animalia, quae multiplicata essent super terram ab initio

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mundi usque in finem, si nulla essent mortua? Quodsi dicas, quod non essent multiplicata, si homo non peccasset; quomodo etiam verum esset quod dicitur eis Genesis primo¹³: Crescite et multiplicamini et replete aquas? Quod si dictum est piscibus, cur non intelligendum est etiam dictum esse aliis animalibus? Nunquid propter culpam hominis facta sunt fecundiora? Quae omnia si inconvenientia sunt, positio ista tanquam inconveniens respuenda est.

Opinio 3. et Conclusio. Et ideo dicendum est tertio modo, quod nulla alia anima nisi rationalis immortalis est. — Et ratio huius apparet, si aspiciamus ad finem, propter quem creaturae factae sunt, ex quo fine ponitur in rebus perpetuitas, vel corruptibilitas, secundum earum exigentiam. Cum autem omnes creaturae factae sint propter Deum iuxta illud¹⁴: Universa propter semetipsum operatus est Dominus, sola creatura rationalis facta est ad fruendum Deo, et ut beatificetur in ipso, quae sola est ad imaginem. Aliae vero creaturae, quae solum tenent rationem vestigii, factae sunt vel ad manifestationem divinae bonitatis, vel ad obsequium creaturae rationalis. — Ratio ex fine principali.

Haec duplex. Manifestatio autem divini exemplaris et bonitatis Dei est in productione universi, quod est quoddam exemplatum, complete repraesentans illud exemplar, et propter repraesentationis completionem completam debet habere et perpetuam durationem. Universum autem dupliciter¹⁵ habet esse, videlicet decurrens et permanens. Esse decurrens non potest esse perpetuum, quia necesse est, quod aliquando sit quietum. Esse vero permanens est perpetuum. Illae igitur partes, quae respiciunt universum quantum ad esse permanens, sicut sunt orbes caelorum et elementorum, perpetuitatem habent. Illae vero quae respiciunt¹⁶ quantum ad esse decurrens, utpote quae consistunt in generatione et corruptione, qualia sunt mineralia, plantae et animalia bruta, non debent habere esse perpetuum, sed terminatum, quae quasi quodam transitu suo et quadam inveteratione et innovatione, morte et vivificatione decorant universum. Et sic patet, quod bruta animalia quantum ad corpus et animam corruptibilia sunt per naturam, in quantum facta sunt ad repraesentandum divinam bonitatem et sapientiam. Et haec ratio sumta est a fine principali.

Ratio secundaria. Est etiam alia ratio, sumta a fine non principali, in quantum scilicet creaturae, in quibus est sola ratio vestigii, factae sunt propter creaturam rationalem, scilicet hominem. Quaedam enim factae sunt propter hominem secundum omnem statum, sive viae, sive patriae; quaedam solum secundum statum viae; et quaedam solum secundum statum patriae. — Distinctio. Et illa quae facta sunt propter hominem secundum omnem statum, sive viae, sive patriae¹⁷, cum status patriae sit perpetuus, debent esse perpetua; et talia sunt quae integrant hominis habitaculum, sicut caelum et quatuor elementa. Illa vero, quae facta sunt propter hominem secundum statum viae, cum ille status sit pertransitorius et habeat finem, debent esse corruptibilia; talia autem sunt animalia bruta, quae facta sunt ad supplendam corporis indigentiam secundum eum statum, in quo indiget cibis et alimoniis. — Et sic concedendae sunt rationes ostendentes, animas brutales esse mortales ex sua prima conditione.

Solutio oppositorum.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur de Ecclesiaste, quod unus est interitus etc.; dicendum, quod loquitur quantum ad exteriorem intelligentiam¹⁸; et propterea subiungit¹⁹: Quis novit, si spiritus filiorum Adam ascendat sursum? quasi dicat: non novit homo, qui ambulat secundum intellectum carnalem, qui ea sola considerat, quae exterius apparent; homo autem sapiens novit, qui illud attendit, quod ipse Ecclesiastes in fine²⁰ dicit: Scito, quod pro omni errato adducet te Deus in iudicium.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de libro Sapientiae, dicendum, quod loquitur vel de morte damnationis aeternae, vel de morte temporali in eo cui mors est poena. Tale autem est solum animal rationis capax, quod, sicut solum natum est esse beatum, solum natum est esse miserum, sic solum natum est praemiari, solum natum est puniri, quia solum ipsum est, cui data est vis discretiva inter bonum et malum, verum et falsum²¹. Unde etsi bestia doleat, cum occiditur vel laeditur, non tamen punitur; non enim est capax miseriae; solus enim ille est miser, qui vel scit, se esse miserum vel scire debet, cum malum habet.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima sensibilis hominis est immortalis; dicendum, quod non est simile. Sensibile enim in homine nominat potentiam, scilicet animae rationalis, sicut infra²² patebit; sensibile vero in brutis nominat formam, quae substantificatur in materia transmutabili; et quia pendet ex illa quantum ad esse, corrumpitur, illa corrupta.

