Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 30, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 30

Textus Latinus

p. 714

Articulus I. De originalis peccati entitate.

Quaestio I. Utrum corruptio, quae est in humana natura, insit ei a suae conditionis primordio, an ex peccati merito.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum corruptio, quam videmus in humana natura, insit ei ex suae conditionis primordio, an ex peccati merito. Et quod non insit ex suae conditionis primordio, sed ex peccati merito, videtur tam ex ordine divinae iustitiae, quam ex ordine sapientiae, quam etiam ex ordine bonitatis. Differt enim triplex ordo in creaturis, quia per iustitiam fit ordinatio remunerationum et meritorum, per sapientiam vero ordinatio partium ad se invicem, per bonitatem vero ordinatio rerum in suum finem.

Fundamenta.

1. Ex parte divinae iustitiae arguitur sic. Nulli iuste infligitur poena, nisi praecedat culpa¹; sed nihil aliud est poena quam passio involuntaria in rationali creatura: ergo nullo modo talis passio fuit in homine, antequam praecesserit in eo culpa: igitur talis corruptio non fuit in humano genere a primordio suae conditionis, sed ex merito transgressionis.

2. Item, a summa iustitiae aequitate nulla procedit curvitas et obliquitas; sed humana natura non solum corrupta est corruptione poenalitatis, verum etiam corruptione curvitatis, quia videmus, homines ex corruptione sibi indita inclinari ad malum²: ergo nunquam a divina iustitia processit, quod humana natura sit corrupta in sui primordio: ergo si corrupta est, hoc est solum peccati merito.

3. Ex ordine autem sapientiae arguitur sic. Ubicumque est summa sapientia, ibi est summa pulcritudo, sicut exponit Augustinus in libro de Trinitate sexto: Quare species appropriatur Filio³; sed a summa pulcritudine nihil procedit foedum, nihil turpe, nihil quod rationalem offendat aspectum; sed in homine ratione utente sunt aliquae passiones connaturales, de quibus rationabiliter erubescit: ergo talis passio nunquam fuit in homine a sua prima origine; et fuit sic, vel merito transgressionis: ergo etc.

4. Item, ubicumque intelligitur summa sapientia, intelligitur summa veritas et summa aequalitas; sed a summa aequalitate nulla debet procedere improportionabilitas; sed duratio et conservatio corporis secundum statum praesentis miseriae est improportionabilis animae, quae est eius forma, quia hoc est temporale, illud perpetuum: ergo nunquam humana natura sic producta fuit in sui primordio a summa sapientia: videtur ergo, quod in hoc ceciderit ex propria culpa⁴.

5. Ex ordine divinae bonitatis arguitur sic. A summa bonitate nihil procedit, quod sit magis propinquum ad malum quam ad bonum, cum universa propter semetipsam summa bonitas operetur⁵; sed sensus et cogitationes hominum prona sunt in malum ab adolescentia sua, secundum quod dicit sacra Scriptura: ergo in illa corruptione, in qua est, non fuit humana natura a summa bonitate producta.

6. Item, nihil quod procedit a summa bonitate, est dignum maledictione; sed multae sunt in nobis passiones maledictione dignae, propter quas tam Iob⁶ quam Ieremias maledixit diei suae, in qua natus est, et in Lege maledicebantur steriles mulieres: ergo non videtur, quod humana natura in ea corruptione, in qua nunc est, creata sit a summa bonitate. — Videtur igitur, quod in hanc corruptionem et statum devenerit merito culpae, cum hoc sit contra ordinem bonitatis, sapientiae et iustitiae, contra quem ordinem inconveniens est Deum aliquid facere.

Sed contra: 1. Primo ostenditur, quod hoc non repugnet ordini divinae iustitiae, quia non est maioris innocentiae homo, quam sit ovis vel agnus; sed ovis mortalis et passibilis producta fuit a Deo, ita quod in nullo ex hoc derogatur divinae iustitiae⁷: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod si talem produxisset hominem, qualis nunc est, non videretur in aliquo derogari eidem.

2. Item, quod non repugnet ordini sapientiae, videtur. Secundum idem exemplar, secundum quod Deus produxit hominem de terra, produxit etiam alia animantia et corpora mixta; sed hoc non repugnat pulcritudini divini exemplaris, quod ex quatuor elementis composita sint corruptibilia, immo hoc facit ad ordinem universi, sicut in pluribus locis ostendit Augustinus⁸: ergo non videtur esse contra ordinem sapientiae, si Deus easdem proprietates et passibilitates a natura indidit hominibus, quas etiam dedit aliis animalibus.

3. Item, quod non sit contra ordinem bonitatis divinae, videtur. Ad summam enim bonitatem spectat dare unicuique inclinationem competentem suae naturae. Sed sicut anima rationalis delectari habet in bono simpliciter, ita et sensibilis in bono ut nunc; et sicut terra habet quiescere deorsum, ita et ignis sursum. Si igitur Deus omnibus dedit proprias inclinationes, igitur a primaria hominis constitutione erat diversitas appetituum in sensibili et rationali, erat nihilominus appetitus diversus in elementis corpus constituentibus. Si igitur diversitas primae inclinationis facit rebellionem, et diversitas secundae inclinationis inducit corruptionem⁹; videtur, quod si homo hoc modo conditus esset, in nullo derogaretur ordini bonitatis divinae.

