Dist. 9, Art. 1, Q. 3
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 9
Quaestio III. Utrum secundum maiorem capacitatem naturalium dentur a Deo maiora dona gratuita.
Tertio quaeritur de ipsis ordinibus quantum ad dispositionem praeambulam; et cum haec sit naturalium capacitas et praecellentia, est quaestio, utrum secundum maiorem capacitatem naturalium dentur a Deo maiora dona gratuita. Et quod sic, videtur:
Ad oppositum. 1. Per illud quod dicitur Matthaei vigesimo quinto1: Dedit unicuique secundum propriam virtutem; constans est, quod loquitur ibi de dato superaddito naturae: ergo si secundum virtutem naturae dedit, videtur, quod secundum meliora naturalia sint et maiora gratuita.
2. Item, Magister supra distinctione tertia2: «Qui natura magis subtiles et sapientia plus perspicaces creati sunt, hi maioribus gratiae muneribus praediti sunt»; et hoc ipsum dicit in littera: ergo videtur, quod maior gratia detur secundum maiora naturalia.
3. Item, ad hoc videtur esse ratio: materiae dispositae ad formam, secundum quod dignius et melius disponitur, Deus nobiliorem dat formam3: ergo cum naturalia sint sicut dispositiones quaedam ad gratuita, quanto quis habet meliora naturalia, tanto Deus dabit ei maiora dona gratuita.
4. Item, ratio, quare Deus non dat homini gratiam, est, quia homo non accipit4: ergo cum ipse sit semper promptus et paratus dona sua liberalissime infundere, et liberalitas eius superexcedat omnem capacitatem, videtur, quod de capacitate naturae nihil dimittat vacuum, quando quis plene se convertit ad eum. Et si hoc, restat, quod qui maiora habet naturalia, cum maioris gratiae sit capax, maiorem etiam habebit gratiam. Et hoc videtur sonare verbum Platonis5 dicentis, quod «dedit unicuique beatitudinis, quantum capax erat».
5. Item, sicut gratia est dispositio ad gloriam, ita bona natura est dispositio ad gratiam; sed Deus ei qui habet ampliorem gratiam, ampliorem dat gloriam: ergo ei qui habet meliora naturalia, dat maiora gratuita. Si tu dicas, quod non est simile, quia gratia meretur gloriam, non sic natura gratiam; obiicitur6 tunc, quia qualiscumque sit comparatio dispositionis, hoc tamen verum est, quia gloria perfecte complet naturam, ita quod nullus in ea remanet appetitus incompletus. Si ergo gloria implet naturae capacitatem, aut natura magis capax magis habebit de gloria, aut non erit glorificata: si ergo secundum maiorem capacitatem naturae est maioritas gloriae, et quantitas gloriae correspondet quantitati gratiae, ergo secundum maiorem capacitatem naturalium attendetur maioritas gratiae.
6. Item, finis imponit necessitatem his quae sunt ad finem; sed natura facta est propter gloriam, non e converso: si ergo Deus praesciens et praedestinans facit animam ad hoc, quod eam glorificet, tantam dabit ei naturalium capacitatem, quantam scit se ei daturum gloriam; aut si ultra tribuat, faciet aliquid frustra. Quodsi hoc est falsum, restat, quod capacitas naturae et quantitas gloriae commetiantur7: ergo redit idem quod prius.
Fundamenta. Contra: 1. Ecclesiastici primo8: Secundum datum suum praebet illam diligentibus se: ergo videtur, quod distributio sapientiae et gratiae non pensatur ex parte suscipientis, sed ex parte Dei conferentis.
2. Item, possibile est, eum qui meliora habet naturalia, nihil habere de gratia et omni tempore vitae suae carere gratia, eum vero, qui habet minora naturalia, abundare in gratia: quod si hoc est verum, ergo non est dispensatio gratiae secundum mensuram naturalium.
3. Item, Deus dat gratiam homini, secundum quod se praeparat: ergo si habens minora naturalia frequenter se melius praeparat quam habens maiora, ergo videtur, quod maiora suscipiat dona gratuita, quamvis minora habeat naturalia.
