Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 2
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 28
Articulus I. Quaestio II. Utrum liberum arbitrium absque gratia gratum faciente possit adversarium suum vincere.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium absque gratia gratum faciente possit adversarium suum vincere. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Genesis quarto1 dictum est Cain: Subter te erit appetitus tuus, et tu dominaberis illius; sed constat, quod Cain iam erat in mortali peccato: ergo in statu illo dominari poterat appetitui proprio. Sed nullam victoriam habet in nobis adversarius nisi per nostrum appetitum: si igitur absque gratia gratum faciente Cain superare poterat proprium appetitum; videtur, quod posset etiam vincere adversarium.
2. Item, Bernardus in libro de Libero Arbitrio2: Liberum arbitrium est potentissimum sub Deo. Et ibidem dicit, quod liberum arbitrium « sui omnino defectum non patitur, quare potissime in ipso aeternae et incommutabilis imago deitatis videtur. Nam si habet initium, nescit tamen occasum; nec de iustitia vel de gratia accipit augmentum nec de peccati miseria detrimentum ». Ergo si liberum arbitrium, adiutum gratia et iustitia, possit superare adversarium; pari ratione videtur, quod possit etiam per se ipsum.
3. Item, spiritus luxuriae deiicitur vel vincitur per continentiam, et spiritus iracundiae per patientiam, et sic de aliis; sed continentia et patientia possunt haberi absque gratia gratum faciente per gratiam gratis datam: ergo videtur etc.
4. Item, difficilius est vincere se ipsum quam vincere diabolum; sicut enim habitum fuit, et Magister dicit supra distinctione vigesima prima3: « Fortior est tentatio carnis quam tentatio hostis »; sed homo absque gratia gratum faciente potest se ipsum vincere et morti exponere, sicut patet in haereticis: ergo multo fortius videtur, quod absque gratia gratum faciente possit de diabolo triumphare.
5. Item, adversarius noster, in quo nulla est gratia gratum faciens, frequenter potest nos devincere et sibi subiugare: si ergo non est peioris conditionis homo, quam sit diabolus; videtur, quod absque aliquo dono gratiae possit quis adversarium suum vincere.
Sed contra: 1. Primae ad Corinthios decimo quinto4: Deo gratias, qui dedit nobis victoriam per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum: igitur sine auxilio Christi nemo potest de inimico habere victoriam. Si ergo Christus auxiliatur nobis per gratiam suam, per quam nos iustificat, videtur etc.
2. Item, ad Romanos septimo5: Infelix ego homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? Et respondet: Gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum. Si ergo nullus vincit adversarium, nisi qui liberatur a lege peccati et mortis; videtur, quod absque gratia Dei per Iesum Christum, quae quidem est gratia gratum faciens, non possit adversarium vincere.
3. Item, super illud Psalmi6: Infirmati sunt etc., Glossa: « Non potentes resistere vitiis per se ». « Deo enim desistente ab auxilio, laborare potest homo, sed non vincere »: ergo videtur, quod absque auxilio gratiae gratum facientis non contingit vincere tentatorem. Quodsi tu dicas, hoc intelligendum esse de gratia gratis data, non gratum faciente solum; obiicitur per aliam Glossam super illud Psalmi7: Immissiones per angelos malos etc.; ibi Glossa: « Diabolus potestatem habet in peccatore sicut in proprio pecore »: ergo cum non possit a peccato erui nisi per gratiam gratum facientem, non potest nisi per illam erui a potestate diaboli: ergo sine illa non potest ipsum devincere.
4. Item, vincenti debetur corona, secundum quod dicitur Apocalypsis secundo et tertio8; sed nulli pugnanti contra adversarium debetur corona gloriae, nisi ei qui habet gratiam gratum facientem: ergo nullus absque illa potest diabolum devincere.
5. Item, quidquid homo faciat et quidquid etiam caveat, quamdiu est sine gratia gratum faciente, manet in culpa, sicut prius ostensum est; sed cum manet in culpa, servus est diaboli, servus est etiam peccati; et qui servus est diaboli, victus est a diabolo, secundum quod dicitur secundae Petri secundo: igitur absque gratia gratum faciente impossibile est de diabolo triumphare.
Conclusio
Sine gratia gratum faciente homo non potest adversarium ita vincere, ut proficiat in merito condigni.
Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod differt dicere, aliquem resistere adversario, et aliquem vincere adversarium. Plus enim importat victoria quam resistentia. Resistentia namque consistit in hoc, quod quis non consentiat suggestioni diabolicae; sed victoria consistit in assequendo oppositum eius quod diabolus intendebat. Intendebat autem diabolus hominem reddere inimicum Deo, et facere dignum aeterno supplicio. Tunc igitur homo vincit adversarium, quando sic resistit tentationi, ut efficiatur maior Dei amicus et mereatur regnum aeternum. — Et quoniam hoc absque gratia gratum faciente esse non potest, ideo concedendum est, quod etsi quis per gratiam gratis datam possit diabolo resistere, ut ei non consentiat suggerenti; tamen absque dono, quod reddat hominem acceptum Deo, ipsum vincere non potest, ut contra eius intentionem proficiat dignitate meriti vel in merito condigni. — Et concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.
Ad 1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de eo quod dictum est Cain: Subter te erit appetitus tuus etc., dicendum, quod etsi in potestate eius esset appetitum refrenare, ut in actum peccati non procederet, etiam absque gratia gratum faciente; non tamen ex hoc sequitur, quod posset adversarium devincere; quia, etsi sine gratia hoc faceret, esset ibi resistentia, per quam vitaret poenam, non tamen esset ibi victoria, per quam mereretur palmam.
Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod liberum arbitrium dicitur esse potentissimum sub Deo, et quod non angetur nec minuitur; dicendum, quod, quemadmodum fuit supra expositum, hoc intelligitur quantum ad privationem coactionis, non quantum ad potentiam servandae rectitudinis.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod spiritus luxuriae vincitur per continentiam; dicendum, quod etsi per continentiam, quae est absque gratia gratum faciente, possit quis resistere spiritui luxuriae; illa tamen resistentia triumphus dici non potest, pro eo quod nullam ex hoc assequitur palmam.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potest quis vincere se ipsum sine gratia gratum faciente; dicendum, quod falsum est. Quamvis enim haereticus, qui exponit se morti, videatur se ipsum vincere, non tamen est ibi victoria, sed deiectio. Superatur enim ab erroris improbitate et conscientiae perversitate et obstinationis profunditate; et propter hoc magis meretur confusionem et ignominiam ex illa mortis perpessione quam gloriam.
Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod diabolus potest vincere hominem absque gratia; dicendum, quod victoria diaboli consistit in subiugando sibi hominem per peccatum, victoria vero hominis consistit in promerendo illud quod diabolus amisit; et ideo, sicut facilius est peccare quam in bonum9 proficere, sic facilius est, diabolum superare hominem, quam hominem adversarium vincere. Praeterea, diabolus non vincit hominem nisi volentem et consentientem10, diabolus autem nunquam vincitur volens; et ideo non sequitur, quodsi diabolus potest reportare victoriam de homine absque gratia, quod similiter possit esse e converso; immo non est simile, sicut ostensum est.
I. Hanc quaestionem de necessitate gratiae habitualis ad vincendum adversarium ab aliis antiquis Petri Lombardi commentatoribus non vidimus specialiter tractatam nisi aliquatenus ab Aegidio R., hic q. 2. a. 2. dub. lat. 1. Principia autem in solutione adhibita eadem sunt cum iis quae in seq. quaestione declarantur. De necessitate gratiae actualis ad vincendas tentationes agitur infra a. 2. q. 2.
II. Quoad sequentem (3.) quaest. notandum, quod eadem distinctio inter duos modos mandata Dei implendi etiam a S. Thoma (hic a. 3, et aliis verbis etiam in S. I. II. q. 109. a. 4.) in hac quaestione solvenda adhibetur. — De eadem quaest. tractant etiam: B. Albert., hic a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. I. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. I. a. 4.
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Article I. Question II. Whether free choice without grace that makes pleasing can conquer its adversary.
Second, it is asked whether free choice without grace that makes pleasing can conquer its adversary. And it seems that it can.
1. In Genesis chapter four1 it was said to Cain: Beneath you shall be your appetite, and you shall have dominion over it; but it is established that Cain was already in mortal sin: therefore in that state he was able to have dominion over his own appetite. But the adversary has no victory in us except through our appetite: if therefore without grace that makes pleasing Cain was able to overcome his own appetite, it seems that he could also conquer the adversary.
