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Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 28

Textus Latinus
p. 674

Articulus I.

Quantum possit liberum arbitrium absque gratia gratum faciente.

Quaestio I.

Utrum liberum arbitrium absque gratia gratum faciente possit a culpa resurgere.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium absque gratia non gratum faciente possit a culpa resurgere. Et quod non, videtur:

1. Primo per illud, quod dicitur ad Romanos tertio1: Iustificati gratis per gratiam ipsius. Et paulo ante: Ex operibus legis non iustificatur omnis caro. Et expressius ad Titum tertio: Non ex operibus iustitiae, quae fecimus nos, sed secun- p. 675 dum suam misericordiam etc.: igitur gratia gratum faciente circumscripta, non potest liberum arbitrium per se resurgere a culpa.

2. Item, ad Galatas secundo2: Non abiicio gratiam Dei; si enim per legem iustitia, ergo Christus gratis mortuus est: si ergo virtute liberi arbitrii posset homo ad iustitiam redire, videtur, quod Christus frustra mortuus esset; quod si hoc est impium dicere, patet etc.

3. Item, nemo petit ab alio quod habet in sua potestate; sed in Psalmo3 petit vir sanctus: Sana animam meam, quia peccavi tibi. Docet etiam nos ipse Salvator petere in oratione dominica: Et dimitte nobis debita nostra: ergo etc.

4. Item, hoc ostenditur ratione, quam facit Bernardus4: cum aliquis de impio fit pius, de malo fit bonus; et cum de malo fit bonus, melioratur; nullus tamen habet posse supra se: ergo nullus potest se ipsum meliorare propria virtute: ergo nec absque gratia Dei a culpa resurgere.

5. Item, omni peccato offenditur Deus, qui est ipsa iustitia, et omne peccatum fit contra mandatum Dei; sed tanta est offensa, quantus est ille qui offenditur: cum igitur ipse sit infinitus, offensa habet aliquo modo rationem infiniti. Si igitur liberum arbitrium potentiae finitae est, impossibile est, quod in pristinum statum redeat, nisi reducatur per divinam misericordiam, quae sua gratuita bonitate condonet culpam sive remittat offensam; hoc autem non fit sine gratia: ergo etc.

6. Item, peccatum est privatio vitae spiritualis et privatio lucis; sed vita spiritualis non potest redire ad animam nisi a fonte vitae, nec lux nisi a fonte lucis5: ergo impossibile est, quod anima resurgat a culpa, nisi Deus, qui est fons vitae et lux perennis, sua benignitate eam vivificet et illuminet; hoc autem non est nisi per donum gratiae: ergo etc.

Sed contra:

1. Damascenus6: « Peccatum est ab eo quod est secundum naturam in id quod est praeter naturam aversio »; sed facilius est unicuique rei moveri secundum naturam quam praeter naturam: ergo si liberum arbitrium virtute propria peccando potest moveri praeter naturam, virtute propria redire poterit ad naturam: ergo sicut potuit cadere, ita et resurgere.

2. Item, maior est virtus liberi arbitrii quam naturae; sed natura, cum infirmatur, sanari potest <!-- page 675 R-col --> absque auxilio medicinae: ergo multo fortius liberum arbitrium, cum infirmatur per culpam, sanari potest absque omni gratia.

3. Item, absque gratia gratum faciente de ignorante potest fieri homo sciens, non solum in his quae subsunt naturae, sed etiam in his quae sunt supra naturam: ergo pari ratione absque gratia gratum faciente poterit homo fieri iustus de peccatore.

4. Item, peccator in mortali peccato existens potest desiderare et velle iustitiam; sed nihil aliud est esse iustum quam velle iustitiam, quia iustitia est rectitudo voluntatis; tunc autem voluntas recta est, quando vult iustitiam7: ergo peccator in mortali peccato absque gratia gratum faciente iustificari potest.

5. Item, per eandem vim, per quam quis movetur ad aliquid, quiescit ibidem8: ergo si aliquis non movetur ad culpam nisi voluntate, non quiescit ibi nisi per voluntatem, et quamdiu vult: ergo si non vult in culpa persistere absque gratia gratum faciente, videtur, quod possit a culpa resurgere. Si iudicas, quod non potest velle; contra: « Potestates rationales sunt ad opposita », sicut dicit Philosophus9, et voluntas, quamdiu est in via, vertibilis est: ergo sicut voluntarie potuit culpam appetere, ita voluntarie potest a culpa resurgere.

