Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 26

Textus Latinus

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Articulus unicus. De gratiae quidditate.

Quaestio III. Utrum gratia sit in genere substantiae, vel accidentis.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum gratia sit in genere substantiae, vel in genere accidentis. Et quod sit in genere accidentis, videtur.

1. Omne quod advenit substantiae iam completae, est accidens¹; sed gratia advenit substantiae iam completae, scilicet animae rationali: ergo gratia est accidens.

2. Item, quod « adest et abest praeter subiecti corruptionem est accidens »²; sed gratia est huiusmodi, sicut patet, quia multi iusti efficiuntur peccatores, et e converso: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne quod recipit magis et minus, est accidens³; sed gratia recipit magis et minus, quia maior est in uno quam in altero, et in eodem ipso secundum diversa tempora magis intenditur: ergo etc.

4. Praeterea, aut gratia est substantia, aut accidens. Si est accidens, habeo propositum; si substantia: aut substantia-materia, aut substantia-forma, aut substantia-compositum⁴. Substantia-materia non, hoc constat; substantia composita non, quia tunc non esset animae unibilis; substantia-forma non, quia tunc ex gratia et anima fieret unum per essentiam: ergo si non est substantia, restat, quod est accidens.

5. Item, si est substantia; aut corporalis, aut spiritualis. Non corporalis, hoc constat; si spiritualis, aut Deus, aut Angelus, aut anima rationalis; sed constans est, quod gratia creata nec est Deus, nec est Angelus, nec rationalis anima: ergo restat, quod gratia creata sit in genere accidentis.

6. Item, nulla substantia est habitus; sed gratia est quidam habitus animam decorans et ornans, sicut dicitur super illud Psalmi⁵: Ut exhilaret faciem in oleo: « Gratia est quidam nitor animi » etc.: ergo gratia non est substantia; et est substantia, vel accidens: ergo etc.

Sed contra: 1. Nullum accidens est nobilius substantia⁶: sed gratia est nobilior anima, quam perficit et complet, sicut perfectio est nobilior perfectibili: ergo gratia non est accidens; et est accidens, vel substantia: ergo etc.

2. Item, nullum accidens est substantiae similius quam substantia; sed gratia inter ceteras creaturas est Deo similior, et Deus est substantia: ergo gratia est in genere substantiae.

3. Item, nullum accidens est stabilius quam substantia, pro eo quod substantia praebet fulcimentum

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accidenti, non e converso; sed gratia stabilit ipsam animam et confirmat in bono, nec potest ipsa gratia aliquo modo incurvari in malo: si ergo anima est substantia, gratia est substantia.

4. Item, omnis forma, quae est principium vitae, est in genere substantiae⁷; sed gratia est principium vitae et nobilissimae vitae: ergo gratia est in genere substantiae.

5. Item, tria sunt genera bonorum, scilicet bona media, bona minima et bona maxima, sicut vult Augustinus in libro de Libero Arbitrio⁸; sed bona minima et bona media sunt in genere substantiae: ergo multo fortius et bona maxima; et gratia est de bonis maximis: ergo etc.

6. Item, omne accidens quod inest alicui ut accidens, aut inest per se, aut per accidens. Si igitur gratia inest animae ut accidens, aut ergo inest per se, aut per accidens. Si per se: ergo habet ortum ex propriis principiis subiecti⁹: ergo iam non erit gratia, sed naturalis proprietas. Si per accidens; sed omne per accidens reducibile est ad per se: ergo si gratia inest animae per accidens, erit aliud subiectum, cui inerit per se. Quaero igitur, quid sit illud. Si autem non est aliquod tale dare, restat, quod gratia non est accidens; et est accidens, vel substantia: ergo etc.

Conclusio

Gratia ut donum creatum est accidens.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ponentes, gratiam donum esse creatum, necesse habent ponere, gratiam esse in genere accidentis.

