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Dist. 21, Art. 3, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 21

Textus Latinus
p. 506

Quaestio II. Utrum peccatum primum hominis fuerit remissibile, vel irremissibile.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum peccatum, quod primo secutum est ex tentatione illa, fuerit remissibile, vel irremissibile. Et quod irremissibile, videtur.

Ad oppositum: 1. Augustinus de Mirabilibus sacrae Scripturae1, loquens de Angelo, dicit, quod resurgere non potuit, quia de sublimissimo statu cecidit; sed homo cecidit de nobilissimo gradu et statu, quem potuit habere in via: ergo si non potuit resurgere daemon, pari ratione nec homo.

2. Item, peccatum, ad quod nullam habet homo inclinationem, nullam habet excusationem, et quod omni caret excusatione, non est dignum remissione; sed peccatum, quod omnino ineptum est ad remissionem, est irremissibile: ergo peccatum illud est irremissibile, quod fit sine aliqua inclinatione. Sed tale fuit peccatum, quod consecutum est ex prima tentatione: ergo, etc.

3. Item, morbus, qui totam naturam inficit, est incurabilis, quia omnino sanitatem et principium sanitatis expellit; sed peccatum, quod ex primaria tentatione subsecutum est, totam naturam humanam infecit2: videtur igitur, quod fuerit morbus incurabilis.

4. Item, Adam, antequam peccaret, non solum habuit naturalia, sed etiam gratuita, sicut ostendetur infra3 — et hoc innuit Glossa, Lucae decimo, ubi dicit, quod homo « vulneratus fuit in naturalibus et exspoliatus gratuitis » — Angelus vero non habuit gratuita, sed solum naturalia, sicut ostensum fuit supra4: ergo maiorem corruptionem fecit peccatum hominis in homine quam peccatum angeli in angelo. Sed peccatum, quod magis corrumpit, minus est aptum sanari: ergo si peccatum angeli fuit irremediabile, multo fortius peccatum hominis.

Sed contra: 1. Poenitentia est via ad inveniendam veniam5; sed primus parens, postquam peccavit, potuit poenitere quod patet, quia doluit et poenituit: ergo potuit veniam et misericordiam invenire: ergo peccatum eius fuit remissibile.

2. Item, dignum est, ut qui ab alio deiicitur ab alio adiuvetur; sed homo, cum peccavit, alio tentante deiectus est: ergo decuit, ipsum habere praesidium et adiutorium ad resurgendum6; sed illo habito, peccatum hominis est remissibile: ergo, etc.

3. Item, peccatum primi hominis totam humanam naturam infecit: ergo si irremissibile fuisset, tota humana natura damnata fuisset: ergo divina providentia et dispositio, quae hominem fecerat propter beatitudinem, fuisset frustrata, et ita esset vana.

4. Item, non est maioris stabilitatis culpa quam gratia, nec demeritum quam meritum: ergo si culpa Adae fuisset irremissibilis, gratia praecedens fuisset inamissibilis: ergo si gratiam potuit amittere, pari ratione a culpa potuit resurgere.

Quaestio est igitur, propter quid remissibile fuerit peccatum humanum, non angelicum.

Conclusio.

Peccatum primum hominis remissibile fuit, quod triplici ratione congruum esse probatur.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod primum peccatum hominis, quod ex tentatione diaboli subsecutum est, remissibile fuit.

Et si quaeratur ratio huius, dicendum, quod ex tribus rationibus una potest ratio sufficiens colligi. Remissibile namque fuit peccatum primi hominis, quia erat in carne mortalis, quia in voluntate vertibilis, quia in transgressione excusabilis7. — Carnis mortalitas faciebat remissibilitatem. Potuit enim divina iustitia severitatem et aequitatem sui iudicii in homine exercere praeter aeternam damnationem in hoc, quod hominem peccatorem morti tradidit et hominis innocentis mortem pro satisfactione suscepit, ut8 sic exerceretur in homine severitatis vindicta pro culpa perpetrata, ut, quemadmodum homo voluntarie peccando Deum deseruerat et se ipsum morte culpae occiderat, sic spiritus invitus desereret corpus, et mors exigatur in poena, sicut commissa fuerat in culpa. Angelus autem per naturam immortalis erat nec mori poterat, nisi p. 507 morte aeterna; et ideo non erat9 alia via exercendi in ipsum iustitiae severitatem nisi per mortem damnationis aeternae. Et sic carnis mortalitas multum facit ad hoc, quod peccatum hominis esset remissibile.