4. Item, quod talis fuerit homo conditus, videtur posse persuaderi ex ratione, sumta secundum principia naturalis philosophiae. Cum enim homo sit minor mundus¹⁰, propter quem omnia facta sunt, debet habere naturalem conformitatem ad mundum maiorem, qui propter ipsum factus est a sua primaria conditione. Sed ita videmus in maiori mundo, quod inferiores orbes contrario motu moventur orbi superiori, secundum quod dicunt philosophi naturales: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod in homine per naturam portio sensitiva movetur contra iudicium rationis. Sed haec est corruptio, quae in nobis est maxime inordinata: si igitur haec est a prima conditione, videtur, quod et omnis alia.

5. Item, hoc videtur alia ratione, sumta per principia moralis philosophiae. Dicit enim moralis philosophus¹¹, quod virtus est difficillimorum operativa, nec est aliqua virtutis laus, ubi nulla est difficultas: si ergo homo fuit conditus ad virtutem dispositus, videtur, quod a sua prima conditione habuerit difficultatem faciendi bonum et vitandi malum, et in tali fuisset dispositus, quod omnis virtus habere posset in eo suum usum: ergo videtur creatus fuisse cum huiusmodi corruptionibus.

6. Item, hoc videtur ratione, sumta secundum principia theologiae. Dicit enim per Scripturam¹² Spiritus sanctus, quod via perveniendi ad gloriam et sublimitatem est per ignominiam et humilitatem; via perveniendi ad coronam est per tentationem et pugnam; via perveniendi ad quietem et tranquillitatem est per labores et tribulationes. Si ergo homo debuit sic fieri, quod esset dispositus pervenire ad gloriam et victoriam et pacem perfectam; videtur, quod humana natura in poenalitatibus et corruptionibus, in quibus nunc est, a suae conditionis primordio fuerit constituta.

Conclusio.

Humana natura in has corruptiones deiecta est merito primae praevaricationis, non instituta a primordio suae conditionis.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod absque dubio natura humana in has corruptiones¹³ deiecta est merito primae praevaricationis, non instituta a primordio suae conditionis. Hoc enim fidei veritas praedicat, sacrae Scripturae auctoritas confirmat, rationis probabilitas manifestat. Fides hoc clamat et dicit, Filium Dei passum esse, ut nos a morte eriperet, in quam nos induxerat primus parens. Sacrae Scripturae auctoritas confirmat, quae dicit Genesis secundo¹⁴, qualiter homo per culpam inobedientiae poenam mortalitatis incurrerit. Ratio autem hoc manifestat, sicut prius in opponendo monstratum est, tam ex ordine, qui respicit divinam iustitiam, quam ex ordine, qui respicit sapientiam, quam etiam ex ordine, qui respicit bonitatem summam.

Attendendum est tamen, quod ratio in inquirendo dupliciter potest procedere: aut prout est adiuta radio fidei, et sic procedit aspiciendo ad causas superiores; aut prout iudicio proprio relicta est, et sic procedit inspiciendo ad naturas et causas inferiores; acquirit enim scientiam per viam sensus et experientiae¹⁵. Primo modo ratiocinantur doctores catholici et fideles circa ea quae sunt fidei, et secundum hunc modum ratiocinandi¹⁶ multum est hoc consonum rationi, quod Deus in tanta miseria et calamitate, in qua nunc est, hominem a principio non fecerit; immo dicere contrarium magnae impietatis videtur esse piae et sanae menti. Secundo modo ratiocinando processerunt philosophi, qui non aspexerunt in hominis conditione suum principalem Auctorem, sed aspexerunt principia componentia et operationes, quas habet per virtutem naturae; et secundum hunc modum ratio potius discordat veritati catholicae, quam concordet. Et haec est ratio, quare philosophi, qui fuerunt tantae veritatis indagatores, non pervenerunt ad lapsus humani cognitionem, quia eis videbatur esse valde rationabile, hominem sic fuisse conditum¹⁷; cum tamen catholicis doctoribus non solum fide, sed etiam rationum evidentia certitudinaliter eius contrarium appareat esse verum. — Unde et rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, sunt concedendae.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod Deus fecit ovem passibilem, quae tamen non peccavit; dicendum, quod non est simile de homine et de ove; homo enim, qui rationis particeps est, capax est beatitudinis et iustitiae, et per oppositum culpae et miseriae. Unde sicut in homine obliquari culpa est, sic et pati poena est; in ove autem neutrum contingit reperire¹⁸. Ideo passibilitas ovis nihil facit ad ordinem nec contra ordinem divinae iustitiae, cuius est considerare meritorum exigentiam; non sic autem est de passione in natura humana.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod secundum idem exemplar alia genera animalium facta sunt corruptibilia; dicendum, quod non est simile, pro eo quod alia animalia ab homine non habent formam completivam incorruptibilem. In solo autem homine anima est immortalis per naturam, sicut ostensum fuit supra¹⁹; et ideo mortalitas in aliis animalibus non ponit aliquam improportionem perfectibilis ad suam perfectionem, sicut ponit in homine; ac per hoc nec ita repugnat mortalitas in aliis animalibus ordini, quem sapientia Dei servat in rerum conditione, sicut mortalitas reperta in homine.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod summae bonitatis est dare unicuique suam inclinationem; dicendum, quod hoc verum est, salvo ordine, qui attenditur inter res, secundum quod comparantur ad invicem; quoniam bonitas non praeiudicat sapientiae; et quia secundum ordinem naturae corpus debet esse subiectum animae, et sensibilitas²⁰ subiecta debet esse rationi: sic debuit Deus dare inclinationem tam corpori hominis, quam sensualitati carnis, quod in nullo praeiudicaretur rectitudini rationis. Et hinc est, quod etsi sensualitas bonum ut nunc appeteret, nulla tamen erat rebellio in primo homine, quia tantum appetebat, sicut ratio dictabat. Nunc autem est rebellio, quia praeter iudicium rationis frequenter appetit; et propter hoc brutales effecti sumus et iumentis insipientibus comparati, cum tamen homo in primordio conditus fuerit in honore et dignitate rationis²¹.

