← Back to Distinction 19

Dist. 19, Art. 2, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 19

Textus Latinus
p. 464

Articulus II. De immortalitate Adae ex parte corporis.1

Consequenter quaeritur quantum ad secundum articulum de immortalitate Adae ex parte corporis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum, anima non peccante, posset corpus Adae dissolvi.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum, ipsa peccante, posset per esum ligni vitae in vita perpetuari.

Quaestio I. Utrum corpus Adae, ipso non peccante, posset dissolvi.

Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod etiamsi Adam non peccasset, corpus eius dissolvi potuisset, tali ratione.

Ad oppositum:

1. Adam in statu innocentiae habebat corpus mortale, sicut dicit Augustinus et Magister in littera2, ergo corruptibile; sed «omne corruptibile de necessitate corrumpetur, sicut vult Philosophus, quamvis non omne generabile de necessitate generetur»: ergo, corpus Adae corruptum fuisset, esto quod in statu innocentiae permansisset.

2. Item, contrarietas est causa pugnae, et pugna in composito est causa dissolutionis3: ergo in illo statu, in quo potest esse contrarietas, potest esse dissolutio; sed corpus Adae etiam secundum statum innocentiae ex contrariis habebat compositionem: ergo, statu illo manente, poterat habere dissolutionem.

3. Item, cuicumque statui competit restauratio, competit deperditio; sed corpori Adae in statu innocentiae competebat restauratio per sumtionem ciborum: ergo et eidem corpori secundum statum innocentiae inerat deperditio. Sed cuicumque inest deperditio, inest et consumtio, et in quocumque ponitur consumtio, ponitur et corruptio: ergo corpus Adae, in statu innocentiae persistens, dissolvi poterat et corrumpi, nulla culpa interveniente.

4. Item, constans est, quod Adam non poterat vivere, nisi comederet, cum haberet corpus animale4; sed poterat non comedere: ergo, poterat absque ullo peccato corpus eius deficere. Si tu dicas, quod peccaret in non comedendo, quia tenebatur comedere; contra: non semper tenebatur comedere — quia signemus aliquam horam, in qua tenebatur. In illa hora aut Adam esuriret, aut non. Si esuriret: ergo pateretur, antequam peccaret; si non esuriret: ergo natura non indigeret, cum natura bene disposita tempore necessitatis cibum appetat5: ergo non teneretur tunc comedere nec alias6; ergo nunquam.

5. Item, si Adam stetisset, aliquis de filiis eius poterat peccare. Ponatur ergo, quod peccasset; sed possibile est, virum iustum a peccatore, insidiante interfici absque sua culpa, sicut Abel interfectus est a Cain7: ergo possibile esset, Adam saltem, dormientem ab eo iugulari et iugulatus interire nulla culpa sua interveniente. p. 465

6. Item, impassibilitas est dos corporum glorificatorum8; sed corpus Adae in statu innocentiae glorificatum non erat: ergo in statu illo persistens impassibilitatem non habebat: ergo persistendo in statu illo mori et non mori poterat: ergo corpus Adae erat dissolubile, anima non peccante.

Sed contra:

Fundamenta. 1. Isidorus de Trinitate9: «Si homo in paradiso innocenter viveret, nec ignis eum ureret, nec aqua mergeret, nec absentia aeris suffocaret, nec omnia quae nocent mortalibus, impedirent»: ergo videtur, quod ipso permanente in statu innocentiae, corpus eius non erat resolubile.

2. Item, mors est poena peccati10; sed omnis poena est ordinata; poena autem non ordinatur nisi per culpam: nulli ergo potest inesse nec poena nec mors nec corruptio, nisi cui prius inest culpa: ergo anima non peccante, impossibile fuit, dissolvi corpus Adae.

3. Item, ad hoc, quod debite constituatur aliquod compositum, necesse est, materiam et formam proportionari ad invicem. Si igitur anima ut forma et perfectio unita est corpori, impossibile erat, corpus illud resolvi et corrumpi, nisi aliqua corruptio prius incideret ex parte animae; sed corruptio, quae potest incidere ex parte animae, non est nisi culpae: ergo impossibile fuit, corpus Adae resolvi et pati, nisi in anima culpa fuisset praeambula.