Ad cuius intelligentiam notandum est, quod est aliquod accidens, quod comparatur ad aliquid, sicut ad subiectum et causam; aliquod, quod solum comparatur ad aliquid sicut ad subiectum, et ad aliud sicut ad causam: verbi gratia, nigredo in corvo comparatur ad ipsum corvum, sicut ad subiectum et causam; lumen in aere, vel species in speculo comparatur solum sicut ad subiectum, non sicut ad causam, quia, etsi ibi recipiatur, aliunde tamen habet ortum¹⁰.

Tale autem accidens, quod comparatur ad aliquid sicut ad subiectum, et ad aliud sicut ad causam, potest esse sub triplici differentia. Quoddam enim est, quod habet ortum ab inferiori; quoddam, quod habet ortum a pari; quoddam, quod habet ortum a superiori: sicut¹¹ ab inferiori, ut species lapidis in oculo, vel etiam in intellectu nostro; sicut a pari, ut similitudo speculi in speculo; sicut a superiori, ut lumen in aere illuminato. — Tale autem accidens, quod habet ortum a superiori, in quantum accidens est, complementum est, non quantum ad esse primum, sed quantum ad esse secundum. Quia vero a superiori est, habet nobilitare subiectum in hoc, quod iungit ipsum et conformat ei quod est ipso superius. Et si sit tale accidens, quod ortum habet ab ente primo¹² supremo; si eius infusio vel origo sit secundum perfectam influentiam, non solum habet nobilitare, verum etiam consummare et quietare; et hoc non facit tantum ratione sui, verum etiam ratione eius, a quo procedit, in quo reperitur omnis perfectio et bonorum omnium aggregatio, ac per hoc completa beatitudo¹³. — Concedendae sunt ergo rationes probantes, gratiam esse accidens.

1. Ad illud autem quod obiicitur primo in contrarium, quod nullum accidens nobilius est substantia; dicendum, quod illa ratio deficit tripliciter. Primum quidem, quia nobilitas substantiae et accidentis, et bonitas substantiae et accidentis proprie non habent comparari. Accidens enim bonum dicitur non sibi, sed alii¹⁴, non sicut ordinatum, sed sicut ratio ordinandi; sed ipsa substantia bona est tanquam bonitatis participativa. — Alius etiam defectus est ibi, quoniam, etsi nullum accidens nobilius sit substantia, prout accidens comparatur in se quantum ad essentiam generis sive quantum ad esse primum; nihilominus tamen, prout accidens consideratur in subiecto et includit esse subiecti, quandam nobilitatem superaddit quantum ad esse secundum. — Tertius etiam defectus est, quia, quod gratia dicatur nobilior anima et perfectio animae, hoc non est ratione sui tantum, sed quia unit bono increato, sicut praedictum est.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nullum accidens

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similius est substantiae quam substantia; dicendum, quod sicut dictum est¹⁵ de bonitate, quod alio modo dicitur anima esse bona, alio modo gratia; sic etiam alio modo anima Deo assimilatur, et alio modo gratia. Anima enim Deo assimilatur sicut divinae similitudinis susceptiva, gratia vero sicut ipsa similitudo vel donum assimilativum; unde non est comparatio proprie inter hunc modum assimilandi et illum. — Alius est etiam defectus, quia, cum anima assimiletur Deo propter gratiam, et ubi unum propter alterum, utrobique tantum unum¹⁶; sic non est maior vel minor assimilatio dicenda in anima gratificata quam in gratia gratificante. — Tertius etiam defectus est, quia, etsi substantia plus assimiletur substantiae in ratione entis, nihil tamen prohibet accidens plus assimilari alicui substantiae sub ratione proprietatis, sicut anima sapiens plus assimilatur Deo, in quantum est ens per se, quam ipsa qualitas sapientiae; nihilominus tamen Deo, in quantum est sapiens, plus assimilatur anima, in quantum est sapiens, quam in quantum est substantia. Sic et in proposito intelligendum est.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nullum accidens est stabilius substantia; dicendum, quod verum est de illo accidente, quod comparatur ad aliquid sicut ad subiectum et causam; de eo vero accidente, quod aliunde habet originem, non habet veritatem, sicut patet in radio exeunte a sole, qui fixus permanet, aere moto. Et quia gratia est tale accidens, ideo illa ratio non habet locum in proposito.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod gratia est forma, quae est principium vitae; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem de forma, quae dat vivere, quod spectat ad esse primum. Gratia autem est forma dans vitam quantum ad esse secundum sive quantum ad bene esse; et ideo illud non valet. Non enim fit unum per essentiam ex gratificato et gratia, sicut fit unum per essentiam ex corpore vivificato et anima vivificante.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de bonis maximis et minimis et mediis, dicendum, quod illa divisio bonorum est secundum acceptionem boni, qua aliquid dicitur bonum, quia bonum alii et utile, sicut patet ex verbis Augustini ibidem: quia bona maxima sunt illa quibus non contingit male uti; et ideo ad gradum bonitatis secundum eum modum, per quem ibi loquitur Augustinus, nihil facit, utrum bonum illud, quod dicitur maximum, sit in genere substantiae, vel accidentis.

6. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum insit animae per se, aut per accidens; dicendum, quod per se inest in genere subiecti, sed non per se in genere causae. Et quia per se inest in genere subiecti, ideo non est quaerendum aliud subiectum, cui per prius insit. Quia vero non inest per se in genere causae, ideo non inest omni animae nec ex principiis animae habet originem; ideo quodam modo habet naturam accidentis inhaerentis per se, quodam modo naturam accidentis inhaerentis per accidens.

Scholion

I. Quod gratia creata non tantum accidentaliter se habeat ad habentem (quod etiam verum esse potest respectu eius quod in se est substantia, ut patet in veste respectu corporis vestiti), sed etiam in se sit in genere accidentis, scilicet qualitatis; non est nisi corollarium solutionis praecedentium quaestionum. Notanda sunt verba in corp. de effectu subiectum nobilitante, consummante et quietante, quem habet gratia, quatenus iungit animam origini superiori, scil. Spiritui S.

Quoad modum loquendi in sequente (4.) quaest. usurpatum notandum, quod termini corrumpi, fieri et creari secundum S. Thomam (S. I. II. q. 110. a. 2. ad 3.) de accidentibus minus proprie dicuntur: « Ideo proprie loquendo nullum accidens neque fit, neque corrumpitur, sed dicitur fieri vel corrumpi, secundum quod subiectum incipit, vel desinit esse in actu secundum illud accidens. Et secundum hoc etiam gratia dicitur creari ex eo, quod homines secundum ipsam creantur, id est in novo esse constituuntur ex nihilo, id est non ex meritis, secundum illud Ephes. 2, 10: Creati in Christo Iesu in operibus bonis ». Ipse tamen in Comment. (hic q. 2. ad 5.) eodem ac S. Bonav. utitur modo loquendi.

II. Alii auctores hanc et sequentem quaest. plerumque coniungunt. De utraque igitur tractant: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 61. m. 2. a. 3. — Scot., I. Sent. d. 17. q. 3. n. 23. 27. 28. — S. Thom., hic q. unica a. 2; S. loc. et art. cit. — B. Albert., hic a. 2; S. p. II. q. 98. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica a. 3. 6. — Richard. a Med., hic a. unicus q. 2. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. unica.

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English Translation

Article, sole. On the quiddity of grace.

Question III. Whether grace is in the genus of substance or of accident.

Thirdly it is asked whether grace is in the genus of substance or in the genus of accident. And that it is in the genus of accident, it seems.

1. Everything that comes to a substance already complete is an accident¹; but grace comes to a substance already complete, namely to the rational soul: therefore grace is an accident.

2. Likewise, that which « is present and absent without the corruption of the subject is an accident »²; but grace is of this kind, as is clear, since many just men become sinners, and conversely: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, everything that admits of more and less is an accident³; but grace admits of more and less, since it is greater in one than in another, and in the same person it is intensified more at different times: therefore etc.

