Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 4
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 26
Quaestio IV. Utrum gratia sit in genere accidentis corruptibilis, vel incorruptibilis.
Quarto quaeritur, utrum gratia sit in genere accidentis corruptibilis, an incorruptibilis. Et quod sit accidens corruptibile, videtur.
1. Omne accidens, quod est in subiecto variabili, secundum quod est variabile, est corruptibile1; sed gratia est in subiecto variabili, utpote in anima, secundum libertatem arbitrii, in qua consistit mutatio et vertibilitas: ergo etc.
2. Item, omne accidens, quod habet oppositum potens inesse suo subiecto, est corruptibile; sed gratia opponitur culpae, et culpa potest inesse animae viri iusti, quamdiu est in statu viae: ergo etc.
3. Item, omne accidens, quod est aliunde et non habet causam in subiecto, potest ab illo separari; sed gratia est in anima et non habet ortum ab anima: ergo potest separari ab ipsa; sed post separationem non potest in esse conservari: ergo gratia nata est corrumpi.
4. Item, omne accidens, cuius conservatio pendet ex conversione voluntatis ad Deum, est corruptibile, cum voluntas possit a Deo averti; sed gratia est huiusmodi: ergo etc.
Sed contra: 1. Anima eo ipso, quod est imago Dei, est incorruptibilis — «non enim esset imago Dei, sicut dicit Augustinus2, si mortis termino clauderetur» — ergo cum in gratia consistat imago reformationis, videtur, quod gratia sit incorruptibilis.
2. Item, accidens, quod est in subiecto non a se, sed ab alio, non movetur necessario ad motum eius in quo est, sicut patet de specie existente in speculo, et lumine existente in medio; sed gratia est in anima non a se, sed a Deo: ergo non videtur, quod ad mutationem seu ad variationem animae corrumpatur.
3. Item, his quae sunt corruptibilia, dedit divina virtus propagandi potentiam: igitur aut gratia non est corruptibilis, aut si corrumpitur, habet vim producendi gratiam sibi similem; sed gratia non potest sibi similem producere, sicut in primo libro ostensum est3: ergo non est corruptibilis de se.
4. Item, omne quod corrumpitur in tempore, sui diuturnitate senescit in tempore4; sed gratia, quanto magis durat in homine, tanto perfectior est et stabilior et magis renovat spiritum: ergo gratia non videtur corrumpi.
5. Item, si gratia corrumpitur, aut corrumpitur a Deo, aut a libero arbitrio, aut a peccato; a Deo non, cum gratiam corrumpi sit malum; a libero arbitrio non, cum nullum subiectum corrumpat suam perfectionem5; a peccato non, quia peccatum est pura privatio, et modica gratia potest super omnem culpam: ergo cum nihil habeat corrumpens, videtur, quod sit incorruptibilis.
6. Item, si corrumpitur, aut corrumpitur in aliquid, aut in nihil. Si in aliquid, quaero: in quid? Nec est aliquid dare, cum non producatur ex aliquo, sed de nihilo. Si in nihil; contra: nihil quod corrumpitur, secedit omnino in non-ens6. Si igitur gratia nobilissimum est inter omnia accidentia, et Deus non permittit alia accidentia in non-ens cedere, videtur, quod nec de gratia permittat.
Conclusio.