4. Et per hoc manifesta est responsio ad sequens obiectum, quod obiicit de diversitate motuum orbium caelestium. Etsi enim videatur ibi esse contrarietas, non tamen est ibi contrarietas, immo ordinatio recta, pro eo quod sphaera superior semper movet inferiorem, et nunquam inferior superiorem. Nunc autem in nobis non est sic, pro eo quod videmus aliam legem in membris nostris, repugnantem legi mentis nostrae et captivantem nos in servitutem peccati²².

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtus est difficillimorum operativa; dicendum, quod quaedam est difficultas, quae venit ex genere operis, quaedam vero, quae venit ex defectu operantis. Prima difficultas est de essentia virtutis. Virtus enim, in quantum virtus, circa magna consistit et ardua; haec autem difficultas in primo homine fuit sic. Homo enim ita perfecte Deo obedivisset et ita perfecte Deo adhaesisset, sicut perfectio virtutis obedientiae et amicitiae hoc requirit; et sic de aliis virtutibus²³. — Est et alia difficultas, quae venit ex defectu operantis; et ista quidem non est de essentia virtutis, immo accidit virtuti, secundum quod virtus est; et ideo ad hoc, quod homo esset virtuosus, non oportuit hanc difficultatem reperire²⁴ in homine in primordio. Et quod illud sit verum, hoc planum est. Quanto enim aliquis magis proficit in virtute, tanto magis operatur cum minori difficultate ex parte sua; si igitur haec difficultas esset de virtutis essentia, secundum quod homo proficeret, minueretur in eo virtutis excellentia; quod falsum esse nemo dubitat.

6. Ad illud autem quod obiicitur de via perveniendi ad salutem secundum sacrae Scripturae instructionem, dicendum, quod Scriptura sacra tradita est homini lapso et documenta tradit, per quae perducatur ad patriam, secundum quod competit statui praesenti. Ideo ex his non potest argui, quod talis debuerit homo fieri, ut per hanc viam deveniret; tales enim viae²⁵ sunt valde asperae. Si autem homo non peccasset, non cum asperitate, sed cum omni lenitate pervenisset ad suum finem. Et est simile: quia sanitas conservatur per bona cibaria et suavia, sed non recuperatur nisi per potiones amaras.

Scholion

I. Conclusio loquitur tantum de facto; et fide constat, corruptionem, sive ut alii cum S. Thoma loquuntur, defectus corporis et animae, quibus laborat genus humanum, originem habere a peccato Adae. Argumenta autem rationis, hic in fundam. et in corp. posita, sane debent intelligi, ne excludere videantur possibilitatem status naturae purae, quando scilicet Deo placuisset hominem non exaltare ad finem supernaturalem, sed eum creare dotatum solis donis naturalibus aptumque ad finem assequendum naturalem per operationes eiusdem ordinis. In hac hypothesi homo non esset aptus nec obligatus, ut tenderet ad finem supernaturalem, immediatam scil. visionem et fruitionem Dei; caruisset etiam tunc dono gratiae sanctificantis, atque donis integritatis. Hinc iisdem, ut in statu naturae lapsae, naturalibus premeretur defectibus, quae naturam humanam consequuntur, nisi Deus alio modo supplevisset; expers autem fuisset culpae originalis et captivitatis sub potestate diaboli (Concil. Trident. Sess. V. can. 2.). Possibilem autem fuisse statum naturae purae, exploratum est. Nam s. Sedes, condemnatis multis propositionibus Baii et etiam prop. 16. Synodi Pistoriensis, oppositam doctrinam tenendam esse docuit, scilicet dona tum gratiae sanctificantis tum integritatis non esse debita ex naturali exigentia et conditione humanae naturae, sed potius esse gratuitum Dei beneficium. Ad immortalitatem spectat condemnata Baii prop. 78: « Immortalitas primi hominis non erat gratiae beneficium, sed naturalis conditio » (cfr. prop. 17. Synodi Pistor.); ad defectus naturales in genere prop. 55: « Deus non potuisset ab initio talem creare hominem, qualis nunc nascitur ».

Quod autem S. Bonav. omnino alienus sit ab errore Baii, iam concluditur ex distinctione in corp. posita de duplici modo inquirendi rationabiliter circa hanc rem, scilicet vel suppositis nonnullis principiis fidei, vel ex sola rationis vi. De hoc autem modo philosophorum dicit, « quod tunc ratio potius discordat veritati catholicae quam concordet », dum S. Thom. (S. c. Gent. IV, c. 52.) docet, quod duce sola ratione, « peccati originalis in humano genere probabiliter quaedam signa apparent ». Hinc iam infertur, argumenta a S. Bonaventura allata, intelligenda esse in suppositione praesentis providentiae, quae hominem destinavit ad finem supernaturalem et ab initio fecit « hominem rectum » (Eccl. 7, 30.). — Quod autem immortalitas secundum corpus fuerit in Adam donum gratuitum, probatum est supra d. 19. a. 3. q. I. Saepius etiam asserit S. Bonav., quod naturalia remaneant integra post peccatum etiam in daemonibus (supra d. 6. a. 3. q. I. fundam. 2. et in corp. et etiam expressius III. Sent. d. 28. q. 2. ad 3.), quia « quod est naturale est indelebile » (supra d. 7. p. II. a. I. q. 2. fundam. 1.). De corruptione, quam infert peccatum, cfr. infra d. 37. praesertim a. 2. — Etiam illud principium (fundam. I.), quod poena non infligatur, nisi praecedat culpa, si intelligitur de omni passione rationalis creaturae, non valet, nisi supposita praesente providentia, quam fide tantum novimus (cfr. Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2.).