4. Furthermore, either grace is a substance or an accident. If it is an accident, I have my proposition; if a substance: then either substance-matter, or substance-form, or substance-composite⁴. Substance-matter it is not, this is established; substance-composite it is not, since then it would not be unitable to the soul; substance-form it is not, since then from grace and the soul there would come to be one thing in essence: therefore if it is not a substance, it remains that it is an accident.

5. Likewise, if it is a substance, then either corporeal or spiritual. Not corporeal, this is established; if spiritual, then either God, or an Angel, or a rational soul; but it is certain that created grace is neither God, nor an Angel, nor a rational soul: therefore it remains that created grace is in the genus of accident.

6. Likewise, no substance is a habit; but grace is a certain habit adorning and beautifying the soul, as is said upon that text of the Psalm⁵: That he may make the face cheerful with oil: « Grace is a certain brightness of the soul » etc.: therefore grace is not a substance; and it is [either] a substance or an accident: therefore etc.

On the contrary: 1. No accident is nobler than a substance⁶: but grace is nobler than the soul, which it perfects and completes, just as the perfection is nobler than the perfectible: therefore grace is not an accident; and it is [either] an accident or a substance: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, no accident is more like a substance than a substance [is]; but grace among other creatures is more like God, and God is a substance: therefore grace is in the genus of substance.

3. Likewise, no accident is more stable than a substance, for the reason that the substance furnishes support

to the accident, and not conversely; but grace stabilizes the soul itself and confirms it in good, nor can grace itself in any way be bent toward evil: if therefore the soul is a substance, grace is a substance.

4. Likewise, every form that is a principle of life is in the genus of substance⁷; but grace is a principle of life, and of the noblest life: therefore grace is in the genus of substance.

5. Likewise, there are three kinds of goods, namely middle goods, least goods, and greatest goods, as Augustine holds in the book On Free Choice⁸; but the least goods and the middle goods are in the genus of substance: therefore much more so are the greatest goods; and grace is among the greatest goods: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, every accident which is present in something as an accident is present either per se or per accidens. If therefore grace is present in the soul as an accident, then it is present either per se or per accidens. If per se: then it has its origin from the proper principles of the subject⁹: therefore it will no longer be grace, but a natural property. If per accidens; but everything per accidens is reducible to something per se: therefore if grace is present in the soul per accidens, there will be another subject in which it is present per se. I ask, then, what that is. But if no such thing can be given, it remains that grace is not an accident; and it is [either] an accident or a substance: therefore etc.

Conclusion

Grace, as a created gift, is an accident.

I respond: It must be said that those who hold grace to be a created gift must necessarily hold grace to be in the genus of accident.

For the understanding of this it must be noted that there is a certain accident which is related to something as to a subject and a cause; and a certain [accident] which is related only to something as to a subject, and to another thing as to a cause: for example, blackness in a crow is related to the crow itself as to a subject and a cause; light in the air, or a species in a mirror, is related only as to a subject, not as to a cause, since, although it is received there, it nevertheless has its origin elsewhere¹⁰.

Now such an accident, which is related to something as to a subject and to another as to a cause, can be under a threefold difference. For there is one which has its origin from something lower; one which has its origin from something equal; one which has its origin from something higher: as¹¹ from something lower, like the species of a stone in the eye, or even in our intellect; from something equal, like the likeness of a mirror in a mirror; from something higher, like light in illuminated air. — Now such an accident, which has its origin from something higher, insofar as it is an accident, is a complement, not with respect to first being, but with respect to second being. But because it is from something higher, it ennobles the subject in this, that it joins it and conforms it to that which is higher than itself. And if it be such an accident as has its origin from the first¹² supreme being; if its infusion or origin be according to a perfect influence, it not only ennobles, but even consummates and brings to rest; and this it does not only by reason of itself, but also by reason of that from which it proceeds, in which is found every perfection and the aggregation of all goods, and through this complete beatitude¹³. — Therefore the reasons proving that grace is an accident must be conceded.