4. Item, qui meliora habet naturalia frequenter remanet in statu imperfectionis, qui vero minora, frequenter assumit statum perfectionis sive religionis: ergo si maior est gratia in perfectis, patet etc.
5. Item, gratia in nobis nullam potentiam ita principaliter respicit sicut arbitrii libertatem9; sed libertas arbitrii aequaliter est in omnibus: si ergo maior est gratia in uno quam in alio, non est a natura, sed magis a distributione divina.
6. Item, distributio gratiae Dei procedit ex visceribus pietatis et misericordiae10; sed misericordiae est magis compati ei qui magis miser est, ceteris paribus, et qui magis indiget. Si ergo ille qui habet minora naturalia, magis indiget sustentari a gratia, quam qui habet meliora: ergo ubi nulla merita vel demerita praecedunt, Deus ei qui minora habet naturalia, debet dare maiorem gratiam: ergo distributio gratiae non est praecise secundum maiorem capacitatem naturae, sed secundum beneplacitum pietatis divinae.
Conclusio
Maior naturalium capacitas respectu gratiae dandae non habet nec efficaciam causalitatis, nec dispositionem necessitatis, sed tantum aliquatenus et fallibiliter dispositionem congruitatis.
Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod gratiam dare secundum maiorem11 Distinctio. capacitatem naturalium potest intelligi tripliciter: Conclusio 1. aut ita, quod hoc quod est secundum dicat efficaciam causalitatis, et sic secundum omnes est falsum, quia naturalia non sunt causa gratiae; Conclusio 2. aut ita, quod dicat dispositionem congruitatis, et sic, ubi non est obstaculum, secundum omnes est verum, quia natura bona de congruo disponit ad gratiam; Conclusio 3. aut ita, quod dicat dispositionem necessitatis, et sic secundum communem opinionem est falsum et a doctoribus reprobatum. — Alia opinio. Tamen secundum aliquorum opinionem aliquando positum est tanquam verum.
Ratio huius opinionis. Ratio autem huius positionis fuit ista. Ipsi enim ponebant, quod gratia non erat aliud quam Deus; et quod caritas non esset aliud quam Spiritus sanctus12; et quod intensio gratiae vel caritatis non erat nisi secundum maiorem depurationem animae et remissionem concupiscentiae, quae obsistit, ne anima possit perfecte Deo uniri; et ideo, concupiscentia omnino extincta, anima tantum unitur Deo, quantum eius potest elevari natura, et tantam dicitur habere gratiam. Et ideo ponebant, quod finaliter anima, quae meliora habebat naturalia, maiorem haberet gratiam. — Falsum est fundam. Sed huius positionis fundamentum improbatum est in primo libro, distinctione decima septima13 et amplius improbabitur infra distinctione vigesima sexta. Item positio ipsa. Ipsa autem positio de se improbabilis est et contra bonos mores esse videtur, dum tantum tribuit ei qui parum laborat et parum Deo servit, quantum ei qui magis, immo plus, si maiora habeat naturalia et perseverat in gratia; quod omnino absurdum est et per rationes praecedentes improbatum. — Et ideo concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt. Ad 6. fundam. Ultima tamen ratio non cogit, quia in distributione gratiarum nec capacitas naturae nec eius indigentia principaliter pensatur, sed divinae praedestinationis dispositio et mensura, secundum quam partitur Deus mensuram fidei, sicut dicit Apostolus14, secundum quod in sua praedestinatione mensus est ei.
