Dist. 21, Art. 3, Q. 3
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 21
Quaestio III. Utrum primum peccatum fuerit gravissimum omnium peccatorum.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum peccatum, quod ex illa tentatione subsecutum est, fuerit gravissimum omnium peccatorum. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Augustinus decimo quarto de Civitate Dei1: « Magna fuit in peccando iniquitas, ubi tanta fuit in non peccando facilitas ». Ex quo verbo elicitur tale argumentum: ubi maior est facilitas ad obediendum, ibi maior est culpa in contemnendo; sed primo homini obedire fuit facillimum: ergo in transgressione illa fuit peccatum maximum.
2. Item, Augustinus ibidem2: « Obedientia secundi hominis eo est praedicabilior, quo factus est obediens usque ad mortem ». Ex quo verbo potest elici tale argumentum: sicut qui est obediens usque ad mortem habet maximum meritum in obediendo et est maxime laudabilis, sicut fuit Filius Dei; sic qui sic est inobediens, ut etiam non desistat propter timorem mortis, maxime est culpabilis et vituperabilis; sed talis fuit inobedientia primorum parentum, qui comminatione mortis non timuerunt transgredi divinum mandatum: ergo videtur, quod illud peccatum fuerit maximum.
3. Item, tanto gravius est peccatum, quanto magis corrumpit, quia peccatum est corruptio modi, speciei et ordinis3; sed peccatum primorum parentum fuit maxime corruptivum, quia non solum ipsos corrupit, sed etiam totum genus humanum: ergo fuit omnium peccatorum maximum.
4. Item, tanto gravius est peccatum, quanto maiori poena punitur per iustum Dei iudicium; sed peccatum primorum parentum punitum fuit poena mortis et exhaeredationis4 in se et in suis posteris, et haec est maxima omnium poenarum: ergo illud peccatum fuit maximum.
Sed contra: 1. Minus est peccatum remissibile quam irremissibile; sed peccatum illud fuit remissibile, ut supra5 probatum est; multa autem peccata sunt irremissibilia: ergo, etc.
2. Item, gravius est peccatum, quod nullo modo est excusabile, quam quod aliquam habet excusationem; sed peccatum primorum parentum aliquam habet excusationem in hoc, quod factum est ad alienam instigationem; peccatum autem in Spiritum sanctum colorem excusationis non habet6: ergo peccatum illud non fuit peccatum gravissimum.
3. Item, tanto gravius est peccatum, quanto ex maiori libidine procedit; sed in primis parentibus minime regnavit libido et voluntatis improbitas, cum eorum natura esset munda et sana: ergo videtur, quod illa transgressio ex inobedientia non fuerit maxima.
4. Item, gravius est peccatum, quod est contra rationem et naturam et institutionem divinam, quam quod solum est contra divinum mandatum; sed peccatum primorum parentum, quod ex illa tentatione secutum est, nec fuit omnino contra naturam nec contra rationem, sed solum contra divinam institutionem — nam nec natura nec ratio per se dictabat, de illo ligno non esse edendum — multa autem sunt peccata, quae sunt contra naturam et rationem et institutionem divinam, quae nos appellamus peccata contra naturam: ergo non videtur, quod illa primorum parentum transgressio omnium peccatorum fuerit maxima.
Conclusio. Peccatum Adae non fuit gravissimum propter maiorem libidinem vel ingratitudinem, fuit tamen aliqualiter, sive sub duplici respectu, gravissimum omnium humanorum peccatorum.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum multis modis possit dici peccatum unum gravius et maius altero, ad praesens tamen attendendum est, quod tribus modis dicitur unum peccatum esse gravius altero: aut propter maiorem libidinem, aut propter maiorem ingratitudinem, aut propter maiorem corruptionem. — Si primo modo loquamur, sic peccatum illud nec fuit maximum simpliciter nec maximum omnium peccatorum humanorum8; ex maiori enim p. 509 libidine diabolus peccavit, et etiam multi filii Adae ex maiori libidine peccant, quam peccaverit primus parens. — Si vero secundo modo dicatur7 peccatum maius, scilicet quantum ad ingratitudinem; sic peccatum Adae non fuit maximum simpliciter, maximum tamen fuit omnium humanorum. Maximum namque simpliciter non fuit, quia diabolus ex maiori ingratitudine peccavit, cum plura bona in sua creatione perceperit et de sublimiori statu lapsus fuerit. Fuit tamen maximum omnium humanorum, quia in nobiliori statu et altiori erat quam aliquis posterorum suorum, qui lapsus fuerit in peccatum; et ideo maxime iudicatur fuisse ingratus. — Si autem dicatur tertio modo peccatum maius altero, ratione maioris laesionis; sic quodam modo fuit maximum omnium, et quodam modo non. Maior enim laesio dupliciter potest intelligi et9 esse, scilicet intensive et extensive. Intensive loquendo peccatum Adae non fuit maximae laesionis, quia non adeo depravavit voluntatem suam, sicut multa peccata depravant. Extensive vero loquendo, peccatum illud maximae laesionis fuit, quia nullum peccatum est, quod tot personis nocuerit et in tot pertranseat, sicut illud peccatum, quod perpetratum fuit ex tentatione primaria; et ita quodam modo fuit gravissimum, quodam modo non.