Gratia est corruptibilis et in nihil potest redigi.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum gratia sit accidens, non potest esse praeter subiectum, in quo est; et cum in subiecto, in quo est, non possit simul cum culpa subsistere, et ipsi subiecto, in quo est gratia, contingat culpam inesse: necesse est, gratiam esse quid corruptibile. — Rursus, cum gratia non producatur ex aliquo materialiter, sed sit simpliciter donum gratuitum et omnino desursum descendens a Patre luminum7; et omne quod corrumpitur, in id cedat, unde producitur: necesse est, gratiam, sicut ex nihilo producitur, sic in nihilum redigi, cum corrumpitur. — Talis autem modus corrumpendi non solum competit gratiae ratione sui initii, sed etiam ratione esse proprii sive modi existendi. Ratione, inquam, sui initii, quia, sicut dictum est, sicut ex nihilo producitur, ita in nihil redigitur, quemadmodum in aliis accidentibus consimiliter reperitur, quod in id redeunt, unde exeunt, cum producuntur. — Competit etiam hoc ei ratione esse proprii sive modi existendi, quoniam, cum gratia non causetur ex principiis eius in quo est, sed aliud habeat pro subiecto, aliud pro causa, quemadmodum, cum lumen corrumpitur, vel similitudo in speculo, vel ipsa species in anima, non corrumpitur illud in quo est, nec redit ad illud a quo est, sed quantum est de se, in nihil cedit: sic gratia — quia non habet esse in anima per modum naturae, sed per modum habitus, ut prius8 habitum est, nec ex principiis animae producitur — cum corrumpitur, in nihil redigitur. Et propterea peccatum, in quo fit gratiae corruptio, dicitur esse nihil9, et inter omnes corruptiones summo Auctori et Conservatori omnium bonorum maxime displicere dignoscitur. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod gratia corrumpitur.
1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod in gratia reperitur ratio imaginis, sicut in anima; dicendum, quod aliter et aliter reperitur imago hic et ibi. Anima enim «est imago Dei, quia capax Dei est et particeps esse potest10», et ita propter beatitudinem facta est et ad beatitudinem apta.
Quae, inquam, beatitudo non potest inesse nisi substantiae immortali; ideo necesse est, animam immortalem esse. Gratia vero ex hoc solo dicitur imago, quia est imaginis reformatio; et quoniam illa imago per gratiam reformata potest deformari, hinc est, quod gratia potest corrumpi. Nec valet illa ratio, quia hinc inde non est consimilis imaginis acceptio.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod accidens, quod non habet ortum a subiecto, non mutatur ad mutationem subiecti; dicendum, quod hoc non est propter hoc solum, quod habeat ortum aliunde, sed quia non dependet ab eo in quo est, sicut patet in radio et lumine. Gratia autem non solum dependet ab eo, a quo est, sed etiam ab anima, in qua est, nec persistit in ea, nisi quamdiu habet faciem suam sive mentem ad Deum conversam11.
3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod rei corruptibili debet dari virtus propagandi; dicendum, quod illud verum est, quando illa res est nata talem virtutem suscipere, et quando etiam illa corruptibilitas inest rei ex defectu propriae naturae; neutrum autem horum competit gratiae. Nam gratia nata est immediate ab ipso Deo procedere12, nec aliquo modo corrumpitur nisi propter aversionem mentis nostrae a rectitudine veritatis aeternae. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens, quod obiicitur, quod omne quod corrumpitur, senescit in tempore; hoc enim verum est de eo quod habet causam corruptionis intra se.
5. Ad illud quod quaeritur, a quo corrumpitur, utrum a Deo, vel a peccato, vel a libero arbitrio; dicendum, quod ipsa gratia deficit in se ipsa. — Si autem quaeratur ratio huius, quare deficit; hoc est13 propter aversionem mentis humanae. Cum enim gratia non salvetur nisi ex continuatione influentiae a bonitate divina super faciem mentis nostrae; quando anima a Deo avertitur, influentia non continuatur, et per consequens gratia corrumpitur; anima autem avertitur per peccatum: et ideo quodam modo gratia per peccatum dicitur corrumpi, non quod peccatum agat in gratiam, sed quia, anima per peccatum se avertente et Deo cessante influere, necesse est, gratiam in se ipsa deficere.
