Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 21, Art. 3, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 21

Textus Latinus

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Articulus III. De quantitate peccati primorum parentum.

Consequenter quantum ad tertium articulum quaeritur de quantitate peccati primorum parentum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum primum peccatum potuerit esse veniale. Secundo quaeritur, utrum fuerit remediabile sive remissibile. Tertio quaeritur, utrum inter cetera genera peccatorum fuerit magis grave.

Quaestio I. Utrum peccatum Adae potuerit esse veniale.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum primum peccatum hominis fuerit vel esse potuerit peccatum veniale. Et quod sic, videtur.

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1. In egressu a rectitudine prius curvatur aliquid parva obliquitate quam magna; sed magna obliquitas est culpa mortalis, et parva est culpa venialis: ergo cum cecidit a statu rectitudinis innocentiae¹, per veniale transivit ad mortale: ergo prius peccavit venialiter quam mortaliter.

2. Item, consensum sive electionem praecedit appetitus, nihil enim eligimus, nisi prius illud appetamus²: ergo ante consensum primi hominis fuit appetitus. Sed appetitus ille erat ad illicitum, ergo erat peccatum; sed non mortale, quia nihil est mortale citra consensum: ergo veniale: prius igitur peccavit peccato veniali quam peccato mortali.

3. Item, contingit aliquid diligere inordinate et supra Deum. Contingit etiam aliquid diligere ordinate et sub Deo; sed inter haec duo cadit medium, videlicet diligere aliquid sub Deo, sed inordinate: si igitur ab extremo in extremum pervenitur per medium³, prius dilexit homo aliquid inordinate sub Deo quam supra Deum. Sed primum est mortale, secundum veniale: ergo etc.

Si tu dicas, quod homo in primo statu existens non potuit peccare venialiter; ostenditur, quod sic:

4. Primum, quia verbum otiosum est peccatum veniale, quantum est de genere suo, cum non sit contra aliquod mandatum⁴; sed Adam poterat verbum otiosum dicere et cum uxore sua iocari: ergo poterat in statu illo venialiter peccare.

5. Item, quod potest in maius potest in minus, quod est ordinatum ad illud⁵; sed Adam poterat peccare mortaliter; sed peccatum mortale est maius quam veniale. Cum igitur Adam primo potuit peccare mortaliter, potuit primo peccare venialiter.

6. Item, est ponere statum, in quo non potest quis peccare venialiter nec mortaliter, utpote statum comprehensoris; et statum, in quo potest peccare venialiter et mortaliter, utpote statum viatoris; et statum, in quo contingit peccare mortaliter et non venialiter, sicut statum angeli lapsi: ergo erit ponere statum, in quo contingeret peccare venialiter et non mortaliter⁶; sed hic non est status nisi hominis instituti: ergo etc.

Sed contra: 1. Peccatum veniale ideo veniale est propter impulsionem et pronitatem, quam homo habet ad illud⁷; sed primus homo nullum habuit impulsum: ergo non potuit primo committere veniale peccatum.

2. Item, in primo homine nullus erat motus brutalis, sed quilibet erat secundum deliberationem rationis; sed peccatum committere cum deliberatione rationis, ubi nulla est pronitas, non potest esse nisi mortale: ergo etc.

3. Item, regnum animae adeo ordinatum erat, sicut dicit Augustinus⁸, quod, si ipsa servaret ordinem sub Deo, nihil exiret eius imperium: ergo impossibile fuit, hominem peccare, nisi prius a Deo se averteret; sed hoc est per mortale: ergo etc.

4. Item, angelus propter dignitatem sui status non solum peccavit mortaliter, sed etiam irremediabiliter⁹: ergo si status innocentiae excedebat statum miseriae in magna praecellentia, videtur, quod illud quod est in nobis modo modicum et leve, in statu illo esset magnum et grave: nulla igitur essent ibi levia et minuta peccata, sed omnia essent gravia et mortalia.

5. Item, omne peccatum aufert innocentiam; sed quod auferebat homini innocentiam auferebat immortalitatem¹⁰; et quod auferebat immortalitatem inferebat mortem; et quod inferebat mortem erat mortale: ergo a primo, nullum peccatum poterat esse primo in homine, quod non esset mortale.