4. Item, status innocentiae medius erat inter statum gloriae et statum miseriae; sed dissolutio corporis omnino opponitur statui gloriae: cum ergo statui gloriae non opponeretur directe status innocentiae, Adam in statu innocentiae persistente, corpus eius non fuit resolubile.

5. Item, omnis passio est ab aliquo repugnante et praedominante; sed Adam in statu innocentiae existente, vel omnia concordarent ei, vel subiacerent: ergo nihil posset corpus eius laedere nec aliquam passionem inferre: ergo corpus eius nec esset passibile nec dissolubile.

6. Item, impossibile est, stante rectitudine alicuius, ipsum obliquari; sed omnis rectitudo consistit in subiacendo Deo et praesidendo aliis creaturis, tam corpori suo quam etiam brutis11: ergo spiritu rationali stante in puritate innocentiae et obedientiae, impossibile fuit, corpus ab eius voluntate recedere. Sed anima semper appetit uniri corpori: ergo impossibile fuit, corpus in tali statu dissolvi.

Conclusio. Corpus Adae in statu innocentiae actu non poterat dissolvi, licet haberet potentiam, ut dissolveretur.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod quemadmodum, iuxta verbum Philosophi12, sensus duplex. haec est duplex: aliquid est nunc immortale, quia adverbium nunc potest hoc determinare, vel ratione actus moriendi, vel ratione potentiae; ita et locutio praecedens: utrum corpus hominis esset dissolubile sive posset dissolvi, ipso non peccante, distingui debet. Illi enim ablativi absoluti13 possunt determinare hoc verbum posset, vel hoc verbum dissolvi. Conclusio 1. Si hoc verbum posset determinent, veritatem habet locutio. Est enim sensus, quod Adam, dum existeret in statu innocentiae, posse habebat, ut corpus eius dissolveretur. — Conclusio 2. Si autem ablativi illi referantur ad actum, qui est dissolvi, sic locutio falsa est. Est enim sensus, quod Adam posset dissolvi in statu innocentiae, ita quod simul esset innocentia et mortis sive corruptionis poena; et hoc est impossibile, providente ordine divinae iustitiae, quae nullam inordinationem in universo sustinet. Si ergo poena deordinata est, nisi praecedat culpa, et corporis dissolutio non potest animae purae et innocenti non esse poena; inconveniens videtur et contra ordinem divinae iustitiae, quod corpus hominis dissolveretur in statu innocentiae. — Et hoc Sancti dicunt, et rationes ad hoc inductae ostendunt, et ideo concedendae sunt, quia verum concludunt.

Solutio oppositorum.

Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod omne corruptibile de necessitate corrumpitur14; dicendum, quod Philosophus loquitur de illo corruptibili, cuius regimen non subiacet voluntati, sed soli virtuti naturali; et illud de necessitate habet corrumpi, quia habet causam corruptionis intra se. Corpus autem Adae, etsi esset mortale et corruptibile, tamen voluntati subiacebat ex ordine divinae iustitiae; et ideo, nisi voluntas deordinaretur, corpus illud nunquam corrumperetur. p. 466