6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil quod corrumpitur secedit omnino in non-ens; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem in accidentibus, quae habent esse naturae, et in eis quae causantur ex principiis subiecti, pro eo quod, cum corrumpuntur accidentia, manent nihilominus et salvantur illa principia; et ideo, cum talia accidentia corrumpuntur, non14 omnino annihilantur. In his vero accidentibus, quae habent esse habitus, sicut similitudo in anima et lumen in aere, non habet veritatem. Non enim similitudo hominis mortui, quae est in anima tua, si de anima tua deleatur et corrumpatur, redit ad hominem illum; vel cum lumen corrumpitur, redit ad solem, maxime si corruptio luminis fiat per corporis interpositionem; nisi forte quis dicat, ad suam originem redire, pro eo quod adhuc salvatur in suo principio effectivo, quod potest producere illi simile. Quia igitur gratia habet se ad modum habitus et ex nihilo producitur, ut prius habitum est; ideo illa propositio non habet hic locum. — Et si tu quaeras: unde hoc est, quod Deus permittit perire tam nobile accidens? satis facile est respondere. Similis enim quaestio est, si quaeratur: cum Deus diligat amicos suos et plus diligat unam animam sanctam, quam diligat caelum et terram; quid est, quod permittit, animam sanctam a se separari, et non permittit, caelum et terram corrumpi? Ad hoc respondebit qui sane intelligit, quod hoc cursui rerum congruit, et «Deus sic res, quas condidit, administrat, ut eas agere proprios motus sinat». Et propterea, quia thesaurus gratiae habetur in vasis fictilibus, quamvis sit valde nobilis, tamen de facili amittitur, quamdiu procellis tentationum concutitur.
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Question IV. Whether grace is in the genus of a corruptible or an incorruptible accident.
Fourthly it is asked whether grace is in the genus of a corruptible or an incorruptible accident. And that it is a corruptible accident, it seems.
1. Every accident that is in a variable subject, insofar as it is variable, is corruptible1; but grace is in a variable subject, namely in the soul, according to the freedom of choice, in which consist change and mutability: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, every accident that has an opposite capable of being in its subject is corruptible; but grace is opposed to fault, and fault can be in the soul of a just man, so long as he is in the state of the wayfarer: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, every accident that is from elsewhere and does not have its cause in the subject can be separated from it; but grace is in the soul and does not have its origin from the soul: therefore it can be separated from it; but after separation it cannot be preserved in being: therefore grace is apt to be corrupted.
4. Likewise, every accident whose preservation depends on the conversion of the will to God is corruptible, since the will can be turned away from God; but grace is of this kind: therefore etc.
On the contrary: 1. The soul, by the very fact that it is the image of God, is incorruptible — «for it would not be the image of God, as Augustine says2, if it were closed off by the term of death» — therefore since the image of reformation consists in grace, it seems that grace is incorruptible.
2. Likewise, an accident that is in a subject not of itself, but from another, is not necessarily moved by the motion of that in which it is, as is clear of the species existing in a mirror, and of light existing in a medium; but grace is in the soul not of itself, but from God: therefore it does not seem that it is corrupted by the change or variation of the soul.
3. Likewise, to things that are corruptible the divine power gave the capacity of propagating; therefore either grace is not corruptible, or if it is corrupted, it has the power of producing grace like itself; but grace cannot produce its like, as was shown in the first book3: therefore it is not corruptible of itself.
4. Likewise, everything that is corrupted in time grows old in time by its long duration4; but grace, the more it endures in a man, is the more perfect and stable and the more it renews the spirit: therefore grace does not seem to be corrupted.
5. Likewise, if grace is corrupted, it is corrupted either by God, or by free choice, or by sin; not by God, since for grace to be corrupted is an evil; not by free choice, since no subject corrupts its own perfection5; not by sin, since sin is a pure privation, and a little grace prevails over every fault: therefore since it has nothing to corrupt it, it seems that it is incorruptible.
6. Likewise, if it is corrupted, it is corrupted either into something, or into nothing. If into something, I ask: into what? Nor is there anything to assign, since it is not produced out of anything, but from nothing. If into nothing; on the contrary: nothing that is corrupted withdraws entirely into non-being6. If therefore grace is the most noble among all accidents, and God does not permit other accidents to pass into non-being, it seems that He does not permit it of grace either.
Conclusion.
Grace is corruptible and can be reduced to nothing.