2. Likewise, Bernard in the book On Free Choice2: Free choice is the most powerful thing under God. And in the same place he says that free choice « suffers no failing of itself at all, wherefore most especially in it the image of the eternal and unchangeable deity is seen. For though it has a beginning, yet it knows no setting; nor does it receive increase from justice or from grace, nor loss from the misery of sin ». Therefore if free choice, aided by grace and justice, can overcome the adversary, by parity of reasoning it seems that it can do so also by itself.
3. Likewise, the spirit of lust is cast down or conquered through continence, and the spirit of anger through patience, and so of the rest; but continence and patience can be had without grace that makes pleasing, through grace freely given: therefore it seems, etc.
4. Likewise, it is more difficult to conquer oneself than to conquer the devil; for as has been held, and as the Master says above in the twenty-first distinction3: « The temptation of the flesh is stronger than the temptation of the enemy »; but a man without grace that makes pleasing can conquer himself and expose himself to death, as is plain in heretics: therefore much more strongly does it seem that without grace that makes pleasing he can triumph over the devil.
5. Likewise, our adversary, in whom there is no grace that makes pleasing, can frequently overpower us and subjugate us to himself: if therefore a man is not of worse condition than the devil is, it seems that without any gift of grace someone can conquer his adversary.
On the contrary: 1. First Corinthians chapter fifteen4: Thanks be to God, who has given us the victory through Jesus Christ our Lord: therefore without the help of Christ no one can have victory over the enemy. If therefore Christ helps us through his grace, by which he justifies us, it seems, etc.
2. Likewise, Romans chapter seven5: Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death? And he answers: The grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord. If therefore no one conquers the adversary except one who is delivered from the law of sin and death, it seems that without the grace of God through Jesus Christ — which indeed is grace that makes pleasing — one cannot conquer the adversary.
3. Likewise, upon that text of the Psalm6: They were weakened etc., the Gloss: « Not able to resist vices by themselves ». « For when God desists from his help, a man can labor, but not conquer »: therefore it seems that without the help of grace that makes pleasing it does not happen that one conquers the tempter. But if you say that this is to be understood of grace freely given, not of grace that makes pleasing alone, the objection is made through another Gloss upon that text of the Psalm7: Sendings in by evil angels etc.; there the Gloss: « The devil has power over a sinner as over his own beast »: therefore since one cannot be rescued from sin except through grace that makes pleasing, one cannot be rescued from the power of the devil except through it: therefore without it one cannot conquer him.
4. Likewise, to the conqueror a crown is owed, according to what is said in Apocalypse chapters two and three8; but to no one fighting against the adversary is the crown of glory owed, except to him who has grace that makes pleasing: therefore no one without it can conquer the devil.
5. Likewise, whatever a man may do and whatever also he may guard against, so long as he is without grace that makes pleasing, he remains in fault, as was shown before; but while he remains in fault, he is the servant of the devil, and a servant also of sin; and he who is the servant of the devil has been conquered by the devil, according to what is said in second Peter chapter two: therefore without grace that makes pleasing it is impossible to triumph over the devil.
Conclusion
Without grace that makes pleasing a man cannot so conquer the adversary as to make progress in the merit of condignity.
I respond: For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that it is one thing to say that someone resists the adversary, and another that someone conquers the adversary. For victory implies more than resistance. For resistance consists in this, that one does not consent to the diabolical suggestion; but victory consists in attaining the opposite of that which the devil intended. Now the devil intended to render the man an enemy to God, and to make him deserving of eternal punishment. Then, therefore, does a man conquer the adversary, when he so resists temptation that he is made a greater friend of God and merits the eternal kingdom. — And since this cannot be without grace that makes pleasing, therefore it must be granted that, although someone through grace freely given can resist the devil, so as not to consent to him when he suggests, nevertheless without the gift that renders a man acceptable to God he cannot conquer him, so as to make progress against the devil's intention in the dignity of merit or in the merit of condignity. — And the reasons that show this are to be granted.
To the 1st. To that which is objected concerning what was said to Cain: Beneath you shall be your appetite etc., it must be said that although it was in his power to restrain his appetite, so that he did not proceed into the act of sin, even without grace that makes pleasing; nevertheless it does not follow from this that he could conquer the adversary; because, even if he did this without grace, there would be there resistance, by which he would avoid punishment, yet there would not be there victory, by which he would merit the palm.
To the 2nd. To that which is objected, that free choice is said to be the most powerful thing under God, and that it is neither increased nor diminished; it must be said that, just as was expounded above, this is understood as to the privation of compulsion, not as to the power of preserving rectitude.
