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Dist. 24, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 24

Textus Latinus
p. 556

Articulus I. De adiutorio homini collato, per quod posset resistere.

Quaestio II. Utrum homini datum fuerit naturale adiutorium, per quod posset absque gratia tentationi resistere.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum datum fuerit homini naturale adiutorium, per quod posset absque omni gratia tentationi resistere. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. « Liberum arbitrium, ut dicit Anselmus1, est potestas servandi rectitudinem propter se »; sed liberum arbitrium est potentia naturalis: ergo per naturalem potentiam absque addita gratia homo poterat servare rectitudinem sive iustitiam. Sed servando rectitudinem, tentationi non consentiret, immo resisteret et superaret: ergo etc. — Servatur enim — qui enim rectus est, obliquus esse non potest, quamdiu vult esse rectus — sed « nihil tam est in voluntate nostra quam ipsa voluntas4 », nihil facilius homini recto quam velle rectitudinem: si ergo liberum arbitrium hominis, quantum est de sua conditione primaria, rectum erat; absque omni gratia superaddita rectitudinem servare poterat, et sic adversario resistere et tentationem superare.

2. Item, ponatur homo in puris naturalibus; aut igitur posset resistere diabolo suadenti, aut non. Si non; et nullus peccat in eo quod vitare non potest2: ergo si consentiret tentationi diabolicae, non peccaret; quod est impossibile. Si sic: ergo per naturale adiutorium sine gratia superaddita superare poterat adversarium.

3. Item, natura nulli dat esse, quin etiam det ei aliquam potentiam permanendi, cum non deficiat in necessariis3; unde sicut aliquid naturaliter propagatur, sic etiam in naturali virtute in esse conservatur. Si ergo liberum arbitrium homini datum per naturam propriam innocens erat et immune a culpa: ergo per naturam propriam absque omni gratia permanere poterat in sua innocentia: ergo etc.

4. Item, rectitudo voluntatis solo actu voluntatis servatur.

Sed contra: 1. Augustinus de Vera Innocentia5: « Humana natura, etsi in illa integritate, in qua condita est, permaneret, nullo tamen modo se ipsam, Creatore non adiuvante, servaret »: ergo quantumcumque homo haberet liberum arbitrium, ad hoc, ut permaneret, necessarium ei erat gratiae divinae suffragium.

2. Item, si tunc poterat de potentia naturae tentationi resistere; et naturalia sunt eadem in nobis et in ipso: ergo tentationi resistere esset nobis per naturam possibile: ergo frustra frequentaremus dominicam orationem, petentes: Et ne nos inducas in tentationem6. Quod si absurdum est dicere, patet etc.

p. 557 3. Item, si virtute propria posset homo absque omni gratia tentationi resistere, potuisset etiam victoriam de inimico obtinere; sed victoriae respondet corona: ergo absque omni gratia potuisset mereri et pervenire ad gloriam; quod si evidenter falsum est, restat etc.

4. Item, tentationi resistere hoc est opus de se laudabile; sed faciens opus laudabile non potest non proficere: ergo si virtute propria habuit, unde posset stare, virtute propria habuit, unde posset proficere; quod est contra Magistrum in littera7, qui dicit, quod habuit unde posset stare, sed non habuit unde posset proficere.

Conclusio

Primus homo per naturale adiutorium cum continuatione divinae influentiae poterat tentationi resistere sine novae gratiae appositione.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod aliquem posse resistere virtute propria tentationi diabolicae absque omni gratia, intelligi potest dupliciter: aut ita, quod excludatur continuatio divinae influentiae, aut ita, quod excludatur appositio novae gratiae. Primum simpliciter est impossibile; nunquam enim liberum arbitrium malae suggestioni resisteret, nisi Deus suae bonitatis influentia continua in bono conservaret. Secundo modo veritatem habet pro statu innocentiae. Sicut enim dicit Magister in littera8, magna erat in primo homine « liberi arbitrii ab omni labe et corruptione immunitas atque naturalium potentiarum animae sinceritas et vivacitas », et per hoc poterat evitare et repellere suggestionem diabolicam; nec indigebat, ad hoc apponi sibi novam gratiam, cum respectu huius nulla esset in eo difficultas, sicut dicit Magister in littera9, et rationes ostendunt, quae ad primam partem inducuntur; et ideo concedendae sunt.

