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Dist. 30, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 30

Textus Latinus
p. 717

Quaestio II. Utrum natura humana merito primae transgressionis fuerit corrupta poenaliter tantum, an etiam culpabiliter.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum merito primae transgressionis humana natura fuerit corrupta poenaliter tantum, an etiam culpabiliter. Et quod culpabiliter corrupta sit, videtur.

Fundamenta.

1. Ad Romanos quinto1: Sicut per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors, ita et in omnes homines mors pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt. Ex isto verbo colligitur, quod omnes in Adam fuerunt infecti et peccatores constituti. Si forte dicas, sicut dicunt Pelagiani, quod p. 718 pertransiit per imitationem; contra: ad Ephesios secundo2: Eramus natura filii irae, sicut et ceteri; sed nemo est filius irae nisi per culpam: si ergo per naturam omnes eramus filii irae, omnes per naturam contrahimus culpam: ergo in ceteris natura humana culpabiliter est infecta.

2. Item, Ioannis tertio3: Nisi quis renatus fuerit ex aqua et Spiritu sancto etc.; sed nullus a praemio aeterno excluditur nisi pro peccato: si igitur omnes non baptizati excluduntur, sive sint parvi sive adulti, ergo omnes, ex quo nati sunt, habent culpam; sed non culpam, quam fecerunt, cum huic sententiae subiaceant ante usum rationis, sicut patet in parvulis incircumcisis, Genesis decimo septimo: igitur haec est culpa, quae per naturalem generationem reperitur in quolibet: ergo etc.

3. Item, si tota natura esset in una persona, corrupta illa persona quantum ad esse, necesse est, totam naturam corrumpi quantum ad esse: ergo pari ratione, si corrumperetur quantum ad bene esse, corrumperetur tota natura quantum ad bene esse. Sicut enim sequitur: si Adam moritur, homo moritur; sic sequitur: si Adam peccat, homo peccat. Cum igitur tota natura esset in Adam, quando peccavit; videtur, quod tota in eo peccaverit, ac per hoc tota in omnibus et singulis culpabiliter infecta fuerit4.

4. Item, venenato fonte, per consequens venenantur et rivuli a fonte procedentes. Si igitur omnes homines processerunt ab Adam, sicut rami a radice, et rivuli a fonte; et ipse corruptus fuit morbo concupiscentiae, quae5 fuit in eo culpa: videtur, quod et ceteros corrupit eodem corruptionis genere, et ita culpabiliter.

5. Item, sicut se habet innocens respectu innocentis generandi, sic peccator respectu peccatoris; sed si Adam stetisset in sua innocentia, omnes filios genuisset innocentes: ergo tota humana natura esset innocens et pura, quantum esset ex ipso. Hoc satis planum est6: ergo pari ratione, cum peccavit, totam humanam naturam constituit peccatricem, ita quod omnes filios gigneret peccatores.

6. Item, quia Adam peccavit, factus est mortalis; et quia mortalis est, necesse fuit, quod generaret omnes filios mortales; sed sicut se habet effectus ad effectum, ita se habet causa ad causam7: si igitur causa mortalitatis fuit culpa, et mortalitas personae Adae totam humanam naturam fecit mortalem et totam corrupit poenaliter; pari ratione videtur, quod culpa Adae totam humanam naturam infecerit culpabiliter et omnes ex illo exeuntes corruperit culpabiliter. — Si igitur culpa, quae omnibus inest per naturam, est culpa originalis; colligitur ex omnibus his rationibus, quod ponere sit culpam originalem.

Sed contra: 1. Ezechielis decimo octavo8: Filius non portabit iniquitatem patris, et pater etc. Si igitur haec lex divina est, secundum divinam legem quilibet peccat sibi et non alii, iuxta illud Proverbiorum nono: Si sapiens eris, tibimetipsi eris: si autem illusor, solus portabis malum: igitur non videtur, quod ex peccato patris filius habeat infici culpabiliter.

2. Item, tam in novo quam in veteri Testamento nuptiae concessae sunt tanquam bonae et licitae9; sed ad nullum bonum necessario consequitur malum; sed ad nuptias necessario sequeretur malum, si proles culpam contraheret a sua origine: ergo vel nuptiae sunt malae et illicitae, quod est contra sacram Scripturam et fidem christianam, vel non est ponere peccatum originale.

3. Item, corrupta re transmutabili et minus nobili, non propter hoc corrumpitur quod est intransmutabile et maius nobile; sed persona hominis est transmutabilis et minus nobilis quam natura — tota enim natura speciei perpetua est et magis nobilis quam una persona singularis — ergo impossibile fuit, eam a persona Adae totaliter et per culpam infici.

4. Item, in malis generaliter est verum, quod malum habitum praecedit malus actus, quamvis e contrario sit in bonis10: ergo habitualis corruptio naturae oritur ex actuali culpa ipsius naturae. Sed natura, quantum est de se, semper est recta et non peccat, quia peccatum proprie est voluntatis: ergo non videtur, quod tota natura infecta fuerit, vel etiam potuerit infici.