1. To that which is objected first to the contrary, that no accident is nobler than a substance; it must be said that that argument fails in three ways. First indeed, because the nobility of substance and of accident, and the goodness of substance and of accident, cannot properly be compared. For an accident is called good not for itself, but for another¹⁴, not as something ordered, but as the ground of ordering; whereas the substance itself is good as being participative of goodness. — There is also another defect there, since, although no accident is nobler than a substance, insofar as the accident is considered in itself with respect to the essence of the genus or with respect to first being; nevertheless, insofar as the accident is considered in the subject and includes the being of the subject, it adds a certain nobility with respect to second being. — There is also a third defect, because the fact that grace is called nobler than the soul and the perfection of the soul is not by reason of itself only, but because it unites [the soul] to the uncreated good, as was said before.

2. To that which is objected, that no accident

is more like a substance than a substance [is]; it must be said that, just as it was said¹⁵ of goodness, that in one way the soul is called good, in another way grace; so also in one way the soul is assimilated to God, and in another way grace. For the soul is assimilated to God as receptive of the divine likeness, but grace as the very likeness or assimilating gift; hence there is properly no comparison between this mode of assimilating and that. — There is also another defect, because, since the soul is assimilated to God on account of grace, and where one thing [is] on account of another, in both there is only one¹⁶; thus no greater or lesser assimilation is to be spoken of in the grace-given soul than in the grace-giving grace. — There is also a third defect, because, although a substance is more assimilated to a substance in the character of being, nothing nevertheless prevents an accident from being more assimilated to some substance under the character of a property, just as the wise soul is more assimilated to God, insofar as it is a being per se, than is the quality of wisdom itself; nevertheless the soul, insofar as it is wise, is more assimilated to God, insofar as he is wise, [by that] in which it is wise, than [by that] in which it is a substance. And so it must be understood in the matter at hand.

3. To that which is objected, that no accident is more stable than a substance; it must be said that this is true of that accident which is related to something as to a subject and a cause; but of that accident which has its origin elsewhere, it does not hold true, as is clear in the ray going out from the sun, which remains fixed though the air be moved. And because grace is such an accident, therefore that argument has no place in the matter at hand.

4. To that which is objected, that grace is a form which is a principle of life; it must be said that this holds true of the form which gives life [in the sense] that pertains to first being. But grace is a form giving life with respect to second being, or with respect to well-being; and therefore that [objection] is of no force. For there does not come to be one thing in essence from the grace-given [soul] and grace, as there comes to be one thing in essence from the vivified body and the vivifying soul.

5. To that which is objected concerning the greatest, least, and middle goods, it must be said that that division of goods is according to the acceptation of good by which something is called good because it is good for another and useful, as is clear from the words of Augustine in the same place: that the greatest goods are those which it is not possible to use badly; and therefore, as to the degree of goodness according to that mode in which Augustine there speaks, it makes no difference whether that good which is called greatest is in the genus of substance or of accident.

6. To that which is asked, whether it is present in the soul per se or per accidens; it must be said that it is present per se in the genus of subject, but not per se in the genus of cause. And because it is present per se in the genus of subject, therefore there is no need to seek another subject in which it might be present prior [to this]. But because it is not present per se in the genus of cause, therefore it is not present in every soul, nor does it have its origin from the principles of the soul; therefore in one way it has the nature of an accident inhering per se, in another way the nature of an accident inhering per accidens.

Scholion

I. That created grace is related to the one having it not only accidentally (which can also be true with respect to that which is in itself a substance, as is clear in a garment with respect to the clothed body), but is also in itself in the genus of accident, namely of quality; this is nothing but a corollary of the solution of the preceding questions. The words in the body are to be noted, concerning the effect of ennobling, consummating, and bringing to rest the subject, which grace has insofar as it joins the soul to its higher origin, namely the Holy Spirit.

As to the manner of speaking employed in the following (fourth) question, it is to be noted that the terms to be corrupted, to be made, and to be created are, according to St. Thomas (S. I-II, q. 110, a. 2, ad 3), said less properly of accidents: « Therefore, properly speaking, no accident either comes to be or is corrupted, but is said to come to be or to be corrupted according as the subject begins or ceases to be in act with respect to that accident. And according to this grace too is said to be created from the fact that men are created according to it, that is, are constituted in a new being out of nothing, that is, not out of merits, according to that text of Ephes. 2:10: Created in Christ Jesus in good works ». Yet he in his Commentary (here, q. 2, ad 5) uses the same manner of speaking as St. Bonaventure.