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 106. m. 1. — Scot., in utroque Scripto, II. Sent. d. 19. q. unica. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. 1. 11. q. 85. a. 5. 6; S. c. Gent. IV. c. 50-53; de Malo, q. 5. a. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. p. II. tr. 17. q. 107. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 2. 3. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

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English Translation

Article I. On the entity of original sin.

Question I. Whether the corruption that is in human nature belongs to it from the beginning of its condition, or from the merit of sin.

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and asks whether the corruption that we see in human nature belongs to it from the beginning of its condition, or from the merit of sin. And that it does not belong to it from the beginning of its condition, but from the merit of sin, seems [to follow] both from the order of divine justice, and from the order of wisdom, and also from the order of goodness. For a threefold order differs in creatures, since through justice there comes about the ordering of recompenses and merits, through wisdom the ordering of parts to one another, and through goodness the ordering of things to their end.

Arguments.

1. From the side of divine justice it is argued thus. To no one is a penalty justly inflicted unless a fault precede¹; but a penalty is nothing other than an involuntary suffering in a rational creature: therefore in no way was such a suffering in man before a fault had preceded in him: therefore such corruption was not in the human race from the beginning of its condition, but from the merit of transgression.

2. Likewise, from the supreme equity of justice no crookedness and obliquity proceeds; but human nature is corrupted not only by the corruption of penalty, but also by the corruption of crookedness, since we see that men are inclined to evil by the corruption implanted in them²: therefore it never proceeded from divine justice that human nature should be corrupted in its beginning: therefore if it is corrupted, this is solely by the merit of sin.

3. From the order of wisdom it is argued thus. Wherever there is supreme wisdom, there is supreme beauty, as Augustine explains in the sixth book On the Trinity: Why beauty (species) is appropriated to the Son³; but from supreme beauty nothing foul proceeds, nothing base, nothing that would offend the rational gaze; but in man, who uses reason, there are certain connatural passions of which he is reasonably ashamed: therefore such a passion was never in man from his first origin; and it was so, [if at all,] by the merit of transgression: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, wherever supreme wisdom is understood, supreme truth and supreme equality is understood; but from supreme equality no disproportion ought to proceed; but the duration and conservation of the body according to the state of the present misery is disproportionate to the soul, which is its form, since the one is temporal, the other perpetual: therefore human nature was never thus produced in its beginning by supreme wisdom: it seems therefore that it has fallen into this by its own fault⁴.

5. From the order of divine goodness it is argued thus. From supreme goodness nothing proceeds that is more inclined to evil than to good, since supreme goodness works all things for its own sake⁵; but the senses and thoughts of men are prone to evil from their youth, according to what sacred Scripture says: therefore in that corruption in which it is, human nature was not produced by supreme goodness.

6. Likewise, nothing that proceeds from supreme goodness is worthy of malediction; but there are many passions in us worthy of malediction, on account of which both Job⁶ and Jeremiah cursed the day on which they were born, and in the Law barren women were cursed: therefore it does not seem that human nature was created by supreme goodness in that corruption in which it now is. — It seems therefore that it has come into this corruption and state by the merit of fault, since this is against the order of goodness, wisdom, and justice, against which order it is unfitting that God should make anything.

On the contrary: 1. First it is shown that this is not repugnant to the order of divine justice, since man is not of greater innocence than a sheep or a lamb is; but a sheep was produced by God mortal and passible, in such a way that nothing is thereby derogated from divine justice⁷: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems that, if He had produced such a man as he now is, it would not seem that anything was derogated from the same.

2. Likewise, that it is not repugnant to the order of wisdom seems [true]. According to the same exemplar by which God produced man from the earth, He also produced other animals and mixed bodies; but it is not repugnant to the beauty of the divine exemplar that things composed of the four elements should be corruptible — rather, this makes for the order of the universe, as Augustine shows in many places⁸: therefore it does not seem to be against the order of wisdom if God endowed men by nature with the same properties and passibilities that He also gave to other animals.

3. Likewise, that it is not against the order of divine goodness seems [true]. For it belongs to supreme goodness to give to each thing an inclination befitting its nature. But just as the rational soul has its delight in the good simply, so also the sensible [soul] in the good as now [presented]; and just as earth tends to rest downward, so fire upward. If therefore God gave to all their proper inclinations, then from the primary constitution of man there was a diversity of appetites in the sensible and the rational, and there was likewise a diverse appetite in the elements constituting the body. If therefore the diversity of the first inclination produces rebellion, and the diversity of the second inclination induces corruption⁹; it seems that, if man had been constituted in this manner, nothing would be derogated from the order of divine goodness.

4. Likewise, that man was so constituted can seem to be persuaded by a reason taken according to the principles of natural philosophy. For since man is a lesser world¹⁰, for whom all things were made, he ought to have a natural conformity to the greater world, which was made for his sake from its primary condition. But thus we see in the greater world that the lower spheres are moved by a contrary motion to the higher sphere, according to what the natural philosophers say: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems that in man by nature the sensitive portion is moved against the judgment of reason. But this is the corruption that is most disordered in us: if therefore this is from the first condition, it seems that every other [corruption] is also.

5. Likewise, this seems [to follow] by another reason, taken from the principles of moral philosophy. For the moral philosopher says¹¹ that virtue is operative about the most difficult things, nor is there any praise of virtue where there is no difficulty: if therefore man was constituted disposed for virtue, it seems that from his first condition he had the difficulty of doing good and avoiding evil, and was disposed in such a way that every virtue could have its use in him: therefore it seems he was created with corruptions of this kind.