5. Item, nullum naturale est culpabile, pro eo quod « in naturalibus nec laudamur nec vituperamur11 »; sed originalis corruptio est naturalis, cum sit eadem apud omnes: ergo videtur, quod ista duo sint incompossibilia, quod aliqua corruptio sit culpabilis, et quod sit originalis: ergo non videtur, quod natura tota a persona potuerit culpabiliter infici.

6. Item, nullum necessarium est voluntarium; sed corruptio originalis est necessaria: ergo non est voluntaria. Sed omnis culpa est affectio voluntaria, p. 719 secundum quod dicit Augustinus in libro de Libero Arbitrio12: ergo impossibile est, originalem corruptionem esse culpam: redit igitur idem quod prius, quod nulla culpa sit originalis, et quod natura humana in Adam non fuerit infecta culpabiliter.

Conclusio.

Humana natura in omnibus hominibus corrupta est, non solum poenaliter, sed etiam culpabiliter, et hoc quidem peccato Adae.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod absque dubio tota natura, hoc est natura13 in omnibus hominibus, seminaliter ab Adam descendentibus, corrupta est, non solum poenaliter, sed etiam culpabiliter. Hoc enim manifestat visionis Dei carentia, rationalis erubescentia, concupiscentiae praedominantia. — Carentia visionis Dei hoc manifestat, quia nullus debet aeterno bono, ad quod factus est, privari, nisi in se habeat aliquid, per quod indignus sit divino aspectui praesentari; tale autem non est nisi culpa. Si igitur omnes, quotquot sunt, visione Dei privantur, nisi per baptismum fluminis vel flaminis renascantur; planum est, quod omnes, quotquot sunt, contrahunt ex sua origine culpam14.

Erubescentia etiam rationis hoc manifestat. Nullus enim rationabiliter erubescit de his passionibus, quas habet a natura, nisi insint ei per aliquam culpam; sed omnis homo naturaliter erubescit ex genitalium membrorum motu. Ex hoc igitur colligitur et manifestatur, quod quilibet in se ipso non tantum poenaliter, sed etiam vituperabiliter et culpabiliter est corruptus, quantum est de sua naturali origine15.

Praedominantia concupiscentiae hoc evidentissime manifestat. Certum est enim, quod tunc anima hominis est ordinata, quando spiritus est sub Deo, et caro et virtutes animales sunt sub spiritu et sequuntur eius imperium. Ab oppositis igitur tunc anima hominis est perversa, quando caro et virtutes animales praesunt spiritui rationali. Et hoc quidem verum est de plano, non tantummodo secundum fidem, verum etiam secundum philosophiam16. Sed in homine vigor concupiscentiae et lex membrorum, quam unusquisque habet a nativitate, captivat spiritum et ei praedominatur. Ex hoc igitur clarum et apertum est, quod anima cuiuslibet hominis a nativitate perversa est et inordinata; sed sicut ordinatio in homine et rectitudo iustitia est, sic perversitas et inordinatio culpa est. Si ergo anima17 cuiuslibet hominis per legem concupiscentiae perversa est a sua origine, in quolibet homine indubitanter ponendum est esse peccatum originale, quantum est de sua prima nativitate. — Et de hoc nemo dubitat, nisi qui nescit, quantus sit vigor concupiscentiae, et qualiter spiritus rationalis Deo debeat subesse. Constat enim, quod non subest spiritus noster perfecte Deo, nisi diligat ipsum super omnia et propter se. Planum est etiam, quod nullus in statu naturae corruptae Deum diligit super omnia et propter se sine dono gratiae, immo necessario vincitur a vigore concupiscentiae, ut magis amet se, vel aliquod bonum apparens18. Planum est igitur, quod anima cuiuslibet hominis in sua nativitate peccatrix est, cum subversa et inordinata sit, sicut ostensum est. Et ideo dicit Apostolus ad Romanos septimo19, in persona hominis lapsi: Video aliam legem in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae et captivantem me in lege peccati. Et exclamat: Infelix ego homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? Et respondet: Gratia Dei per Iesum Christum. Hanc igitur legem et inordinationem20 ad Deum si quis velit attendere, nullo modo dubitabit, hominem esse peccatorem a sua nativitate, immo ita certum est, ut dubitari non possit de originali, sicut etiam nec de actuali. — Hoc tamen ignoraverunt philosophi et etiam aliqui haeretici, quia nescierunt attendere, in quo attenditur rectitudo animae et iustitia21, et pro quanto anima dici debet ad Deum ordinata. Constat igitur, quod tota humana natura corrupta est, non solum poenaliter, sed etiam culpabiliter.