6. Item, inter gratiam et culpam media est innocentia, sicut melius patebit infra10: ergo cum possit ab aliquo haberi innocentia sine gratia, sicut habita fuit ab Adam in primordio, et innocentia habita deleatur culpa; videtur, quod sine gratia gratum faciente aliquis possit a culpa resurgere.

Conclusio.

Ut liberum arbitrium resurgat a culpa, necessaria est etiam gratia, secundum quod dicitur habitus animi.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in huius quaestionis determinatione aliter senserunt philosophi, aliter senserunt haeretici, aliter senserunt tractatores catholici.

Philosophi enim ignorantes, qualiter peccato offendatur divina maiestas, et qualiter per ipsum adimatur potentiarum habilitas; dixerunt, quod homo per exercitationem poterat iustus effici, sicut per inordinationem a recta ratione factus erat iniustus. p. 676 Unde et Philosophus dicit, quod pravus, ad meliores exercitationes deductus, aut multum proficiet, aut perfecte in contrarium habitum restituitur11.

Haeretici vero, aliquod lumen fidei habentes, cognoverunt, quod per peccatum offenditur maiestas divina et quodam modo damnificatur12. Excaecati tamen non consideraverunt, qualiter ex culpa natura infirmatur; et ideo dixerunt, quod ad hoc, quod liberum arbitrium a culpa resurgat, non est sibi necessaria aliqua gratia curans, sed sufficit sola gratuita Dei misericordia, quae inclinatur ad remittendum peccata nostra propter satisfactionem, quam Christus sibi facere voluit, dum se in cruce pro nobis obtulit. — Sed haec positio non tantum a veritate deficit, sed etiam, dum contraria implicat, se ipsam destruit. Dicit enim, quod ad hoc, quod liberum arbitrium a culpa resurgat, necesse est, quod Deus sibi culpam remittat; et tamen non est necesse, quod aliquid sibi tribuat, vel circa ipsum faciat. Si enim Deus non mutatur; et iterum ipse iustus iudex est, ut nihil acceptet nisi tantum, quantum valet: ad hoc, quod culpa remittatur, et peccator Deo reconcilietur, necesse est, quod aliquid ipsi peccatori tribuatur, per quod morbus peccati sanetur13.

Catholici vero tractatores et luce fidei et auctoritate Scripturae cognoverunt, quod peccatum et Dei est offensivum, et etiam quodam modo damnificativum, dum homo se transfert de servitio Dei ad servitutem diaboli; et etiam imaginis deformativum. Et ideo dixerunt, quod ad hoc, quod liberum arbitrium resurgat a culpa, necessaria est gratia, non solum secundum quod gratia dicitur gratuita voluntas Dei, nec etiam14 secundum quod dicitur liberalis passio Christi, sed etiam secundum quod dicitur habitus animi. Gratuita enim voluntas Dei concurrit ad hoc, quod fiat offensae remissio — voluntarie enim nobis condonat offensam — liberalis autem passio Christi concurrit ad hoc, quod fiat damni satisfactio15; habitus infusus concurrit ad hoc, quod fiat morbi curatio et imaginis reformatio. Et ideo ad hoc, quod homo resurgat a culpa, multum per omnem modum necessaria est sibi gratia. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod homo absque gratia gratum faciente non potest a culpa resurgere.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod motus in id quod est secundum naturam, facilior est quam ille, qui est in id quod est praeter naturam; dicendum, quod illud verum est de illo motu, qui est secundum naturam, ita quod subiacet16 potestati naturae; et de illo etiam motu, qui est praeter naturam, ita tamen, quod non corrumpitur nec diminuitur ibi naturae potestas, sicut est in motu lapidis sursum. Facilius enim regreditur deorsum, quam ascenderit sursum: tum quia moveri deorsum est in eius potestate; tum etiam, quia per motum sursum nihil diminuebatur vel adimebatur de eius gravitate. — Non sic autem est in proposito, tum quia moveri ad iustitiam est per virtutem supra naturam; tum etiam, quia motus ad culpam diminuit habilitatem liberi arbitrii. Per peccatum enim non solum homo exspoliatur gratuitis, sed etiam vulneratur in naturalibus17.

2. Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens, quod obiicitur de similitudine sanitatis naturae ad sanitatem voluntatis; non enim est simile. Nam sanitas corporalis est in potestate naturae, sanitas vero spiritualis est per aliquid, quod est supra naturam. Cum autem aliquid infirmatur corporaliter, non omnino naturae perimitur virtus, quae erat principium sanitatis18; et ideo a tali infirmitate ad sanitatem naturaliter potest fieri regressus. In peccato vero perditur ipsa gratia Dei et iustitia, per quam erat spiritualis sanitas; et pro tanto dicitur grave peccatum esse mortale, quia aufert homini principium vitae. Et propterea, sicut de mortuo non potest fieri vivus nisi virtute mirabili19 et supra naturam; sic nec de peccatore potest fieri iustus naturaliter, vel voluntarie, sed mirabiliter.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de ignorante, quod potest fieri sciens sine gratia gratum faciente; dicendum, quod non est simile; ignorantia enim, in quantum huiusmodi, potius dicit defectum poenae quam culpae. Unde ignorans, secundum quod ignorans, non displicet Deo; peccans autem, secundum quod p. 677 peccans, Deo displicet; et ideo culpae recte opponitur gratia, quae reddit Deo acceptum, sicut ignorantiae opponitur scientia. Et quoniam oppositum expelli habet per suum oppositum, ideo non sequitur, quod si ignorantia habet expelli sine gratia, quod similiter culpa.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod peccator, manens in mortali, potest velle iustitiam; dicendum, quod velle aliquid est dupliciter: vel exiliter et semiplene, sicut dicitur: Vult, et non vult piger20; vel plene et sufficienter, sicut dicit Apostolus ad Philippenses secundo: Deus operatur in nobis velle et perficere. Primo modo potest esse in peccatore, et talis voluntas non facit aliquem iustum; secundo modo non potest esse sine gratia praeveniente et adiuvante voluntatem. Hoc autem secundo modo, non primo, voluntas iustitiae reddit animam iustam.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod per eandem vim, per quam aliquid movetur, quiescit; dicendum, quod verum est in eo motu, qui est ad aliquod complementum; hoc autem non oportet esse in motu corruptionis et destructionis. Aliquis enim interficitur per violentiam; non tamen oportet, quod per illam eandem vim in morte persistat. Et quia peccatum corruptio dicitur, non oportet, quod quis persistat in peccato ex solo actu voluntatis, sicut per actum voluntatis se in peccato praecipitavit; sicut patet in eo qui se voluntarie interficit vel voluntarie se demergit.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus possit restituere innocentiam et ita delere culpam absque gratia; dicendum, quod hoc verum est; sed largitas divinae misericordiae sic decrevit auferre malum, per quod homo Deo displicet, ut simul daretur bonum, per quod homo Deo placeret; nec unquam expellit culpam, quin sanctificet21 ipsam animam et in ea habitet per gratiam. Unde nihil est medium secundum tempus inter iustum et impium; ex quo enim homo nascitur, necesse est, animam eius vel esse perversam per culpam, vel erectam per gratiam.

Scholion

I. Solutio huius quaestionis decretis Concilii Trident. (Sess. VI. c. 3. i. 7, can. 11.) confirmata est. Idem docetur a S. Bonav. etiam IV. Sent. d. 17. p. I. a. 1. q. 1, dum quaeritur, utrum ad iustificationem impii necessaria sit gratiae infusio (cfr. etiam infra a. 2. q. 1. 3, d. 29. a. 1. q. 1. 2.). — De necessitate gratiae sanctificantis ad salutem contra philosophos et Pelagianos diffuse disputat Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 61. m. 1.

II. De eadem quaestione: Scot., I. Sent. d. 17. q. 3; Report. ibid. q. 2. — S. Thom., IV. Sent. d. 17. q. 1. a. 3; S. 1. II. q. 113. a. 2; S. c. Gent. III. c. 156; de Verit. q. 28. a. 2. — B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 26. a. 1; S. p. II. tr. 16. q. 105. m. 1-3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 1. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

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English Translation

Article I.

How much free choice can do without grace that makes pleasing.

Question I.

Whether free choice can rise again from fault without grace that makes pleasing.

Concerning the first point we proceed thus and inquire whether free choice can rise again from fault without grace that does not make pleasing. And that it cannot, it seems:

1. First, through what is said in Romans, chapter three1: Being justified freely by his grace. And a little before: By the works of the law no flesh shall be justified. And more expressly in Titus, chapter three: Not by the works of justice which we have done, but according to his own mercy etc.: therefore, with grace that makes pleasing set aside, free choice cannot of itself rise again from fault.