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod componi ex contrariis competebat corpori secundum illum statum; dicendum, quod Distinctio. alio modo se habent contraria in compositione corporis secundum statum naturae lapsae, aliter secundum statum naturae institutae. Secundum statum enim naturae lapsae non solum agunt in aliquod extrinsecum, sed etiam ad invicem mutuo agunt et patiuntur, non solum in ipsa constitutione, sed etiam post constitutum esse. In statu autem innocentiae taliter commixta fuerunt et proportionata in prima compositione et ad tantam concordiam redacta15, ut, illo statu manente, mutuo non pugnarent. Et ideo propter illam compositionem corpus illud dissolvi necesse non erat.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod secundum statum innocentiae in illo corpore fiebat deperditio; dicendum, quod sicut natura universalis patitur elementa corrumpi secundum partem, sed nullo modo patitur corrumpi secundum totum; sic et natura bene instituta in homine, regulata ab ordine iustitiae16 et providentiae admittebat, deperditionem, fieri in homine secundum aliquam partem propter statum animalitatis, in quo erat; sed nullo modo patiebatur corruptionem fieri in toto. Sicut enim fiebat corruptio et deperditio, ita etiam fiebat restauratio; et ideo non consequebatur dissolutio.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Adam a cibo poterat abstinere; dicendum, quod non poterat abstinere a comestione17, quando esset locus et tempus; tum quia sibi expresse praeceptum erat, ut comederet de lignis paradisi, aliis a ligno scientiae boni et mali18; tum etiam, quia, si Dominus non praecepisset, natura bene instituta dictaret, quae dictat, nullum debere manum sibi iniicere. — Nec valet illa obiectio, quam obiicit de fame; debebat enim famem praevenire, et ipse bene sciebat horam et indigentiam suae naturae, quam si pertransiret, omitteret et peccaret.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod peccator potest occidere innocentem; dicendum, quod verum est secundum statum naturae lapsae, in quo omnis homo merito peccati originalis est mortis debitor. Unde permittere, innocentem occidi ab impio, non est contra ordinem divinae iustitiae secundum statum praesentem; in statu autem illo, quia nulla culpa praecesserat, ordo divinae iustitiae talem deordinationem vel punitionem admittere non debebat.

Ad 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod impassibilitas est dos corporum glorificatorum; dicendum, quod verum est, secundum quod impassibilitas privat et actum et potentiam passionis secundum omnem statum. Illa autem impassibilitas corpori Adae non inerat nisi secundum statum determinatum, et ideo perfecta non erat nec dos dici debebat.

Scholion

I. Loquendo de facto, fide constat, quod corpus Adae nullo modo incurrisset mortem vel corruptionem, dummodo ipse non peccasset. Unde statu innocentiae durante, excludebatur actus moriendi. Loquendo autem de possibilitate vel impossibilitate moriendi, cum S. Augustino et Magistro distingui debet non posse mori, quo negatur aptitudo sive potentia ad moriendum, et posse non mori, quo asseritur potentia non moriendi. In statu naturae glorificatae Beati omnino sunt inepti ad moriendum, unde habent simpliciter non posse mori. In statu naturae lapsae homo moritur et non potest non mori. In statu innocentiae, sicut habuit potentiam peccandi et non peccandi, ita etiam potentiam moriendi et non moriendi, sive «quodam modo erat mortalis, in quantum poterat mori, et quodam modo immortalis, in quantum poterat non mori» (S. Thom., hic q. unica a. 2; cfr. hic dub. 2.). Stante autem statu innocentiae, ut dicunt fere omnes, in sensu composito primi parentes non potuerunt mori, bene vero in sensu diviso. Scotus autem (in utroque Scripto hic q. unica n. 3.), contra modum loquendi, a Ss. Bonaventura et Thoma adhibitum, plura opponit. Nam negat, quod homo, stante statu innocentiae, non potuit mori, et dicit: «Stante statu innocentiae, potuit mori; ista tamen potentia non fuisset reducta ad actum, et sic poterat non mori». Ipse enim putat, primos homines non tam per donum intrinsecum integritatis, quam per protectionem Dei extrinsecam in statu innocentiae fuisse immortales, scil. quatenus a quolibet fuisset translatus, antequam virtus sua fuisset improportionabiliter debilitata ad hoc, quod anima esset in corpore» (ibid. n. 6.).

II. De hac et sequenti quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 88. m. 1. — Scot., loc. cit. — S. Thom., hic loc. cit.; S. I. q. 97. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. § 5; S. p. II. tr. 14. q. 83, tr. 13. q. 78. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1, de seq. quaest. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1, de seq. quaest. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 3. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

---

English Translation

Article II. On Adam's immortality on the side of the body.1

Next it is asked, as concerns the second article, of Adam's immortality on the side of the body. And concerning this two questions are asked.

First it is asked, whether, the soul not sinning, the body of Adam could have been dissolved.

Second it is asked, whether, the soul having sinned, it could have been perpetuated in life through the eating of the tree of life.