A quo autem corrupta fuerit, hoc planum est ex ipsa Scriptura22, quia ab Adam. Potuit autem Adam totam naturam corrumpere et culpabilem facere suo peccato, triplici conditione concurrente. Prima est, quia non tantum erat humanae naturae individuum, p. 720 sed totius humanae naturae principium. Secunda est, quia non tantum fuit sibi datum mandatum sicut singulari personae, sed tanquam stipiti totius humanae naturae; et hoc bene indicat textus23, quia mandatum illud descendit per virum ad mulierem. Tertia, quia Adam innocentiam et immortalitatem susceperat pro se et sua tota posteritate: unde ipse innocens et immortalis generasset immortalem et innocentem. Quia igitur ipse erat omnium principium; et transgressus est mandatum quod ei datum erat, secundum quod erat principium; et amisit illam iustitiam et innocentiam, quam debebat omnibus posteris conservare: hinc est, quod per ipsum originali iustitia sumus privati, et in eius infectione ceteri sunt infecti, non tantum poenaliter, sed etiam culpabiliter: tum propter debitum ordinationis, quae deberet esse in nobis; tum propter carentiam illius innocentiae, quam deberemus habere; tum propter praedominantiam concupiscentiae, per quam animae nostrae sunt inordinatae et iniustae; et si iniustae sunt et inordinatae, necesse est, eas summae iustitiae displicere. — Patet igitur, quod tota humana natura corrupta est, non solum poenaliter, sed etiam culpabiliter. Patet nihilominus, a quo fuerit corrupta, quoniam a primo parente. Qualiter autem illa culpa traduci habeat, hoc determinabitur infra24. Rationes igitur ad primam partem concedendae sunt.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod filius non portabit iniquitatem patris; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur de peccato, quo pater peccat ut singularis persona, sicut melius manifestabitur infra25; et ideo locum non habet in transgressione primaria, quia illa non fuit omnino singularis personae, sicut explanatum est supra.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ad bonum non necessario consequitur malum; dicendum, quod verum est per se loquendo. Unde ad nuptias non necessario sequitur genitae prolis corruptio, in quantum est ibi maris et feminae coniunctio naturalis, sed in quantum illi coniunctioni adiuncta est corruptio vitiosa seminis ob peccatum primi parentis. Et si tu obiicias, sicut obiicit haereticus26, quod qualitercumque sequatur malum, omittendum esset illud bonum; dicendum, quod illud non est verum, nisi quando malum praeponderat bono. Nunc autem non est sic, quia in generantibus non est ulla culpa; in generato vero melius est sic esse quam non esse, maxime cum subveniatur ei per gratiam baptismalem.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod corrupto minus nobili et transmutabili, non corrumpitur magis nobile et perpetuum; dicendum, quod illud verum est et locum habet, quando illud quod est magis nobile et perpetuum, non dependet a minus nobili et transmutabili. Non sic autem est in proposito, quia tota natura humana dependebat a persona Adae quantum ad existentiam. Unde si Adam fuisset mortuus, totum genus humanum esset in eo corruptum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod malum habitum praecedit malus actus; dicendum, quod hoc verum est; verumtamen ex hoc non oportet, quod malum habitum naturae praecedat malus actus naturae, secundum quod natura, sed sufficit, quod praecedat malus actus personae, pro eo quod natura et persona sunt indivisa; et ideo corruptio personalis potest effici naturalis, sicut ostendit Anselmus de Conceptu virginali27. — Posset tamen dici, quod etsi natura in se non peccaverit, peccavit tamen, prout erat in Adam; ipse enim Adam peccavit, in quantum erat omnium hominum principium.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nullum naturale est culpabile; dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Augustinus28, differt dicere naturam et naturam corruptam. Potest igitur aliquid esse naturale, quod consequitur ipsam naturam secundum institutionem, et aliquid esse naturale, quod consequitur ipsam naturam secundum corruptionem. Dico igitur, quod illud quod est naturale, quod consequitur naturam secundum institutionem, nullo modo est culpabile; illud vero quod sic est naturale, quod consequitur naturam secundum corruptionem, culpabile est; et tale est originale. Et sic patet illud.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nullum necessarium voluntarium est; dicendum, quod etsi hoc respectu eiusdem veritatem possit habere, tamen respectu diversorum non necesse est, quod habeat veritatem. Quod enim necessarium est uni, voluntarium potest esse alteri; et sic est in originali, quod quidem, etsi nobis sit necessarium, Adae tamen fuit voluntarium; et ratione illius voluntatis nobis imputatur in peccatum, unde dicuntur omnes peccasse in ipso29. Hoc autem melius ostendetur, cum manifestabitur, qualiter originale peccatum traducitur. p. 721

Scholion

I. Conclusio est de fide, ut constat ex Concilio Arausicano II. (can. 2.) et Tridentino (Sess. V. can. 2.), et communiter a Scholasticis approbatur. Mirum autem est et improbandum, quod Durand. (hic q. 2.), licet confiteatur, quod « in nobis est per originem aliquod peccatum, seu aliqua culpa », tamen postea favere videatur iis qui opinabantur, quod « in parvulis peccatum originale non sit proprie culpa, sicut est actuale, sed solum interpretative ».