6. Item, si Adam primo commisisset veniale, quaero, utrum potuisset poenitere, an non. Si non: ergo fuisset irremediabile. Si sic: ergo propter veniale peccatum doluisset: ergo passibilis factus esset; et si passibilis, ergo et mortalis, cum eadem esset in eo ratio passibilitatis et mortis. Ergo necesse fuit, primum peccatum primi hominis vel esse mortale, vel esse irremediabile, vel quod aliquid esset veniale et inferret mortem; quae duo simul stare non poterant.

Conclusio. Primum peccatum Adae fuit mortale, nec potuit esse veniale.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc duplex fuit opinio. Quidam enim dixerunt, quod Adam primo peccato peccavit mortaliter, potuisset tamen peccare venialiter, non tamen omni genere venialis. Quoddam enim est veniale, quod est veniale ex genere actus, sicut dicere verbum otiosum et mendacium iocosum, vel exire in risum dissolutum; et hoc est veniale, non solum, cum praevenit rationis iudicium, sed etiam, cum subsequitur; et hoc peccato

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dicunt Adam primo peccare potuisse. Est aliud genus venialis peccati, quod dicitur veniale a veniendo, quia venit ex surreptione et pronitate naturae corruptae¹¹; et hoc praevenit, non subsequitur iudicium rationis; et tali peccato dixerunt Adam peccare non potuisse propter ordinem originalis iustitiae, quo inferior potentia ita subdebatur superiori, quod nihil appeteret absque eius imperio et dictamine. — Et haec positio satis fuit probabilis.

Verumtamen communiter non approbant eam doctores theologiae; nam improbabilitatem habet, si quis attendat ad perfectionem status et regulam rectitudinis, in qua erat; a qua etiam, cum nullum haberet impellens, exire non poterat, nisi contemnendo divinam iustitiam et foedando suam innocentiam et corrumpendo naturam suam; quae omnia faciunt, primam culpam Adae non venialem, sed mortalem fuisse, nec potuisse aliter esse. Et ideo est communis opinio, quam hodie approbant doctores, quod Adam in statu innocentiae primo peccato peccavit mortaliter, nec primum eius peccatum veniale esse potuit. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa: 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod prius est pervenire ad parvam obliquitatem quam ad magnam; dicendum, quod verum est, ubi est curvitas paulativa et per successionem; ibi autem potius fuit fractio quam curvatio, vel si curvatio dici debet, primo incepit in consensu, qui fuit mortale peccatum, et ita inter rectitudinem et illam obliquitatem non intercidit medium. Et si tu quaeras: unde hoc? dico, quod hoc non fuit propter immediatam oppositionem rectitudinis ad peccatum mortale, sed quia in tali subiecto, quod quidem vel oportebat esse sanum¹², vel mortuum.

2. Ad secundum quod obiicitur, quod appetitus praecedit consensum; dicendum, quod verum est; sed appetitus, qui praecessit consensum primorum parentum, non fuit libidinosus, sed naturalis; ex tunc autem incepit esse libidinosus, quando voluntas deliberativa consensit, et tunc etiam incepit esse mortalis; et ita non ante coepit esse peccatum, quam esset mortale.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod medium est inter diligere ordinate sub Deo, et inordinate supra Deum; dicendum, quod etsi sit medium, comparando statum ad statum simpliciter, comparando tamen ad hominem illum, non cadebat medium. Ratio autem huius erat propter magnam approximationem ad Deum, ob quam nihil poterat inordinate diligere, quin per hoc Deo iniuriam faceret, ac per hoc supra Deum diligeret.

4. Ad aliud quod obiicitur, quod poterat dicere verbum otiosum, quod est veniale; dicendum, quod verbum otiosum ei fuisset mortale propter status perfectionem. Unde quod dicitur, aliquod peccatum esse veniale generaliter sive de genere sui actus, hoc intelligendum est respectu naturae lapsae.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur: quod potest in maius, potest in minus; dicendum, quod illud non est semper verum, quia non est hominis potestas aliquando ita ordinata ad minus, sicut ad maius. Unde maius est, hominem mori quam febricitare, facilius tamen potest aliquis alicui inferre mortem quam febrem¹³; sic et homo primus citius potuit se occidere quam debilitare, id est, prius mortaliter quam venialiter peccare.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quartus status esse deberet, in quo posset tantum venialiter peccare; dicendum, quod illum statum nullo modo convenit esse. Quod enim aliquod peccatum sit veniale alicui, hoc est propter magnam pronitatem, quam habet ad peccandum, et difficultatem, quam habet ad benefaciendum; et ubi haec sunt, est facilitas ad mortale. Et ita nunquam est ponere statum, in quo peccetur venialiter, in quo non possit peccari mortaliter; est tamen ponere e converso statum, scilicet in quo contingit peccare mortaliter, et non venialiter, propter defectum poenitentiae; huiusmodi autem est status daemonum¹⁴.