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4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima sensibilis est nobilior omni corpore; dicendum, quod maior nobilitas et minor non facit ad maiorem durationem creaturae — magis enim nobilis est etiam secundum statum naturae lapsae homo, quam sit lapis; tamen lapis plus durat modo²³ — sed hoc facit privatio corrumpentis causae. Et hanc habet anima sensibilis propter hoc, quod fundatur et pendet ex corpore composito ex contrariis, supra quam contrarietatem sublimata est natura caelestis.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima sensibilis non senescit; dicendum, quod verum est, quantum est per se; senescit tamen ratione eius in quo radicatur, scilicet ratione corporis, ratione cuius etiam habet corrumpi; et hoc ex conditione sua primaria.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod bruta serviunt hominibus; dicendum, quod servitium remunerabile non est nisi illud quod est laudabile. Sola autem potentia rationalis et deliberativa, in qua consistit arbitrii libertas, est, in qua cadit laus et vituperium; et ideo quantumcumque obsequium sit magnum et utile, non est dignum remuneratione, nisi factum fuerit ex arbitrii libertate: ideo non decet, remunerari animas brutorum. Et sic patet illud.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether every soul, even the brutish, was from its first condition immortal.

Secondly it is asked whether every soul, namely the brutish, and not only the rational, was from its first condition immortal. And that it was, seems thus:

To the contrary [Ad oppositum].

1. Ecclesiastes 3¹: One is the destruction of man and of beasts; but men, although they perish as to their bodies, do not however perish as to their souls: therefore by parity of reasoning neither do the brute animals.

2. Likewise, Wisdom 1²: God made not death, neither hath he pleasure in the destruction of the living; therefore death has not been introduced except on account of sin: therefore if man had not sinned, neither would he himself die, nor would the brute animal die. But this would not be, unless the souls of brutes were immortal: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, this seems from reason. When it is proved that the soul of Peter is immortal, it is proved that every soul is immortal by hypothesis³, because there is no greater reason as to one than as to another, speaking of rational souls; therefore by parity of reasoning, speaking of sensible animals, if one sensible soul is immortal, then all are. But the human sensible soul is immortal, because never is [the soul] rational without the sensible: therefore since in this man shares with the brutes, the sensible soul of brute animals is by nature immortal.

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4. Likewise, every soul, however little nobility it has, surpasses every body, as Augustine wills, therefore it more nearly approaches the likeness of God; but certain bodies are by nature immortal, like the celestial bodies: therefore much more so the souls of the brute animals.

5. Likewise, a substance whose power and operation does not grow old in time, is not corrupted in time: but the sensible soul is of this kind, because, as the Philosopher says, « if an old man took the eye of a youth, he would see thus as a youth »: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, because man serves God, he is worthy of recompense; and therefore it is necessary to posit his soul to be immortal, that he may be recompensed after death: therefore by parity of reasoning, since the brute animals serve man, and through this serve God in man, it seems similarly that they ought to be recompensed.

On the contrary:

Foundations [Fundamenta].

1. No form is separable from the body, except one which has its own operation apart from the body; but no brutish spirit is of this kind: therefore etc. The major is manifest, both because the Philosopher⁴ says it, and also because there is no substance which lacks every operation, since none is idle. The second [premise] is manifest to sense.

2. Likewise, all the brute animals were made for the use of man⁵; but the use of man consists in feeding on them, and he feeds on them when he kills them: therefore they were made for this, that they should serve man not only through life, but also through death; but this would not be, if their souls were immortal: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, an immortal body is owed to an immortal soul, so far as is from the first institution⁶: therefore if the souls of brutes were immortal, they had immortal bodies. But it is established that the brutes have not sinned: therefore they ought still to be immortal. But if⁷ this is established to be false, it is plain also that the first thing [is false].