Solutio oppositorum. 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod dedit unicuique secundum propriam virtutem; dicendum, quod secundum dicit ibi solummodo causam disponentem de congruo. Et iterum, virtus ibi vocatur conatus cordis, qui non solum dicit capacitatem, sed etiam actualem praeparationem; et ideo auctoritas illa non cogit.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de auctoritate Magistri, similiter dicendum, quod ibi dicit dispositionem de congruo, et magis congruam dispositionem dicit circa Angelos quam circa homines, de quibus loquitur Magister. Non valet quod homines. Boni enim15, qui ad Deum conversi sunt, secundum hoc plus se praeparaverunt, secundum quod meliora naturalia habuerunt, quia quilibet movebatur in Deum secundum totum cordis conatum, cum non haberet retardativum. Non sic autem est in hominibus; et ideo illa auctoritas exponi debet, ampliari non debet.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod materiae melius dispositae imprimit Deus nobiliorem formam; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia materia disponitur ad formam naturalem dispositione, quae est necessitas; Notandum. sed maior capacitas naturalium non disponit ad maiorem gratiam dispositione necessitatis, sed solum congruitatis. Et quia dispositio congruitatis multis modis potest impediri, sive per oppositum, sive per maiorem congruitatem, quae potest ex aliquo accidente supervenire in alio; ideo illa ratio non concludit.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod homo non habet gratiam, quia non accipit; dicendum, Notandum. quod verum est; sed ex hoc non sequitur, quod «ideo habeat gratiam, quia accipit», sicut dicit Anselmus16, quia in privativis et contradictorie oppositis non tenet consequentia in ipso, sed e contrario; et ideo sicut non conceditur, quod maiorem habeat gratiam, quia accipit, sic non est concedendum, quod maiorem habeat gratiam ex maiori capacitate.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod natura disponit ad gratiam; dicendum, sicut dicebatur, quod non est simile, quia natura non sic meretur gratiam, sicut gratia gloriam. Ad illud vero quod subiungit, quod gloria perficit totam capacitatem naturae; dicendum, quod Notandum. sicut forma perficit capacitatem materiae non simpliciter, sed prout exigit dispositio superinducta; sic gloria perficit naturam non simpliciter, sed secundum quod exigebat gratia, quae prius libero arbitrio data erat. Cum autem sic perficitur, sufficienter perfecta est, quia rectitudo iustitiae limitat appetitum naturae, ut non ultra appetat, quam gratia promeruit, maxime cum plene sufficiat quod Deus sibi retribuit.
6. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod capacitas naturae ordinatur ad gloriam finaliter; dicendum, quod sic ordinatur a Deo, ut tamen praesupponatur dispositio ex parte voluntatis nostrae17. Unde sicut homo, qui capax erat beatitudinis et propter beatitudinem factus, per deordinationem voluntatis deputatur aeternis suppliciis et perdit gloriam; sic homo, qui maioris beatitudinis capax erat, quia non ex totis viribus suis se disponit ad gratiam, minorem assequitur gloriam, quam assequatur alius minoris capacitatis, qui magis se disponit ad gratiam. — Nec sequitur, quod aliquid sit ibi frustra, quia ex hoc ostendit Deus, quantum possit gratia super naturam. Verumtamen hoc in bonis Angelis non habet instantiam; cum enim ex totis viribus suis se disposuerint ad gratiam, secundum quod habuerunt meliora naturalia, data sunt eis maiora gratuita.
I. Communis doctrina tenet, respectu hominum in statu naturae lapsae minime subsistere legem, quod gratia semper secundum maiorem vel minorem naturae capacitatem a Deo donetur (cfr. hic q. 9; S. Thom., S. I. q. 108. a. 4.); sed respectu Angelorum communiter docetur, Deum, gratis gratuita sua dona distribuentem, dictam legem sibi statuisse, non autem in eo sensu, quod gratiam dederit proprie intuitu naturae, quasi gratia sit debita vel naturae in se, vel meritis naturae viribus acquisitis. — Notabilis est solut. ad 4.
II. Scot., apud Hier. de Montefortino, t. II. q. 62. a. 6. — S. Thom., S. I. q. 62. a. 6. — Richard. a Med., II. Sent. d. 5. a. 2. q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., II. Sent. d. 4. q. 2. in fine.
---
Question III. Whether according to a greater capacity of natural endowments greater gratuitous gifts are given by God.
Thirdly it is asked concerning the orders themselves as to the preambular disposition; and since this [disposition] is the capacity and precellence of natural endowments, the question is whether, according to a greater capacity of natural endowments, greater gratuitous gifts are given by God. And that it is so seems [to be the case]:
To the opposite. 1. Through that which is said in Matthew twenty-five1: He gave to each according to his own ability (virtus); it is settled that He there speaks of a gift superadded to nature: therefore, if He gave according to the ability of nature, it seems that according to better natural endowments there are also greater gratuitous gifts.