Ad obiecta: 1. Ad illud ergo Augustini de Vera Innocentia, iam patet responsio. Dicit enim10, quod nulla creatura rationalis potest sine divino adiutorio conservari, non quia ad resistendum peccato sit ei necessaria gratia, quamdiu est in innocentia, sed quia, in quocumque statu est, necessaria est sibi divinae bonitatis influentia.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod eadem sunt naturalia in nobis et in primo homine; dicendum, quod etsi eadem sunt11 secundum substantiam, tamen infirmata sunt et vulnerata et deteriorata; et ideo non sequitur, quod tantum posse habeant, quantum habuerunt, quando natura erat instituta.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tentationi resistere, hoc est victoriam obtinere; dicendum, quod plus est adversarium superare quam eidem resistere. Ad hoc enim quod aliquis adversarium superet, opportunum est12, quod oppositum assequatur, ad quod adversarius pertrahere intendebat; hoc autem solum est, quando homo non tantum resistit adversario voluntarie, verum etiam meritorie. Tunc enim recte vincitur diabolus, quando ex vexatione tentationis, per quam intendebat incurvare ad demeritum, homo proficit ad meritum. Hoc autem liberum arbitrium facere non potest nisi per gratiae adiutorium, quamvis per se posset refugere peccatum. Si enim absque gratia peccatum refugeret, meritorium sibi non esset, et tamen tentationi resisteret13.

4. Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens, quia Magister non loquitur de quocumque profectu, sed de profectu in merito, in quo non semper proficit homo, cum facit opus bonum bonitate morali, nisi adsit gratia Spiritus sancti, sicut melius infra14 patebit.

Scholion

I. Richard. a Med. (hic a. 1. q. 1.) cum aliis ita ponit quaestionem: « Utrum per liberum arbitrium sine gratia gratum faciente potuissent primi parentes malo resistere », et in responsione manifeste declarat, affirmativam solutionem intelligendam esse de libero arbitrio in statu iustitiae originalis, id est coniuncto cum dono supernaturali, quod nunc communiter appellatur donum integritatis. Idem addit: « Non credo tamen, quod per pura naturalia potuissent resistere omni motui vitioso ». In eodem sensu intelligendum esse S. Bonaventuram, satis apparet ex verbis in corp. positis, attento modo loquendi illa aetate usitato (cfr. infra d. 28. a. 1. q. 2. 3.). Eodem fere modo ac S. Bonav. loquitur S. Thom. in Commentar. (hic q. 1. a. 4.), sed clare se ipsum explicat S. l. II. q. 109. a. 8; cfr. S. c. Gent. III. c. 160. — Etiam p. 558Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 91. m. 1. a. 2.) sententiam S. Bonaventurae sic explanat: « Nota, quod primus homo duplicem habuit gratiam in primo statu, hoc est, antequam habuerit gratiam gratum facientem [secundum opinionem, eundem non fuisse statim in gratia habituali creatum], scil. gratis datam (communiter dicta gratia eo modo, quo dictum est) et gratiam superinfusam, quae erat continua influentia virtutis a causa prima ». Hanc autem gratiam gratis datam idem paulo superius sic determinavit, quod « comprehendit quidquid est additum naturalibus, quae sunt de constitutione generali rerum, et quod est additum libero arbitrio, disponens et faciens ad eius rectitudinem ». — Alex. Hal. (loc. cit. a. 3. § 2.), B. Albert. (hic a. 2; S. p. II. tr. 14. q. 90. m. 3.), Petr. a Tar. (loc. cit. q. 1.), Richard. a Med. (loc. cit. q. 2.) insuper quaerunt, utrum primus homo in illo statu proficere potuerit per liberum arbitrium. Negative respondent, qui negant, eum statim gratia sanctificante ornatum fuisse; quod qui affirmant etiam illud concedunt.

II. Praeter citatos: B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. loc. cit. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 4. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 5. q. 21. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

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English Translation

Article I. On the aid bestowed on man, by which he could resist.

Question II. Whether man was given a natural aid by which he could resist temptation without grace.

Secondly it is asked whether man was given a natural aid by which he could resist temptation without any grace. And that he could, it seems.

1. « Free choice, as Anselm says1, is the power of preserving rectitude for its own sake »; but free choice is a natural power: therefore by a natural power, without added grace, man was able to preserve rectitude or justice. But by preserving rectitude he would not consent to temptation, but rather would resist it and overcome it: therefore etc. — For it is preserved — for whoever is upright cannot be crooked, so long as he wills to be upright — but « nothing is so much in our will as the will itself4 », nothing is easier for an upright man than to will rectitude: if therefore the free choice of man, as far as concerns its primary condition, was upright; without any superadded grace it was able to preserve rectitude, and thus to resist the adversary and overcome temptation.

2. Likewise, let man be posited in his purely natural state; then either he could resist the devil who urges him, or he could not. If he could not; and no one sins in that which he cannot avoid2: therefore if he consented to the devil's temptation, he would not sin; which is impossible. If he could: therefore by a natural aid, without superadded grace, he was able to overcome the adversary.