4. Likewise, if the souls of brutes were immortal, therefore all the bodies of brutes ought to return⁸, just as the bodies of men also; but if so, it would be impossible that all should be on the earth, since an innumerable multitude of beasts and animals continually succeeds itself: therefore it is inconvenient to say that the souls of brutes are immortal.

### Conclusion. Irrational souls are, from their first condition, mortal.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that some have wished to say that the souls of brutes are immortal, on the ground that the same souls vivify the bodies of brutes and the bodies of men, since by the merit of their sins they pass through, going around from body to body. — First opinion. — It is reproved. And this was the position of certain philosophers and heretics, as has been said above⁹, and has already been disproved above as heretical; and this position is altogether to be cast aside as vile and derogating from the dignity of the rational creature, when it posits that men and beasts are equals. In this matter it indicates that its inventors and defenders are bestial men, when they believe their own souls either to have been or to be in future those of beasts¹⁰. — Note.

Second opinion. There have been others also who wished to say that the souls of brutes are neither so immortal as the rational souls, that they could live after their bodies, nor are they so corruptible as other forms which have contrariety; but as far as is from their own nature, they are born to endure continuously, unless they have an impediment to their duration from the body, without which they cannot subsist. And this kind of impediment to duration they say has been introduced into the bodies of brutes on account of the sin of men¹¹. For if Adam had not sinned, no brute animal would perish. Hence just as by the merit of human sin those things which were made for his service were made worse, so also the brute animals were made subject to death. — But it is disproved in a threefold way. But this at first sight conflicts with what Augustine says in his book On Genesis according to the letter, book three¹², that if man had not sinned, there would nonetheless be animals living by rapine, which to preserve their own life would kill other animals. — It is also repugnant to reason, since no reason says it is fitting that the sheep should be killed because man has sinned, when it has in no way shared with him in sin, nor has it transmitted its sin into the sheep. — It is also repugnant to sensible imagination. For where would those animals be, which would have been multiplied upon the earth from the beginning of

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the world unto its end, if none were dying? But if you say that they would not have been multiplied, if man had not sinned; how then would that be true which is said to them in Genesis 1¹³: Increase and multiply and fill the waters? Now if this was said to the fishes, why is it not to be understood as said also to the other animals? Or were they made more fruitful on account of man's fault? If all these are inconvenient, that position is to be rejected as inconvenient.

Third opinion and conclusion. And therefore it must be said in a third way, that no other soul than the rational is immortal. — And the reason for this appears, if we look to the end on account of which creatures were made, from which end is set in things perpetuity, or corruptibility, according to their need. Now since all creatures were made on account of God, according to that [text]¹⁴: The Lord hath made all things for himself, the rational creature alone has been made to enjoy God, and that it should be made blessed in him, and it alone is to the image. But other creatures, which hold only the character of vestige, were made either for the manifestation of divine goodness, or for the service of the rational creature. — Reason from the principal end.

This is twofold. Now the manifestation of the divine exemplar and of God's goodness consists in the production of the universe, which is a certain exemplated thing, completely representing that exemplar, and on account of the completion of representation it must have a complete and perpetual duration. But the universe in a twofold way¹⁵ has being, namely running and permanent. Running being cannot be perpetual, because it is necessary that at some time it be at rest. But permanent being is perpetual. Those parts, therefore, which respect the universe so far as permanent being, such as are the orbs of the heavens and of the elements, have perpetuity. But those which respect¹⁶ [it] as to running being, namely those which consist in generation and corruption, such as are minerals, plants and brute animals, ought not to have perpetual being, but terminated, which by a certain transit of their own and by a certain growing-old and renewal, by death and vivification, adorn the universe. And thus it is plain that the brute animals, as to body and soul, are by nature corruptible, inasmuch as they were made for representing the divine goodness and wisdom. And this reason is taken from the principal end.

Secondary reason. There is also another reason, taken from the non-principal end, namely inasmuch as the creatures in which there is only the character of vestige were made on account of the rational creature, namely man. For some were made on account of man according to every state, whether of the way, or of the fatherland; some only according to the state of the way; and some only according to the state of the fatherland. — Distinction. And those which were made on account of man according to every state, whether of the way, or of the fatherland¹⁷, since the state of the fatherland is perpetual, ought to be perpetual; and such are those which complete man's dwelling-place, like the heaven and the four elements. But those which were made on account of man according to the state of the way, since that state is transitory and has an end, ought to be corruptible; and such are the brute animals, which were made to supply the body's need according to that state, in which it needs foods and nourishments. — And thus the reasons showing the brutish souls to be mortal from their first condition are to be conceded.