2. Likewise, the Master above, in distinction three2: «Those who were created by nature more subtle and in wisdom more perspicacious, these were endowed with greater gifts of grace»; and he says this very thing in the text: therefore it seems that greater grace is given according to greater natural endowments.
3. Likewise, there seems to be a reason for this: to matter disposed to a form, according as it is more worthily and better disposed, God gives a nobler form3: therefore, since natural endowments are like certain dispositions to gratuitous [gifts], the more one has better natural endowments, the more God will give him greater gratuitous gifts.
4. Likewise, the reason why God does not give grace to a man is that the man does not receive4: therefore, since He Himself is always prompt and ready most liberally to pour in His gifts, and His liberality exceeds all capacity, it seems that He leaves nothing of the capacity of nature empty, when one fully converts himself to Him. And if this [is so], it remains that he who has greater natural endowments, since he is capable of greater grace, will also have greater grace. And this seems to echo the word of Plato5, saying that «He gave to each as much of beatitude as he was capable of».
5. Likewise, just as grace is a disposition to glory, so a good nature is a disposition to grace; but God gives to him who has fuller grace fuller glory: therefore to him who has better natural endowments He gives greater gratuitous [gifts]. If you say that it is not similar, because grace merits glory, [whereas] nature does not thus [merit] grace — it is then objected6 that, whatever be the comparison of the disposition, this nevertheless is true: that glory perfectly completes nature, so that no incomplete appetite remains in it. If, therefore, glory fills the capacity of nature, either a nature more capable will have more of glory, or it will not be glorified: if, therefore, according to a greater capacity of nature there is a greater magnitude of glory, and the quantity of glory corresponds to the quantity of grace, then according to a greater capacity of natural endowments a greater magnitude of grace will be attended to.
6. Likewise, the end imposes necessity on those things which are for the end; but nature was made for the sake of glory, not conversely: if, therefore, God, foreknowing and predestining, makes a soul for this — that He may glorify it — He will give it as much capacity of natural endowments as He knows He will give it of glory; or if He bestows beyond [that], He will do something in vain. But if this is false, it remains that the capacity of nature and the quantity of glory are commensurate7: therefore the same returns as before.
Foundations. On the contrary: 1. Ecclesiasticus, chapter one8: According to His gift He bestows it on those who love Him: therefore it seems that the distribution of wisdom and grace is not weighed on the side of the one receiving, but on the side of God conferring.
2. Likewise, it is possible that he who has better natural endowments should have nothing of grace and for the whole time of his life lack grace, while he who has lesser natural endowments should abound in grace: but if this is true, then the dispensation of grace is not according to the measure of natural endowments.
3. Likewise, God gives grace to a man according as he prepares himself: therefore, if one having lesser natural endowments frequently prepares himself better than one having greater, then it seems that he receives greater gratuitous gifts, although he has lesser natural endowments.
4. Likewise, he who has better natural endowments frequently remains in a state of imperfection, while he who has lesser frequently assumes the state of perfection, or of religious life: therefore, if grace is greater in the perfect, it is clear etc.
5. Likewise, grace in us regards no power so principally as the freedom of choice9; but the freedom of choice is equally in all: if, therefore, grace is greater in one than in another, it is not from nature, but rather from the divine distribution.
6. Likewise, the distribution of God's grace proceeds from the bowels of [His] mercy and pity10; but it belongs to mercy to have more compassion on him who is more wretched — other things being equal — and who is more in need. If, therefore, he who has lesser natural endowments is more in need of being sustained by grace than he who has better: then, where no merits or demerits precede, God ought to give greater grace to him who has lesser natural endowments: therefore the distribution of grace is not precisely according to the greater capacity of nature, but according to the good pleasure of the divine pity.
Conclusion
A greater capacity of natural endowments, with respect to the grace to be given, has neither the efficacy of causality nor the disposition of necessity, but only — in some measure and fallibly — the disposition of congruity.
I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that to give grace according to a greater11 Distinction. capacity of natural endowments can be understood in three ways: Conclusion 1. either thus, that the [word] according-to states an efficacy of causality — and so, according to all, it is false, since natural endowments are not the cause of grace; Conclusion 2. or thus, that it states a disposition of congruity — and so, where there is no obstacle, according to all it is true, since a good nature congruently disposes to grace; Conclusion 3. or thus, that it states a disposition of necessity — and so, according to the common opinion, it is false and reproved by the doctors. — Another opinion. Yet according to the opinion of some it was at one time posited as true.