Question I. Whether the body of Adam, he himself not sinning, could have been dissolved.

Concerning the first, it is proceeded thus, and it is shown that, even if Adam had not sinned, his body could have been dissolved, by this reasoning.

To the opposite:

1. Adam in the state of innocence had a mortal body, as Augustine and the Master in the text2 say, therefore corruptible; but "every corruptible thing will of necessity be corrupted, as the Philosopher holds, although not every generable thing is of necessity generated": therefore the body of Adam would have been corrupted, granted that he had remained in the state of innocence.

2. Likewise, contrariety is the cause of conflict, and conflict in a composite is the cause of dissolution3: therefore in that state, in which contrariety can exist, dissolution can exist; but the body of Adam, even according to the state of innocence, had a composition from contraries: therefore, that state remaining, it could have had dissolution.

3. Likewise, to whatever state restoration belongs, loss belongs; but to the body of Adam in the state of innocence restoration through the taking of foods belonged: therefore loss also was in that same body according to the state of innocence. But in whatever loss is, consumption also is, and in whatever consumption is posited, corruption is posited: therefore the body of Adam, persisting in the state of innocence, could have been dissolved and corrupted, no fault intervening.

4. Likewise, it is established that Adam could not live unless he ate, since he had an animal body4; but he could not-eat: therefore he could, without any sin, let his body fail. If you should say that he would sin in not eating, because he was bound to eat; on the contrary: he was not always bound to eat — for let us mark out some hour in which he was bound. In that hour either Adam would be hungry, or not. If he were hungry, then he would suffer before he sinned; if he were not hungry, then nature would not be in need, since a well-disposed nature seeks food in time of necessity5: therefore he would not then be bound to eat, nor at another time6; therefore never.

5. Likewise, if Adam had stood, some one of his sons could have sinned. Let it be supposed, then, that he had sinned; but it is possible that a just man be slain by a sinner lying in wait without his own fault, as Abel was slain by Cain7: therefore it would be possible that Adam himself, at least while sleeping, be cut down by him and, cut down, perish, no fault of his own intervening. p. 465

6. Likewise, impassibility is a dowry of glorified bodies8; but the body of Adam in the state of innocence was not glorified: therefore persisting in that state it did not have impassibility: therefore by persisting in that state it could die and not die: therefore the body of Adam was dissoluble, the soul not sinning.

On the contrary:

Fundamenta. 1. Isidore On the Trinity9: "If man were to live innocently in paradise, neither would fire burn him, nor water drown him, nor the absence of air suffocate him, nor would all the things that harm mortals impede him": therefore it seems that, he remaining in the state of innocence, his body was not resoluble.

2. Likewise, death is the penalty of sin10; but every penalty is ordered; a penalty, however, is not ordered except through fault: to none, therefore, can penalty nor death nor corruption be present, except to him in whom fault is first present: therefore, the soul not sinning, it was impossible for the body of Adam to be dissolved.

3. Likewise, to this — that a composite be duly constituted — it is necessary that matter and form be proportioned to one another. If, therefore, the soul as form and perfection is united to the body, it was impossible for that body to be resolved and corrupted, unless some corruption first fell upon the side of the soul; but the corruption which can fall upon the side of the soul is only of fault: therefore it was impossible for the body of Adam to be resolved and to suffer, unless fault had been preambulary in the soul.

4. Likewise, the state of innocence was a middle between the state of glory and the state of misery; but dissolution of the body is wholly opposed to the state of glory: since therefore the state of innocence would not be directly opposed to the state of glory, Adam persisting in the state of innocence, his body was not resoluble.

5. Likewise, every passion is from something repugnant and predominant; but Adam existing in the state of innocence, either all things would agree with him, or be subject to him: therefore nothing could harm his body nor inflict any passion: therefore his body would be neither passible nor dissoluble.

6. Likewise, it is impossible, the rectitude of anything standing, for it to be bent aside; but all rectitude consists in being subject to God and in presiding over the other creatures, both over its own body and also over the brutes11: therefore the rational spirit standing in the purity of innocence and obedience, it was impossible for the body to recede from his will. But the soul always seeks to be united to the body: therefore it was impossible for the body in such a state to be dissolved.