I respond: It must be said that since grace is an accident, it cannot exist apart from the subject in which it is; and since in the subject in which it is, it cannot subsist together with fault, and it happens that fault is in the very subject in which the grace is: it is necessary that grace be something corruptible. — Again, since grace is not produced materially out of anything, but is simply a gratuitous gift and entirely coming down from above from the Father of lights7; and since everything that is corrupted passes into that out of which it is produced: it is necessary that grace, just as it is produced from nothing, so be reduced to nothing, when it is corrupted. — But such a mode of corruption belongs to grace not only by reason of its beginning, but also by reason of its proper being or mode of existing. By reason, I say, of its beginning, because, as has been said, just as it is produced from nothing, so it is reduced to nothing, just as is found likewise in other accidents, that they return into that out of which they go forth, when they are produced. — This belongs to it also by reason of its proper being or mode of existing, since, as grace is not caused from the principles of that in which it is, but has one thing for its subject, another for its cause, just as, when light is corrupted, or a likeness in a mirror, or the species itself in the soul, that in which it is is not corrupted, nor does it return to that from which it is, but as far as it is of itself, it passes into nothing: so grace — because it does not have being in the soul after the manner of a nature, but after the manner of a habit, as was held before8, nor is it produced from the principles of the soul — when it is corrupted, is reduced to nothing. And therefore sin, in which the corruption of grace occurs, is said to be nothing9, and among all corruptions it is known to displease most the supreme Author and Preserver of all goods. — Therefore the arguments showing that grace is corrupted must be conceded.
1. To that, then, which is objected first to the contrary, that in grace is found the account of an image, just as in the soul; it must be said that the image is found otherwise here and otherwise there. For the soul «is the image of God, because it is capable of God and can be a partaker10», and so it is made for the sake of beatitude and apt for beatitude.
Which beatitude, I say, cannot be in any but an immortal substance; therefore it is necessary that the soul be immortal. But grace is called an image on this ground alone, that it is the reformation of the image; and since that image reformed by grace can be deformed, hence it is that grace can be corrupted. Nor does that argument avail, because the reception of the image is not alike on the one side and the other.
2. To that which is objected, that an accident which does not have its origin from the subject is not changed at the change of the subject; it must be said that this is not on account of this alone, that it has its origin from elsewhere, but because it does not depend on that in which it is, as is clear in the case of a ray and light. But grace not only depends on that from which it is, but also on the soul in which it is, nor does it persist in it except so long as it has its face or mind turned to God11.
3. 4. To that which is objected, that to a corruptible thing ought to be given the power of propagating; it must be said that this is true when that thing is apt to receive such a power, and when also that corruptibility is in the thing from a defect of its proper nature; but neither of these belongs to grace. For grace is apt to proceed immediately from God Himself12, nor is it corrupted in any way except on account of the turning away of our mind from the rectitude of eternal truth. — And by this is clear the answer to the next, which is objected, that everything that is corrupted grows old in time; for this is true of that which has the cause of its corruption within itself.
5. To that which is asked, by what it is corrupted, whether by God, or by sin, or by free choice; it must be said that grace itself fails in itself. — But if the reason of this be asked, why it fails; this is13 on account of the turning away of the human mind. For since grace is not preserved except by the continuation of the influence from the divine goodness upon the face of our mind; when the soul is turned away from God, the influence is not continued, and consequently grace is corrupted; but the soul is turned away through sin: and therefore in a certain manner grace is said to be corrupted through sin, not because sin acts upon grace, but because, when the soul turns itself away through sin and God ceases to inflow, it is necessary that grace fail in itself.
6. To that which is objected, that nothing which is corrupted withdraws entirely into non-being; it must be said that this is true in accidents that have the being of a nature, and in those which are caused from the principles of the subject, for the reason that, when the accidents are corrupted, those principles nonetheless remain and are preserved; and therefore, when such accidents are corrupted, they are not14 entirely annihilated. But in those accidents which have the being of a habit, such as a likeness in the soul and light in the air, it is not true. For the likeness of a dead man, which is in your soul, if it be erased and corrupted from your soul, does not return to that man; nor when light is corrupted does it return to the sun, especially if the corruption of the light occurs through the interposition of a body; unless perhaps someone should say that it returns to its origin, for the reason that it is still preserved in its effective principle, which can produce its like. Since therefore grace stands after the manner of a habit and is produced from nothing, as was held before; therefore that proposition does not hold here. — And if you ask: whence is it that God permits so noble an accident to perish? it is easy enough to answer. For a similar question is, if it be asked: since God loves His friends and loves one holy soul more than He loves heaven and earth; what is it that He permits a holy soul to be separated from Him, and does not permit heaven and earth to be corrupted? To this he who understands rightly will answer that this is fitting to the course of things, and «God so administers the things which He founded, that He lets them perform their proper motions». And therefore, because the treasure of grace is held in earthen vessels, although it is very noble, yet it is easily lost, so long as it is shaken by the storms of temptations.