3. Likewise, nature gives being to nothing without also giving it some power of enduring, since it does not fail in necessities3; whence just as something is naturally propagated, so too it is preserved in being by a natural power. If therefore the free choice given to man by his own nature was innocent and immune from fault: therefore by his own nature, without any grace, he was able to endure in his innocence: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the rectitude of the will is preserved by the act of the will alone.

On the contrary: 1. Augustine, On the Innocence of Human Nature5: « Human nature, even if it had remained in that integrity in which it was created, would yet in no way have preserved itself, the Creator not aiding it »: therefore however much man had free choice, in order that he might endure, the help of divine grace was necessary to him.

2. Likewise, if then he was able by the power of nature to resist temptation; and the natural endowments are the same in us and in him: therefore to resist temptation would be possible for us by nature: therefore in vain would we frequently say the Lord's Prayer, asking: And lead us not into temptation6. But if it is absurd to say this, it is clear etc.

3. Likewise, if by his own power man could resist temptation without any grace, he could also have obtained victory over the enemy; but to victory corresponds the crown: therefore without any grace he could have merited and arrived at glory; but since this is plainly false, it remains etc.

4. Likewise, to resist temptation is a work praiseworthy in itself; but one who does a praiseworthy work cannot fail to make progress: therefore if by his own power he had that whereby he could stand, by his own power he had that whereby he could make progress; which is against the Master in the text7, who says that he had that whereby he could stand, but did not have that whereby he could make progress.

Conclusion

The first man, by a natural aid together with the continuation of the divine influence, was able to resist temptation without the addition of new grace.

I respond: It must be said that for someone to be able by his own power to resist the devil's temptation without any grace can be understood in two ways: either so that the continuation of the divine influence is excluded, or so that the addition of new grace is excluded. The first is simply impossible; for free choice would never resist an evil suggestion unless God by the continual influence of his goodness preserved it in the good. In the second way it holds true for the state of innocence. For as the Master says in the text8, there was in the first man a great « immunity of free choice from every stain and corruption, and a soundness and liveliness of the natural powers of the soul », and by this he was able to avoid and repel the devil's suggestion; nor did he need new grace to be added to him for this, since with respect to this there was no difficulty in him, as the Master says in the text9, and the reasons show, which are brought forward for the first part; and therefore they are to be conceded.

To the objections: 1. To that text of Augustine On the Innocence of Human Nature, the response is now clear. For he says10 that no rational creature can be preserved without divine aid, not because grace is necessary for it to resist sin, so long as it is in innocence, but because, in whatever state it is, the influence of the divine goodness is necessary to it.

2. To that which is objected, that the natural endowments are the same in us and in the first man; it must be said that although they are the same11 according to substance, yet they are weakened and wounded and made worse; and therefore it does not follow that they have as much power as they had, when nature was first established.

3. To that which is objected, that to resist temptation is to obtain victory; it must be said that to overcome the adversary is more than to resist him. For in order that someone overcome the adversary, it is fitting12 that he attain the opposite of that to which the adversary intended to draw him; but this comes about only when man not only resists the adversary voluntarily, but also meritoriously. For then is the devil rightly conquered, when from the vexation of temptation, by which he intended to bend man toward demerit, man advances toward merit. But this free choice cannot do except through the aid of grace, although by itself it could flee sin. For if without grace it fled sin, it would not be meritorious for it, and yet it would resist temptation13.

4. And by this the response to what follows is clear, namely that the Master does not speak of any progress whatever, but of progress in merit, in which man does not always make progress when he does a good work with moral goodness, unless the grace of the Holy Spirit be present, as will appear better below14.

Scholion

I. Richard of Middleton (here a. 1, q. 1), with others, frames the question thus: « Whether by free choice without sanctifying grace the first parents could have resisted evil », and in his reply he plainly declares that the affirmative solution is to be understood of free choice in the state of original justice, that is, joined with the supernatural gift which is now commonly called the gift of integrity. He likewise adds: « I do not however think that by pure natural endowments they could have resisted every vicious movement ». That St. Bonaventure is to be understood in the same sense appears sufficiently from the words set down in the body, attending to the manner of speaking customary in that age (cf. below d. 28, a. 1, q. 2, 3). In almost the same way as St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas speaks in his Commentary (here q. 1, a. 4), but he explains himself clearly in S. I-II, q. 109, a. 8; cf. S. c. Gent. III, c. 160. — Alexander of Hales too (S. p. II, q. 91, m. 1, a. 2) explains St. Bonaventure's view thus: « Note that the first man had a twofold grace in his first state, that is, before he had sanctifying grace [according to the opinion that he was not created at once in habitual grace], namely freely given grace (commonly called grace in the manner that has been stated) and superinfused grace, which was the continual influence of power from the first cause ». And this freely given grace the same author a little above so determined, that it « comprises whatever is added to the natural endowments, which belong to the general constitution of things, and that which is added to free choice, disposing and making it toward its rectitude ». — Alexander of Hales (loc. cit. a. 3, § 2), B. Albert (here a. 2; S. p. II, tr. 14, q. 90, m. 3), Peter of Tarentaise (loc. cit. q. 1), Richard of Middleton (loc. cit. q. 2) further ask whether the first man could have made progress in that state through free choice. Those answer negatively who deny that he was at once adorned with sanctifying grace; while those who affirm this also concede the former.