6. Likewise, this seems [to follow] by a reason taken according to the principles of theology. For the Holy Spirit says through Scripture¹² that the way of attaining glory and sublimity is through ignominy and humility; the way of attaining the crown is through temptation and combat; the way of attaining rest and tranquillity is through labors and tribulations. If therefore man had to be so made that he was disposed to attain glory and victory and perfect peace; it seems that human nature was constituted, from the beginning of its condition, in the penalties and corruptions in which it now is.

Conclusion.

Human nature has been cast down into these corruptions by the merit of the first transgression, not instituted [so] from the beginning of its condition.

I respond: It must be said that, without doubt, human nature has been cast down into these corruptions¹³ by the merit of the first transgression, not instituted [so] from the beginning of its condition. For the truth of faith proclaims this, the authority of sacred Scripture confirms it, the probability of reason manifests it. Faith cries this out and says that the Son of God suffered in order to rescue us from the death into which the first parent had led us. The authority of sacred Scripture confirms it, which says in Genesis 2¹⁴ how man through the fault of disobedience incurred the penalty of mortality. Reason manifests it, as was shown above in the objecting, both from the order that regards divine justice, and from the order that regards wisdom, and also from the order that regards supreme goodness.

It must be noted, however, that reason in its inquiring can proceed in two ways: either insofar as it is aided by the ray of faith, and thus it proceeds by looking to the higher causes; or insofar as it is left to its own judgment, and thus it proceeds by examining natures and lower causes; for it acquires knowledge by the way of sense and experience¹⁵. In the first way the catholic doctors and the faithful reason about the things that are of faith, and according to this manner of reasoning¹⁶ it is much consonant with reason that God did not make man, from the beginning, in the great misery and calamity in which he now is; rather, to say the contrary seems to a pious and sound mind to be [a thing] of great impiety. In the second way of reasoning the philosophers proceeded, who did not look in the condition of man to his principal Author, but looked to the constituting principles and the operations that he has by the power of nature; and according to this manner reason rather discords with catholic truth than agrees with it. And this is the reason why the philosophers, who were such great investigators of truth, did not arrive at the knowledge of the human fall, because it seemed to them very reasonable that man was so constituted¹⁷; whereas to the catholic doctors not only by faith, but also by the evidence of reasons, the contrary of it appears certainly to be true. — Hence the reasons too which show this are to be conceded.

1. To that, then, which is first objected, that God made the sheep passible, which nevertheless did not sin; it must be said that the case of man and of the sheep is not alike; for man, who is a partaker of reason, is capable of beatitude and justice, and conversely of fault and misery. Hence just as in man to be made crooked is a fault, so also to suffer is a penalty; but in the sheep neither happens to be found¹⁸. Therefore the passibility of the sheep makes nothing toward the order nor against the order of divine justice, whose [office] is to consider the exigency of merits; but it is not so with passion in human nature.

2. To that which is objected, that according to the same exemplar other kinds of animals were made corruptible; it must be said that the case is not alike, for the reason that other animals, unlike man, do not have a completive incorruptible form. But in man alone the soul is immortal by nature, as was shown above¹⁹; and therefore mortality in other animals does not posit any disproportion of the perfectible to its perfection, as it posits in man; and on account of this, mortality in other animals is not so repugnant to the order which the wisdom of God preserves in the condition of things, as the mortality found in man.

3. To that which is objected, that it belongs to supreme goodness to give to each its own inclination; it must be said that this is true, the order being preserved which is attended to among things insofar as they are compared to one another; since goodness does not prejudice wisdom; and because according to the order of nature the body ought to be subject to the soul, and sensibility²⁰ ought to be subject to reason: thus God ought to have given an inclination to the body of man as well as to the sensuality of the flesh, in such a way that the rectitude of reason would in no way be prejudiced. And hence it is that, even though sensuality desired the good as now [presented], there was nevertheless no rebellion in the first man, since it desired only as reason dictated. But now there is rebellion, since it frequently desires beyond the judgment of reason; and on account of this we have been made brutish and likened to senseless beasts of burden, although man was in the beginning constituted in the honor and dignity of reason²¹.

4. And through this the response is manifest to the following objection, which objects concerning the diversity of motions of the heavenly spheres. For although there seem to be a contrariety there, yet there is no contrariety there, but rather a right ordering, for the reason that the higher sphere always moves the lower, and never the lower the higher. But now in us it is not so, for the reason that we see another law in our members, repugnant to the law of our mind and captivating us into the servitude of sin²².

5. To that which is objected, that virtue is operative of the most difficult things; it must be said that there is a certain difficulty which comes from the kind of work, and a certain other which comes from the defect of the one working. The first difficulty is of the essence of virtue. For virtue, insofar as it is virtue, is concerned with great and arduous things; but this difficulty in the first man was thus: for man would have obeyed God so perfectly and adhered to God so perfectly as the perfection of the virtue of obedience and friendship requires; and so of the other virtues²³. — And there is another difficulty which comes from the defect of the one working; and this indeed is not of the essence of virtue, but rather is accidental to virtue, insofar as it is virtue; and therefore, for man to be virtuous, it was not necessary that this difficulty²⁴ be found in man in the beginning. And that this is true is plain. For the more one advances in virtue, the more he works with less difficulty on his own part; if therefore this difficulty were of the essence of virtue, then as man advanced, the excellence of virtue would be diminished in him; which no one doubts to be false.