Et ex hoc patet responsio ad rationes ad utramque partem adductas: utraeque enim secundum diversas vias verum concludunt, sicut aspicienti satis est planum.
I. S. Thom. diserte docet (hic q. 2. a. 2; S. II. II. q. 163. a. 3.), peccatum illud primorum parentum non fuisse gravius omnibus aliis peccatis humanis, si attendatur species peccati, quae gravitas essentialis est peccato; sed fuisse gravissimum, si idem attendatur secundum conditionem peccantium. Haec sententia videtur esse communis, licet non eodem modo omnes loquantur de gravitate huius peccati absolute considerati. De hoc dicit Scot. (hic q. 2. n. 3.): « Multa peccata fiunt modo a multis, quae sunt graviora, ita quod, si Adam debuisset fuisse damnatus pro illo, multo minorem poenam sustinuisset ». Consentit Richard. a Med. (hic a. 3. q. 2.).
II. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 104. m. 3. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 14. q. 87. m. 3. partic. I. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. — Aegid. R., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Biel, hic q. 2.
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Question III. Whether the first sin was the gravest of all sins.
Thirdly it is asked whether the sin which followed from that temptation was the gravest of all sins. And that it was, seems [to be the case].
1. Augustine in the fourteenth book On the City of God1: "Great was the iniquity in sinning, where there was such great ease in not sinning." From this saying such an argument is drawn: where there is greater ease in obeying, there is greater fault in despising; but for the first man to obey was most easy: therefore in that transgression there was the greatest sin.
2. Likewise, Augustine in the same place2: "The obedience of the second man is the more praiseworthy, in that he was made obedient unto death." From this saying such an argument can be drawn: just as he who is obedient unto death has the greatest merit in obeying and is most praiseworthy, as was the Son of God; so he who is so disobedient that he does not even desist on account of the fear of death is most blameworthy and reprehensible; but such was the disobedience of the first parents, who under the threat of death did not fear to transgress the divine command: therefore it seems that that sin was the greatest.
3. Likewise, a sin is the graver the more it corrupts, for sin is a corruption of mode, species, and order3; but the sin of the first parents was most corruptive, because it corrupted not only themselves but also the whole human race: therefore it was the greatest of all sins.
4. Likewise, a sin is the graver the greater the penalty by which it is punished through the just judgment of God; but the sin of the first parents was punished by the penalty of death and disinheritance4 in themselves and in their posterity, and this is the greatest of all penalties: therefore that sin was the greatest.
On the contrary: 1. A remissible sin is less than an irremissible one; but that sin was remissible, as was proved above5; but many sins are irremissible: therefore, etc.
2. Likewise, a sin which is in no way excusable is graver than one which has some excuse; but the sin of the first parents has some excuse in this, that it was done at the instigation of another; the sin against the Holy Spirit, however, has no semblance of excuse6: therefore that sin was not the gravest sin.
3. Likewise, a sin is the graver the more it proceeds from greater lust; but in the first parents lust and wickedness of will reigned least of all, since their nature was clean and sound: therefore it seems that that transgression by disobedience was not the greatest.
4. Likewise, a sin which is against reason and nature and divine institution is graver than one which is only against a divine command; but the sin of the first parents, which followed from that temptation, was neither wholly against nature nor against reason, but only against the divine institution — for neither nature nor reason of itself dictated that one ought not to eat of that tree — whereas there are many sins which are against nature and reason and divine institution, which we call sins against nature: therefore it does not seem that that transgression of the first parents was the greatest of all sins.
Conclusion. The sin of Adam was not the gravest on account of greater lust or ingratitude, yet it was in a certain way, that is, under a twofold respect, the gravest of all human sins.
I respond: It must be said that, although in many ways one sin can be called graver and greater than another, for the present it must nevertheless be observed that in three ways one sin is said to be graver than another: either on account of greater lust, or on account of greater ingratitude, or on account of greater corruption. — If we speak in the first way, then that sin was neither the greatest absolutely nor the greatest of all human sins8; for from greater p. 509 lust the devil sinned, and also many of the children of Adam sin from greater lust than the first parent sinned. — But if a sin is said7 to be greater in the second way, namely as regards ingratitude; then the sin of Adam was not the greatest absolutely, yet it was the greatest of all human sins. For it was not the greatest absolutely, because the devil sinned from greater ingratitude, since he had received more goods in his creation and fell from a more sublime state. Yet it was the greatest of all human sins, because he was in a nobler and higher state than any of his descendants who fell into sin; and therefore he is judged to have been most ungrateful. — But if a sin is said to be greater than another in the third way, by reason of greater injury; then in a certain way it was the greatest of all, and in a certain way not. For a greater injury can be understood and9 exist in two ways, namely intensively and extensively. Speaking intensively, the sin of Adam was not of the greatest injury, because it did not so deprave his will as many sins deprave [it]. But speaking extensively, that sin was of the greatest injury, because there is no sin which has harmed so many persons and passes into so many, as that sin which was perpetrated from the original temptation; and so in a certain way it was the gravest, and in a certain way not.