Solution of the opposite arguments.

1. To that, then, which is first objected from Ecclesiastes, that one is the destruction etc.; it must be said that he speaks as to the exterior understanding¹⁸; and therefore he adds¹⁹: Who knoweth, if the spirit of the sons of Adam ascend upward? as if to say: the man does not know who walks according to the carnal intellect, who considers only those things which appear outwardly; but the wise man knows, who attends to that which Ecclesiastes himself at the end²⁰ says: Know thou that for every error God will bring thee into judgment.

2. To that which is objected from the book of Wisdom, it must be said that it speaks either of the death of eternal damnation, or of temporal death in him for whom death is a punishment. But such is only the animal capable of reason, which, just as it alone is born to be blessed, alone is born to be miserable, so alone is born to be rewarded, alone is born to be punished, because it alone is that to which has been given the discretive force between good and evil, true and false²¹. Hence even if the beast feels pain, when it is killed or wounded, it is not however punished; for it is not capable of misery; for only he is miserable, who either knows that he is miserable, or ought to know it, when he has evil.

3. To that which is objected, that the sensible soul of man is immortal; it must be said that it is not similar. For sensible in man names a power, namely of the rational soul, as below²² it shall be made plain; but sensible in brutes names a form, which is substantialized in transmutable matter; and because it depends on it as to being, when that is corrupted, it is corrupted.

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4. To that which is objected, that the sensible soul is nobler than every body; it must be said that greater or lesser nobility does not make for greater duration of a creature — for man is more noble even according to the state of fallen nature, than a stone is; nevertheless the stone now endures longer²³ — but this is the work of the privation of a corrupting cause. And the sensible soul has this on account of the fact that it is founded upon and depends on a body composed of contraries, above which contrariety the celestial nature has been raised.

5. To that which is objected, that the sensible soul does not grow old; it must be said that it is true, so far as is of itself; nevertheless it grows old by reason of that in which it is rooted, namely by reason of the body, by reason of which also it has corruption; and this from its primary condition.

6. To that which is objected, that the brutes serve men; it must be said that recompensable service is not anything except that which is praiseworthy. But only the rational and deliberative power, in which consists the freedom of choice, is that in which praise and blame fall; and therefore however great and useful the service may be, it is not worthy of recompense, unless it has been done from freedom of choice: therefore it is not fitting that the souls of brutes be recompensed. And thus that is plain.