To the 3rd. To that which is objected, that the spirit of lust is conquered through continence; it must be said that although through continence, which is without grace that makes pleasing, one can resist the spirit of lust, nevertheless that resistance cannot be called a triumph, for the reason that one attains no palm from it.
To the 4th. To that which is objected, that one can conquer oneself without grace that makes pleasing; it must be said that this is false. For although a heretic, who exposes himself to death, may seem to conquer himself, nevertheless there is not there victory, but a casting-down. For he is overcome by the wickedness of his error and the perversity of his conscience and the depth of his obstinacy; and on account of this he merits confusion and ignominy from that endurance of death rather than glory.
To the 5th. To that which is objected, that the devil can conquer a man without grace; it must be said that the devil's victory consists in subjugating the man to himself through sin, whereas the man's victory consists in earning that which the devil lost; and therefore, just as it is easier to sin than to make progress in good9, so it is easier for the devil to overcome the man than for the man to conquer the adversary. Moreover, the devil does not conquer a man except one who is willing and consenting10, whereas the devil is never conquered willingly; and therefore it does not follow that, if the devil can carry off victory over a man without grace, that likewise it can be the other way around; rather it is not alike, as has been shown.
I. This question, concerning the necessity of habitual grace for conquering the adversary, we have not found specially treated by the other ancient commentators on Peter Lombard, except to some extent by Giles of Rome, here q. 2, a. 2, dub. lat. 1. But the principles employed in the solution are the same as those declared in the following question. On the necessity of actual grace for conquering temptations there is a discussion below, a. 2, q. 2.
II. As to the following (3rd) question, it must be noted that the same distinction between the two modes of fulfilling God's commandments is employed also by St. Thomas (here a. 3, and in other words also in Summa I-II, q. 109, a. 4) in solving this question. — On the same question there treat also: Blessed Albert, here a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. I, a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 3. — Giles of Rome, here q. I, a. 4.
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- Vers. 7. — Haec quaestio quoad primum hominem iam soluta est supra d. 24. p. I. a. 1. q. 2.Gen. 4, 7. — This question, as concerns the first man, was already resolved above in d. 24, p. I, a. 1, q. 2.
- Vide supra pag. 115, nota 6. Eodem loco etiam invenies primam partem textus seq., sicut in originali habetur (loc. cit. c. 9. n. 28.); in secunda parte textus allati originale pro vel de gratia exhibet vel gloria, et pro de peccati miseria legit de peccato sive miseria.See above p. 115, note 6. In the same place you will also find the first part of the following text, as it stands in the original (loc. cit. c. 9, n. 28); in the second part of the cited text the original gives, for vel de gratia, vel gloria, and for de peccati miseria reads de peccato sive miseria.
- Cap. 6. Cfr. ibid. in Comment. a. 2. q. 3, ubi comparatio fit inter tentationes carnis et alias.Ch. 6. Compare, in the same place, in the Commentary a. 2, q. 3, where a comparison is made between the temptations of the flesh and the others.
- Vers. 57.v. 57.
- Vers. 24. seq.v. 24 and following.
- Psalm. 106, 12. — Prima Glossa est interlinearis et habetur apud Lyranum, apud quem nec non apud Strabum exhibetur secunda Glossa, quae ordinaria est et sumta ex Augustino in hunc loc. (n. 10.).Ps. 106, 12. — The first Gloss is interlinear and is found in Lyra, in whom — as also in Strabo — the second Gloss is given, which is the Ordinary Gloss and is taken from Augustine on this passage (n. 10).
- Psalm. 77, 49. — Glossam, quae est secundum Augustinum in hunc loc. n. 28, vide apud Strabum et Lyranum. Verba integra Augustini sunt: « In filiis vero diffidentiae tanquam in suis mancipiis operatur, quemadmodum homines in pecoribus suis ». Lyranus: In malos potest diabolus ut in suo pecore.Ps. 77, 49. — For the Gloss, which is according to Augustine on this passage n. 28, see Strabo and Lyra. The full words of Augustine are: « But in the children of distrust he works as in his own chattels, just as men do in their cattle ». Lyra: Over the wicked the devil has power as over his own beast.
- Cap. 2, 7. et 10; c. 3, 12. et 21.Ch. 2, vv. 7 and 10; ch. 3, vv. 12 and 21.
- Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 bono.The Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads bono.
- Cfr. supra pag. 170, nota 2.Compare above, page 170, note 2. ---