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Dist. 9, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 9

Textus Latinus
p. 244

Quaestio II. Utrum distinctio Angelorum sit a natura, an a gratia.

Secundo quaeritur, quae sit distinctionis ordinum principalis causa, utrum scilicet sit a natura, vel a gratia. Et quod a natura, videtur:

Ad oppositum. 1. Per illud quod dicit Magister in littera1: «Superiores sunt qui natura sunt magis subtiles et intelligentia amplius perspicaces»: ergo si ordo attenditur secundum sub- et supra, videtur, quod ordo Angelorum sit a natura.

2. Item, supra distinctione tertia2: «In exordio suae conditionis alii superiores, alii inferiores Dei sapientia constituti sunt»; sed quod habuerant ab exordio suae conditionis est eis naturale: ergo distinctio ordinum est in eis a natura.

3. Item, quaecumque Deus facit a primaria conditione, facit in modo, specie et ordine, ita quod ista sunt naturalia unicuique3: ergo nobilissimam creaturam, scilicet angelicam, a principio suae conditionis debuit facere in perfecto modo, specie et ordine. Si ergo hoc est a natura, quod est eis ab initio inditum, patet etc.

4. Item, gratiae gratum facientis est unire et assimilare: si ergo quod est principium uniendi non est principium ordinis distinguendi, videtur, quod distinctio ordinum non sit a gratia; et est a gratia, vel a natura: ergo etc.

Fundamenta. Contra hoc obiicitur: 1. Per definitionem ordinis, quam Magister ponit in littera4: «Ordo est multitudo caelestium spirituum, qui inter se aliquo munere gratiae similantur»: ergo videtur, quod absque munere gratiae in Angelis non sit ordo.

2. Item, supremus omnium ordinum est ordo Seraphim; sed ordo Seraphim est ab eminentia dilectionis et caritatis: ergo primus et praecipuus ordo est a gratia. Si ergo omnes alii ex illo pendent, videtur, quod nullus ordo in Angelis sit sine dono gratiae.

3. Item, Throni dicuntur, sicut dicit Gregorius5, quia «tanta divinitatis gratia replentur, ut in eis sedeat Deus»: si ergo Deus non dicitur sedere nec inhabitare nisi per gratiam gratum facientem, ergo ordo Thronorum non est nisi a gratia: ergo pari ratione videtur de aliis.

4. Item, Deus non praefert hominem homini propter naturalia, sed propter merita6: ergo si distinctio ordinum est secundum divinam acceptionem, non est secundum naturalia, sed secundum gratuita.

Conclusio

Angelicorum ordinum distinctio principaliter est a gratia, a natura tantum ut a dispositione praeambula.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut patet ex definitione ordinis supra posita7, Conclusio. ordo et est a natura et est a gratia; sed a natura tanquam a praeambula dispositione, a gratia tanquam a completiva perfectione. Hoc dico de illis ordinibus, secundum quos attenditur distinctio hierarchiarum in supremis spiritibus, sicut manifeste apparet ex officio et actione et nominatione ipsorum ordinum, inter quos praecipuus ordo est ordo Seraphim, qui denominatur ab ardore dilectionis, quae non est in Angelis consummata et perfecta nisi per gratiam. Et ideo concedo, quod ordinum principalis distinctio non potest esse a natura.

Solutio oppositorum. 1. 2. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium de duplici auctoritate Magistri, quod per naturam alii aliis sunt superiores; dicendum, quod hoc non concludit, quod ordines sint a natura sicut a causa completiva; quia non quaelibet superioritas et inferioritas facit ordinem completum, sed ea solum, in qua consistit rerum ordinabilium complementum quantum ad officium et statum.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod modus et species et ordo est a natura; dicendum, quod aequivocatio est in ordine; ipse8 enim loquitur ibi de ordine, quo creatura dicitur ordinata per comparationem ipsius ad finem; ordo vero Angelorum attenditur secundum praecellentiam ipsorum ordinabilium inter se, et haec completa non est inter Angelos natura consimiles nisi per dona gratuita, capacitatem naturae complentia.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod gratia unit, ergo ordines non distinguit, sive perficit: dicendum, quod est loqui de gratia quantum ad habitum et quantum ad usum et quantum ad statum. Etsi gratia gratum faciens uniat et conformet quantum ad habitum, quia omnes habitus gratuiti sunt in omnibus;

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distinguit tamen quantum ad usum et ordinat quantum ad statum, pro eo quod usus diversificatur in diversis, et status unius in gratia est excellentior statu alterius. Et hoc est quod facit in habentibus consimilem gratiam, ordinem et gradum. Et hoc modo esse in Angelis est intelligendum9.

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English Translation
p. 244

Question II. Whether the distinction of the Angels is from nature or from grace.

Secondly it is asked what is the principal cause of the distinction of the orders — namely, whether it is from nature or from grace. And that it is from nature seems [to be the case]:

To the opposite. 1. Through that which the Master says in the text1: «The superior [Angels] are those who are by nature more subtle and in intelligence more perspicacious»: therefore, if order is attended to according to below and above, it seems that the order of the Angels is from nature.

2. Likewise, above, in distinction three2: «At the outset of their condition some were established superior, others inferior, by the wisdom of God»; but what they had had from the outset of their condition is natural to them: therefore the distinction of the orders is in them from nature.