Voluntatis vertibilitas ad hoc nihilominus faciebat. Quia enim homo conditus est in vertibilitate arbitrii, quae non tantum debebat esse in eo ad momentum, sed etiam ad tempus diuturnum, quia longo tempore debebat esse viator; hinc est, quod sicut gratia adveniens eius voluntati non abstulit vertibilitatem ad malum, sic culpa superveniens non abstulit potentiam revertendi ad bonum; et sicut potuit transgredi, ita potuit conteri; et sicut per culpam pervenit ad iram divinam, sic per poenitentiam rediit ad gratiam. Hoc autem angelus non habuit, sicut ostensum fuit supra distinctione septima10, propter brevitatem spatii merendi, post quod voluntas eius vertibilitatem habere non poterat, sicut ibidem ostensum est.

Excusabilitas etiam in culpa faciebat ad peccati hominis remissibilitatem. Quia enim alio suggerente cecidit, dignum fuit, per alium sublevari; et ideo competebat sibi mediatorem habere. Et quia lapsus non potest resurgere sine manu sublevante, et inimicus non potest reconciliari sine mediatore interveniente; hinc est, quod peccatum hominis remissibile fuit, non peccatum angeli: quia homo, qui per alium cecidit, alium debuit habere adiutorem et relevatorem; angelus vero non, quia cecidit per semetipsum. Et haec est ratio, quam Magister reddit in littera11.

Epilogus. Et sic patet, quod triplex est ratio, quare peccatum hominis remissibile fuit; et istae tres concurrentes reddunt unam rationem integram. Inter has tamen praecipua est ratio, quae medio loco posita est, scilicet vertibilitas voluntatis post lapsum, per quam homo susceptibilis erat poenitentiae, mediante qua ad veniam poterat pervenire. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, peccatum hominis, quod ex prima tentatione secutum est, fuisse remissibile.

Solutio oppositorum: 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod cecidit de nobilissimo statu; dicendum, quod quamvis homo esset in statu sublimi, non tamen sic dicitur de sublimissimo statu cecidisse, sicut angelus. Angelus enim proximus erat gloriae, adeo quod uno solo motu conversionis ad Deum poterat effici gloriosus; non sic fuit de homine12; et ideo non est simile.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod homo nullam habuit inclinationem; dicendum, quod etsi non habuit inclinativum13 interius, habuit tamen impulsivum exterius, ratione cuius aliquo modo fuit peccatum eius excusabile. Esto tamen, quod excusabile non esset in se, nihilominus excusabile factum est, quando homo incepit de sua transgressione dolere.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tota natura corrupta est; dicendum, quod etsi corrupta sit tota quantum ad totam posteritatem, quae seminaliter ex Adam procedit, nihilominus tamen remansit ipsi Adae semen, in quo benedictae sunt omnes gentes14, id est Christus, in quo nulla fuit corruptio, immo membrum sanissimum fuit; et ideo sua cauterizatione cetera membra a faece peccati curavit. Remansit etiam in homine aliqua naturalis rectitudo, utpote synderesis15, quae non fuit in eo extincta, qua movente et instigante, potuit peccatum detestari, et detestando ad Deum reverti et revertendo curari.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod homo habuit naturalia et gratuita, quando peccavit; dicendum, quod etsi aliquod donum amiserit in peccando, quod lucifer non perdidit, quia non habuit; naturae tamen rectitudo non est adeo obliquata in homine, sicut fuit in diabolo; et non tam improbe et pertinaciter adhaesit ei quod appetiit, sicut angelus, qui nullum habuit retardativum.