II. Other authors for the most part join this and the following question. They treat of both, therefore: Alex. Hal., S. p. III, q. 61, m. 2, a. 3. — Scotus, I Sent. d. 17, q. 3, n. 23, 27, 28. — St. Thom., here q. unica a. 2; S., loc. and art. cit. — B. Albert, here a. 2; S. p. II, q. 98, m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., here q. unica a. 3, 6. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. unicus q. 2, 3. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 1. — Biel, here q. unica.

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Apparatus Criticus

Cfr. Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Communitatibus et differentiis generis et accidentis; Boeth., in hunc loc.; etiam supra pag. 327, nota 1.
Cfr. Porphyry, On the Predicables, c. On the Common Features and Differences of Genus and Accident; Boethius, on this passage; also above, p. 327, note 1.
Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Accidente, secundum Aristot., I. Topic. c. 4.
Porphyry, On the Predicables, c. On the Accident, following Aristotle, Topics I, c. 4.
Cfr. Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Communitatibus et differentiis generis et accidentis, c. de Com. et diff. differentiae et accidentis, et c. de Com. et diff. speciei et accidentis.
Cfr. Porphyry, On the Predicables, c. On the Common Features and Differences of Genus and Accident, c. On the Common Features and Differences of Difference and Accident, and c. On the Common Features and Differences of Species and Accident.
Vide Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 2. et 23. (c. 1. seq.) et XII. Metaph. text. 14. (XI. c. 3.). — Vat. composita; sed plurimi codd., ut F K M P Q T bb cc ee etc., cum primis edd. compositum, quod et cod. M habet paulo inferius.
See Aristotle, On the Soul II, text. 2 and 23 (c. 1 seq.) and Metaphysics XII, text. 14 (XI, c. 3). — The Vatican [edition reads] composita; but very many codices, such as F K M P Q T bb cc ee etc., together with the first editions, [read] compositum, which cod. M also has a little further below.
Psalm. 103, 15. Explicatio apposita est ex August., super hunc Ps. Serm. 3. n. 13. et integra sic sonat: Gratia Dei, nitor quidam in manifestationem; sicut dicit Apostolus [I. Cor. 12, 7.]: Unicuique autem datur Spiritus ad manifestationem. Gratia quaedam, quae est hominum ad hominem perspicua, ad conciliandum sanctum amorem, oleum dicitur, in nitore divino. Cfr. infra dub. 2.
Psalm 103:15. The explanation appended is from Augustine, on this Psalm, Serm. 3, n. 13, and in full it runs thus: « The grace of God [is] a certain brightness unto manifestation; as the Apostle says [1 Cor. 12:7]: And to each is given the Spirit unto manifestation. A certain grace, which is perceptible from man to man, [given] for the conciliating of holy love, is called oil, in divine brightness ». Cfr. below, dub. 2.
Vide supra pag. 319, nota 4.
See above, p. 319, note 4.
Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 24. seq. (c. 2.).
Cfr. Aristotle, On the Soul II, text. 24 seq. (c. 2).
Libr. II. c. 19. n. 50, et I. Retract. c. 9. n. 4. Cfr. lit. Magistri, dist. seq. c. 2. 3, ubi etiam exempla horum bonorum afferuntur.
Book II, c. 19, n. 50, and Retract. I, c. 9, n. 4. Cfr. the text of the Master, in the following distinction, c. 2 and 3, where also examples of these goods are adduced.
Vide supra pag. 327, nota 6. — Quod omne per accidens reducatur ad per se, insinuat Aristot., II. Phys. text. 66. (c. 6.). Averroes, in IV. Phys. text. 43. ait: Omne enim, quod invenitur in aliquo per accidens, invenitur in eo propter aliquod habens illud per se.
See above, p. 327, note 6. — That everything per accidens is reduced to something per se is intimated by Aristotle, Physics II, text. 66 (c. 6). Averroes, on Physics IV, text. 43, says: « For everything which is found in something per accidens is found in it on account of something having it per se ».