3. Likewise, whatever God makes from the primary [act of] founding, He makes in measure, species, and order, so that these are natural to each thing3: therefore the noblest creature, namely the angelic, He ought to have made — from the beginning of its condition — in a perfect measure, species, and order. If, therefore, that which was implanted in them from the beginning is from nature, it is clear etc.

4. Likewise, it belongs to sanctifying grace to unite and to assimilate: if, therefore, that which is the principle of uniting is not the principle of distinguishing order, it seems that the distinction of the orders is not from grace; and it is [either] from grace or from nature: therefore etc.

Foundations. Against this it is objected: 1. Through the definition of order which the Master sets down in the text4: «An order is a multitude of celestial spirits who are likened to one another by some gift of grace»: therefore it seems that without a gift of grace there is no order in the Angels.

2. Likewise, the supreme of all the orders is the order of the Seraphim; but the order of the Seraphim is from the eminence of love and charity: therefore the first and chief order is from grace. If, therefore, all the others depend on it, it seems that no order in the Angels is without a gift of grace.

3. Likewise, the Thrones are [so] called, as Gregory says5, because «they are filled with so great a grace of divinity that God sits in them»: if, therefore, God is not said to sit or to indwell except through sanctifying grace, then the order of the Thrones is only from grace: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems [so] concerning the others.

4. Likewise, God does not prefer one man to another on account of natural [endowments], but on account of merits6: therefore, if the distinction of the orders is according to divine acceptance, it is not according to natural [endowments], but according to gratuitous [gifts].

Conclusion

The distinction of the angelic orders is principally from grace, [and] from nature only as from a preambular disposition.

I respond: It must be said that, as is clear from the definition of order set down above7, Conclusion. an order is both from nature and from grace; but from nature as from a preambular disposition, [and] from grace as from a completive perfection. This I say of those orders according to which the distinction of the hierarchies is attended to in the supreme spirits, as manifestly appears from the office and action and nomination of those orders — among which the chief order is the order of the Seraphim, which is named from the ardor of love, [a love] which is not consummated and perfected in the Angels except through grace. And therefore I concede that the principal distinction of the orders cannot be from nature.

Solution of the opposing [arguments]. 1, 2. To that, then, which is objected to the contrary from the twofold authority of the Master — that by nature some are superior to others — it must be said that this does not conclude that the orders are from nature as from a completive cause; because not every superiority and inferiority makes a complete order, but only that [superiority and inferiority] in which consists the completion of orderable things as to office and status.

3. To that which is objected — that measure and species and order are from nature — it must be said that there is an equivocation in [the word] order; for he8 [the objector] is speaking there of the order by which a creature is said to be ordered by its relation to [its] end; but the order of the Angels is attended to according to the precellence of the orderable things themselves among one another — and this [precellence] is not complete among Angels alike in nature except through gratuitous gifts, which complete the capacity of nature.

4. To that which is objected — that grace unites, therefore it does not distinguish, or perfect, the orders — it must be said that one may speak of grace as to habit and as to use and as to status. Even if sanctifying grace unites and conforms as to habit — since all gratuitous habits are in all [the Angels];

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it nevertheless distinguishes as to use and orders as to status, inasmuch as use is diversified in diverse [subjects], and the status of one [Angel] in grace is more excellent than the status of another. And this is what it effects in those having a like grace, order, and grade. And it is to be understood that it is in this manner in the Angels9.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Hic c. 4.
    Here, c. 4 [of the Master's text — Lombard, Sentences II, d. 9, c. 4].
  2. Cap. 2. lit. Magistri.
    Chapter 2 of the text of the Master.
  3. Cfr. August., IV. de Gen. ad lit. c. 3. n. 7; de Natura boni, c. 3. Vide etiam hic lit. Magistri, c. 4.
    Cf. Augustine, On Genesis to the Letter IV, c. 3, n. 7; On the Nature of the Good, c. 3. See also here the text of the Master, c. 4.
  4. Hic c. 2. — Nonnulli codd. ut F T V assimilantur pro similantur.
    Here, c. 2. — Some codices, such as F, T, V, [read] assimilantur (are assimilated) for similantur (are likened).
  5. In Evang. hom. 34. n. 10. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.
    [Gregory,] Homilies on the Gospels, hom. 34, n. 10. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 2.
  6. Cfr. Deut. 10, 17. seq.; Act. 10, 34; Eph. 6, 9. — Paulo inferius plures codd. cum primis edd. acceptationem pro acceptionem.
    Cf. Deuteronomy 10:17 f.; Acts 10:34; Ephesians 6:9. — A little below, several codices, with the first editions, [read] acceptationem for acceptionem (acceptance).
  7. In praenotatis ad hanc distinctionem, circa medium. Cfr. et lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Paulo inferius post Hoc dico in cod. aa additur secundum quod (quid?).
    In the prefatory notes to this distinction, near the middle. Cf. also the text of the Master, c. 2. — A little below, after Hoc dico, codex aa adds secundum quod — [the editors query:] quid? (what?).
  8. Intellige: obiiciens. — Paulo inferius plures codd. istius pro ipsius.
    Understand: the objector. — A little below, several codices [read] istius for ipsius.
  9. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion to the preceding question [the SCHOLION of `d9-a1-q1`, whose n. III opens Sequentem quaestionem...]. ---
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