The reason of this opinion. Now the reason of this position was this. For they posited that grace was nothing other than God; and that charity was nothing other than the Holy Spirit12; and that the intensification of grace or charity was nothing but [a function of] the greater purification of the soul and the remission of concupiscence, which stands in the way lest the soul be able to be perfectly united to God; and therefore, concupiscence being entirely extinguished, the soul is united to God as much as its nature can be elevated, and it is said to have that much grace. And therefore they posited that, finally, the soul which had better natural endowments would have greater grace. — The foundation is false. But the foundation of this position was disproved in the first book, distinction seventeen13, and will be further disproved below in distinction twenty-six. Likewise the position itself. And the position itself is in itself improbable and seems to be against good morals, since it grants as much to him who labors little and serves God little as to him who [serves] more — indeed, more, if he has greater natural endowments and perseveres in grace; which is altogether absurd and disproved by the preceding reasons. — And therefore the arguments which show this are to be conceded. To the 6th foundation. The last argument, however, does not compel, because in the distribution of graces neither the capacity of nature nor its need is principally weighed, but the disposition and measure of the divine predestination, according to which God apportions the measure of faith, as the Apostle says14, according as in His predestination He has measured it out to him.
Solution of the opposing [arguments]. 1. To that, then, which is objected to the contrary — that He gave to each according to his own ability — it must be said that according-to there states only a disposing cause of congruity. And again, ability (virtus) is there called the effort of the heart, which states not only capacity but also actual preparation; and therefore that authority does not compel.
2. To that which is objected from the authority of the Master, it must likewise be said that he there speaks of a disposition of congruity, and he speaks of a more congruent disposition concerning the Angels than concerning men, of whom the Master is speaking. It does not hold for men. For the good [Angels]15, who were converted to God, prepared themselves the more according as they had the better natural endowments, since each one was moved into God according to the whole effort of [his] heart, having nothing to retard him. But it is not so in men; and therefore that authority ought to be expounded, [and] ought not to be extended.
3. To that which is objected — that God imprints a nobler form on better-disposed matter — it must be said that it is not similar, because matter is disposed to a natural form by a disposition which is a necessity; Note. but a greater capacity of natural endowments does not dispose to a greater grace by a disposition of necessity, but only of congruity. And because a disposition of congruity can be impeded in many ways — whether by something opposed, or by a greater congruity which can supervene in another from some accident — therefore that argument does not conclude.
4. To that which is objected — that man does not have grace because he does not receive — it must be said Note. that this is true; but from this it does not follow that «he therefore has grace because he receives», as Anselm says16, because in privatives and contradictorily opposed [terms] the consequence does not hold in the thing itself, but conversely; and therefore, just as it is not conceded that he has greater grace because he receives, so it is not to be conceded that he has greater grace from a greater capacity.
5. To that which is objected — that nature disposes to grace — it must be said, as was said, that it is not similar, because nature does not merit grace in the way that grace [merits] glory. But to that which is added — that glory perfects the whole capacity of nature — it must be said that Note. just as a form perfects the capacity of matter not absolutely, but as the superinduced disposition requires, so glory perfects nature not absolutely, but according as the grace required [it] which had earlier been given to free choice. And when it is thus perfected, it is sufficiently perfected, because the rectitude of justice limits the appetite of nature, so that it does not desire beyond what grace has merited — especially since what God renders to it fully suffices.
6. To that which is objected last — that the capacity of nature is ordered to glory finally — it must be said that it is so ordered by God, yet so that a disposition on the side of our will is presupposed17. Hence, just as a man who was capable of beatitude and made for the sake of beatitude is, through the disordering of [his] will, assigned to eternal punishments and loses glory; so a man who was capable of greater beatitude, because he does not dispose himself to grace with all his powers, attains a lesser glory than another of lesser capacity attains who disposes himself more to grace. — Nor does it follow that anything is there in vain, because by this God shows how much grace can [do] above nature. Nevertheless this has no instance in the good Angels; for since they disposed themselves to grace with all their powers, according as they had better natural endowments, greater gratuitous [gifts] were given to them.