Conclusion. The body of Adam in the state of innocence could not in act be dissolved, although it had the potency that it might be dissolved.

I respond: For an understanding of what has been said it must be noted that just as, according to the word of the Philosopher12, Twofold sense. this is twofold: something is now immortal, because the adverb now can determine this either by reason of the act of dying, or by reason of potency; so too the foregoing locution: whether the body of man was dissoluble or could be dissolved, he himself not sinning, must be distinguished. For those absolute ablatives13 can determine either this verb could, or this verb be dissolved. Conclusion 1. If they determine the verb could, the locution has truth. For the sense is that Adam, while he existed in the state of innocence, had the potency that his body might be dissolved. — Conclusion 2. If, however, those ablatives are referred to the act, which is to be dissolved, then the locution is false. For the sense is that Adam could be dissolved in the state of innocence, so that there were at once innocence and the penalty of death or corruption; and this is impossible, the order of divine justice providing, which sustains no disorder in the universe. If, therefore, a penalty is disordered unless fault precedes, and dissolution of the body cannot but be a penalty to a pure and innocent soul; it seems unfitting and against the order of divine justice that the body of man should be dissolved in the state of innocence. — And this the Saints say, and the reasons adduced to this end show, and therefore they must be conceded, since they conclude truly.

Solution of the opposites.

To 1. To that which is objected first, that every corruptible thing is of necessity corrupted14; it must be said that the Philosopher speaks of that corruptible whose governance is not subject to will, but only to natural power; and that of necessity has to be corrupted, because it has the cause of corruption within itself. But the body of Adam, even though it was mortal and corruptible, nevertheless was subject to the will by the order of divine justice; and therefore, unless the will were disordered, that body would never be corrupted. p. 466

To 2. To that which is objected, that being composed from contraries belonged to the body according to that state; it must be said that Distinction. contraries comport themselves in one way in the composition of the body according to the state of fallen nature, otherwise according to the state of instituted nature. For according to the state of fallen nature they not only act upon something extrinsic, but they also act and suffer upon one another mutually, not only in the very constitution, but also after constituted being. In the state of innocence, however, they were so commingled and proportioned in the first composition and reduced to such concord15, that, that state remaining, they would not fight one another. And therefore on account of that composition that body did not need to be dissolved.

To 3. To that which is objected, that according to the state of innocence in that body loss took place; it must be said that just as universal nature suffers the elements to be corrupted according to part, but in no way suffers them to be corrupted according to the whole; so also nature well instituted in man, regulated by the order of justice16 and providence, admitted loss to take place in man according to some part on account of the state of animality in which he was; but in no way did it suffer corruption to take place in the whole. For just as corruption and loss took place, so too restoration took place; and therefore dissolution did not follow.

To 4. To that which is objected, that Adam could abstain from food; it must be said that he could not abstain from eating17, when there was place and time; both because it was expressly commanded him that he should eat of the trees of paradise, other than the tree of knowledge of good and evil18; and also because, if the Lord had not commanded, nature well instituted would dictate what it dictates, that no one ought to lay a hand upon himself. — Nor does the objection avail which is raised concerning hunger; for he ought to forestall hunger, and he himself well knew the hour and the indigence of his nature, which if he were to let pass, he would omit and sin.

To 5. To that which is objected, that a sinner can kill an innocent man; it must be said that this is true according to the state of fallen nature, in which every man, by the merit of original sin, is a debtor of death. Hence to permit an innocent man to be killed by an impious one is not against the order of divine justice according to the present state; but in that state, since no fault had preceded, the order of divine justice ought not to admit such disordering or punishment.

To 6. To that which is objected, that impassibility is a dowry of glorified bodies; it must be said that this is true according as impassibility deprives of both the act and the potency of passion according to every state. That impassibility, however, was present to the body of Adam only according to a determinate state, and therefore was not perfect nor ought to be called a dowry.