Scholion

I. Scotus (in utroque scripto hic q. 1.) sustinet, quod primum peccatum potuisset esse veniale, cum inordinate transgredi potuisset vel consilium, vel tale praeceptum, cuius violatio non separat a fine. Hoc approbat etiam Biel (II. Sent. d. 22. q. 1.) tanquam probabilius. Richard. a Med. (hic a. 3. q. 1.) tum hanc opinionem tum oppositam iudicat esse probabilem. Sed Alex. Hal., S. Thom. aliique antiqui doctores fere communiter cum nostro Doctore contrariam tenent sententiam.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 104. m. 6. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 3; S. I. II. q. 89. a. 3; de Malo q. 7. a. 7. — B. Albert., hic a. 10; et de hac et seqq. qq. S. p. II. tr. 14. q. 87. m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 3. — Durand., hic q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 6.

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English Translation

Article III. On the magnitude of the sin of the first parents.

Consequently, with regard to the third article, the question is raised concerning the magnitude of the sin of the first parents. And concerning this three things are asked.

First it is asked, whether the first sin could have been venial. Second it is asked, whether it was remediable or remissible. Third it is asked, whether among the other kinds of sins it was more grave.

Question I. Whether the sin of Adam could have been venial.

Concerning the first, one proceeds thus, and it is asked, whether the first sin of man was, or could have been, a venial sin. And that it could, it seems.

1. In departing from rectitude something is first bent by a small obliquity rather than a great one; but a great obliquity is a mortal fault, and a small one a venial fault: therefore when he fell from the state of the rectitude of innocence¹, he passed through the venial to the mortal: therefore he sinned venially before mortally.

2. Likewise, appetite precedes consent or choice, for we choose nothing unless we first desire it²: therefore before the consent of the first man there was appetite. But that appetite was toward something illicit, therefore it was a sin; but not mortal, for nothing is mortal short of consent: therefore venial: he therefore sinned by a venial sin before by a mortal sin.

3. Likewise, it happens that one loves something inordinately and above God. It also happens that one loves something ordinately and under God; but between these two there falls a mean, namely to love something under God, but inordinately: if therefore one passes from one extreme to the other through a mean³, man loved something inordinately under God before above God. But the first is mortal, the second venial: therefore etc.

If you should say that man, existing in the first state, could not sin venially; it is shown that he could:

4. First, because an idle word is a venial sin, so far as concerns its own genus, since it is not against any commandment⁴; but Adam could speak an idle word and jest with his wife: therefore he could sin venially in that state.

5. Likewise, what can [do] the greater can [do] the lesser, which is ordered to it⁵; but Adam could sin mortally; but a mortal sin is greater than a venial one. Since therefore Adam could first sin mortally, he could first sin venially.

6. Likewise, one must posit a state in which one can sin neither venially nor mortally, namely the state of the comprehensor; and a state in which one can sin venially and mortally, namely the state of the wayfarer; and a state in which it happens [that one can] sin mortally and not venially, like the state of the fallen angel: therefore one must posit a state in which it would happen [that one can] sin venially and not mortally⁶; but this is none other than the state of man as instituted: therefore etc.

On the contrary: 1. A venial sin is venial precisely on account of the impulse and the proneness which a man has toward it⁷; but the first man had no impulse: therefore he could not first commit a venial sin.

2. Likewise, in the first man there was no brute motion, but every [motion] was according to the deliberation of reason; but to commit a sin with the deliberation of reason, where there is no proneness, cannot be other than mortal: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the kingdom of the soul was so ordered, as Augustine says⁸, that, if it [the soul] kept the order under God, nothing would go forth from its rule: therefore it was impossible for man to sin unless he first turned himself away from God; but this is through a mortal [sin]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the angel, on account of the dignity of his state, sinned not only mortally, but even irremediably⁹: therefore if the state of innocence exceeded the state of misery in great pre-eminence, it seems that what is in us now small and light would, in that state, be great and grave: therefore there would be no light and slight sins there, but all would be grave and mortal.