2. Likewise, in Galatians, chapter two2: I cast not away the grace of God; for if justice be by the law, then Christ died in vain: if therefore by the power of free choice a man could return to justice, it seems that Christ would have died in vain; and if it is impious to say this, the point is clear, etc.

3. Likewise, no one asks from another what he has in his own power; but in the Psalm3 the holy man asks: Heal my soul, for I have sinned against thee. The Savior himself also teaches us to ask in the Lord's Prayer: And forgive us our debts: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, this is shown by a reason that Bernard makes4: when someone becomes pious from impious, he becomes good from bad; and when he becomes good from bad, he is made better; yet no one has power over himself: therefore no one can make himself better by his own power: therefore neither can he rise again from fault without the grace of God.

5. Likewise, by every sin God is offended, who is justice itself, and every sin is done against the commandment of God; but the offense is as great as is he who is offended: since therefore he is infinite, the offense has in some way the character of the infinite. If therefore free choice is of finite power, it is impossible that it return to its former state, unless it be brought back by the divine mercy, which by its gratuitous goodness pardons the fault or remits the offense; but this does not happen without grace: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, sin is the privation of spiritual life and the privation of light; but spiritual life cannot return to the soul except from the fountain of life, nor light except from the fountain of light5: therefore it is impossible that the soul rise again from fault, unless God, who is the fountain of life and perennial light, by his kindness vivify and illumine it; but this happens only through the gift of grace: therefore etc.

On the contrary:

1. The Damascene6: « Sin is a turning away from that which is according to nature into that which is against nature »; but it is easier for any thing to be moved according to nature than against nature: therefore if free choice by its own power can in sinning be moved against nature, by its own power it will be able to return to nature: therefore as it was able to fall, so also to rise again.

2. Likewise, the power of free choice is greater than that of nature; but nature, when it is weakened, can be healed without the aid of medicine: therefore much more strongly can free choice, when it is weakened through fault, be healed without any grace.

3. Likewise, without grace that makes pleasing a man can be made knowing from being ignorant, not only in those things which lie under nature, but also in those things which are above nature: therefore by parallel reasoning, without grace that makes pleasing a man will be able to be made just from being a sinner.

4. Likewise, a sinner existing in mortal sin can desire and will justice; but to be just is nothing other than to will justice, since justice is the rectitude of the will; and the will is then right when it wills justice7: therefore a sinner in mortal sin can be justified without grace that makes pleasing.

5. Likewise, by the same force by which someone is moved toward something, he comes to rest in it8: therefore if someone is moved to fault only by the will, he does not rest in it except through the will, and so long as he wills: therefore if he does not will to persist in fault, without grace that makes pleasing, it seems that he can rise again from fault. If you judge that he cannot will it; on the contrary: « Rational powers are toward opposites », as the Philosopher says9, and the will, so long as it is on the way, is changeable: therefore as it was able voluntarily to seek fault, so voluntarily it can rise again from fault.

6. Likewise, between grace and fault innocence is in the middle, as will appear better below10: therefore since innocence can be had by someone without grace, as it was had by Adam in the beginning, and since fault is destroyed by innocence had; it seems that without grace that makes pleasing someone can rise again from fault.

Conclusion.

That free choice rise again from fault, grace too is necessary, according as it is called a habit of the soul.

I respond: It must be said that in the determination of this question the philosophers held one view, the heretics another, the catholic treatise-writers another.

For the philosophers, being ignorant of how the divine majesty is offended by sin, and how through it the fitness of the powers is taken away, said that man could be made just through exercise, just as through disorder away from right reason he had been made unjust. Hence the Philosopher too says that a depraved man, led to better exercises, either will profit much, or is perfectly restored to the contrary habit11.

The heretics, however, having some light of faith, recognized that through sin the divine majesty is offended and in some way harmed12. Yet, being blinded, they did not consider how nature is weakened by fault; and therefore they said that, for free choice to rise again from fault, no healing grace is necessary to it, but the gratuitous mercy of God alone suffices, which is inclined to remit our sins on account of the satisfaction which Christ willed to make for himself, when he offered himself on the cross for us. — But this position not only falls short of the truth, but also, while it implies contradictions, destroys itself. For it says that, for free choice to rise again from fault, it is necessary that God remit the fault to him; and yet it is not necessary that he bestow anything on him, or do anything about him. For if God is not changed; and again he himself is a just judge, so that he accepts nothing except only as much as it is worth: for the fault to be remitted and the sinner reconciled to God, it is necessary that something be bestowed on the sinner himself, by which the disease of sin be healed13.