Notatu dignum est quod dicitur (hic in corp.) de triplici conditione concurrente in Adam, ut corrumpere potuerit naturam in omnibus hominibus; quae doctrina repetitur et applicatur infra d. 33. a. I. q. I, et cum S. Anselmo docetur: « Si Adam nequisset ad eos quos generaturus erat, iustitiam suam perducere, nequaquam posset ad eos iniustitiam (culpam) suam perducere ». Certe carentia iustitiae originalis nequit habere pro genere humano rationem culpae, nisi supponatur, quod conservatio eiusdem habuerit pro eodem rationem debiti. Hoc autem rursus supponit, tum quod ex Dei ordinatione totum genus humanum adstrictum fuerit ad finem supernaturalem assequendum, tum quod a Deo acceperit ius quoddam ad dona supernaturalia (gratiam et integritatem) sibi ab Adamo cum ipsa natura transmittenda. Hoc ultimum denique supponit, quod Adam fuerit caput et principium secundarium humani generis in ordine et naturali et supernaturali et quasi depositarius ipsius, cui, ut dicit S. Doctor, non fuit « datum mandatum sicut singulari personae, sed tanquam stipiti totius humanae naturae ». — Essentia peccati originalis magis explicatur infra a. 2. q. I. — Quoad argumenta quaedam rationis recole schol. ad praecedentem quaest.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 106. m. 2. a. 1. — Scot., in utroque Scripto, hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. I. a. 2; S. I. II. q. 81. a. 1. 3, q. 82. a. I; de Malo, q. 4. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 2; S. p. II. tr. 17. q. 107. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. I. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. I. q. I. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 2.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether human nature, by the merit of the first transgression, was corrupted penally only, or also culpably.

Secondly it is asked whether, by the merit of the first transgression, human nature was corrupted penally only, or also culpably. And that it was corrupted culpably, it seems.

Arguments.

1. To the Romans 51: As by one man sin entered into the world, and by sin death, so also death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned. From this word it is gathered that all in Adam were infected and constituted sinners. If perhaps you say, as the Pelagians say, that [sin] passed by imitation; on the contrary: to the Ephesians 22: We were by nature children of wrath, even as the rest; but no one is a child of wrath except by fault: if therefore by nature we were all children of wrath, by nature we all contract fault: therefore in the rest [of men] human nature is culpably infected.

2. Likewise, John 33: Unless one be born again of water and the Holy Spirit etc.; but no one is excluded from the eternal reward except for sin: if therefore all the unbaptized are excluded, whether they be little ones or adults, then all, from the time they are born, have fault; but not a fault which they have committed, since they are subject to this sentence before the use of reason, as is clear in uncircumcised little ones, Genesis 17: therefore this is a fault which is found in each one through natural generation: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, if the whole nature were in one person, that person being corrupted as to being, it is necessary that the whole nature be corrupted as to being: therefore by parity of reasoning, if it were corrupted as to well-being, the whole nature would be corrupted as to well-being. For just as it follows: if Adam dies, man dies; so it follows: if Adam sins, man sins. Since therefore the whole nature was in Adam when he sinned, it seems that the whole sinned in him, and through this the whole was culpably infected in all and each4.

4. Likewise, the fountain being poisoned, consequently the streams proceeding from the fountain are also poisoned. If therefore all men proceeded from Adam, as branches from a root and streams from a fountain, and he was corrupted by the disease of concupiscence, which5 was in him a fault: it seems that he corrupted the others too by the same kind of corruption, and thus culpably.

5. Likewise, as the innocent stands in relation to the innocent to be generated, so the sinner to the sinner; but if Adam had stood in his innocence, he would have generated all his sons innocent: therefore the whole of human nature would be innocent and pure, as far as it would be from him. This is plain enough6: therefore by parity of reasoning, when he sinned, he constituted the whole of human nature a sinner, in such a way that he would generate all his sons sinners.

6. Likewise, because Adam sinned, he was made mortal; and because he is mortal, it was necessary that he generate all his sons mortal; but as effect stands to effect, so cause stands to cause7: if therefore the cause of mortality was fault, and the mortality of the person of Adam made the whole of human nature mortal and corrupted the whole penally; by parity of reasoning it seems that the fault of Adam infected the whole of human nature culpably and corrupted culpably all who go forth from him. — If therefore the fault that is in all by nature is original fault, it is gathered from all these reasons that one must posit an original fault.

On the contrary: 1. Ezekiel 188: The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, and the father etc. If therefore this is a divine law, according to the divine law each one sins to himself and not to another, according to that [saying] of Proverbs 9: If you be wise, you shall be so for yourself: but if you be a scorner, you alone shall bear the evil: therefore it does not seem that from the sin of the father the son should be culpably infected.

2. Likewise, both in the New and in the Old Testament marriages were granted as good and licit9; but to no good does evil necessarily follow; but to marriage evil would necessarily follow, if the offspring contracted fault from its origin: therefore either marriages are evil and illicit, which is against sacred Scripture and the Christian faith, or one must not posit original sin.

3. Likewise, a changeable and less noble thing being corrupted, that which is unchangeable and more noble is not on that account corrupted; but the person of man is changeable and less noble than the nature — for the whole nature of the species is perpetual and more noble than one singular person — therefore it was impossible that it be totally and through fault infected by the person of Adam.

4. Likewise, in evil things it is generally true that a bad habit precedes a bad act, although in good things it is the contrary10: therefore the habitual corruption of nature arises from the actual fault of nature itself. But nature, as far as it is of itself, is always right and does not sin, since sin properly belongs to the will: therefore it does not seem that the whole nature was infected, or even could be infected.

5. Likewise, nothing natural is culpable, for the reason that « in natural things we are neither praised nor blamed11 »; but original corruption is natural, since it is the same in all: therefore it seems that these two are incompossible, that some corruption be culpable and that it be original: therefore it does not seem that the whole nature could be culpably infected by a person.