6. To that, however, which is objected concerning the way of attaining salvation according to the instruction of sacred Scripture, it must be said that sacred Scripture was handed down to fallen man and delivers the documents through which he may be led to the fatherland, according as it befits the present state. Therefore from these it cannot be argued that man ought to have been made such that he should arrive by this way; for such ways²⁵ are very harsh. But if man had not sinned, he would have arrived at his end not with harshness, but with all gentleness. And there is a likeness: for health is preserved through good and pleasant foods, but is not recovered except through bitter potions.

Scholion

I. The conclusion speaks only of the fact; and by faith it is certain that corruption, or as others with St. Thomas say, the defect of body and soul with which the human race labors, has its origin from the sin of Adam. But the arguments of reason, here placed in the fundamenta and in the corpus, must indeed be understood so as not to seem to exclude the possibility of the state of pure nature — namely, when it would have pleased God not to exalt man to a supernatural end, but to create him endowed with natural gifts alone and fit to attain a natural end through operations of the same order. In this hypothesis man would not be fit nor obliged to tend to a supernatural end, namely the immediate vision and fruition of God; he would also then have lacked the gift of sanctifying grace, and the gifts of integrity. Hence by these same [conditions], as in the state of fallen nature, he would be pressed by the natural defects that follow upon human nature, unless God had supplied otherwise; but he would be free of original fault and of captivity under the power of the devil (Council of Trent, Sess. V. can. 2.). That the state of pure nature was possible is established. For the Holy See, having condemned many propositions of Baius and also prop. 16 of the Synod of Pistoia, taught that the opposite doctrine is to be held, namely that the gifts both of sanctifying grace and of integrity are not due from the natural exigency and condition of human nature, but rather are a gratuitous benefit of God. To immortality pertains the condemned prop. 78 of Baius: « The immortality of the first man was not a benefit of grace, but a natural condition » (cfr. prop. 17 of the Synod of Pistoia); to natural defects in general prop. 55: « God could not have created from the beginning such a man as is now born ».

That St. Bonaventure is altogether foreign to the error of Baius is now concluded from the distinction placed in the corpus concerning the twofold mode of inquiring reasonably about this matter, namely either by supposing certain principles of faith, or from the force of reason alone. Of this mode of the philosophers he says, « that then reason rather discords with catholic truth than agrees », whereas St. Thomas (S. c. Gent. IV, c. 52) teaches that, with reason alone as guide, « certain signs of original sin in the human race probably appear ». Hence it is now inferred that the arguments adduced by St. Bonaventure are to be understood in the supposition of the present providence, which destined man to a supernatural end and from the beginning made « man upright » (Eccl. 7, 30). — That immortality according to the body was in Adam a gratuitous gift was proven above in d. 19. a. 3. q. I. St. Bonaventure also often asserts that natural [endowments] remain integral after sin even in the demons (above d. 6. a. 3. q. I. fundam. 2. and in the corpus, and even more expressly III Sent. d. 28. q. 2. ad 3.), since « what is natural is indelible » (above d. 7. p. II. a. I. q. 2. fundam. 1.). On the corruption which sin brings, cfr. below d. 37, especially a. 2. — Also that principle (fundam. I), that a penalty is not inflicted unless a fault precede, if it is understood of every passion of a rational creature, does not hold unless on the supposition of the present providence, which we know by faith alone (cfr. Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 2.).

II. Alexander of Hales, S. p. II. q. 106. m. 1. — Scotus, in both Commentaries, II Sent. d. 19. q. unica. — St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 1; S. I-II. q. 85. a. 5. 6; S. c. Gent. IV. c. 50-53; de Malo, q. 5. a. 5. — Bl. Albert, here a. 1; S. p. II. tr. 17. q. 107. m. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1. a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1. q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1. a. 2. 3. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3. — Biel, on this and the following questions, here q. unica.