And from this is clear the response to the reasons brought forward on both sides: for both sets conclude what is true according to different ways, as is sufficiently plain to one who looks.
I. St. Thomas teaches expressly (here q. 2, a. 2; S. II-II, q. 163, a. 3) that that sin of the first parents was not graver than all other human sins, if the species of the sin is considered, which gravity is essential to sin; but that it was the gravest, if the same is considered according to the condition of those sinning. This opinion seems to be the common one, although not all speak in the same way about the gravity of this sin considered absolutely. Concerning this Scotus says (here q. 2, n. 3): "Many sins are committed in a manner by many, which are graver, so that, if Adam had had to be damned for it, he would have suffered a much lesser penalty." Richard of Mediavilla agrees (here a. 3, q. 2).
II. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 104, m. 3. — B. Albert, Summa p. II, tr. 14, q. 87, m. 3, partic. I. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 2. — Giles of Rome, here a. 2, q. 2. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Biel, here q. 2.
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- Cap. 15. n. 1: Quisquis huiusmodi damnationem vel nimiam vel iniustam putat, metiri profecto nescit, quanta fuerit iniquitas in peccando, ubi tanta erat non peccandi facilitas.Ch. 15, n. 1: "Whoever thinks such a condemnation either excessive or unjust truly knows not how to measure how great was the iniquity in sinning, where there was such ease in not sinning."
- Loc. cit. Textus integer est hic: Et sicut obedientia secundi hominis eo praedicabilior, quo factus est obediens usque ad mortem (Philip. 2, 8.), ita inobedientia primi hominis eo detestabilior, quo factus est inobediens usque ad mortem. Ubi enim magna est inobedientiae poena proposita, et res a Creatore facilis imperata, quisnam satis explicet, quantum malum sit non obedire in re facili et tantae potestatis imperio et tanto terrenti supplicio?Loc. cit. The full text is here: "And just as the obedience of the second man is the more praiseworthy, in that he was made obedient unto death (Phil. 2:8), so the disobedience of the first man is the more detestable, in that he was made disobedient unto death. For where the penalty of disobedience set forth is great, and the thing commanded by the Creator is easy, who could sufficiently explain how great an evil it is not to obey in an easy matter and under the command of so great a power and with so terrifying a punishment [threatened]?"
- Secundum August., de Natura boni, c. 4. et 37. Cfr. infra d. 33. a. 2. per totum. — August. hoc et seq. arg. praecipue affert contra Iulianum (op. imperf.), libr. II. c. 94; III. c. 65; VI. c. 23. et 27. Cfr. etiam Enchir. c. 25. seqq. et 48, quod Magister, infra d. XXXIII. c. 3. pro hac re allegat, ubi etiam argg. pro parte contraria recitat.According to Augustine, On the Nature of the Good, c. 4 and 37. Cf. below, d. 33, a. 2, throughout. — Augustine brings forward this and the following argument especially against Julian (Opus imperfectum), bk. II, c. 94; III, c. 65; VI, c. 23 and 27. Cf. also the Enchiridion, c. 25 ff. and 48, which the Master cites for this matter below, d. XXXIII, c. 3, where he also recites the arguments for the contrary part.
- Nonnulli codd., ut F ee cum edd. 2, 3 exhaereditationis.Some codices, such as F ee with editions 2, 3, [read] exhaereditationis ["disinheritance"].
- Quaest. praeced. — De seq. prop. cfr. Matth. 12, 31. seq., ubi Dominus dicit, Spiritus blasphemiam et peccatum contra Spiritum sanctum non remitti neque in hoc saeculo neque in futuro. — In pluribus codd. ut F T W X cc et ed. 1 maior sic sonat: Maius est peccatum irremissibile quam remissibile.The preceding question. — On the following proposition cf. Matt. 12:31 ff., where the Lord says that the blasphemy of the Spirit and the sin against the Holy Spirit are not forgiven, neither in this world nor in the next. — In several codices, such as F T W X cc and ed. 1, the major premise runs thus: "The irremissible sin is greater than the remissible."
- Cfr. infra d. 43. a. 2. q. 1.Cf. below, d. 43, a. 2, q. 1.
- Permulti codd., ut F H I K T W X etc. et edd. 1, 2, 3 dicebat.Very many codices, such as F H I K T W X etc. and editions 1, 2, 3, [read] dicebat [for dicatur].
- Vat. bene adiunxit vocem humanorum, quae in codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3 desideratur.The Vatican edition rightly added the word humanorum ["human"], which is wanting in the codices and editions 1, 2, 3.
- Cod. cc et ed. 1 omittunt et. — Cfr. infra d. 33. dub. 2. ubi duodecim modi recensentur, quibus unum peccatum dicitur gravius esse altero.Codex cc and ed. 1 omit et. — Cf. below, d. 33, dub. 2, where twelve ways are listed by which one sin is said to be graver than another. ---