6. Likewise, nothing necessary is voluntary; but original corruption is necessary: therefore it is not voluntary. But every fault is a voluntary affection, according to what Augustine says in the book On Free Choice12: therefore it is impossible that original corruption be a fault: there returns therefore the same [conclusion] as before, that no fault is original, and that human nature in Adam was not culpably infected.

Conclusion.

Human nature in all men is corrupted, not only penally, but also culpably, and this indeed by the sin of Adam.

I respond: It must be said that, without doubt, the whole nature, that is, the nature in all men descending seminally from Adam13, is corrupted, not only penally, but also culpably. For this the lack of the vision of God, the shame of reason, and the predominance of concupiscence manifest. — The lack of the vision of God manifests this, because no one ought to be deprived of the eternal good for which he was made, unless he have in himself something through which he is unworthy to be presented to the divine gaze; but such a thing is nothing other than fault. If therefore all, as many as there are, are deprived of the vision of God unless they be reborn by the baptism of the river [water] or of the breath [Spirit], it is plain that all, as many as there are, contract fault from their origin14.

The shame of reason also manifests this. For no one is reasonably ashamed of those passions which he has from nature, unless they be in him through some fault; but every man is naturally ashamed at the motion of the genital members. From this, therefore, it is gathered and manifested that each one is corrupted in himself not only penally, but also blamably and culpably, as far as is from his natural origin15.

The predominance of concupiscence manifests this most evidently. For it is certain that the soul of man is then ordered when the spirit is under God, and the flesh and the animal powers are under the spirit and follow its command. From the opposite [conditions], therefore, the soul of man is perverted when the flesh and the animal powers preside over the rational spirit. And this indeed is true plainly, not only according to faith, but also according to philosophy16. But in man the force of concupiscence and the law of the members, which each one has from birth, captivates the spirit and predominates over it. From this, therefore, it is clear and manifest that the soul of each man is perverted and disordered from birth; but just as ordination and rectitude in man is justice, so perversity and disorder is fault. If therefore the soul17 of each man is perverted by the law of concupiscence from its origin, in each man it must undoubtedly be posited that there is original sin, as far as is from his first birth. — And of this no one doubts, except one who does not know how great is the force of concupiscence, and how the rational spirit ought to be subject to God. For it is certain that our spirit is not perfectly subject to God unless it love Him above all things and for His own sake. It is also plain that no one in the state of corrupted nature loves God above all things and for His own sake without the gift of grace, but rather is necessarily overcome by the force of concupiscence, so that he loves himself more, or some apparent good18. It is plain, therefore, that the soul of each man is a sinner at his birth, since it is subverted and disordered, as has been shown. And therefore the Apostle says to the Romans 719, in the person of fallen man: I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind and captivating me in the law of sin. And he exclaims: Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death? And he answers: The grace of God by Jesus Christ. If anyone, therefore, wishes to attend to this law and disorder20 toward God, he will in no way doubt that man is a sinner from his birth — rather, it is so certain that one cannot doubt of the original [sin], just as not even of the actual. — This, however, the philosophers, and also some heretics, did not know, because they did not know how to attend to that in which the rectitude of the soul and its justice is attended to21, and in relation to what the soul ought to be said to be ordered toward God. It is certain, therefore, that the whole of human nature is corrupted, not only penally, but also culpably.

But by whom it was corrupted, this is plain from Scripture itself22, namely, by Adam. And Adam was able to corrupt the whole nature and make it culpable by his sin, three conditions concurring. The first is that he was not only an individual of human nature, but the principle of the whole of human nature. The second is that the commandment was given not to him only as to a singular person, but as to the stock of the whole of human nature; and the text well indicates this23, since that commandment descended through the man to the woman. The third is that Adam had received innocence and immortality for himself and for his whole posterity: hence he, innocent and immortal, would have generated [offspring] immortal and innocent. Since, therefore, he was the principle of all; and transgressed the commandment which had been given to him, insofar as he was a principle; and lost that justice and innocence which he ought to have preserved for all his descendants: hence it is that through him we are deprived of original justice, and in his infection the rest are infected, not only penally, but also culpably: both on account of the debt of the ordination which ought to be in us; and on account of the lack of that innocence which we ought to have; and on account of the predominance of concupiscence, through which our souls are disordered and unjust; and if they are unjust and disordered, it is necessary that they displease supreme justice. — It is clear, therefore, that the whole of human nature is corrupted, not only penally, but also culpably. It is likewise clear by whom it was corrupted, namely, by the first parent. But how that fault is propagated will be determined below24. The reasons, therefore, for the first part are to be conceded.

1. To that, then, which is first objected, that the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father; it must be said that this is understood of the sin by which the father sins as a singular person, as will be better manifested below25; and therefore it has no place in the first transgression, since that was not entirely of a singular person, as was explained above.

2. To that which is objected, that to a good evil does not necessarily follow; it must be said that this is true, speaking per se. Hence to marriage the corruption of the offspring generated does not necessarily follow, insofar as there is there a natural conjunction of male and female, but insofar as to that conjunction is joined the vicious corruption of the seed on account of the sin of the first parent. And if you object, as the heretic objects26, that in whatever way evil follows, that good ought to be omitted; it must be said that this is not true, except when the evil outweighs the good. But now it is not so, since in those who generate there is no fault; while in the one generated it is better so to be than not to be, especially since he is aided by baptismal grace.