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Apparatus Criticus

Cfr. dictum August., supra pag. 432, nota 4. allatum. Idem, VI. Op. imperf. contra Iulianum, c. 36. sic: « Omnis autem poena hominis quid est, nisi poena imaginis Dei? Quae si infertur iniuste, profecto a quo infertur iniustus est. Quis porro dubitet, quod iniuste inferatur poena imagini Dei, nisi hoc culpa meruerit? » Quoad minorem cfr. illud Anselmi in eius libro de Conceptu virgin. et orig. pecc. c. 4: Nam nihil est alicui poena, nisi quod est contra voluntatem; et nulla res poenam sentit, nisi quae habet voluntatem. Cfr. infra d. 36. a. 2. q. 2. et a. 3. q. 1. seq. — In edd., excepta I, maior sic sonat: Nullus affligitur poena, nisi praecedat culpa; post quae Vat. prosequitur sic: sed passio involuntaria in rationali creatura est poena; talis autem passio non fuit in homine, antequam praecessit in eo culpa. Versus finem arg., ubi cum codd. F K M U Y aa bb ee et aliis nec non cum ed. I legimus in humano genere, Vat. habet in humana natura.
Cfr. the dictum of Augustine cited above on p. 432, note 4. The same, VI. Unfinished Work against Julian, c. 36, says thus: « But what is every penalty of man, except the penalty of the image of God? If it is inflicted unjustly, surely he by whom it is inflicted is unjust. Who, moreover, would doubt that a penalty is inflicted unjustly on the image of God, unless fault has merited this? » As to the minor, cfr. that saying of Anselm in his book On the Virginal Conception and Original Sin, c. 4: For nothing is a penalty to anyone except what is against the will; and no thing feels a penalty except one that has a will. Cfr. below d. 36. a. 2. q. 2. and a. 3. q. 1, following. — In the editions, except I, the major runs thus: No one is afflicted with a penalty unless a fault precede; after which the Vatican [edition] continues thus: but an involuntary passion in a rational creature is a penalty; but such a passion was not in man before a fault had preceded in him. Toward the end of the argument, where with codices F K M U Y aa bb ee and others, and also with ed. I, we read in the human race, the Vatican [edition] has in human nature.
Similiter loquitur Bernardus in expositione verborum illorum Eccl. 7, 30; Solummodo hoc inveni, quod fecerit Deus hominem rectum. Cfr. supra pag. 124, nota 3. — Pro corruptione curvitatis nonnulli codd. cum Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 corruptione carnis, quibus verbis Vat. sola addit quae est corruptio culpabilis.
Bernard speaks similarly in the exposition of those words of Eccl. 7, 30: « Only this I have found, that God made man upright. » Cfr. above p. 124, note 3. — For corruption of crookedness some codices, with the Vatican [edition] and edd. 2, 3, 4, [read] corruption of the flesh, to which words the Vatican alone adds which is the culpable corruption.
Sive c. 10. n. 11, ubi S. Doctor illam ab Hilario factam appropriationem: « Aeternitas in Patre, species in Imagine, usus in Munere », explanat et quantum ad « speciem in Imagine » dicit: « In qua Imagine speciem nominavit, credo, propter pulcritudinem, ubi iam est tanta congruentia... tanquam Verbum perfectum, cui non desit aliquid, et ars quaedam omnipotentis atque sapientis Dei, plena omnium rationum viventium incommutabilium » etc. Ibid. n. 12. ait: In illa enim Trinitate summa origo est rerum omnium et perfectissima pulcritudo et beatissima delectatio. — Post Augustinus codd. H I T ee et alii cum edd. 2, 4 interiiciunt in littera. Vat. omittit verba Quare species appropriatur Filio.
Or c. 10. n. 11, where the Holy Doctor explains that appropriation made by Hilary: « Eternity in the Father, beauty in the Image, use in the Gift », and as to « beauty in the Image » he says: « In which Image he named beauty, I believe, on account of the beauty where there is now such great congruity... as the perfect Word, to which nothing is lacking, and a certain art of the omnipotent and wise God, full of all the living, immutable reasons » etc. In the same place, n. 12, he says: For in that Trinity is the supreme origin of all things and the most perfect beauty and the most blessed delight. — After Augustinus codices H I T ee and others, with edd. 2, 4, insert in littera (in the text). The Vatican [edition] omits the words Why beauty is appropriated to the Son.
Anselm., II. Cur Deus homo, c. 2: Sapientiae et iustitiae Dei repugnat, ut cogeret hominem mortem pati sine culpa, quem iustum fecit ad aeternam beatitudinem. Sequitur ergo, quia si nunquam peccasset, nunquam moreretur (cfr. ibid. l. c. 9.).
Anselm, Why God Became Man, bk. II, c. 2: It is repugnant to the wisdom and justice of God that He should compel to suffer death without fault the man whom He made just for eternal beatitude. It follows therefore that, if he had never sinned, he would never die (cfr. the same, bk. I, c. 9).
Prov. 16, 4: Universa propter semetipsum operatus est Dominus. — Seq. textus est Gen. 8, 21. — Pro propinquum Vat. pronum.
Prov. 16, 4: The Lord has worked all things for His own sake. — The following text is Gen. 8, 21. — For propinquum (inclined) the Vatican [edition reads] pronum (prone).
Cap. 3, 3. seqq. — Ierem. 20, 14; Exod. 23, 26; Deut. 7, 14. — Circa finem arg. cod. Y voci bonitatis praefigit divinae.
[Job] ch. 3, 3 and following. — Jer. 20, 14; Exod. 23, 26; Deut. 7, 14. — Toward the end of the argument cod. Y prefixes divinae (divine) to the word bonitatis (goodness).
Cfr. supra d. 19. a. 1. q. 2.
Cfr. above d. 19. a. 1. q. 2.
Ut e. g. in libr. III. de Lib. Arb. c. 14. n. 40, ubi illam corruptionem non vituperatione dignam signat, quae oriatur ex « ordine mutabilium rerum sibi cedentium secundum leges congruentissimas, pro valentia cuiusque partis universitati datas »; libr. XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 4; de Natura boni, c. 8; Contra Secundinum Manich. c. 15, ubi corruptionem rerum corporalium ad pulcritudinem universi conferre asserit.
As e.g. in bk. III. On Free Choice c. 14. n. 40, where he marks as not worthy of blame that corruption which arises from « the order of mutable things yielding to one another according to the most fitting laws, given to each part according to its worth for the universe »; bk. XII. On the City of God, c. 4; On the Nature of the Good, c. 8; Against Secundinus the Manichee, c. 15, where he asserts that the corruption of corporeal things contributes to the beauty of the universe.