Scholion

I. De ipsa conclusione non potest esse controversia; sed de ratione principali, quare peccatum primorum parentum fuerit remissibile, non autem peccatum lapsorum angelorum, antiqui Scholastici non conveniunt, ut iam observatum est supra d. 7. p. I. a. I. q. 1. in schol. S. Bonav. (hic in fine corp.) secundum mentem S. Thomae docet, praecipuam rationem, per quam homo susceptibilis esset poenitentiae, esse vertibilitatem voluntatis post lapsum. Eadem quaestio a S. Doctore tangitur III. Sent. d. 20. q. 1.

II. Plures antiqui commentatores Lombardi cum S. Thoma hanc quaestionem hoc loco non tractant, sed eam tangunt in quaestione de obstinatione daemonum (supra d. 7.) et in altera de reparabilitate totius generis humani (III. Sent. d. 20.). De eadem specialim disputant: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 104. m. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 11; S. p. II. tr. 14. q. 87. m. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 4. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 5.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether the first sin of man was remissible or irremissible.

Secondly it is asked, whether the sin which first followed from that temptation was remissible or irremissible. And that it was irremissible seems [to be the case].

On the opposite side: 1. Augustine, in On the Marvels of Sacred Scripture1, speaking of the Angel, says that he could not rise again, because he fell from the most sublime state; but man fell from the noble grade and state which he was able to have in the wayfaring condition: therefore if the demon could not rise again, by parity of reasoning neither could man.

2. Likewise, a sin toward which a man has no inclination has no excuse, and that which lacks all excuse is not worthy of remission; but a sin which is wholly unfit for remission is irremissible: therefore that sin is irremissible which is done without any inclination. But such was the sin which followed from the first temptation: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, a disease which infects the whole nature is incurable, because it wholly expels health and the principle of health; but the sin which followed from the first temptation infected the whole human nature2: it seems therefore that it was an incurable disease.

4. Likewise, Adam, before he sinned, had not only natural [gifts] but also gratuitous [gifts], as will be shown below3 — and the Gloss intimates this, on Luke chapter ten, where it says that man « was wounded in his natural [gifts] and despoiled of his gratuitous [gifts] » — but the Angel did not have gratuitous [gifts], but only natural ones, as was shown above4: therefore the sin of man worked a greater corruption in man than the sin of the angel in the angel. But the sin which corrupts more is less apt to be healed: therefore if the sin of the angel was irremediable, much more so the sin of man.

On the contrary: 1. Penance is the way to finding pardon5; but the first parent, after he sinned, was able to repent which is evident, because he grieved and repented: therefore he was able to find pardon and mercy: therefore his sin was remissible.

2. Likewise, it is fitting that he who is cast down by another should be helped by another; but man, when he sinned, was cast down by another tempting him: therefore it was fitting that he should have a safeguard and aid for rising again6; but, this being had, the sin of man is remissible: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, the sin of the first man infected the whole human nature: therefore if it had been irremissible, the whole human nature would have been damned: therefore the divine providence and disposition, which had made man for the sake of beatitude, would have been frustrated, and thus would be vain.

4. Likewise, fault is not of greater stability than grace, nor demerit than merit: therefore if the fault of Adam had been irremissible, the preceding grace would have been unlosable: therefore if he was able to lose grace, by parity of reasoning he was able to rise again from fault.

The question therefore is, on account of what the human sin was remissible, and not the angelic.

Conclusion.

The first sin of man was remissible, which is proved to be fitting by a threefold reasoning.

I respond: It must be said that the first sin of man, which followed from the temptation of the devil, was remissible.

And if the reason for this be asked, it must be said that from three grounds one sufficient reason can be gathered. For the sin of the first man was remissible because he was mortal in flesh, because changeable in will, because excusable in his transgression7. — The mortality of the flesh made for remissibility. For the divine justice was able to exercise the severity and equity of its judgment upon man apart from eternal damnation in this, that it handed over the sinful man to death and took up the death of an innocent man for satisfaction, so that8 thus there should be exercised upon man the vengeance of severity for the fault perpetrated, so that, just as man by sinning voluntarily had forsaken God and had slain himself by the death of fault, so the spirit should unwillingly forsake the body, and death be exacted in punishment, just as it had been committed in fault. But the angel was by nature immortal and could not die, except p. 507 by eternal death; and therefore there was no9 other way of exercising upon him the severity of justice except through the death of eternal damnation. And thus the mortality of the flesh contributes much to this, that the sin of man should be remissible.