3. To that which is objected, that, a less noble and changeable thing being corrupted, the more noble and perpetual is not corrupted; it must be said that this is true and holds when that which is more noble and perpetual does not depend on the less noble and changeable. But it is not so in the matter at hand, since the whole of human nature depended on the person of Adam as to existence. Hence if Adam had died, the whole human race would have been corrupted in him.

4. To that which is objected, that a bad habit precedes a bad act; it must be said that this is true; nevertheless from this it is not necessary that a bad habit of nature precede a bad act of nature, insofar as it is nature, but it suffices that a bad act of the person precede, for the reason that nature and person are undivided; and therefore a personal corruption can be made natural, as Anselm shows On the Virginal Conception27. — Yet it could be said that, even if nature did not sin in itself, it nevertheless sinned insofar as it was in Adam; for Adam himself sinned, inasmuch as he was the principle of all men.

5. To that which is objected, that nothing natural is culpable; it must be said that, as Augustine says28, it is one thing to speak of nature and [another] of corrupted nature. Something, therefore, can be natural which follows nature itself according to [its] institution, and something can be natural which follows nature itself according to [its] corruption. I say, therefore, that that which is natural in such a way that it follows nature according to institution is in no way culpable; but that which is natural in such a way that it follows nature according to corruption is culpable; and such is the original [corruption]. And thus that [objection] is clear.

6. To that which is objected, that nothing necessary is voluntary; it must be said that, although this can have truth with respect to the same thing, nevertheless with respect to diverse things it is not necessary that it have truth. For what is necessary to one can be voluntary to another; and so it is in the original [sin], which indeed, although it is necessary to us, was nevertheless voluntary to Adam; and by reason of that will it is imputed to us as sin, whence all are said to have sinned in him29. But this will be better shown when it is manifested how original sin is propagated.

Scholion

I. The conclusion is of faith, as is established from the Council of Orange II (can. 2.) and from the Council of Trent (Sess. V. can. 2.), and is commonly approved by the Scholastics. But it is astonishing and to be disapproved that Durandus (here q. 2.), although he confesses that « in us there is through [our] origin some sin, or some fault », nevertheless afterward seems to favor those who held that « in little ones original sin is not properly a fault, as the actual [sin] is, but only interpretatively ».

It is worthy of note what is said (here in the corpus) of the threefold condition concurring in Adam, that he could corrupt the nature in all men; which doctrine is repeated and applied below in d. 33. a. I. q. I, and with St. Anselm it is taught: « If Adam had been unable to convey his justice to those whom he was to generate, he could in no way have conveyed to them his injustice (fault) ». Certainly the lack of original justice cannot have for the human race the character of fault, unless it be supposed that the preservation of the same had for it the character of a debt. But this in turn supposes, both that by God's ordination the whole human race was bound to attain a supernatural end, and that it received from God a certain right to the supernatural gifts (grace and integrity) which were to be transmitted to it by Adam together with the nature itself. This last, finally, supposes that Adam was the head and the secondary principle of the human race in both the natural and the supernatural order, and as it were the depositary thereof, to whom, as the Holy Doctor says, the commandment was given not « as to a singular person, but as to the stock of the whole of human nature ». — The essence of original sin is more fully explained below in a. 2. q. I. — As to certain arguments of reason, recall the scholion to the preceding question.