I. The common doctrine holds that, with respect to men in the state of fallen nature, the law by no means subsists that grace is always given by God according to the greater or lesser capacity of nature (cf. here, q. 9; St. Thomas, Summa I, q. 108, a. 4); but with respect to the Angels it is commonly taught that God, freely distributing His gratuitous gifts, set this said law for Himself — yet not in the sense that He gave grace properly with regard to nature, as though grace were owed either to nature in itself or to merits acquired by the powers of nature. — The solution to [argument] 4 is notable.
II. Scotus, in Hieronymus de Montefortino, t. II, q. 62, a. 6. — St. Thomas, Summa I, q. 62, a. 6. — Richard of Mediavilla, Sentences II, d. 5, a. 2, q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, Sentences II, d. 4, q. 2, at the end.
---
- Vers. 13.Verse 13 [Matthew 25:15].
- Cap. 2. — Verba paulo inferius posita et hoc ipsum [cod. aa hoc idem] dicit in littera respiciunt praesentem distinctionem, c. 4.Chapter 2. — The words placed a little below, et hoc ipsum dicit in littera (and he says this very thing in the text) [codex aa: hoc idem], regard the present distinction, c. 4.
- Sub quo respectu Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 24. (c. 2.) ait: Actus activorum sunt in patiente praedisposito. Cfr. II. de Generat. animal. c. 3. — Vat., interpunctione mutata: esse ratio materiae dispositae ad formam; secundum enim quod dignius etc.In which respect Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 24 (c. 2), says: The acts of active things are in a predisposed patient. Cf. On the Generation of Animals II, c. 3. — The Vatican edition, with the punctuation altered: esse ratio materiae dispositae ad formam; secundum enim quod dignius etc.
- Anselm., de Casu diaboli, c. 2. seqq.Anselm, On the Fall of the Devil, c. 2 ff.
- Prout refertur a Chalcidio in suo Comment. super Timaeum (ed. Dr. Ioh. Wrobel, Lipsiae, 1876 pag. 26.): «Optimus erat [rerum Conditor]; ab optimo porro invidia longe relegata est [cfr. tom. 1. pag. 784, nota 3.]. Itaque consequenter cuncta sui similia, prout cuiusque natura capax beatitudinis esse poterat, effici voluit». De hoc Commentario notatu digna sunt quae sequuntur. Inter opera Honorii Augustodunensis (1090–1120), ed. Migne (Patrol. Lat. tom. 172.) recensetur «Commentarius in Timaeum Platonis, auctore, ut videtur Honorio Augustodunensi». In hoc Commentario legitur: Est igitur ignoratus [Timaeus Platonis] a Latinis usque ad tempus Osii papae [Osii, Cordubensis ecclesiae in Hispania episcopi], qui cum sciret, in eo multa utilia nec fidei contraria contineri, rogavit Chalcidium, archidiaconum suum, in utraque lingua peritum, ut de Graeco in Latinum illum transferret. Cuius auctoritati obediens, primas partes illius transtulit. — Cod. Q post quod subiungit Deus.As it is reported by Chalcidius in his Commentary on the Timaeus (ed. Dr. Ioh. Wrobel, Leipzig, 1876, p. 26): «He [the Founder of things] was best; and from the best, moreover, envy is far removed. Therefore, consequently, He willed all things to be made like Himself, according as the nature of each was capable of beatitude». — Concerning this Commentary the following is worthy of note. Among the works of Honorius of Autun (1090–1120), in the Migne edition (Patrologia Latina, vol. 172), is listed a «Commentary on the Timaeus of Plato, the author being, as it seems, Honorius of Autun». In this Commentary one reads: The Timaeus of Plato was therefore unknown to the Latins until the time of Pope Osius [Osius, bishop of the church of Córdoba in Spain], who, since he knew that many useful things, and nothing contrary to the faith, were contained in it, asked Chalcidius, his archdeacon, skilled in both languages, to translate it from Greek into Latin. Obedient to his authority, he translated the first parts of it. — Codex Q, after quod, adds Deus.