5. Likewise, every sin takes away innocence; but what took away innocence from man took away immortality¹⁰; and what took away immortality brought in death; and what brought in death was mortal: therefore from the first, no sin could be in man at the beginning which was not mortal.

6. Likewise, if Adam had first committed a venial [sin], I ask whether he could have repented, or not. If not: then it would have been irremediable. If so: then on account of the venial sin he would have grieved: then he would have become passible; and if passible, then also mortal, since the ground of passibility and of death would be the same in him. Therefore it was necessary that the first sin of the first man either be mortal, or be irremediable, or that something be venial and bring in death; which two could not stand together.

Conclusion. The first sin of Adam was mortal, nor could it have been venial.

I respond: For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that concerning this there was a twofold opinion. For some said that Adam by his first sin sinned mortally, but could nevertheless have sinned venially, yet not by every kind of venial [sin]. For one [kind] is venial which is venial by the genus of the act, like speaking an idle word and a jesting falsehood, or breaking out into dissolute laughter; and this is venial not only when it precedes the judgment of reason, but also when it follows it; and by this sin

they say Adam could first have sinned. There is another genus of venial sin, which is called venial from "coming" (a veniendo), because it comes from the surprise and proneness of corrupted nature¹¹; and this precedes, does not follow, the judgment of reason; and by such a sin they said Adam could not sin, on account of the order of original justice, by which the lower power was so subjected to the higher that it would desire nothing apart from its rule and dictate. — And this position was sufficiently probable.

Nevertheless the doctors of theology do not commonly approve it; for it has improbability, if one attends to the perfection of the state and the rule of rectitude in which he was; from which also, since he had nothing impelling him, he could not depart except by despising the divine justice and by defiling his innocence and by corrupting his nature; all of which make the first fault of Adam to have been not venial, but mortal, nor could it have been otherwise. And therefore it is the common opinion, which today the doctors approve, that Adam in the state of innocence by his first sin sinned mortally, nor could his first sin have been venial. — Hence the reasons which show this are to be granted.

To the arguments for the affirmative side: 1. To that, then, which is objected, that one first arrives at a small obliquity rather than at a great one; it must be said that this is true where there is a gradual bending by succession; but there it was rather a breaking than a bending, or if it ought to be called a bending, it first began in the consent, which was a mortal sin, and so between rectitude and that obliquity no mean fell in. And if you ask: whence this? I say that this was not on account of the immediate opposition of rectitude to mortal sin, but because in such a subject, which indeed had either to be sound¹², or dead.

2. To the second which is objected, that appetite precedes consent; it must be said that this is true; but the appetite which preceded the consent of the first parents was not lustful, but natural; from then on, however, it began to be lustful, when the deliberative will consented, and then also it began to be mortal; and so it did not begin to be a sin before it was mortal.

3. To that which is objected, that there is a mean between loving ordinately under God and inordinately above God; it must be said that, although there is a mean comparing the state to the state simply, yet comparing it to that man, no mean fell in. The reason for this was on account of the great nearness to God, on account of which he could love nothing inordinately without thereby doing injury to God, and thereby loving [it] above God.

4. To the other [argument] which is objected, that he could speak an idle word, which is venial; it must be said that an idle word would have been mortal for him on account of the perfection of his state. Hence, as to what is said, that some sin is venial generally or by the genus of its act, this is to be understood with respect to fallen nature.

5. To that which is objected: what can [do] the greater can [do] the lesser; it must be said that this is not always true, because the power of man is sometimes not so ordered toward the lesser as toward the greater. Hence it is greater for a man to die than to be sick with fever, yet one can more easily inflict death on another than fever¹³; so too the first man could more readily kill himself than weaken himself, that is, [could] sin mortally before venially.

6. To that which is objected, that there ought to be a fourth state, in which one could sin only venially; it must be said that such a state in no way is fitting to be. For that some sin be venial to someone is on account of the great proneness which he has to sinning, and the difficulty which he has to doing good; and where these are, there is facility to the mortal. And so there is never to be posited a state in which one sins venially, in which one cannot sin mortally; there is nevertheless to be posited, conversely, a state, namely in which it happens [that one can] sin mortally and not venially, on account of a defect of repentance; and of this kind is the state of the demons¹⁴.