Scholion

I. Speaking of the fact, by faith it is established that the body of Adam in no way would have incurred death or corruption, so long as he had not sinned. Hence, the state of innocence enduring, the act of dying was excluded. Speaking, however, of the possibility or impossibility of dying, with St. Augustine and the Master a distinction must be drawn between not being able to die (non posse mori), by which is denied aptitude or potency for dying, and being able not to die (posse non mori), by which is asserted the potency of not dying. In the state of glorified nature the Blessed are wholly inept for dying, whence they have simply non posse mori. In the state of fallen nature man dies and cannot not-die. In the state of innocence, just as he had the potency of sinning and of not sinning, so also the potency of dying and of not dying, or "in one way he was mortal, inasmuch as he could die, and in one way immortal, inasmuch as he could not die" (St. Thom., here q. unica a. 2; cf. here dub. 2). The state of innocence standing, however, as nearly all say, in the composite sense the first parents could not die, but indeed in the divided sense. Scotus, however (in both Scripta here q. unica n. 3), against the mode of speaking employed by Sts. Bonaventure and Thomas, raises many objections. For he denies that man, the state of innocence standing, could not die, and says: "The state of innocence standing, he could die; this potency, however, would not have been reduced to act, and thus he could not die." For he himself thinks that the first parents were immortal in the state of innocence not so much through an intrinsic gift of integrity as through an extrinsic protection of God, namely, inasmuch as anyone would have been translated before his power had been disproportionately weakened to the point that the soul should be in the body" (ibid. n. 6).

II. Concerning this and the following question: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 88. m. 1. — Scot., loc. cit. — S. Thom., here loc. cit.; S. I. q. 97. a. 1. — B. Albert., here a. 2. § 5; S. p. II. tr. 14. q. 83, tr. 13. q. 78. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 2. a. 1, on the following question a. 2. — Richard. a Med., here a. 2. q. 1, on the following question q. 2. — Aegid. R., here q. 2. a. 1. — Dionys. Carth., on this and the following questions here q. 3. — Biel, on this and the following questions here q. unica.