II. Besides those cited: B. Albert, here a. 1; S. loc. cit. m. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 2. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 4. — Henry of Ghent, Quodl. 5, q. 21. — Denis the Carthusian, here q. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Dialog. de Lib. Arb. c. 3.
    Anselm, Dialogue on Free Choice, c. 3.
  2. August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 18. n. 50: Quis enim peccat in eo quod nullo modo caveri potest?
    Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will III, c. 18, n. 50: « For who sins in that which can in no way be guarded against? »
  3. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 45. (c. 9.): Natura neque facit frustra quidquam neque deficit in necessariis. — Vat. et edd. 3, 4 infra ante naturali omittunt in.
    Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 45 (c. 9): « Nature neither does anything in vain nor fails in necessities. » — The Vatican edition and editions 3 and 4 below, before naturali, omit in.
  4. August., I. Retract. c. 22. n. 4. et III. de Lib. Arb. c. 3. n. 7. — De maiori cfr. Anselm., Dialog. de Veritate, c. 12.
    Augustine, Retractations I, c. 22, n. 4, and On Free Choice of the Will III, c. 3, n. 7. — On the major premise cf. Anselm, Dialogue on Truth, c. 12.
  5. Sub hoc titulo hic citatur illa collectio 390 sententiarum, quas Prosper Aquitanus ex diversis Augustini operibus excerpsit. Sententia, quae hic affertur, est sent. 308. et sumta est ex August., Epist. 186. ad Paulinum, c. 11. n. 37; habetur etiam in can. 19. concilii Arausicani. In textu originali pro etsi exstat etiamsi, deinde omittitur tamen et post Creatore subiungitur suo.
    Under this title there is here cited that collection of 390 sentences which Prosper of Aquitaine excerpted from various works of Augustine. The sentence here adduced is sentence 308 and is taken from Augustine, Letter 186 to Paulinus, c. 11, n. 37; it is also found in canon 19 of the Council of Orange. In the original text, for etsi there stands etiamsi, then tamen is omitted, and after Creatore there is added suo.
  6. Matth. 6, 13; Luc. 11, 4. — Paulo superius pro esset nobis fere omnes codd. cum primis edd. esset a nobis, non bene.
    Matthew 6:13; Luke 11:4. — A little above, for esset nobis, nearly all the codices with the first editions read esset a nobis, not well.
  7. Hic c. 1.
    Here, c. 1.
  8. Hic c. 2.
    Here, c. 2.
  9. Hic c. 1; d. XXV. c. 6; d. XXXIII. c. 3.
    Here, c. 1; d. XXV, c. 6; d. XXXIII, c. 3.
  10. Cod. cc et ed. 1 omittunt Dicit enim. Paulo inferius post gratia cod. F non perverse adiungit nova; cod. 1 hunc locum sic mutavit: non quia ad resistendum peccato appositio novae gratiae sit ei necessaria.
    Codex cc and edition 1 omit Dicit enim. A little below, after gratia, codex F not improperly adds nova; codex 1 altered this passage thus: not because the addition of new grace is necessary to it for resisting sin.
  11. Vat. sint.
    The Vatican edition reads sint.
  12. Primae edd. cum aliquibus codd. optimum est, Vat. oportet. Subinde post assequatur in codd. DF altera manus inseruit eius.
    The first editions, with some codices, read optimum est; the Vatican edition, oportet. Then, after assequatur, in codices D and F a second hand inserted eius.
  13. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. et infra d. 28. a. 1. q. 2, ubi hoc diffusius explicatur.
    Cf. here the Master's text, c. 1, and below d. 28, a. 1, q. 2, where this is explained more at length.
  14. Dist. 28, a. 2. q. 3. et d. 29. a. 1. q. 1. seqq.
    Distinction 28, a. 2, q. 3, and d. 29, a. 1, q. 1 ff. ---
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