The catholic treatise-writers, however, both by the light of faith and by the authority of Scripture, recognized that sin is both offensive to God, and also in some way harmful, while man transfers himself from the service of God to the servitude of the devil; and also deformative of the image. And therefore they said that, for free choice to rise again from fault, grace is necessary, not only according as grace is called the gratuitous will of God, nor even14 according as it is called the liberal passion of Christ, but also according as it is called a habit of the soul. For the gratuitous will of God concurs that the remission of the offense come about — for voluntarily he pardons us the offense — the liberal passion of Christ concurs that the satisfaction of the loss come about15; the infused habit concurs that the curing of the disease and the reformation of the image come about. And therefore, for man to rise again from fault, grace is in every way greatly necessary to him. — Therefore the reasons showing that man cannot rise again from fault without grace that makes pleasing are to be granted.

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that the motion into that which is according to nature is easier than that which is into that which is against nature; it must be said that this is true of that motion which is according to nature, in such a way that it lies under16 the power of nature; and of that motion too which is against nature, yet in such a way that the power of nature is not there corrupted nor diminished, as is the case in the upward motion of a stone. For it returns downward more easily than it ascended upward: both because to be moved downward is within its power; and also because by the upward motion nothing was diminished or taken away from its weight. — But it is not so in our case, both because to be moved toward justice is by a power above nature; and also because the motion toward fault diminishes the fitness of free choice. For through sin man is not only despoiled of gratuitous gifts, but also is wounded in his natural endowments17.

2. And by this is clear the response to what follows, which is objected concerning the likeness of the health of nature to the health of the will; for it is not alike. For bodily health is within the power of nature, but spiritual health is through something that is above nature. For when something is weakened corporeally, the power of nature, which was the principle of health, is not entirely destroyed18; and therefore from such weakness a return to health can be made naturally. But in sin the very grace of God and justice, through which there was spiritual health, is lost; and to that extent grave sin is said to be mortal, because it takes from man the principle of life. And on this account, just as from a dead man a living one cannot be made except by a marvelous power19 and above nature; so neither from a sinner can a just man be made naturally, or voluntarily, but marvelously.

3. To that which is objected concerning the ignorant man, that he can be made knowing without grace that makes pleasing; it must be said that it is not alike; for ignorance, as such, rather bespeaks a defect of penalty than of fault. Hence the ignorant, as ignorant, is not displeasing to God; but the sinner, as sinning, is displeasing to God; and therefore grace, which renders one acceptable to God, is rightly opposed to fault, just as knowledge is opposed to ignorance. And since an opposite is to be expelled by its opposite, it does not therefore follow that, if ignorance is to be expelled without grace, that fault likewise is.

4. To that which is objected, that a sinner, remaining in mortal sin, can will justice; it must be said that to will something is twofold: either weakly and half-fully, as it is said: The sluggard wills, and wills not20; or fully and sufficiently, as the Apostle says in Philippians, chapter two: God works in us to will and to accomplish. In the first way it can be in a sinner, and such a will does not make anyone just; in the second way it cannot be without grace going before and helping the will. But in this second way, not in the first, the will of justice renders the soul just.

5. To that which is objected, that by the same force by which something is moved, it comes to rest; it must be said that this is true in that motion which is toward some completion; but this need not be the case in a motion of corruption and destruction. For someone is killed by violence; yet it need not be that by that same force he persist in death. And since sin is called a corruption, it need not be that one persist in sin from the mere act of the will, just as by an act of the will he cast himself into sin; as is clear in the one who voluntarily kills himself or voluntarily drowns himself.

6. To that which is objected, that God can restore innocence and thus destroy fault without grace; it must be said that this is true; but the largesse of the divine mercy has so decreed to take away the evil by which man is displeasing to God, that at the same time there be given the good by which man would be pleasing to God; nor does he ever expel fault, without sanctifying21 the soul itself and dwelling in it through grace. Hence there is nothing in the middle, with respect to time, between the just and the impious; for from the time man is born, it is necessary that his soul be either perverse through fault, or set upright through grace.