The changeableness of the will made for this nonetheless. For since man was constituted in changeableness of free choice, which ought to be in him not only for a moment but also for a long time, because for a long time he was to be a wayfarer; hence it is that, just as the grace coming to his will did not take away its changeableness toward evil, so the fault supervening did not take away the power of returning to good; and just as he was able to transgress, so he was able to be contrite; and just as through fault he came to divine wrath, so through penance he returned to grace. But the angel did not have this, as was shown above in the seventh distinction10, on account of the brevity of the span for meriting, after which his will could not have changeableness, as was there shown.

The excusableness in the fault also made for the remissibility of the sin of man. For since he fell by another's suggestion, it was fitting that he should be raised up by another; and therefore it was suitable for him to have a mediator. And since the fallen cannot rise again without a hand to raise him, and the enemy cannot be reconciled without a mediator intervening; hence it is that the sin of man was remissible, not the sin of the angel: because man, who fell through another, ought to have another as helper and restorer; but not the angel, because he fell through himself. And this is the reason which the Master renders in the text11.

Epilogue. And thus it is evident that there is a threefold reason why the sin of man was remissible; and these three concurring render one integral reason. Among these, however, the principal one is the reason placed in the middle position, namely the changeableness of the will after the fall, through which man was capable of penance, by means of which he could come to pardon. — The reasons therefore are to be granted which show that the sin of man, which followed from the first temptation, was remissible.

Solution of the opposing arguments: 1. To that, then, which is objected, that he fell from the noblest state; it must be said that, although man was in a sublime state, nevertheless he is not said to have fallen from the most sublime state as the angel did. For the angel was next to glory, so much so that by one single motion of conversion to God he could be made glorious; it was not thus with man12; and therefore it is not similar.

2. To that which is objected, that man had no inclination; it must be said that, although he did not have an inclining [cause]13 within, he nevertheless had an impelling [cause] without, by reason of which his sin was in some way excusable. Yet granted that it was not excusable in itself, it was nevertheless made excusable when man began to grieve over his transgression.

3. To that which is objected, that the whole nature is corrupted; it must be said that, although it is corrupted as a whole with respect to the whole posterity which proceeds seminally from Adam, nevertheless there remained to Adam himself a seed in which all nations are blessed14, that is Christ, in whom there was no corruption, but rather he was a most healthy member; and therefore by his cauterization he healed the other members from the dregs of sin. There remained also in man some natural rectitude, namely synderesis15, which was not extinguished in him, by whose moving and instigating he was able to detest sin, and by detesting to return to God, and by returning to be healed.

4. To that which is objected, that man had natural and gratuitous [gifts] when he sinned; it must be said that, although he lost some gift in sinning which Lucifer did not lose, because he did not have it; nevertheless the rectitude of nature is not so bent in man as it was in the devil; and he did not cleave so wickedly and obstinately to what he desired as the angel, who had nothing to hold him back.

Scholion

I. Concerning the conclusion itself there can be no controversy; but concerning the principal reason why the sin of the first parents was remissible, and not the sin of the fallen angels, the ancient Scholastics do not agree, as has already been observed above at d. 7, p. I, a. I, q. 1. In the scholion of St. Bonaventure (here at the end of the body), following the mind of St. Thomas, he teaches that the principal reason, by which man was capable of penance, is the changeableness of the will after the fall. The same question is touched by the holy Doctor at III Sent., d. 20, q. 1.