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Apparatus Criticus

Vers. 19. — Scil. Eccle. 3, 19: Unus est interitus hominis et iumentorum.
Verse 19. — Namely Ecclesiastes 3:19: One is the destruction of man and of beasts.
Vers. 13. — Scil. Sap. 1, 13: Quoniam Deus mortem non fecit nec laetatur in perditione vivorum.
Verse 13. — Namely Wisdom 1:13: For God made not death, neither hath he pleasure in the destruction of the living.
Aristot., III. Topic. c. 4. (c. 6.) inter locos argumentandi recenset illum ex suppositione sive ex hypothesi, in quo scil. non proceditur a particulari ad universale, sive quando aliquis postulat, illud quod uni inest vel non inest, etiam omni inesse vel non inesse, « ut si hominis anima immortalis, et alias, si autem haec non, nec alias... Manifestum igitur est, quod qui hypothesi utitur facit problema universale particulariter positum; nam particulariter confitentem universaliter postulabit confiteri, eo quod uni, et omni similiter postulaverit inesse ».
Aristotle, Topics III, c. 4 (c. 6), among the loci of argumentation reckons that [argument] from supposition or from hypothesis, in which namely one does not proceed from the particular to the universal, or when someone postulates that what is in or not in one thing, is also in or not in all: « as if a man's soul is immortal, then also others; but if this one not, then not others either... It is therefore manifest, that he who uses hypothesis makes a universally posited problem out of one particularly stated; for he will demand that the one confessing particularly confess universally, on the ground that he postulated it to be in one and similarly in all ».
Libr. VII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 19. n. 23; XII. c. 16. n. 32; III. de Lib. Arb. c. 5. n. 16; de Duabus animabus contra Manich. c. 1. n. 4; Enarrat. in Ps. 145. n. 3. Cfr. III. de Lib. Arb. c. 5. n. 12; IX. de Civ. Dei, c. 9.
Book VII On Genesis according to the letter, c. 19, n. 23; XII, c. 16, n. 32; III On Free Choice, c. 5, n. 16; On the Two Souls against the Manichees c. 1, n. 4; Enarration on Psalm 145, n. 3. Cf. III On Free Choice, c. 5, n. 12; IX On the City of God, c. 9.
Libr. I. de Anima, text. 65. (c. 4.).
Book I On the Soul, text 65 (c. 4).
Libr. I. de Anima, text. 12. seq. (c. 1.) — De seq. ratione cfr. supra pag. 197, nota 5.
Book I On the Soul, text 12f. (c. 1) — On the following reasoning cf. above p. 197, note 5.
Cfr. supra d. 15, a. 2. q. 1.
Cf. above d. 15, a. 2, q. 1.
Vide art. 2. q. 1. et a. 3. q. 1. — Paulo inferius antiquiores codd. Quod etsi hoc, cod. aa Et si hoc pro Quodsi hoc, quod habet cod. cc cum ed. I.
See art. 2, q. 1, and a. 3, q. 1. — A little below the more ancient codices read Quod etsi hoc; codex aa reads Et si hoc in place of Quodsi hoc, which codex cc has with ed. I.
Libr. VII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 19. n. 23; XII. c. 16. n. 32; III. de Lib. Arb. c. 5. n. 16; de Duabus animabus contra Manich. c. 1. n. 4; Enarrat. in Ps. 145. n. 3. Cfr. III. de Lib. Arb. c. 5. n. 12; IX. de Civ. Dei, c. 9.
Book VII On Genesis according to the letter, c. 19, n. 23; XII, c. 16, n. 32; III On Free Choice, c. 5, n. 16; On the Two Souls against the Manichees c. 1, n. 4; Enarration on Psalm 145, n. 3. Cf. III On Free Choice, c. 5, n. 12; IX On the City of God, c. 9.
Cod. I resurgere.
Codex I reads to rise again.
Dist. 18. a. 2. q. 2.
Dist. 18, a. 2, q. 2.
Vide August., VII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 10. n. 14. seqq.
See Augustine, On Genesis according to the letter VII, c. 10, n. 14ff.
Cod. cc et ed. 1 hominis. — Mox post peccati humani codd. F aa addunt cetera, et dein plures alii codd. cum ed. I substituunt deteriora pro deteriorata.
Codex cc and ed. 1 read of man. — Soon after of human sin codices F aa add the other things, and then several other codices with ed. I substitute worse things for deteriorated.
Cap. 16. n. 25.
Chap. 16, n. 25.
Vers. 22.
Verse 22.
Prov. 16, 4. — Cfr. supra d. 16. a. 1. q. 1, d. 1. p. II. a. 2. q. 1.
Proverbs 16:4. — Cf. above d. 16, a. 1, q. 1, d. 1, p. II, a. 2, q. 1.
Cod. cc et ed. 1 duplex.
Codex cc and ed. 1 read twofold.
Supple cum cod. cc et ed. 1 universum.
Supply with codex cc and ed. 1 the universe.
Multi codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3, omisso secundo disiunctionis membro: quaedam solum secundum statum viae, omittunt etiam sequentia: Et illa quae facta... sive patriae.
Many codices with eds. 1, 2, 3, with the second disjunction-member omitted: some only according to the state of the way, omit also the following: And those things which were made... or of the fatherland.
Cap. 3, 21. — Paulo superius codd. AIY aa aliique apparentiam pro intelligentiam; fortasse melius.
Chap. 3:21. — A little above codices AIY aa and others read appearance in place of understanding; perhaps better.
Cap. 12, 14: Ut cuncta, quae fiunt, adducet Deus in iudicium pro omni errato, sive bonum, sive malum illud sit.
Chap. 12:14: That God will bring all things which are done into judgment for every error, whether it be good, or evil.
Cfr. supra pag. 433, nota I. De sequentibus cfr. August., de Natura boni c. 7. 8.
Cf. above p. 433, note I. On what follows cf. Augustine, On the Nature of the Good c. 7, 8.
Dist. 31. a. 1. q. 1.
Dist. 31, a. 1, q. 1. ---

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