Scholion

I. The solution of this question has been confirmed by the decrees of the Council of Trent (Sess. VI, c. 3, i. 7, can. 11). The same is taught by St. Bonaventure also in IV Sent. d. 17, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, where it is asked whether for the justification of the impious an infusion of grace is necessary (cf. also below a. 2, q. 1, 3, d. 29, a. 1, q. 1, 2). — On the necessity of sanctifying grace for salvation against the philosophers and Pelagians, Alexander of Hales disputes at length, S. p. III, q. 61, m. 1.

II. On the same question: Scotus, I Sent. d. 17, q. 3; Report. ibid. q. 2. — St. Thomas, IV Sent. d. 17, q. 1, a. 3; S. I-II, q. 113, a. 2; S. c. Gent. III, c. 156; de Verit. q. 28, a. 2. — B. Albert, II Sent. d. 26, a. 1; S. p. II, tr. 16, q. 105, m. 1-3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2, a. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following questions, here q. 1. — Biel, on this and the following questions, here q. unica.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 24. — Seq. textus est ibid. v. 20; tertius loc. cit. v. 5.
    Verse 24 [Rom. 3:24]. — The following text is in the same place, v. 20; the third is at the place cited, v. 5 [Titus 3:5].
  2. Vers. 21.
    Verse 21 [Gal. 2:21].
  3. Psalm. 40, 5. — Seq. textus est Matth. 6, 12. — Hoc arg. affert August., de Natura et gratia, c. 18. n. 20. seq., ubi exclamat: Nam quid stultius quam orare, ut facias quod in potestate habeas?
    Psalm 40:5. — The following text is Matthew 6:12. — Augustine adduces this argument, On Nature and Grace, c. 18, n. 20 ff., where he exclaims: For what is more foolish than to pray that you may do what you have in your power?
  4. De Gratia et lib. arb. c. 8. n. 23. Cfr. etiam c. 6. n. 18. — Paulo inferius pro nullus tamen codd. F aa nullus autem.
    On Grace and Free Choice, c. 8, n. 23. Cf. also c. 6, n. 18. — A little further down, for nullus tamen codices F aa have nullus autem.
  5. Cfr. August., in Ioan. Evang. tr. 23. n. 3; Enarrat. in Ps. 143. n. 4; de Natura et gratia, c. 23. n. 23.
    Cf. Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John, tr. 23, n. 3; Enarrations on the Psalms, Ps. 143, n. 4; On Nature and Grace, c. 23, n. 23.
  6. Libr. IV. de Fide orthod. c. 20. Cfr. II. c. 30.
    Book IV of On the Orthodox Faith, c. 20. Cf. II, c. 30.
  7. Anselmus, Dialog. de verit. c. 12: Iustitia igitur est rectitudo voluntatis... non enim illam habemus nisi volendo; et si eam volumus, hoc ipso eam habemus... et mox ut habemus et volumus eandem rectitudinem voluntatis, iustitia dicenda est. — Pro tunc autem Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 tunc enim.
    Anselm, Dialogue on Truth, c. 12: Justice therefore is the rectitude of the will... for we have it only by willing; and if we will it, by that very fact we have it... and as soon as we have and will the same rectitude of the will, it is to be called justice. — For tunc autem the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 has tunc enim.
  8. Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 19. (VIII. c. 9.): Eadem enim potentia est sanum et aegrotum esse, et quiescere et moveri, et exstruere et destruere domum etc.
    Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, text 19 (VIII, c. 9): For the same potency is for being healthy and being sick, and for resting and being moved, and for building up and tearing down a house, etc.
  9. Libr. IX. Metaph. text. 3. et 10. (VIII. c. 2. et 5.).
    Metaphysics, Book IX, text 3 and 10 (VIII, c. 2 and 5).
  10. Dist. 29. a. 1. q. 1. ad 5. et a. 2. q. 2, ubi etiam sustinetur opinio, quod Adam in statu innocentiae creatus sit absque dono gratiae gratum facientis.
    Distinction 29, a. 1, q. 1, ad 5, and a. 2, q. 2, where also the opinion is upheld that Adam in the state of innocence was created without the gift of grace that makes pleasing.
  11. Vide II. Ethic. c. 2, ubi Aristoteles docet, virtutem in nobis causari assuetudine operationum, ipsamque eo ipso, quod consistat in mediocritate, corrumpi ab excessu et defectu.
    See Ethics II, c. 2, where Aristotle teaches that virtue is caused in us by the habituation of operations, and that it, by the very fact that it consists in a mean, is corrupted by excess and defect.