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- Cfr. Aristot., de Longitud. et brevit. vitae, c. 2, et de Iuvent. et senect. etc., c. 3. (c. 5.), ubi et maior seq. arg. insinuatur. Vide supra pag. 192, nota 7.Cf. Aristotle, On Length and Shortness of Life, c. 2, and On Youth and Old Age etc., c. 3 (c. 5), where also the major premise of the following argument is suggested. See above p. 192, note 7.
- Vide supra pag. 411, nota 3.See above p. 411, note 3.
- Dist. 17. p. II. q. 2. — De maiori cfr. supra pag. 215, nota 4.Distinction 17, part II, q. 2. — On the major premise cf. above p. 215, note 4.
- Cfr. Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 117. (c. 12.), ex quo supra pag. 66, nota 2. quaedam allata sunt. — In fine arg. codd. K M Y adiungunt posse.Cf. Aristotle, Physics IV, text 117 (c. 12), from which above on p. 66, note 2, certain things were adduced. — At the end of the argument codices K M Y add posse.
- Cfr. Aristot., I. Phys. text. 81. (c. 9.); Boeth., III. de Consol. prosa 11: Porro autem, quod cuique consentaneum est, id unumquodque conservat, sicuti ea quae sunt inimica, corrumpunt.Cf. Aristotle, Physics I, text 81 (c. 9); Boethius, On the Consolation [of Philosophy] III, prose 11: Moreover, that which is agreeable to each thing preserves each thing, just as those things which are hostile corrupt it.
- Cfr. Aristot., I. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 20. et 23. (c. 3. seq.).Cf. Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption I, texts 20 and 23 (c. 3 ff.).
- Iac. 1, 17. — Pro et omnino codd. H K Y et ideo.James 1:17. — For et omnino ("and entirely") codices H K Y read et ideo ("and therefore").
- Hic q. 2. seq. — Paulo superius pro cedit ed. 1 secedit.Here, q. 2 following. — A little above, for cedit edition 1 reads secedit.
- August., in Ioan. Evang. tract. 1. n. 13: Peccatum quidem non per ipsum [Verbum] factum est; et manifestum est, quia peccatum nihil est, et nihil fiunt homines, cum peccant.Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John, tract. 1, n. 13: Sin indeed was not made through Him [the Word]; and it is manifest that sin is nothing, and that men become nothing when they sin.
- August., XIV. de Trin. c. 8. n. 11. — De seqq. cfr. supra d. 19. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. et d. 16. a. 2. q. 3. ad 1.Augustine, On the Trinity XIV, c. 8, n. 11. — On what follows cf. above d. 19, a. 1, q. 1 in the body, and d. 16, a. 2, q. 3, ad 1.
- Gregor., X. Moral. c. 13. n. 27: Interna quippe facies hominis mens est, in qua nimirum recognoscimur, ut ab auctore nostro diligamur.Gregory, Moralia X, c. 13, n. 27: For the inner face of a man is his mind, in which indeed we are recognized, that we may be loved by our Author.
- Cod. F produci.Codex F reads produci ("to be produced").
- Cod. cc et ed. 1 dicendum est, hoc esse pro hoc est. Paulo inferius edd., excepta 1, post avertitur addunt per peccatum, et dein omittunt anima autem avertitur per peccatum. Circa finem solut. cod. T post se avertente adiungit a Deo.Codex cc and edition 1 read dicendum est, hoc esse for hoc est. A little below the editions, except 1, after avertitur add per peccatum, and then omit anima autem avertitur per peccatum. Toward the end of the solution codex T after se avertente adds a Deo.
- Cod. F nec, omisso paulo ante cum, quae particula deest etiam in non paucis aliis codd., ut C F H O R S Y ee etc.Codex F reads nec, with cum omitted a little before, which particle is also lacking in not a few other codices, such as C F H O R S Y ee etc. ---