II. Alexander of Hales, S. p. II. q. 106. m. 2. a. 1. — Scotus, in both Commentaries, here q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. I. a. 2; S. I-II. q. 81. a. 1. 3, q. 82. a. I; de Malo, q. 4. a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 2; S. p. II. tr. 17. q. 107. m. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. I. a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. I. q. I. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1. a. 4. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2. — Biel, on this and the following questions, here q. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 12, ubi Vulgata in hunc mundum pro in mundum. Pro pertransiit ed. I et plurimi codd. pertransit. — Aliquantulum post pro fuerunt codd. C L O R S et alii fuerint.
    Verse 12, where the Vulgate [reads] into this world for into the world. For pertransiit (passed through) ed. I and very many codices [read] pertransit. — A little after, for fuerunt (were) codices C L O R S and others [read] fuerint.
  2. Vers. 3. — De sententia Pelagianorum cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 4.
    Verse 3. — On the opinion of the Pelagians cfr. here the text of the Master, c. 4.
  3. Vers. 5. — Seq. textus est loc. cit. v. 17, ubi Deus dicit ad Abraham: Masculus, cuius praeputii caro circumcisa non fuerit, delebitur anima illa de populo suo: quia pactum meum irritum fecit. — Pro quam fecerunt codd. H T cc et ed. I fecerint.
    Verse 5. — The following text is from the cited place, v. 17, where God says to Abraham: The male whose flesh of his foreskin shall not be circumcised, that soul shall be blotted out from his people: because he has made void my covenant. — For quam fecerunt (which they have committed) codices H T cc and ed. I [read] fecerint.
  4. Cfr. Anselm., de Concept. virgin. et orig. pecc. c. 23.
    Cfr. Anselm, On the Virginal Conception and Original Sin, c. 23.
  5. Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 qui. Mox pro corrupit codd. T Y cum ed. 1 corruperit, codd. aa bb corrumpit.
    The Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 [reads] qui (which [masc.]). Soon, for corrupit (corrupted) codices T Y with ed. 1 [read] corruperit, codices aa bb corrumpit.
  6. Et ostendit Anselm., de Conceptu virgin. et orig. pecc. c. 10. et 24. Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 90. m. 1. a. 1.
    And Anselm shows [this], On the Virginal Conception and Original Sin, c. 10 and 24. Cfr. Alexander of Hales, S. p. II. q. 90. m. 1. a. 1.
  7. Haec propos. minor idem dicit quod Boeth., II. de Differentiis topicis, verbis generalioribus sic exprimit: Quod in unaquaque re evenit, id in eius proportionali evenire necesse est.
    This minor proposition says the same as Boethius, II. On Topical Differences, expresses in more general words thus: What happens in each thing must happen in its proportional.
  8. Vers. 20. — Seq. textus est loc. cit. 12, ubi Vulgata fueris habet pro eris. — In fine arg. pro infici culpabiliter cod. aa effici culpabilis.
    Verse 20. — The following text is from the cited place, [Prov. 9,] 12, where the Vulgate has fueris (you shall be) for eris. — At the end of the argument, for infici culpabiliter (to be culpably infected) cod. aa [reads] effici culpabilis (to be made culpable).
  9. Gen. 1, 27. seq.; Matth. 19, 3. seqq.; I. Cor. 7, 2. seqq.; I. Tim. 4, 3. Cfr. August., de Nuptiis et concupisc. per totum.
    Gen. 1, 27 and following; Matt. 19, 3 and following; 1 Cor. 7, 2 and following; 1 Tim. 4, 3. Cfr. Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence, throughout.
  10. Cfr. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 4. et 6.
    Cfr. Aristotle, II. Ethics c. 4 and 6.
  11. Secundum Aristot., cuius verba vide supra pag. 113, nota 8. De ratione, quae additur minori, cfr. supra pag. 397, nota 1.
    According to Aristotle, whose words see above p. 113, note 8. On the reason which is added to the minor, cfr. above p. 397, note 1.
  12. Libr. II. c. ult. n. 54, ubi peccatum nominat motum voluntarium, quam notationem postea fusius explicat III. c. 1. n. 1. seqq. Ibid. c. 9. n. 26. ait: Non enim peccatum et supplicium peccati naturae sunt quaedam, sed affectiones naturarum, illa voluntaria, ista poenalis. — Paulo superius post affectio voluntaria ed. 1 addit sed nihil est peccatum, nisi sit voluntarium; paulo inferius pro esse culpam edd., excepta 1, esse per culpam, quae et deinde pro originalis substituunt a natura, pro quo cod. C naturalis.
    Bk. II, last chapter, n. 54, where he names sin a voluntary motion, which observation he afterward explains more fully in bk. III, c. 1, n. 1 and following. In the same place, c. 9, n. 26, he says: For sin and the punishment of sin are not certain natures, but affections of natures, the one voluntary, the other penal. — A little earlier, after affectio voluntaria (voluntary affection) ed. 1 adds but nothing is sin unless it be voluntary; a little below, for esse culpam (to be a fault) the editions, except 1, [read] esse per culpam (to be through fault), which then also substitute a natura (from nature) for originalis (original), for which cod. C [reads] naturalis.
  13. Vat. cum ed. 4 absque dubio tota massa, hoc est natura humana. Post pauca pro rationalis codd. H V aa carnalis, quae lectio non congruit cum seqq.
    The Vatican [edition] with ed. 4 [reads] without doubt the whole mass, that is, human nature. After a few [words], for rationalis codices H V aa [read] carnalis (carnal), which reading does not agree with what follows.
  14. Ita et August., Serm. 294. (alias 14. de Verbis Apostoli) c. 3. n. 3, ubi illud Pelagianorum confutatur, parvulos baptizandos esse non propter vitam aeternam, sed propter regnum caelorum. Cfr. III. Contra Iulian. Pelagian. c. 3. n. 9.