  12. Vat. perperam hic adiicit voluntas vel liberum arbitrium. Aliquanto inferius post aliqua gratia ed. 1 addit creata, quod verbum codd. A bb cc et alii substituunt pro curans. — De hac opinione vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. Ibidem in capp. seqq. haec opinio refellitur et tertia approbatur.
    The Vatican edition wrongly adds here voluntas vel liberum arbitrium. Somewhat further down, after aliqua gratia edition 1 adds creata, which word codices A bb cc and others substitute for curans. — On this opinion see here the Master's text, c. 1. In the same place in the following chapters this opinion is refuted and the third approved.
  13. Cfr. supra d. 26. q. 1. seq.
    Cf. above, d. 26, q. 1 ff.
  14. Intellige cum cod. Q nec solum etiam. Subinde pro habitus animi codd. H 1 habitus gratuitus animi.
    Understand with codex Q nec solum etiam. Then for habitus animi codices H 1 have habitus gratuitus animi.
  15. Vat. cum ed. 4 omittit verba ad hoc, quod fiat damni satisfactio; habitus infusus concurrit ad, quae verba ex codd. A E K M Y restituimus, et deinde post morbi curatio interiecto commate, dictae edd. post voculam et immediate sequentem interserunt gratia ut fiat. Cod. 1, omissis etiam cum Vat. verbis praenotatis, post morbi curatio sic prosequitur: sed habitus animi gratuitus ad hoc, quod fiat imaginis reformatio. Sed lectiones evidenter mutilae sunt, cum non respondeant doctrinae in praecedentibus traditae, scil. quod libero arbitrio a Deo gratia curans tribuatur, per quam morbus ipsius sanetur.
    The Vatican edition with edition 4 omits the words ad hoc, quod fiat damni satisfactio; habitus infusus concurrit ad, which words we have restored from codices A E K M Y; and then, after morbi curatio, with a comma inserted, the said editions, after the little word et and the one immediately following, interpose gratia ut fiat. Codex 1, omitting also with the Vatican the words noted above, after morbi curatio continues thus: but a gratuitous habit of the soul, that the reformation of the image come about. But the readings are evidently mutilated, since they do not correspond to the doctrine handed down in what precedes, namely that to free choice a healing grace is bestowed by God, through which its disease is healed.
  16. Codd. T cc et ed. 1 subiaceat.
    Codices T cc and edition 1 have subiaceat.
  17. Cfr. supra pag. 506, nota 3. August., de Natura et gratia, c. 32. n. 60, adducta parabola de Samaritano, in seq. cap. n. 62. de natura humana ait: «Vulnerata, sauciata, vexata, perdita est». Quibus confirmatur quod diximus supra pag. 511, nota 2. Verbotenus est in libro Instructio sacerdotis, p. I. c. 1, n. 2. (inter op. Bern.).
    Cf. above, p. 506, note 3. Augustine, On Nature and Grace, c. 32, n. 60, the parable of the Samaritan being adduced, in the following chapter, n. 62, says of human nature: «It is wounded, hurt, harassed, lost». By these is confirmed what we said above, p. 511, note 2. It is word-for-word in the book Instruction for a Priest, p. I, c. 1, n. 2 (among the works of Bernard).
  18. Cor enim, ut ait Averroes super IV. de Caelo et mundo, text. 24, in eo [scil. infirmo, qui sanatur per se] alterat membrum aegrotans ad sanitatem.
    For the heart, as Averroes says on IV On the Heaven and the World, text 24, in him [namely, the sick man who is healed of himself] alters the ailing member toward health.
  19. Codd. F L O aa ee miraculi.
    Codices F L O aa ee have miraculi.
  20. Prov. 13, 4. — Seq. textus est loc. cit. v. 13. — Circa finem solut. edd. 1, 2, 3, 4 pro non primo perperam substituunt non potest, sed Vat. tantum potest, et deinde pro reddit edd., excepta 1, exhibent reddere.
    Proverbs 13:4. — The following text is at the place cited, v. 13. — Near the end of the solution editions 1, 2, 3, 4 wrongly substitute non potest for non primo, but the Vatican only potest, and then for reddit the editions, except 1, present reddere.
  21. Cod. cc et ed. 1 vivificet. Mox pro et in ea Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 ut in ea. Infra secundum tempus i. e. in praesenti providentia.
    Codex cc and edition 1 have vivificet. Then for et in ea the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 has ut in ea. Below, secundum tempus, i.e. in present providence. ---
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