II. Several ancient commentators of Lombard, together with St. Thomas, do not treat this question in this place, but touch it in the question on the obstinacy of the demons (above, d. 7) and in the other on the reparability of the whole human race (III Sent., d. 20). On the same matter they dispute specially: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 104, m. 5. — Bl. Albert, here a. 11; Summa p. II, tr. 14, q. 87, m. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 3. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2, a. 4. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question, here q. 5.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Libr. I. c. 2. Vide supra pag. 176, nota 5.
    Book I, c. 2. See above, p. 176, note 5.
  2. Cfr. infra d. 30. a. 1. q. 1. seq.
    Cf. below, d. 30, a. 1, q. 1 and following.
  3. Dist. 29. a. 2. q. 1. — Glossa super Luc. 10, 30. seq. sumta est ex Beda in hunc locum, nonnullis verbis adiectis. Verba Glossae integra haec sunt: « Qui [latrones i. e. angeli mali] etiam indumenta gratiae spiritualis, immortalitatis scil. et innocentiae, offerunt [auferunt?], et sic vulnera inferunt i. e. peccati quibus humanae naturae integritas violatur, et mors quasi fossis visceribus inducitur... Semivivo relicto, quia immortalitatem exuere, sed rationis sensum abolere non possunt » etc. Beda haec scribens, verba S. Ambrosii super hunc locum et S. August., II. Quaest. Evang. q. 19. vidisse videtur.
    Dist. 29, a. 2, q. 1. — The Gloss on Luke 10, 30 and following is taken from Bede on this place, with some words added. The words of the Gloss in full are these: « Who [the robbers, i.e. the evil angels] also offer [take away?] the garments of spiritual grace, namely of immortality and innocence, and thus inflict wounds, i.e. of sin, by which the integrity of human nature is violated, and death is brought on as if the entrails were pierced... the man being left half-alive, because they can strip [him] of immortality, but cannot abolish the sense of reason » etc. Bede, writing these things, seems to have seen the words of St. Ambrose on this place and of St. Augustine, II Questions on the Gospels q. 19.
  4. Dist. 4. a. 1. q. 2.
    Dist. 4, a. 1, q. 2.
  5. Plures codd., ut O T W omittunt inveniendam, alii, ut C F P R S veniam; alii, ut I V X Z legunt: via ad veniendum ad veniam, cod. O via ad veniam et misericordiam, Vat. ad veniam vel ad merendum. — Cfr. de hoc arg. infra lit. Magistri d. XXXIII. c. 4.
    Several codices, such as O T W, omit inveniendam; others, such as C F P R S, [read] veniam; others, such as I V X Z, read: the way to coming to pardon; cod. O, the way to pardon and mercy; the Vatican [edition], to pardon or to meriting. — Cf. on this argument below, in the text of the Master, d. XXXIII, c. 4.
  6. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 7, ubi et seq. arg. insinuatur, nec non August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 10. n. 29. seq. et supra pag. 176, nota 1. — Pro ergo decuit non pauci codd., ut H I K P Q V Y Z ee cum edd. 2, 3 ergo debuit.
    Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 7, where the following argument also is intimated, as well as Augustine, III On Free Will c. 10, n. 29 and following, and above, p. 176, note 1. — For therefore it was fitting not a few codices, such as H I K P Q V Y Z ee with editions 2, 3, [read] therefore it ought.
  7. Nonnulli codd., inter quos Q cc cum ed. 1: in carne mortali... vertibili... excusabili.
    Some codices, among them Q cc with edition 1: in mortal flesh... changeable... excusable.
  8. Multi codd., inter quos F R T W aa cc ee, cum edd. 1, 2 et.
    Many codices, among them F R T W aa cc ee, with editions 1, 2, [read] and.
  9. Vat. non enim erat.
    The Vatican [edition]: for there was not.
  10. Part. I. a. I. q. 1.
    Part I, a. I, q. 1.
  11. Hic c. 7. — Paulo inferius post Et istae tres in cod. W subiicitur rationes.
    Here, c. 7. — A little below, after And these three, in cod. W rationes is added.
  12. Cod. cc et ed. 1 de primo homine.
    Cod. cc and edition 1: of the first man.
  13. Ita Vat. cum aliis edd. et pluribus codd., sed codd. F K T aa ee inclinationem.
    Thus the Vatican [edition] with the other editions and several codices, but codices F K T aa ee [read] inclinationem.
  14. Gen. 22, 18; 26, 4. et Gal. 3, 8. Cfr. August., X. de Gen. ad lit. c. 20. n. 35. seq.
    Gen. 22, 18; 26, 4 and Gal. 3, 8. Cf. Augustine, X On Genesis according to the Letter c. 20, n. 35 and following.
  15. De qua fusius infra d. 39. a. 2. q. 1. seqq.
    On which more fully below, d. 39, a. 2, q. 1 and following.
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