- Non pauci codd. ostenditur.Not a few codices [read] ostenditur (it is shown) [for obiicitur].
- Vat. secum commensurantur.The Vatican edition reads secum commensurantur (are commensurate with one another).
- Vers. 10, in quo textu Vulgata praebuit pro praebet. — Dein multi codd. distinctio pro distributio; indebite.Verse 10 [Ecclesiasticus 1:10], in which text the Vulgate read praebuit (bestowed) for praebet (bestows). — Then many codices [read] distinctio for distributio; improperly.
- Cfr. infra d. 26. q. 3. et de seq. prop. d. 25. p. II. a. 1. q. 1.Cf. below, d. 26, q. 3, and on the following proposition, d. 25, p. II, a. 1, q. 1.
- Luc. 1, 78.Luke 1:78.
- In cod. T additur et minorem.In codex T there is added et minorem (and lesser).
- Huius sententiae erat Magister Sententiarum, libro I. d. XVII. c. 1. seqq., ubi etiam c. 8. de augmentatione gratiae agitur. — Nonnulli codd. cum ed. 1 quod caritas non est aliud pro quod caritas non esset aliud.Of this opinion was the Master of the Sentences, in Book I, d. 17, c. 1 ff., where in c. 8 the augmentation of grace is also treated. — Some codices, with edition 1, [read] quod caritas non est aliud for quod caritas non esset aliud.
- Parte I. q. 1. et p. II. q. 1. seq. — Infra d. 26. q. 2.Part I, q. 1, and p. II, q. 1 f. — Below, d. 26, q. 2.
- Rom. 12, 3.Romans 12:3.
- Supple cum Vat. Angeli.Supply, with the Vatican edition, Angeli (the Angels).
- De Casu diaboli, c. 3, ubi hoc ostenditur tali exemplo: Si ego porrigo tibi aliquid, et tu accipis, non ideo do, quia accipis, sed ideo accipis, quia do, et est datio causa acceptionis. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 40. a. 4. q. 2. ad 6. — Ratio addita sumta est ex Aristot., II. Topic. c. 3. (c. 8.), ubi docet quod in contradictorie oppositis valet consequentia e converso; respectu tamen privativorum, si per se sumuntur, oppositum valet: «Verumtamen non in privationibus [consequentia] e converso, sed contra se ipsa [in ipso] consequentiam necessarium est semper fieri, veluti visum sequi sensum, caecitatem autem insensibilitatem; opponitur enim sensus insensibilitati, ut habitus et privatio». Verba igitur S. Bonav. ita intelligenda. In privativis, quae se habent per modum contradictionis, v. g. habere gratiam et non habere gratiam [bonum et non bonum, ut ait Aristoteles], non tenet consequentia in ipso, sed e contrario. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 822, nota 1.On the Fall of the Devil, c. 3, where this is shown by such an example: If I hold out something to you, and you receive it, I do not therefore give because you receive, but you therefore receive because I give, and the giving is the cause of the receiving. Cf. I Sentences, d. 40, a. 4, q. 2, ad 6. — The added reasoning is taken from Aristotle, Topics II, c. 3 (c. 8), where he teaches that in contradictorily opposed [terms] the consequence holds conversely; yet with respect to privatives, if they are taken of themselves, the opposite holds: «Nevertheless, not in privations [is the consequence valid] conversely, but it is necessary that the consequence always be made against the thing itself [in the thing itself], as sight follows sense [and] blindness follows insensibility; for sense is opposed to insensibility as habit and privation». The words of St. Bonaventure are therefore to be understood thus: in privatives which stand by way of contradiction — e.g. to have grace and not to have grace [good and not-good, as Aristotle says] — the consequence does not hold in the thing itself, but conversely. Cf. vol. I, p. 822, note 1.
- Non pauci codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 naturae; plures propter abbreviationem sunt dubiae lectionis. Paulo inferius multi codd. propter beatitudinem perfectus pro et propter beatitudinem factus.Not a few codices, with editions 1, 2, 3, [read] naturae (of nature); many, on account of the abbreviation, are of doubtful reading. A little below, many codices [read] propter beatitudinem perfectus (perfected for the sake of beatitude) for et propter beatitudinem factus (and made for the sake of beatitude). ---