Sicut supra d. 13. a. 3. q. 2. in fine explanatum est. — In hac propos. cod. aa inde a verbis lumen in aere textum formavit sic: vel species in speculo comparatur solum ad aerem et speculum sicut ad subiectum, non sicut ad causam; et comparatur ad solem et ad illum cuius est species sicut ad causam, non sicut ad subiectum; quia si ibi recipiatur, aliunde tamen habet ortum.
As was explained above, d. 13, a. 3, q. 2, at the end. — In this proposition cod. aa, from the words light in the air, formed the text thus: « or a species in a mirror is related only to the air and the mirror as to a subject, not as to a cause; and it is related to the sun and to that of which it is the species as to a cause, not as to a subject; for if it is received there, it nevertheless has its origin elsewhere ».
Pro sicut ed. I ponit Si est, et dein pro sicut a pari substituit si a pari et si est a superiori.
For sicut (« as ») ed. I puts Si est, and then for sicut a pari (« as from something equal ») it substitutes si a pari and si est a superiori.
In Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 deest primo.
In the Vatican [edition] and edd. 2, 3, 4, primo (« first ») is wanting.
Respicitur nota Boethii definitio beatitudinis, quam supra pag. 467, nota 9. attulimus. — Pro aggregatio cod. Y congregatio.
Reference is made to Boethius' well-known definition of beatitude, which we cited above, p. 467, note 9. — For aggregatio cod. Y [reads] congregatio.
Nam accidens, secundum Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 2. (VI. c. 1.), non est ens, sed quid entis [substantiae]. Cfr. etiam supra pag. 626, nota 4, ubi monstratur, quod secundum Aristot. ad propriam comparationem requiritur univocatio; substantia autem et accidens non sunt univoca. Clarius adhuc S. Doctor de hoc loquitur 1. Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. 1. ad 1. his verbis: Dicendum, quod non est ibi comparatio, quia ubi unum propter alterum, ibi tantum unum; unde habens caritatem bonus est propter caritatem. Vel non cadit ibi comparatio, quia non uniformiter dicitur bonum. Nam substantia rationalis dicitur bona, quia ordinabilis in finem, caritas bona, quia ordinans.
For an accident, according to Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text. 2 (VI, c. 1), is not a being, but something of a being [of a substance]. Cfr. also above, p. 626, note 4, where it is shown that according to Aristotle a proper comparison requires univocity; but substance and accident are not univocal. Still more clearly the Holy Doctor speaks of this in I Sent. d. 17, p. I, q. 1, ad 1, in these words: « It must be said that there is no comparison there, because where one thing [is] on account of another, there is only one; hence one having charity is good on account of charity. Or, no comparison falls there, because good is not said uniformly. For the rational substance is called good because it is orderable to an end, charity good because it is ordering ».
In solut. ad 1. — Immediate post pro de bonitate cod. O de substantiae bonitate. In seqq. codd. K T V aa bb et alii cum ed. 1 pluries substituunt similatur pro assimilatur.
In the solution to [objection] 1. — Immediately after, for de bonitate cod. O [reads] de substantiae bonitate. In what follows, codd. K T V aa bb and others, together with ed. 1, several times substitute similatur for assimilatur.
Aristot., III. Topic. c. 2. contra propositionem, quod plura bona sint eligibiliora paucioribus, haec profert: Si alicubi alterius gratia; nihil enim eligibiliora utraque quam unum, ut sanum fieri et sanitas quam sanitas etc.
Aristotle, Topics III, c. 2, against the proposition that several goods are more choiceworthy than fewer, brings forward this: « [Unless] somewhere [one is] for the sake of the other; for the two together are in no way more choiceworthy than the one, as [e.g.] to become healthy and health [are no more choiceworthy] than health, etc. ».

← Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 2 Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 4→