Edd., excepta I, cum pluribus codd. tentationem; nostra lectio nititur codd. A X Y Z aa bb cc ee et aliis. Cod. Z addit per elementorum separationem in corpore hominis.
The editions, except I, with several codices, [read] temptation; our reading rests on codices A X Y Z aa bb cc ee and others. Cod. Z adds through the separation of the elements in the body of man.
Vide supra d. 14. p. II. a. I. q. 1. seq. — Quod omnia propter hominem facta sint, monstratum est supra d. 15. a. 2. q. 1. — De ratione sic argumentandi cfr. Aristot., I. de Histor. animal. c. 15, ubi loquitur de ordine partium hominis ad mundum maiorem; vide etiam supra pag. 336, nota 6.
See above d. 14. p. II. a. I. q. 1, following. — That all things were made for the sake of man was shown above in d. 15. a. 2. q. 1. — On the manner of arguing thus cfr. Aristotle, I. On the History of Animals c. 15, where he speaks of the order of the parts of man to the greater world; see also above p. 336, note 6.
Cfr. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 3. Sententiam ipsam vide supra pag. 572, nota 2. — Vat. omittit vocem moralis, voci philosophus praecedentem.
Cfr. Aristotle, II. Ethics c. 3. The sentiment itself see above p. 572, note 2. — The Vatican [edition] omits the word moralis (moral), which precedes the word philosophus (philosopher).
Matth. 23, 12; Luc. 14, 11; — Tob. 12, 13; II. Tim. 2, 5; — Luc. 24, 26; Act. 14, 21. — Paulo inferius pro victoriam cod. Z coronam.
Matt. 23, 12; Luke 14, 11; — Tob. 12, 13; II Tim. 2, 5; — Luke 24, 26; Acts 14, 21. — A little below, for victoriam (victory) cod. Z [reads] coronam (crown).
Edd. cum non paucis codd. tentationes, sed procul dubio multo melior est lectio codd. Y aa bb ee, quam in textum recepimus, quippe cum ratio corruptionis latior sit quam ratio tentationis.
The editions, with not a few codices, [read] temptations, but without doubt the reading of codices Y aa bb ee is much better, which we have received into the text, since indeed the notion of corruption is broader than the notion of temptation.
Vers. 17: In quocumque enim die comederis ex eo, morte morieris. Ibid. c. 3. narratur lapsus hominis. — Pro quae dicit Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 et plures codd. quia dicit. Aliquantulum ante pro eriperet codd. F U liberaret, cod. aa redimeret.
Verse 17: For on whatever day you shall eat of it, you shall die the death. In the same place, c. 3, the fall of man is narrated. — For quae dicit (which says) the Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 and several codices [read] quia dicit (because it says). A little before, for eriperet (might rescue) codices F U [read] liberaret (might free), cod. aa redimeret (might redeem).
Cfr. supra d. 24. p. II. a. I. q. 1. in corp. — Paulo superius pro inspiciendo edd., excepta I, respiciendo.
Cfr. above d. 24. p. II. a. I. q. 1. in the corpus. — A little earlier, for inspiciendo (examining) the editions, except I, [read] respiciendo (looking back).
Vat. ratiocinandi.
The Vatican [edition reads] ratiocinandi.
Codd. C K U S T Y aa bb et alii cum primis edd. conditionem.
Codices C K U S T Y aa bb and others, with the first editions, [read] conditionem.
Cfr. August., de Natura boni, c. 7. seq.; Anselm., de Conceptu virgin. et orig. pecc. c. 3. — In fine solut. cod. A addit: Vel dicendum, quod poena non dicitur inesse alicui, nisi quod natus est cognoscere iustum et iniustum, bonum et malum, poenam et gloriam: sed ovis non est huiusmodi; ideo patet. Vel sicut in sequenti auctoritate dicitur, ovis non habet formam incorruptibilem, sicut homo, sed potius corruptibilem; ideo debet esse corruptibilis, ut proportio salvetur. In homine autem aliter; quia incorruptibilis est forma, incorruptibile debet esse formatum.
Cfr. Augustine, On the Nature of the Good, c. 7 and following; Anselm, On the Virginal Conception and Original Sin, c. 3. — At the end of the solution cod. A adds: Or it must be said that a penalty is not said to be in anything except [that] which is born to know the just and the unjust, the good and the evil, penalty and glory: but the sheep is not of this kind; therefore it is clear. Or, as is said in the following authority, the sheep does not have an incorruptible form, like man, but rather a corruptible one; therefore it must be corruptible, so that the proportion may be preserved. But in man it is otherwise; because the form is incorruptible, the formed [thing] must be incorruptible.
Dist. 19. a. 1. q. 1. seq. — Mox pro improportionem multi codd. cum edd. I, 2, 3 perperam proportionem.
Dist. 19. a. 1. q. 1, following. — Soon, for improportionem (disproportion) many codices with edd. I, 2, 3 [read] erroneously proportionem (proportion).
Edd. cum nonnullis codd. sensualitas. Cfr. supra pag. 578, nota 5. et pag. 387, nota 6.
The editions, with several codices, [read] sensualitas (sensuality). Cfr. above p. 578, note 5, and p. 387, note 6.
Psalm. 48, 21: Homo cum in honore esset, non intellexit; comparatus est iumentis insipientibus et similis factus est illis. — Paulo superius post praeter iudicium codd. Y aa inserunt immo contra iudicium. Dein pro effecti sumus cod. cc et ed. I facti sumus.
Ps. 48, 21: Man, when he was in honor, did not understand; he was compared to senseless beasts of burden and was made like to them. — A little earlier, after praeter iudicium (beyond judgment) codices Y aa insert immo contra iudicium (rather, against judgment). Then for effecti sumus (we have been made) cod. cc and ed. I [read] facti sumus (we were made).
Rom. 7, 23: Video autem aliam legem in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae et captivantem me in lege peccati.
Rom. 7, 23: But I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind and captivating me in the law of sin.
Cfr. supra d. 29. a. 3. q. I., ubi dicitur, in illo statu virtutes non habuisse actus imperfectos.
Cfr. above d. 29. a. 3. q. I., where it is said that in that state the virtues did not have imperfect acts.
Vat. et edd. 3, 4 reperiri.
The Vatican [edition] and edd. 3, 4 [read] reperiri (to be found [passive]).
Pro viae codd. C F K L R S T etc. nec non edd. 1, 2, 3 substituunt in se; fortasse legendum esset viae in se.
For viae (ways) codices C F K L R S T etc., and also edd. 1, 2, 3, substitute in se (in themselves); perhaps it should be read viae in se (the ways in themselves).

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