    Thus also Augustine, Serm. 294 (otherwise 14, On the Words of the Apostle) c. 3, n. 3, where that [opinion] of the Pelagians is refuted, that little ones are to be baptized not for the sake of eternal life, but for the sake of the kingdom of heaven. Cfr. III. Against Julian the Pelagian, c. 3, n. 9.
  15. Cfr. August., I. de Nuptiis et concupisc. c. 6. n. 7; I. Contra duas epist. Pelagianor. c. 15. n. 31. seq.; III. Contra Iulian. Pelagian. c. 10. n. 20. — Edd., excepta 1, omittunt naturali.
    Cfr. Augustine, I. On Marriage and Concupiscence c. 6, n. 7; I. Against Two Letters of the Pelagians c. 15, n. 31 and following; III. Against Julian the Pelagian c. 10, n. 20. — The editions, except 1, omit naturali (natural).
  16. Cfr. supra pag. 604, nota 5, ubi auctoritatem Aristotelis adduximus. Cfr. etiam August., Enarrat. in Ps. 145. n. 5; II. de Actis cum Felice Manich. c. 4. et 17. — In seq. propos. respicitur Rom. 7, 23.
    Cfr. above p. 604, note 5, where we adduced the authority of Aristotle. Cfr. also Augustine, Enarration on Ps. 145, n. 5; II. On the Acts with Felix the Manichee c. 4 and 17. — In the following proposition Rom. 7, 23 is referred to.
  17. Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 et aliquibus codd. natura.
    The Vatican [edition] with edd. 2, 3, 4 and some codices [read] natura (nature).
  18. Codd. cum vetustioribus edd. debet.
    The codices, with the older editions, [read] debet (ought).
  19. Cfr. supra d. 28, praesertim a. 1. q. 3. et d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 1. praesertim ad 3. — Vers. 23. seqq.
    Cfr. above d. 28, especially a. 1. q. 3, and d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 1, especially ad 3. — Verses 23 and following.
  20. Ita non pauci codd., ut N V X Z bb cc ee, cum ed. 1; Vat. cum aliis ordinationem.
    Thus not a few codices, as N V X Z bb cc ee, with ed. 1; the Vatican [edition] with others [reads] ordinationem (ordination).
  21. Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 iustitiae.
    The Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 [reads] iustitiae.
  22. Rom. 5, 12. — Mox pro conditione cod. aa ratione.
    Rom. 5, 12. — Soon, for conditione (condition) cod. aa [reads] ratione (account).
  23. Gen. 2, 16. seq.: Praecepitque ei dicens... ne comedas etc. Quem textum August., VIII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 17. n. 36. eodem sensu interpretatur, de quo vide supra d. XXI. lit. Magistri, c. 8. — De rationibus hic propositis cfr. Anselm., de Conceptu virgin. et orig. pecc. c. 2. 9. 10. 23. seq.
    Gen. 2, 16 and following: And he commanded him, saying... do not eat etc. This text Augustine, VIII. On Genesis according to the Letter c. 17, n. 36, interprets in the same sense, on which see above d. XXI. of the text of the Master, c. 8. — On the reasons here proposed cfr. Anselm, On the Virginal Conception and Original Sin, c. 2, 9, 10, 23 and following.
  24. Dist. 31. a. 1. 2.
    Dist. 31. a. 1. 2.
  25. Dist. 33. a. 1. q. 1.
    Dist. 33. a. 1. q. 1.
  26. Cfr. August., de Peccato orig. c. 33. n. 38. seq.; II. de Nuptiis et concup. c. 21. seqq. — Paulo superius pro seminis Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, paucis codd. suffragantibus, in hominis semine.
    Cfr. Augustine, On Original Sin c. 33, n. 38 and following; II. On Marriage and Concupiscence c. 21 and following. — A little earlier, for seminis (of the seed) the Vatican [edition] with edd. 2, 3, 4, a few codices favoring, [reads] in hominis semine (in the seed of the man).
  27. Cap. 23, ubi ait: Quod Adam comedebat, hoc natura exigebat; quia, ut hoc exigeret, sic creata erat. Quod vero de ligno vetito comedit, non hoc voluntas naturalis, sed personalis, hoc est propria, fecit; quod tamen egit persona, non fecit sine natura. Persona enim erat, quod dicebatur Adam; natura, quod homo; fecit igitur persona peccatricem naturam, quia cum Adam peccavit, homo peccavit. Siquidem non quia homo erat, ut vetitum praesumeret, impulsus est; sed propria voluntate, quam non exigit natura, sed persona concepit, attractus est. — Paulo superius post personae codd. F Y ee et alii cum ed. I omittunt pro. Paulo inferius post in Adam Vat. adiungit peccante.
    Ch. 23, where he says: What Adam ate, this nature required; for, that it should require this, it had been so created. But that he ate of the forbidden tree, this not the natural will, but the personal, that is, the proper [will], did; yet what the person did, he did not do without the nature. For person was that which was called Adam; nature, that which was [called] man; the person therefore made the nature a sinner, since when Adam sinned, man sinned. For he was not impelled to presume the forbidden [thing] because he was man; but he was drawn by his proper will, which nature does not require, but the person conceived. — A little earlier, after personae codices F Y ee and others with ed. I omit pro. A little below, after in Adam the Vatican [edition] adds peccante (sinning).
  28. Libr. I. Retract. c. 10. n. 3. et c. 13. n. 6; de Natura et gratia, c. 3. n. 3; II. de Nuptiis et concup. c. 21. n. 36. — Paulo inferius pro institutionem ed. I primam constitutionem.
    Bk. I. Retractations c. 10, n. 3, and c. 13, n. 6; On Nature and Grace, c. 3, n. 3; II. On Marriage and Concupiscence c. 21, n. 36. — A little below, for institutionem (institution) ed. I [reads] primam constitutionem (the first constitution).
  29. Rom. 5, 12: In quo omnes peccaverunt. — Cfr. infra d. 31. a. 1. 2. ubi de modo propagationis peccati originalis.
    Rom. 5, 12: In whom all have sinned. — Cfr. below d. 31. a. 1. 2, where [it treats] of the mode of propagation of original sin.
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