---

Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion to the preceding question.
  2. Hic c. 2. seqq. — De dicto Aristotelis, ab Averroe contracto, cfr. I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 133 (c. 12.), et VI. Metaph. text. 7. (V. c. 3.). — Mox post Adae cod. O interserit de necessitate.
    Here c. 2 and following. — On Aristotle's dictum, contracted by Averroes, cf. On the Heavens and the World I, text 133 (c. 12), and Metaph. VI, text 7 (V c. 3). — Just after Adae cod. O inserts de necessitate.
  3. Damasc., I. de Fide orthod. c. 4: Compositio enim causa (ἀρχή) pugnae, pugna dissidii (διαστάσεως), dissidium solutionis (λύσεως).
    Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith I, c. 4: For composition is the cause (ἀρχή) of conflict, conflict of division (διαστάσεως), division of dissolution (λύσεως).
  4. Cfr. quaest. seq. nec non a. 3. q. 1. et supra pag. 424, nota 7.
    Cf. the following question, also a. 3 q. 1, and above p. 424, note 7.
  5. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 6. (IV. c. 5.): Necessarium dicitur, sine quo non contingit vivere tanquam concausa, ut respirare et alimentum animali necessarium est; impossibile enim est absque his animal esse.
    Aristotle, Metaph. V, text 6 (IV c. 5): The necessary is so called, without which life does not occur, as a concause, just as breathing and food are necessary to an animal; for it is impossible for an animal to be without these.
  6. Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 11: Alimenti cupiditas naturalis est; siccum enim, vel humidum alimentum, vel etiam utrumque, cum indigent, omnes cupiunt.
    Aristotle, Ethics III c. 11: The desire of food is natural; for all desire dry, or wet food, or also both, when they are in need.
  7. Gen. 4, 8. — Codd. F aa: Item, esto quod Adam pro Item, si Adam.
    Gen 4:8. — Codd. F, aa: Item, esto quod Adam in place of Item, si Adam.
  8. Ostenditur IV. Sent. d. 49. p. II. n. 1. princip. a. 2. q. 1. et a. 2. princip. a. 1. q. 1. seq.
    Shown in IV Sent. d. 49 p. II n. 1 princip. a. 2 q. 1 and a. 2 princip. a. 1 q. 1 seq.
  9. Sive de Ordine creaturarum, c. 10. n. 8: Dum vero ibi homo immortaliter et beate viveret, nunquid et totius orbis subiectio sibi non subiaceret? Quid enim illum ab ingressu orbis intercluderet, qui in creaturis nocere sibi aliquid non timeret, dum ignis non ureret, non aqua mergeret, non bestiarum fortitudo mactaret, non spinarum vel cuiuscumque rei aculei vulnerarent, non absentia aeris suffocaret, non omnia, quae nocent mortalibus, impedirent?
    Or On the Order of Creatures, c. 10 n. 8: While indeed there man was living immortally and blessedly, would not the subjection of the whole world also lie under him? For what would shut him off from entrance into the world, who would fear nothing in the creatures to harm him, while fire would not burn, nor water drown, nor strength of beasts slay, nor thorns or spines of any thing whatever wound, nor absence of air suffocate, nor all the things that harm mortals impede?
  10. Rom. 6, 23: Stipendia enim peccati mors. — De propp. seqq. cfr. August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 18. n. 51.
    Rom 6:23: For the wages of sin is death. — On the following propositions cf. Augustine, On Free Will III c. 18 n. 51.
  11. Cfr. August., de Vera Relig. c. 23. n. 44; Enarrat. in Ps. 145. n. 5. et de Quantit. animae, c. 36. n. 80. Anselm., I. Cur Deus homo, c. 11, plura docet de rectitudine sive iustitia voluntatis. — Pro omnis rectitudo nonnulli codd. rectitudo hominis. Vat. post Deo adiungit vel subiiciendo se Deo.
    Cf. Augustine, On True Religion c. 23 n. 44; Enarr. in Ps. 145 n. 5, and On the Quantity of the Soul c. 36 n. 80. Anselm, Cur Deus homo I c. 11, teaches much on the rectitude or justice of the will. — In place of omnis rectitudo some codd. rectitudo hominis. The Vatican edition after Deo adds vel subiiciendo se Deo.
  12. Libr. VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 6.): Nam anceps secundum amphibologiam est nunc incorruptibile esse; aut enim, quoniam non corrumpitur nunc, significat, aut quoniam non possibile corrumpi nunc, aut quoniam huiusmodi est nunc, ut nunquam possit corrumpi.
    Topics VI c. 3 (c. 6): For it is ambiguous by amphiboly to be incorruptible now; for it signifies either that it is not corrupted now, or that it is not possible to be corrupted now, or that it is now of such a kind that it can never be corrupted.
  13. Plurimi codd. et edd. 1, 2 non bene absolute.
    Most codd. and edd. 1, 2 not well absolute.
  14. Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 et uno alteroque cod. corrumpetur.
    The Vatican edition with edd. 3, 4 and one or another cod. reads corrumpetur [will be corrupted].
  15. Fere omnes codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3, 4 minus convenienter educta, cod. L adducta, cod. O ducta (reducta?). Deinde pro non pugnarent aliqui codd. et ed. 1 non repugnarent.
    Nearly all codd. with edd. 1, 2, 3, 4 less suitably educta, cod. L adducta, cod. O ducta (reducta?). Then in place of non pugnarent some codd. and ed. 1 non repugnarent.
  16. Codd. M Y aa divinae institiae.
    Codd. M, Y, aa divinae institiae [of divine justice].
  17. Scil. comedendi. — Paulo ante pro quando cod. cc et ed. 4 quin.
    Namely, from eating. — A little before, in place of quando cod. cc and ed. 4 read quin.
  18. Gen. 3, 4. seqq. Cfr. lit. Magistri hic c. 4. — Mox pro si Vat. etsi, quae et dein post dictaret cum ed. 4 addit eum sumere cibum.
    Gen 3:4 and following. Cf. the text of the Master here c. 4. — Just after, in place of si the Vatican edition reads etsi, which then also after dictaret with ed. 4 adds eum sumere cibum. ---
← Dist. 19, Art. 1, Q. 2Dist. 19, Art. 2, Q. 2→