Scholion

I. Scotus (in both writings, here q. 1) maintains that the first sin could have been venial, since [Adam] could have inordinately transgressed either a counsel or such a precept whose violation does not separate from the end. Biel (II Sent., d. 22, q. 1) also approves this as more probable. Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 3, q. 1) judges both this opinion and the opposite to be probable. But Alexander of Hales, St. Thomas, and the other ancient doctors hold, almost commonly with our Doctor, the contrary opinion.

II. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 104, m. 6. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 3; Summa I-II, q. 89, a. 3; de Malo q. 7, a. 7. — Bl. Albert, here a. 10; and on this and the following questions, Summa p. II, tr. 14, q. 87, m. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 1. — Giles of Rome, here q. 2, a. 3. — Durandus, here q. 4. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 6.

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Apparatus Criticus

Eccle. 7, 30: Solummodo hoc inveni, quod fecerit Deus hominem rectum.
Eccles. 7:30 (Vulg.): Only this have I found, that God made man upright.
Hic ordo actuum voluntatis exponitur a Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 22. Cfr. etiam August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 25. n. 74. seq.
This order of the acts of the will is set out by John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith II, c. 22. Cf. also Augustine, On Free Will III, c. 25, n. 74 ff.
Cfr. Aristot., VI. Phys. text. 32. (c. 4.) ubi habetur, quod in mutatione non transitur statim ab uno extremo in alterum, sed per intermedia, »ut ex albo in fuscum, non in nigrum«.
Cf. Aristotle, Physics VI, text 32 (c. 4), where it is held that in change one does not pass at once from one extreme to the other, but through intermediates, "as from white to dusky, not to black."
Cfr. infra d. 42. a. 2. q. 1.
Cf. below, d. 42, a. 2, q. 1.
Vide supra pag. 210, nota 11.
See above, p. 210, note 11.
Cfr. infra d. 41. a. 2. q. 1. — Vat. in hac prop. omittit ideo veniale, nonnulli codd., inter quos ee, et edd. 3, 4 supprimunt tantum ideo.
Cf. below, d. 41, a. 2, q. 1. — The Vatican edition omits ideo veniale in this proposition; some codices, among them ee, and editions 3 and 4, suppress only ideo.
De quo agitur infra d. 24. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. et a. 2. q. 1.
Treated below, d. 24, p. II, a. 1, q. 1, and a. 2, q. 1.
Cfr. XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 15. et 29. — Pro regnum animae codd. F Z regimen animae.
Cf. Augustine, On the City of God XIV, c. 15 and 29. — For regnum animae (kingdom of the soul) codices F Z read regimen animae (governance of the soul).
Sicut probatum est supra d. 7. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.
As was proved above, d. 7, p. I, a. 1, q. 1.
Cfr. supra d. 19. a. 3. q. 1. ad 3. — In fine arg. pro primo in homine Vat. in primo homine. — Notandum autem quod Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 104. m. 6. ait: Aliud est dicere, quod homo potuit primo peccare venialiter, et quod homo potuit peccare venialiter primo. Concedendum est autem, quod homo primo potuit peccare venialiter, sicut hoc: Deus ab aeterno potuit creare mundum, sed non potuit creare ab aeterno.
Cf. above, d. 19, a. 3, q. 1, ad 3. — At the end of the argument, for primo in homine the Vatican edition reads in primo homine. — It is to be noted, moreover, that Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 104, m. 6, says: "It is one thing to say that man could first sin venially, and [another] that man could sin venially first. It is to be granted, however, that man first could sin venially, as in this: God from eternity could create the world, but could not create from eternity."
Cfr. infra d. 41. a. 2. q. 1. in corp.
Cf. below, d. 41, a. 2, q. 1, in the body.
Nonnulli codd., ut CH unum, ed. 1 sanum seu vicum.
Some codices, like CH, read unum; edition 1 reads sanum seu vicum.
Cfr. supra d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. ad 3. et I. Sent. d. 41. a. 1. q. 1. ad 6. — In fine solutionis plures codd., ut C F R aa peccari pro peccare.
Cf. above, d. 8, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, ad 3, and I Sent., d. 41, a. 1, q. 1, ad 6. — At the end of the solution several codices, like C F R aa, read peccari for peccare.
Cfr. supra d. 7. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. seq.
Cf. above, d. 7, p. I, a. 1, q. 2 ff. ---

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